Kantian grammar applied to French, English, Danish and some other languages

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Abstract: Many linguists refer to Kant, but they do not really seem to take him seriously. I will try to show that a little closer look at Kant's cognitive model might yield insight into certain important aspects of the syntactic-semantic constitution of the sentence in different languages. I will also show that Hamann, Herder and their many followers are completely wrong in arguing that Kant's model was influenced by his own language without himself knowing it. In the present work, I am especially concerned with the difference between space and time adjuncts on the one hand, and causal adjuncts on the other hand. In a series of publications, I have investigated the French interrogative word pourquoi ('why'), which, contrary to the other interrogative words, cannot be followed by stylistic inversion, and I have tried to explain why pourquoi, which functions as a causal adjunct, behaves differently from quand ('when') and où ('where), adjuncts of time and place respectively. During this exploration, it struck me that most of the peculiarities attached to the causal adjuncts in French and the way they differed from time and place adjuncts were exactly the same in Danish even though these languages differ radically in lexicon, morphology and syntax. It appears that English and, more surprisingly, two non Indo-European languages – namely, Japanese and Hungarian – behave in the same way as French and Danish. I explain this difference between causal adjuncts and time and place adjuncts by postulating a different degree of attachment to the verb, and I have created a sentence model which seem to fit nicely into Kant's cognitive model. This might indicate that we are dealing with something universal.

Keywords: Causal adjuncts, Danish, English, French, Hungarian, Japanese, Kant, syntax, semantics, typology.

1. Introduction: Kant's attitude towards language

The notion of "Kantian Grammar" might seem like a joke, for, not only did Kant never write a grammar, he is even notorious for having paid no attention to language at all. This "bad reputation" seems to have begun with his contemporaries, Hamann and Herder, who started an intellectual feud shortly after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]),1 accusing Kant of continuing the thought-language dualism of the Enlightenment, according to which thoughts and concepts were in principle independent of language (cf. Forster 2012: 487). Hamann and Herder even argued that Kant was unaware of the role that language played in the construction of his own cognitive model. This line of interpretation of Kant has persisted ever since the eighteenth century. Thus Waxman (2005: 103, as quoted in Forster 2012: 487) states that Kant's "psychologistic explications resolve the elements of discursive thought into a non-discursive psychological process from which everything linguistic in nature has been excluded in favor of the nature and workings of the individual, isolated psyche".

However, in 2012 and 2014 two publications appeared with the very telling titles: Forster's (2012) article "Kant's Philosophy of Language?" (with a question mark) and Schalow & Velkley's (2014) anthology The Linguistic Dimension of Kant's Thought (this time without any question mark!).2 So what is this all about? Let us take a brief look at what is said in these publications.

Following the directions given by Schalow and Velkley (2014: 4), I will first present some of Kant's explicit statements about language, as quoted by Forster (2012) and Schalow & Velkley

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1 Hamann: Metacritique on the Purism of Reason (circulated privately from 1784 although not published until 1800).

2 Schalow & Velkley (2014) contains 12 remarkable "Historical and Critical Essays", in which distinguished Kant scholars examine the many ways in which Kant's philosophy addresses the nature of language. Unfortunately there is no room to discuss them all here.
(2014). Secondly, I will look at "certain implicit insights about language which can be explicated through further examination" of his writings. And thirdly, I will consider "the influences Kant had on subsequent thinkers who did consider the nature of language" Schalow and Velkley (2014: 4).

As Forster (2012: 488) remarks, in spite of the fact that Kant, in Critique of Pure Reason,3 "scrupulously avoids using such terms as 'language', 'sentence', and 'word' in fundamental explanatory roles, in favor of using such purely psychological terms as 'thought', judgement', 'concept', 'representation', 'intuition', 'principle', 'schema' 'idea' and so on", closer investigations of all his publications reveal many explicit references to language. Below are some examples:

- "our cognition has need of a certain means, and this is language" (Vienna Logic [1780 or 1790], Forster 2012: 489)
- "the logicians are wrong in defining a proposition as judgement expressed in words; for we also need to use words in thoughts for judgements that we do not express as propositions" (On a Discovery [1790], Forster 2012: 489)
- "thinking is talking with oneself" (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1798], Forster 2012: 490)
- "words are the means best adapted to signifying concepts" (Forster 2012: 490)

Forster (2012: 488) and Schalow & Velkley (2014: 6) both point out that Kant might also have operated "on the foundation of the unquestioned premise that all thinking is speaking" (cf. Brandt 1991, quoted by Forster 2012: 488).

Given that the incredible number of pages that Kant left is intellectually tough reading, looking for the implicit insights will probably be a perennial process. Schalow's (2014) analysis of "the language of time in Kant's transcendental schematism" seems to be a very interesting step forwards. Schalow stresses the importance of the section "Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment or Analytic of Principles" (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]: 142ff.), where Kant "schematizes" the pure concepts, presenting time as "the source of the determinations distinctive of each one of them" (Schalow 2014: 56). Time forms part of a kind of "lexicon" "that is universal, because its chief idioms, for example, "succession", "permanence", "presence", form an awareness that is common to all human beings" (Schalow 2014: 57) and "it is in conjunction with time that the pure concepts acquire synonymous determinations (e.g., of "permanence" for substance, "presence" for existence, "succession" for cause and effect)." (Schalow 2014: 63). Although Kant emphasized that the transcendental imagination was not inherently discursive, Schalow argues that "through the strategic role that time plays, however, the formative power of imagination can nevertheless graphically exhibit a genre of distinctions – as etched through a temporal nexus – which prefaces the development of language in its predicative form", some sort of profound "semiotic level"4 (Schalow 2014: 57). One could almost talk of a preliminary dictionary.5 We will return to the pure concepts in section 2.3 below, where the difference between "sensibility" ("Anschauungsformen") and "understanding" ("Verstandsbezeichnungen") will be discussed, and where the "temporal schema" of the pure concept "Cause" will be presented. Here, let us look very briefly at some of the subsequent thinkers who were influenced by Kant.

Schalow & Velkley (2014: 4) draw particular attention to Ernst Cassirer6 and Martin

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3 This also applies to his other two Critiques (Critique of Practical Reason from 1788 and Critique of Judgement from 1790).
4 Schalow has borrowed this term from La Rocca (1989) who talks of a "Semiotische Ebene".
5 Schalow's description resembles that of Baron (2006), who discusses "une zone cognitive indépendante de la langue, d'origine « préverbale » " ('a cognitive zone that is independent of language'), the only difference being that Baron considers the spatial relations as the basis, whereas the basis for Schalow (and Kant) is "time". See also 3. Below.
6 Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) "spearheaded the 'back to Kant' movement in the 1920s and expanded the frontiers of
Heidegger. As is well known, the latter has had an enormous influence on the so-called "linguistic turn", the most important characteristic of which is the focusing primarily on the relationship between philosophy and language. Heidegger constantly refers to Kant in his publications but, as Schalow remarks (Schalow 2014: 65), it is probably the following quote from a 1973 seminar at Zähringen that "most aptly summarizes the importance that Kant's schematism played in the development of Heidegger's overall project": schematism is "the Kantian way of discussing being and time".

The above-mentioned authors succeed in showing that, even if Kant did not formulate any explicit philosophy of language, he did care about language, and he certainly paved the way for the linguistic turn.

In this article I will proceed more radically by "explicating" another "implicit insight" hidden in Critique, which permits me to claim that Kant's cognitive model can be used to explain certain important aspects of the syntactic-semantic constitution of the sentence in different (and probably all) languages. While the above-mentioned works look at Kant's publications from a philosopher's point of view, so to speak, my point of view will be that of a grammarian.

In section 2, I will demonstrate this by analyzing the difference between space and time adjuncts on the one hand, and causal adjuncts on the other hand. My object language is first of all French which I compare to Danish and English. But in order to test the universality of the model, I also look briefly at two (randomly chosen) non-Indo-European languages, namely Japanese and Hungarian. In 3, I will return to Hamann and Herder (and their many "followers") and ask the following question: Is it really true that Kant underestimated the importance of language in the model presented in Critique?

2. Examination of the notions of time, place and cause and their linguistic expressions

2.1. Cause in traditional grammar and cognitive approaches to grammar

As grammarians do not agree on how to deal with the notion of cause, I will offer a brief presentation of some typical descriptions to begin with.

To Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 69), causation, an "experiential gestalt", "is a basic human concept. It is one of the concepts most often used by people to organize their physical and cultural realities". "Cause" can manifest itself on different levels and in different syntactic functions. Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 70ff.) and Lakoff (1987: 54-55) argue that the prototypical causation "appears to be direct manipulation, which is characterized most typically by a cluster of interactional properties" (such as a human agent provoking, directly, a change in a patient, using his hands, body, or some instrument, etc.). A typical example of direct causation is a transitive construction like the following:

(1) Sam killed Harry.

Here cause and result are expressed through a single morpheme, and agent and patient have both participant roles. As Lyons puts it (1977: 489), "the vast majority of trivalent and bivalent verbs in all languages are most commonly used with an agentive subject and (...) their meaning is generally, though not always, causative". The same verb can be used in constructions like (2) where the process of "excessive drinking" is reified and treated as an entity having the same function as Sam in (1).

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7 Martin Heidegger's (1889–1976) best known book, Being and Time, is considered one of the most important philosophical works of the 20th century.
8 In such cases, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 25ff.) speak of "ontological metaphors".

transcendental philosophy to include a symbol, myth, and culture" (Schalow & Velkley 2014: 4).
(2) Excessive drinking killed Bill. (Lyons 1977: 490)

While (1) and (2) express a single event, (3), which contains the causative auxiliary cause, expresses "two separate events, Harry's death and what Sam did to cause it" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 131):

(3) Sam caused Harry to die.

This sentence "indicates indirect or remote causation" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 131). Example (4), where the instigation and the effect are expressed in two separate clauses, "indicates a still weaker causal link" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 131):

(4) Sam brought it about that Harry died.

In all the constructions (1)–(4), although to different extents, agent and patient have both participant roles. This is not the case in (5) where the cause is indicated by a causal clause or a prepositional phrase, both of which take up a circumstantial role (i.e. as causal adjuncts):

(5) (Why did they stop playing?) They stopped playing because it had started to rain/because of the rain.

The constructions in (5) indicate the reason why the game had to stop. As we move from (1) to (5), there is a gradual decrease in attachment to the "center"of the sentence. The type of construction represented in (1) I will call "internal causation", whereas I will call the type represented in (5) "external causation". It is not quite clear where to draw the line between the two types.\(^9\) In what follows, I will only look at the external causation-type represented by (5).

That causation is such a basic human concept is also what appears from Brunot's (1922: 812ff.) famous treatise, La pensée et la langue ('Thought and Language' in English). Brunot devotes five chapters (VI–X) to show how easily a causal sense arises when two propositional contents are combined, even if the construction was originally "created" for other purposes (e.g. temporal connections):\(^10\)

(6) Dès qu'on constate la fièvre, c'est qu'il y a infection (Brunot 1922: 814)

As soon as you see the fever, it is because there is an infection.

The notion of CAUSE is one of the "Semantic Primitives" laid down by Wierzbicka (1996: 70, 137, 186ff.). Referring to Kant, Wierzbicka (1996: 70) remarks that "causation – with time and space – constitutes one of the basic categories of human cognition; it is not a category that we learn from experience but one of the categories which underlie our interpretation", and she points out that "data from language acquisition, as well as from cross-cultural semantics, are consistent with Kant's view" (Wierzbicka 1996: 70).\(^11\) As seen in my discussion of Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) theory

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9 As Lyons remarks (1977: 490): "the distinction between a single temporally extended situation and two distinct, but causally connected, situations is not something that is given in nature, as it were".

10 My translation of "... l'esprit établit entre les faits les plus divers un rapport de causalité, en partant d'autres rapports." (Brunot 1922: 821–22).

11 Wierzbicka (1996: 70) remarks, on the one hand, that apparently all languages have a lexical exponent of causation (whether it is a conjunction like because, a noun like cause, or an ablative suffix), and on the other hand, that because-sentences appear quite early in children's speech "despite the highly abstract and "non-emperical" character of the concept of causality".
above, CAUSE, even if it is a basic human concept, is not really a "semantic primitive". But this does not need to bother us here. What I do want to challenge is the analysis according to which causation belongs to the same level as time and space. We will return to this problem in 2.2.–2.4. below.

2.2. The strange behavior of pourquoi
In a series of publications (Korzen 1983, 1985, 1990, 2009), I have investigated the French interrogative word pourquoi ('why'), which, contrary to the other interrogative words, cannot be followed by stylistic inversion (but has to be combined with clitic inversion):

(7)  
a. Qui est cette jolie fille?  
  *Who is that beautiful girl?*
b. Que fera Jean-Michel?  
  What will Jean-Michel do?  
c. A quoi pensait Jean-Michel?  
  What was Jean-Michel thinking of?  
d. Quand reviendra votre belle-mère?  
  When will your mother-in-law come back?  
e. Où est garée votre voiture?  
  Where is your car parked?  
f. Comment va votre fils?  
  How is your son?  
g. *Pourquoi pleure votre fils? → Pourquoi votre fils pleure-t-il?  
  *Why is your son crying?*

In these publications I have tried to explain why pourquoi, which functions as a causal adjunct, behaves differently from quand ('when') and où ('where'), adjuncts of time and place respectively. During this exploration, it struck me that, with the exception of subject inversion, most of the peculiarities attached to the causal adjuncts in French – and the way they differed from time and place adjuncts – were exactly the same in Danish and in English, even though the three languages are very different in so many other regards (cf. Herslund & Baron 2003, 2005; Herslund 2015; Durst-Andersen 2011). In the above-mentioned publications, I explained the difference between causal adjuncts and time and place adjuncts by postulating a different degree of attachment to the verb, as we shall see in 2.4. below. But why is there this difference in attachment? And why do causal adjuncts behave in the same way in languages which differ so much in other respects?

At any rate, Wierzbicka's analysis, according to which the three notions of time, space and cause belong to the same level, all of them being semantic primitives, "irreducible categories of human language and cognition" (Wierzbicka 1996: 71), fails to explain why, then, the expressions for cause behave so differently from those expressing time and place. In order to explain this, we have to take a closer look at Kant's cognitive model again.

2.3. Time, space and cause in Kant's Critique of Pure reason
In his Critique (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]), where he sets out to examine the foundations of human knowledge, Kant places the role of the human subject, or knower, at the center of our inquiry into nature, pointing out that all objects about which the mind can think must conform to its – rather limited – manner of thought. Since we can never escape the innate constraints of our minds, we must deal with them and accept that it is impossible to philosophize about things as they are, independently of us. Thus Kant makes a clear distinction between things as they appear to us as human beings, which are appearances in space and time, and the thing-in-itself ("das Ding an sich"),
which we cannot ever come to know. Kant characterizes the shift in point of view that made him focus on the human cognitive apparatus rather than the "outer world" as his "Copernican Revolution", because he attempted to reverse the mind-world relationship just as Copernicus had reversed the sun-earth relationship.

Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 45) points out that "there are two sources of of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely sensibility ("Anschauungsförmen") and understanding ("Verstandesbegriffe"). By the former, objects are given to us, by the latter, they are thought.". Thus, in the first place, it is a matter of the aptitude to capture by the senses (sensibility), and in the second place the aptitude to interpret (understanding) what we have sensed e.g. as a relation of cause and effect. Kant considers both aptitudes as necessary (and inherent in man):

Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensible faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its concepts sensible (that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as it is to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under concepts). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot intuit, and the sensible faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]: 69-70)

But Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 69-70) explicitly warns us against conflating the two:

But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, Aesthetic, from the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, Logic

Besides, the distinction between the two faculties appears clearly from the organization of the book. They are both discussed in the first (and longest) part: "Trancendental Doctrine of Elements". This part, which deals with the fundamental building blocks of experience, is divided into two chapters: 1) "Transcendental Aesthetic" and 2) "Transcendental Logic". Let us take a brief look at these chapters.

"Transcendental Aesthetic" deals with the two forms of sensibility that are a priori conditions for any possible experience – namely, Space and Time. Space is a necessary presupposition for being able to observe at all. Or, as Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 50) puts it himself:

Space (…) is a necessary representation a priori, which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is a representation a priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for external appearances.

It is a universally valid and necessary (i.e., a priori) truth that everything must necessarily be found at some place or other (cf. Hartnack 1967: 18). As for Time, Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 56) points out that

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12 The English word sensibility does not really render the sense of Anschauung, but it is difficult to find another word.
Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of ourselves and of our internal state. For time cannot be any determination of outward appearances. It has to do with neither shape nor position; on the contrary, it determines the relation of representations in our inner state.

We cannot experience anything without presupposing time. One cannot imagine a world that is not in time, i.e., a world where nothing happens either before, at the same time as, or after something else. It is a universally valid and necessarily true proposition that every event and process occurs at a given moment in time and that every process takes a certain time (cf. Hartnack 1967: 23).

"Transcendental logic" treats the fundamental concepts of understanding, which Kant calls categories. The categories synthesize the random data of the sensory manifold into intelligible objects. There are twelve categories, among which we find the relation of "Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)" (Kant 1993 [1781, 1787]: 85):

1. Of Quantity
   Unity
   Plurality
   Totality
2. Of Quality
   Reality
   Negation
   Limitation
3. Of Relation
   Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens)
   Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) (the bold characters are mine)
   Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)
4. Of Modality
   Possibility – Impossibility
   Existence – Non-existence
   Necessity – Contingence

The categories under 'quantity' and 'quality' Kant calls 'the mathematical categories'; these categories indicate the conditions for making judgements about objects in space and time. The categories under 'relation' and 'modality' Kant calls "the dynamic categories"; these categories indicate how an object is determined in relation to other objects.

As should be clear from the discussion above, Cause – a dynamic category – differs completely from Space and Time, the two forms of sensibility. Indeed, one could say that it is, in a certain sense, less fundamental than these. Moreover, already before setting out to explain the "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements", Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 45) explicitly states:

13 These concepts are a priori concepts, i.e., concepts that are not formed by abstracting from experience (cf. Hartnack 1965: 32).
14 Cf. Kant (1993 [1781, 1787]: 85): "These concepts we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, our purpose being originally identical with his, notwithstanding the great difference in the execution".
15 As we saw in section 1. above, the temporal schema corresponding to cause and effect is that of succession.
So far as the faculty of sensibility may contain representations \textit{a priori}, which form the conditions under which objects are given, in so far it belongs to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sensibility must form the first part of our science of elements, because \textbf{the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given, must precede those under which they are thought} [the bold characters are mine]

Thus, Kant does not place "Cause" at the same level as "Space" and "Time" regardless different linguists seem to have meant. Directly connected to the senses, "Space" and "Time" constitute the preconditions for any possible experience and function as "the scene" where experiences appear (cf. Thomsen 1964: 270). "Cause" adds, as it were, an explanation to the sensed phenomena.

In the following section, we shall see that this difference between Space and Time on the one hand and Cause on the other hand has quite radical consequences for the syntactic-semantic constitution of the sentence.

2.4. \textit{Time, space and cause according to Korzen (1985)}

In Korzen (1983, 1985, 1990), I examined the special behaviour of cause adjuncts compared to the other sentence members, particularly space and time adjuncts, from which it distinguishes itself in several respects. The most spectacular way in which it distinguishes itself is the way that causal clauses combine with their main sentence as compared to temporal and relative clauses (see section 2.4.2.3.). Below I will show a small representative sample of the characteristic properties of these syntactic functions.

2.4.1. The hierarchical model

The starting point of my description is the following hierarchical model, where the causal adjunct occupies an intermediary level between the sentence adjuncts (e.g. \textit{heureusement}) and constituents capable of triggering stylistic inversion (see section 2.4.2. below):

Figure 1: The hierarchical model

\begin{itemize}
  \item "Whole Sentence"
  \item Sentence adjuncts
  \item "Central Sentence" ("Macro drama")
  \item Causal adjuncts
  \item "Elementary Sentence" ("Micro drama")
  \item Verb and valency complements
  \item Space and Time adjuncts
\end{itemize}

\footnote{Figure 1 is not a syntactic tree but a graphic representation of the hierarchical organization of the elements that one can find in a sentence, and the terms "Whole Sentence", "Central Sentence" and "Elementary Sentence" mean: "elements likely to be found in the Whole Sentence etc.". In Korzen (1983, 1985, 1990), these are called "phrase entière", phrase centrale", and "phrase élémentaire".}
The Central Sentence denotes the proper content, i.e. the part that is asserted, as opposed to the sentence adjuncts, which are merely "shown" (in the sense of Wittgenstein, cf. Nolke 1999). In Korzen (1985), I said that the sentence adjuncts were "periphery elements", and I will use that term below. The Elementary Sentence, which contains the verb and its valency complements (i.e. those having participant roles) and possibly space and time adjuncts, denotes the situation which is the center of interest. In order to abbreviate, I will use the term "elementary constituents" in order to talk of the valency complements and the space and time adjuncts. These sentence members share several properties by which they distinguish themselves from the causal adjuncts.

2.4.2. Differences between the causal adjuncts and the elementary constituents

2.4.2.1. The "essential" character of the elementary constituents: quantifiability

The elementary constituents can be considered "essential" because they are necessary in order that one can say that an event has taken place. If you negate the existence of one of them by means of an expression signifying "zero", it amounts to negating the whole proposition (cf. de Cornulier 1974: 161). This is what we see in (9):

(9)  
a. **Personne** ne chante. (Subject)  
   Nobody sings.  
b. Jeanne ne mange **rien**. (Object)  
   Jane eats nothing  
c. Je ne donnerai ce livre à **personne**. (Indirect object)  
   I will not give this book to anyone  
d. Michèle ne travaille **nulle part**. (Space adjunct)  
   Michelle does not work anywhere  
e. Michèle ne travaille **jamais**. (Time adjunct)  
   Michelle never works

The sentences in signify a) 'There is no singing at all', b) 'Jane does not eat at all', c) 'I will not make a present of this book at all', d) and e) 'Michelle does not work at all'. In all these constructions the negated constituents are negation words which form the second part of the negation.

The causal adjunct does not behave like that. Negating the cause does not amount to negating the whole proposition:

(10) Michèle pleure **sans raison**.  
   Michelle cries without reason

The sentence in (10) does not mean 'Michelle does not cry at all'. In fact, it happens very often that someone talks of a phenomenon while maintaining that no other phenomenon provoked it.\(^\text{17}\) It is significant that there is no negative word in French that denotes 'for no reason' corresponding to *jamais* ('never') and *nulle part* ('nowhere'). In the other languages too, there are special negative words corresponding to the French negative words we saw in (9).

The Danish negative words can all be derived from the Old Norse *engi* 'nothing'. It must be admitted, however, that *ingensinde* ('never') has almost been ousted by *aldrig*,\(^\text{18}\) another radical, in modern Danish:

\(^\text{17}\) A Google search generated more than 2,000,000 hits *sans [aucune] raison* and more than 52,000,000 for *without [any] reason*, 19-9 2009.

\(^\text{18}\) Composed of *aldr*, dative from *aldr* 'age' and the negative particle –*gi*. 
As seen in (11), the English equivalents are all a combination of the negation and a noun or an adverb (body, thing, where, ever).

In Japanese, the corresponding negative words are derived via the suffix –mo:

(12) daremo = nobody (cf. dare 'who')
    nanimo = nothing (cf. nani 'what')
    dokodemo = nowhere (cf. doko 'where')\(^{19}\)

An exception is zenzen ('never'),\(^{20}\) which has its own radical like Danish aldrig. It is important to notice, however, that both languages have a single word for 'never'.

Hungarian has the following negative words:

(13) senki = nobody (cf. ki 'who')
    semmi = nothing (cf. mi 'what')
    sehol = nowhere (cf. hol 'where')
    soha = never (different from mikor 'when')

However, there is no corresponding expression (i.e. no single word or regular "composition") denoting 'for no reason' in any of the mentioned languages; they all have to be used with a prepositional phrase corresponding to the French sans raison and the English without reason:

(14) a. Danish
    uden grund
    *without reason*

b. Japanese
    riyuu naku
    *reason without*

c. Hungarian
    ok nélkül
    *reason without*

The fact that negating the cause does not amount to negating the whole proposition might seem difficult to reconcile with Kant's theory, according to which "causation – with time and space – constitutes one of the basic categories of human cognition" (Wierzbicka 1996: 70, see also section 2. above). However, here one must bear in mind that Kant did not place the three notions at the same level. Space and Time are more fundamental, as they are directly connected to the senses. What we really mean when we say 'without any reason' is obviously 'without any apparent reason', i.e. 'for a reason unknown to us/a reason to which we have no access'. The idea of cause does not really arise until we are presented (preferably several times) with two or more events following one

\(^{19}\) This is not a perfectly correct description: the word needs to combine with a negative morpheme "nai" to express the negative meaning. But it is a kind of "regular" "composed negation" that has a certain resemblance with the French composed negation e.g. *Il ne connaît personne* 'he does not know anybody', where *personne* had, originally, an affirmative sense.

\(^{20}\) The same comment as for *dodokemo*. This word, too, must combine with a negative morpheme.
after the other. Then the human mind will tend to conclude that there is a causal relation between them.\footnote{The notion of Cause is not empiric, cf. also Hume.} If you "remove" the cause, the world becomes absurd or inexplicable, but if you "remove" space and time, you pull the rug from under your feet, and there will be nothing left.

We have just seen that it is possible to negate the entire proposition by negating the existence of one of the elementary constituents by means of an expression signifying 'zero'. On the other hand, it is possible to "reinforce" it by "reinforcing" one of the elementary constituents. Thus, one could say that the examples in (16) express a larger quantity of action than the examples in (15):

(15)  
a. Jean-Michel chante.  
Jean-Michel is singing.  
b. Jean-Michel a embrassé Maryse.  
Jean-Michel kissed Maryse.  
c. Jean-Michel a donné des cadeaux à Sophie.  
Jean-Michel gave a present to Sophie.  
d. On a manifesté à Paris.  
They demonstrated in Paris  
e. Michel vient ici le mardi.  
Michel comes here every Tuesday.

(16)  
a. Jean-Michel et Pierre chantent. ('il y a deux fois plus de chant')  
Jean-Michel and Pierre are singing ('there is twice as much singing')  
b. Jean-Michel a embrassé Maryse et Mathilde. ('il y a deux fois plus de baisers')  
Jean-Michel kissed Maryse and Mathilde. ('there is twice as many kisses')  
c. Jean-Michel a donné des cadeaux à Sophie et à Irène. ('il y a deux fois plus de bénéficiaires')  
Jean-Michel gave gifts to Sophie and Irène. ('there are twice as many beneficiaries')  
d. On a manifesté à Paris et à Lyon. ('on a manifesté à deux endroits')  
They demonstrated in Paris and Lyon. ('they demonstrated in two places')  
e. Michel vient ici le mardi et le jeudi. ('Michel vient ici deux fois par semaine')  
Michel comes here every Tuesday and every Thursday. ('Michel comes twice a week')

As for the causal adjunct, increasing the number of causes does not result in a "bigger amount of action", which remains the same in (17) as in (18):

(17)  
Michel a embrassé Maryse parce qu'il l'aime.  
Michel kissed Maryse because he loves her.

(18)  
Michel a embrassé Maryse parce qu'il l'aime et que le soleil brille.  
Michel kissed Maryse because he loves her and the sun is shining.

Sometimes a whole lot of reasons are given for the same situation:

(19)  
Je ne suis pas allé en classe parce qu'il fait froid, parce qu'il pleut, parce qu'il neige, parce qu'il gèle, parce qu'il y a du brouillard, parce que le ciel est gris, parce qu'il vente et qu'il grêle (From Eugene Ionesco's \textit{Le bon et le mauvais temps}, p. 130)\footnote{Thanks to Birgitte Regnar for supplying me with this wonderful example.}
Il did not go to school because it is cold, because it is raining, because it is snowing, because
it is freezing, because it is foggy, because the sky is gray, because the wind is blowing and because it is hailing.

I will say that the elementary constituents are "quantifiable". This quantifiability has important morpho-syntactic consequences as we shall see below.

2.4.2.2. The n'importe qui type
It is possible to "reinforce", as it were, the truth value of a proposition by saying that the proposition is true whenever or wherever it takes place, and whatever be the entities that participate in it. In order to express this phenomenon, there are pronominal phrases corresponding to the quantifiable constituents like:

(20) English: who(m)ever, whatever, wherever, whenever
French: n'importe qui, n'importe quoi, n'importe où, n'importe quand
Danish: hvem som helst, hvad som helst, hvor som helst, når som helst
Japanese: dare demo, nan demo, dok demo, itsudemo
Hungarian: akárki, akármi, akárhol, akárnikor

Until recently I thought that why and its equivalents could not enter into these constructions, but it appears that it exists in some of the languages at least:

(21) English: whyever23
French: pour n'importe quelle raison
Danish: af hvilken som helst grund
Japanese: *Dooshitedemo
Hungarian Akármiert, bármiert24

2.4.2.3. Clause combining
Two situations can be connected by the fact that they share the same time, the same space, the same object, the same person, etc. Thus, they share one of the "essentiel" aspects. In order to express this, there are combinations of subordinate clauses and their main clauses like (22) in French, (23) in English and (24) in Danish,25 (25) in Japanese and (26) in Hungarian:

(22) a. Tu peux venir quand tu voudras.
    b. Tu peux dîner où tu voudras.
    c. Tu peux faire ce que tu voudras.
    d. Tu peux épouser qui tu voudras.

(23) a. You can come when(ever) you want.
    b. You can dine where(ver) you want.
    c. You can do what(ever) you want.
    d. You can marry who(ever)/whom(ever) you want.

23 Whyever seems to be much less frequent than whatever: a Google search generated 153.000.000 hits for the latter and 17.600 hits for the former (27-09-2010). In Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, the latter is written in one word, but the former in two.
24 Akármiert seems odd to some informants. Moreover, both expressions seem to appear later than the other expressions. It does not appear in Sándor Eckhard's dictionary Magyar-Francia szótár 1958. I thank Michael Carsten Larsen for this information.
25 In the Danish tradition, we call the shared element "common member" (cf. Diderichsen 1946).
(24) a. Du kan komme nár du (end) vil.
ob. Du kan spise hvor du (end) vil.
c. Du kan gøre hvad du (end) vil.
d. Du kan gifte dig med hvem du (end) vil.

(25) a. Anata wa itsudemo kite mo ii
   you theme whenever you want to come
b. Anata wa dokodemo tabetai tokoro de tabareraru
   you theme wherever you want to eat
c. Anata wa nandemo sukina koto ga dekiru.
   You theme whatever you like to do
d. Anata wa sukina dare-tomo kekkon dekiru
   you theme like with whoever marry can

(26) a. Te jöhetsz amikor akarsz
    you come can.2pers.sing when(ever) will.2pers.sing
b. Te ehetsz ahol akarsz
    you eat can wherever will.2pers.sing
c. Te azt csinálhatsz amit akarsz
    you that do can.2pers.sing whatever will.2pers.sing
d. Te megházasodhatsz azzal akivel akarsz
    you marry.refl.2pers.sing article, instrument will.2pers.sing

In (22)–(26) the time, place, etc. are non-specific. However, the same "share" is possible when they are specific:

(27) Pierre est parti quand Charles est venu.
Pierre left when Charles arrived.

(28) Michèle habite dans la maison où Jacques travaille.
Michel lives in the house where Jacques works.

No construction corresponding to (22)–(28) denotes that two events happen for the same reason, so the causal conjunction is excluded from (29), corresponding to (22)–(24):

(29) French; *Tu peux venir pourquoi tu voudras.
    English: *You can come why(ever) you want.
    Dansh: *Du kan komme hvorfor du vil.

In all the languages, constructions like (30), which contains a causal clause, express that the event denoted by the causal clause explains the event denoted by the main sentence. They do not express that two events happen for the same reason:

(30) Pierre est parti parce que Charles est venu.
    Peter left because Charles came.

Of course, it happens that two (or more) situations can be explained by one and the same reason. Say Paul stayed at home because it was snowing (he hated snow), but Jacques went out because it was snowing (he loved snow). Theoretically, it should be possible to imagine a construction like
(31), but it just "sounds" odd:

(31) ?Paul est resté chez lui pour la même raison que celle pour laquelle Jacques est sorti.
   Paul stayed at home for the same reason as the reason for which Jacques went out.

No language seems to use such a construction. At any rate, they are not expressible by a single conjunction. What is "shared" in constructions like (22)–(28) is always one of the essential aspects, which are, explicitly or implicitly, "present" in all situations. They are part of any situation. These possibilities of clause combining are probably the most spectacular consequence of the difference between the time and space adjuncts on the one hand, and the causal adjunct on the other.

The ways two propositions combine can be illustrated by Figures 1 and 2, where Figure 1 represents the construction with the common member, and Figure 2 represents the causal construction where the two propositions are connected by an operator:

Figure 2: Common member

-\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{Figure 3: Operator} \\
\end{array}\]

This difference between space and time adjuncts on the one hand, and causal adjuncts on the other hand is so radical that it should convince everybody that they can't be placed on the same level.

2.4.2.4. Periphery properties

Being outside the Elementary Sentence, the causal adjuncts share certain properties with the sentence adjuncts. They can for instance be outside the scope of negation and combine directly with the negative adverb corresponding to not:

(32) French: *Pourquoi pas?*  
    English: *Why not?*  
    Danish: *Hvorfor ikke?*  
    Japanese: *Dooshite soo de wa nai deshoo ka?*  
    Hungarian: *Miert nem?*

That position is excluded for space and time adjuncts in French, English, Danish and Japanese:

(33) French: *Quand pas?*  
    English: *When not? Where not?*  
    Danish: *Hvornår ikke? Hvor ikke?*  

26 They do not have to be physically there, but they are always implied.

However it is possible in Hungarian:

(34) a. Nikor nem? (when not)  
    b. Hol nem? (where not)

However, it is very important to notice that the construction is possible with all the interrogatives. Thus, in Hungarian, we also find:

(35) a. Ki nem? (who not)  
    b. Ni nem? (what not)

The causal adverb, in (32) occupies exactly the same place as unfortunately in (36):

(36) French: Malheureusement pas!  
    English: Unfortunately not!  
    Danish: Desværre ikke!  
    Hungarian: Sajnos nem!

Like sentence adjuncts, but unlike space and time adjuncts, causal adjuncts may also modify elliptic sentences:

(37) French: Michel va venir. – Pourquoi Michel? *Quand Michel? *Où Michel?  
    Danish: Michel kommer. – Hvorfor Michel? *Hvornår Michel? *Hvor Michel?  
    Hungarian: Miert Mikkel?

The constructions in (37) are the same kind of constructions as (38) where the sentence adjunct unfortunately and its equivalents modify the elliptic construction:

    English: Who will come? – Michel, unfortunately.  
    Danish: Hvem kommer? – Michel, desværre.  
    Hungarian: Mikkel, sajnos.

This difference between space and time adjuncts and the adjuncts which are outside the Elementary Sentence is probably due to the fact that an elliptic sentence already, implicitly, contains the other Elementary constituents (i.e. time and place adjuncts, etc.), for which reason it can only be modified by "external" sentence members.

2.5. Partial conclusion: Causal adjuncts compared to space and time adjuncts

It should appear from 2.4. that space and time adjuncts share important properties with the other elementary constituents. All these constituents denote essential aspects of the situation which is the center of interest, and because of that, they differ from all other constituents that can be found in a sentence. The causal adjunct, on the other hand, is excluded from this exclusive circle, and it shares

27 My anonymous referee adds the following commentary: "They might become acceptable in some extremely rare contexts, but I would judge them as unacceptable by default".
several properties with the sentence adjuncts.\textsuperscript{28}

In 2.1., where I quoted Lakoff \& Johnson, Brunot and Wierzbicka, I stated that causation is such a basic notion, whereas I have just said that the causal adjunct does not denote an "essential aspect of the situation". So we might seem, to be left with a paradox. However the paradox is only apparent, because we have looked at the constructions from two different points of view: when we look at a sentence denoting a single propositional content, the causal adjunct is not "essential" (recall section 2.4.2.1.), but as soon as you combine two propositional contents, then the causal sense appears.

3. General conclusion
We must conclude that, as far as the properties examined in 2.4. are concerned, French, English, Danish, Hungarian and Japanese have almost the same syntax. In all five languages, the space and time adjuncts differ fundamentally – and in the same ways – from the causal adjuncts, although these languages, being typologically different, differ from each other in many other important respects. This fits so nicely in the model that Kant presents in \textit{Critique}.

Therefore we must also conclude that Hamann and Herder and their many followers are completely wrong when they allege that Kant was unaware of the role language played in the construction of his own cognitive model! What Kant's model describes in \textit{Critique} is not dependent on any particular language nore on any particular culture. It is determined by our bodily apparatus. I think it is very probable that the discussed differences between the time and space expressions on the one side, and causal expressions on the other belong to those "universals that constitute the backdrop of any typology"\textsuperscript{29} (Herslund 2015).

References


Diderichsen, Paul (1946) \textit{Elementær Dansk Grammatik}. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.


\textsuperscript{28} In Korzen (1985), I examine many other syntactic differences between the "elementary constituents" and the causal adjuncts.

\textsuperscript{29} My translation of "traits universaux qui constituent l'arrière-fond de toute typologie".

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