Globe: A Journal of Language, Culture and Communication, 8: 1-19 (2019)

Double deixis in second person pronouns as a metaleptic device

Kim Ebensgaard Jensen, University of Copenhagen

Abstract: This paper discusses double deixis (i.e. when a deictic form points at two referents simultaneously) in second person referential forms. A contribution to cognitive poetics, the article presents a theoretical discussion of the cognitive hinterland behind double-deictic uses of second person forms in which a simple interactional frame (i.e. a cognitive model representing conceptualization of a recurring type of communicative situation) is proposed as a model that readers of literary fiction call upon. Moreover, it is held, drawing on an admittedly "lite" version of text world theory, that – due to the above-mentioned interactional frame – this is what enables double-deictic use of second person forms along with other metaleptic devices to make sense and have the empathy-generating effect on readers that they have. For illustrative purposes, examples of double deixis in a particular genre of literature called solitaire adventures will be discussed.

Keywords: cognitive poetics, discourse and text worlds, empathy, interactional frame, participation structure.

1. Introduction

We might speculate that the typical narrative perspectives employed in literature are the first and the third person narratives. Second person narratives occur, but they appear to be far less commonplace. Yet, second person narratives may possess one feature that first and third person narratives do not have (at least not to the same extent), but which all writers of fiction presumably aim to achieve: they can pull the reader into the story. Consider the following three versions of an excerpt from the same narrative (Jackson & Livingstone 2003: 149):

(1) a. As she watches the living mural, she is unaware of the speed with which her candle is burning. Suddenly it flickers and goes out! She again begins to hear the piercing screams and their pitch grows to an unbearable level. She drops to her knees clutching her ears and crawls towards the wall.

b. As I watch the living mural, I am unaware of the speed with which my candle is burning. Suddenly it flickers and goes out! I again begin to hear the piercing screams and their pitch grows to an unbearable level. I drop to my knees clutching my ears and crawl towards the wall.

c. As you watch the living mural, you are unaware of the speed with which your candle is burning. Suddenly it flickers and goes out! You again begin to hear the piercing screams and their pitch grows to an unbearable level. You drop to your knees clutching your ears and crawl towards the wall.

Presumably, (1a) and (1b) do not instill the same degree of empathy with the protagonist as (1c) – which is the original version of the narrative – does. This is arguably due to the use of second person pronouns in referring to the protagonist.

This paper explores the use of second person pronouns as a strategy of creating empathy in readers with protagonists. Drawing on Fillmore's (1982: 117) notion of interactional frames, Gavins' (2007) text world theory, and Herman's (1994, 1997) theory of double deixis, this paper proposes that second person forms in second person narratives are metaleptic strategies that trigger cognitive processes and evoke in readers cognitive structures that, through perspectival simulation, generate strong empathy with protagonist characters. More specifically, a theory – based on double deixis – is proposed which, if verifiable, may serve as a descriptive framework applicable in the

study of second person narratives in a cognitive-linguistic perspective. This paper, then, is intended as a contribution to cognitive poetics – a branch of the Humanities that combines cognitive linguistics with literary analysis – and is thus primarily aimed at cognitive linguists, cognitive poeticians, and cognitive narratologists.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly covers deixis as a linguistic phenomenon and describes the basic types of deixis. Section 3 serves to introduce the reader to Fillmore's (1987: 117) notion of interactional frames and Gavins' (2007) theory of text worlds, and proposes a very simple cognitive representation of the experience of reading fiction, which is held to be fundamental to double deixis as a linguistic phenomenon. The next section introduces Herman's (1994, 1997) notion of double deixis as a metaleptic device and discusses how double-deictic uses of second person forms interact with text worlds and prompt a complex process of empathy in the reader. Lastly, Section 5 discusses some examples of double-deictic use of second person forms in the pop-cultural literary genre of the solitaire adventure, in which second person narratives are rather common[1].

2. Deixis

'Deixis' is used as an umbrella term in linguistics with reference to the fact that languages have inventories of forms which serve to situate discourse products (i.e. utterances, texts, conversations and the like) in the context of the communicative situation.

Traditionally, deictic forms are said to 'point' at elements in the context of the communicative situation. Imagine, for example, a sign on a door saying *This door opens this way*. The two noun phrases *this door* and *this way* point at the door itself and the direction in which it swings open, respectively, and, through the demonstrative pronoun *this*, indicate that the door and the opening direction are proximal in space to the sign. *This door opens this way* is a special case, as the vantage point, also known as the deictic center, is attached to the sign. As Bühler (1999: 102-117) points out, the default deictic center is the communicative situation relative to what he calls *die Origo des Hier-Jetzt-Ich-Systems*. That is, the vantage point of deictic reference is ultimately egocentric and coincides per default with the vantage point of the utterer. With this in mind, consider an utterance such as *Come here now*. This utterance can only be understood with reference to the *Hier-Jetz-Ich* system: the verb *come* specifies movement towards the position of the utterer and is thus spatially bound to the perspective of the utterer, *here* points at the spatial position of the utterer and is also spatially bound, and *now* specifies a point in time which corresponds to the present moment of the production of the utterance and is temporally bound to the perspective of the utterer; one could even argue that the imperative realization of *come* indirectly specifies an addressee relative to the utterer's role as the speaker.

Linguists generally agree that there are five basic types of deixis:[2]

- **spatial deixis**: spatial-deictic forms specify relations and positions in the physical context relative to the deictic center. Examples from English are the demonstrative pronouns *this*/*these* and *that*/*those,* which can be used to point at elements in the space surrounding the communicative situation and establish their position in space relative to the deictic center as proximal or distal, respectively. The locative adverbs *here* and *there* indicate position in space relative to the communicative situation and also indicate proximity and distance.

[1] Second person narratives constitute the standard mode of narration in the leading solitaire adventure franchises. For instance, all publications in the *Fighting Fantasy*, *Choose Your Own Adventure*, and *Fabled Lands* franchises are second person narratives as are the *Tunnel and Trolls* solo adventures.

[2] See, for instance, Levinson (1983: 54-96) and Fillmore (1997).

- **temporal deixis**: temporal-deictic forms specify periods and points in time relative to the deictic center. Temporal adverbs like *now*, *then*, *yesterday*, *tomorrow*, and *shortly* can all be used temporal-deictically as means of specifying points in time relative to the now of the deictic center. Likewise, expressions such as *last year*, *next X-mas*, *this very moment*, and *that one time* all have temporal-deictic functions. Lastly, temporal deixis is grammaticalized into the tense systems of most languages. Thus, in English, the past tense specifies that the action expressed by the verb took place in the past relative to the now of the deictic center, while the present tense specifies that it coincides with the now of the deictic center, and future-marking constructions such as *will V* and *be going to V* specify that it is in the future of the now of the deictic center.
- **person deixis**: person-deictic forms specify participants and non-participants in the communicative situation relative to the deictic center. This is the primary function of personal pronouns, with first person pronouns specifying the utterer (singular ones point at the utterer, and plural ones at a group that includes the utterer), second person pronouns specifying the addressee, and third person pronouns pointing at non-participants who may or may not be present. Reflexive pronouns in English, such as *myself*, *herself*, and *yourself*, as well as possessive pronouns, such as *my*, *his*, and *their,* can also be used person-deictically.
- **social deixis**: social-deictic forms specify roles, positions, and relations in the social structure of the community in question relative to the deictic center. In English, forms of address, such as *Your Majesty*, *Your Honor*, and *Mr. President* are social-deictic. This also applies to occupational titles when used vocatively, such as *Professor*, *Sheriff*, and *Doctor*. Likewise, other expressions used vocatively have social-deictic functions, as is the case of *old man*, *dude*, *bro*, *dad*, and *kiddo*. Many languages have inventories of grammatical forms that serve social-deictic purposes, ranging from the relatively simple T/V-distinction found in many Romance languages to the very complex systems of honorifics known from, for instance, Japanese and Korean.
- **text deixis**: text-deictic forms specify elements within the discourse product relative to the deictic form itself; text deixis is primarily used as a means of generating textual cohesion. Most pronouns can be used text-deictically as seen in Katy Perry's hit song *I kissed a girl and I liked it,* where the personal pronoun *it* refers back to the clause *I kissed a girl*.

Epistemic deixis (Croft & Wood 2000: 64) can perhaps be added to this list. Admittedly more abstract than the five basic types, epistemic deixis is predicated upon the notion of common ground (e.g. Clark 1996). As a term, 'common ground' covers shared knowledge (including beliefs and values) among interlocutors. A distinction is made between personal common ground, ie. common ground shared by interlocutors in the situation of communication, and communal common ground, i.e. common ground shared by an entire community. As Croft & Wood (2000: 65) suggest, "common ground provides us with an epistemic perspective situating the speaker and the hearer". Epistemic deixis, then, is when an utterer refers to something that is assumed to be common ground and linguistically treated as shared information.

3. Interactional frames and the discourse world

An important feature of the communicative situation is its participation structure (Goffman 1974, 1981). Participation structure has to do with the types of participants involved in the act of communication and the relations among them. Rather than a simple dyadic speaker-listener relation, participation structure is complex to the point of there being several types of listeners, speakers, and non-participants. Goffman's approach to participation is very situation-oriented and has, due to its fine-grained nature, proven to be a very useful analytical tool in linguistic-anthropological studies

of participant actions in speech events (Goodwin & Goodwin 2004).

Participation structure is essential to the topic of this paper, because double-deictic uses of *you* transgress the boundary between the world of the literary narrative and the situation of reading the narrative. What happens is essentially that double-deictic *you* points from within the narrative world and out into the participation structure.

3.1. A frame-based approach to participation structure

In a cognitive perspective, different types of participation structure are, in addition to being social-situational interactional phenomena that interlocutors participate in, also cognitive phenomena. In keeping with the experientialist and usage-based conception of language within contemporary cognitive linguistics, an argument can be made that recurring patterns of actual participation in communicative situations become conventionalized in members of the speech community, and abstract cognitive representations of such structures emerge in people.

For example, university students have to undergo a socialization process (sometimes referred to as 'breaking the code') from when they are freshmen, in which they figure out what it means to be an academic as they are introduced to a range of communicative genres and situations they were not used to before, including the plenary lecture, the seminar class, the study group meeting, the supervision meeting, and the like. Eventually, they generalize over all of those experiences, and abstract representations of them emerge in the students' encyclopedic knowledge as what Fillmore (1982: 117) calls interactional frames.

Interactional frames constitute a subset of the category of cognitive phenomena known as frames (sometimes also called domains, cognitive schemata, or cognitive models). A frame as such is a region in cognitive space (that is, it is a structure in encyclopedic knowledge) described by Fillmore (1982: 111) as follows:

> By the term 'frame' I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the entire system into which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced in a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available. I intend the word 'frame' as used here to be a general cover term for the set of concepts variously known, in the literature on natural language understanding, as 'schema', 'script', 'scenario', 'ideational scaffolding', 'cognitive model', or 'folk theory'.

For instance, to understand the concept of BUYING, which is of course lexically encoded into words such as *buy*, *purchase*, and *procure*, you need to understand the entire situation of COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION including concepts such as SELLING, COMMODITIES, PRICE, and VALUE. This is because all of these concepts and the relations between them form a COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION frame which is integral to our knowledge and understanding of situations of commercial transaction (e.g. Lawler 1989, Croft et al. 2001).

Frames, then, are based on, and help us make sense of, experiences. This also applies to the particular subset of frames that Fillmore (1982) has termed interactional frames, which have to do with "how we conceptualize what is going on between the speaker and the hearer, or between the author and the reader" (Fillmore 1982: 117). As an example, I shall return to the situation of a university student acquiring experiential knowledge of different communicative situations in academia. Arguably, the student will experience several plenary lectures, all of which are unique, as the topics are different, the lecturers are different, the lecture halls different, and the slides – if there even are slides – are different. Yet, all these lectures have several shared features: there is a lecturer, there is an audience, it takes place in a lecture hall with a conventional topological structure, it is

part of a university course, the purpose is for the students to acquire knowledge pertaining to the course, there is some form of exam looming at the end of the semester, it can be hard to stay awake during a lecture, and so on and so forth. These features provide the ground for abstraction into a general UNIVERSITY LECTURE FRAME in students. Part of this frame is the participation structure of a lecture: the LECTURER is the SPEAKER, the STUDENTS are the AUDIENCE, the COMMUNICATION is mostly ONE-WAY, the LECTURER is expected to DIVULGE INFORMATION that the STUDENTS need for the EXAM, the STUDENTS are expected to PAY ATTENTION and take in the INFORMATION, and there is an unequal power relation among the LECTURER and the STUDENTS.

This process, it can be argued, applies to all communicative situations, including telephone conversations, political speeches, e-mailing, reading a newspaper article, reading fiction, listening to a pop song, and watching a movie or TV show. Ultimately, then, an individual will have a vast network of interactional frames that conceptualize different communicative situations and participation structures therein. In keeping with findings in contemporary cognitive science (e.g. Lakoff 1987), this network has a category structure with an abstract superordinate level frame which captures the basics of what all such frames have in common – namely, the SPEAKER/WRITER role (or SENDER), the MESSAGE that is communicated itself, the LISTENER/HEARER (or RECIPIENT), and ADDRESSEE roles. This frame can be set up in a simplified manner like this:

Fig. 1: Generalized COMMUNICATIVE SITUATION frame



The LISTENER/READER/RECIPIENT and ADDRESSEE are kept separate because, although they often coincide, they do not necessarily always do so. It can be assumed that people are aware of this (for instance, an eavesdropper – or some other presence – does not coincide with the RECIPIENT). This frame is very reminiscent of a standard model of communication, and this is not a coincidence, as many communication scholars presumably apply this generalized model in their studies of communication. For instance, Reddy (1993), who proposed that we think of communication metaphorically as a CONDUIT (which is essentially the core of the model in Figure 1), severely criticizes the famous Shannon & Weaver (1949) model of communication for being based on Shannon & Weaver's own application of this folk model of communication:

> Shannon and Weaver were very careful to point out that the “perceived signals” were not necessarily “the transmitted signal” because of the possible intervention of distortion and noise. But they blithely wrote the word “message” on the right, or receiving, side of their famous paradigm (Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 7). At the very least they should have written “reconstructed message” there. In their theory something is rebuilt on that right side which, hopefully, resembles the original message on the left side. The ambiguity of the word “message” should have led them to regard this word as a disaster and never to consider it for use.
>
> If they did not, I believe it is because their thought processes were responding to the

> biasing effect of the conduit metaphor. Weaver, it seems, could not hold the theory clearly in mind when he spoke of human communication, and used the conduit metaphor expressions almost instantly. "How precisely," he asked, "do the transmitted symbols *convey* the desired meaning [italics mine] (p. 4). Or he compared two "messages, one of which is *heavily loaded with meaning* and the other of which is pure nonsense" (p. 8). In truth, it seems that he still thought of the MESSAGE2, the repertoire members, as being sent across the channel, even though this destroys the notion of information as selective power. Weaver hedges significantly when he describes the action of the transmitter. It "changes" he says, "the *message* into the *signal*" [italics Weaver's] (p. 7). Really, this is a strange description. A code is a relationship between two distinct systems. It does not "change" anything into anything else. It merely preserves in the second system the pattern of organization present in the first system. Marks or sounds are not transmuted into electronic pulses. Nor are thoughts and emotions magically metamorphosed into words. Again, this is conduit-metaphor thinking. There is no justification whatsoever in information theory for talking about communication this way. (Reddy 1993: 183-184 – italics in original; *mine* refers to Reddy)

Of course, when I use terms like "message" in this paper, I do so because the model in Figure 1 is presented as an interactional frame and, ultimately, a folk model.

My main assumption is that, among the interactional frames subsumed by the abstract model in Figure 1, there is an interactional frame for reading fiction, which is laid out in Figure 2:

Fig. 2: READING FICTION frame



The model is relatively simple and, a generalization over recurring experiences of reading fiction, itself an abstract. It is likely that it covers a range of more specific frames pertaining to different literary genres. Moreover, this category of interactional frames is likely to be more detailed in avid readers than in casual readers. In the frame in Figure 2, the author WRITES the TEXT which the READER READS. The text contains a NARRATIVE consisting of CHARACTERS, one or more PLOTS, a SETTING, and so on and so forth. Importantly, the READER is AWARE that what happens in the NARRATIVE, even if it feels very real, is ultimately not REALITY; part of the entire experience of READING FICTION is the knowledge that there is a BOUNDARY between the FICTIONAL NARRATIVE and the REALITY that the READER lives in. This is what is indicated by the bold line surrounding the box that represents the TEXT. Granted there may be individuals, such as schizophrenics and other people with personality disorders and other types of mental illness, who cannot make this distinction (Jacobsen 1971), and it is likely that there are cultures in which narratives, or at least certain types of narrative, are considered reality (be it mythical reality, divine reality, dream reality or some other

type of reality). However, an assumption can be made that the frame in Figure 2 is prevalent in most cultures which have written literary fiction.

Arguably, part of the experience of READING FICTION is knowing that one is reading fiction. Thus, when reading fiction, readers evoke the model in Figure 2 or a more specific subcategorial instance thereof which, among other things, provides the reader with the basic participation structure of the situation of reading fiction. Readers are likely to draw on general cognitive structures and processes when reading; for instance, Stockwell & Mahlberg (2015) argue that readers engage in the process of mind-modeling when making sense of fictional characters:

> The term [mind-modeling] here refers to the capacity that humans evidently have for imagining and maintaining a working model of the characteristics, outlook, beliefs, motivations and consequent behaviour of others. It is this fundamental cognitive capacity that allows us to understand that other people are people, and that they are in some ways similar to us and in some ways different. It is a fundamental feature of consciousness that we are able to understand that other people are similarly conscious. (Stockwell & Mahlberg 2015: 133)

Mind-modeling, then, is probably based on the very basic socio-cognitive phenomena of intersubjectivity and theory of mind, the former being the ability to share perspectives with other people and the latter being the assumption that other people also have minds (the latter undoubtedly enables the former; the two can be conflated, as they are closely intertwined). The ability to model minds draws on both a theory of mind (it would make no sense to model minds if we did not assume other people have minds) and intersubjectivity (mind-modeling is an attempt at at least constructing other individuals' perspectives). Presumably, we engage in mind-modeling whenever we interact with other people, and, according to Stockwell & Mahlberg (2015), we apply the same cognitive ability in making sense of fictional characters. What prevents readers from mistaking characters for real people, however, is that we also draw on the model in Figure 2 when we read literary fiction.

3.2. Discourse worlds and text worlds

In text world theory (Gavins 2007), a distinction is made between the discourse world, which is "the immediate situation which surrounds human beings as they communicate with one another" (Gavins 2007: 9), and the text world, which is a mental representation that readers construct in their minds prompted by linguistic cues in the text (Gavins 2007: 10). Text worlds can seem very real and prompt reactions in readers similar to those prompted by real-world stimuli:

> Central to the text-world approach is the appreciation that the text-worlds we construct in order to understand discourse are often as richly detailed as the discourse-world from which they spring. Text World Theory retains the emphasis first placed by cognitive psychologists on the essentially analogue nature of mental representations. While some discourses may require only simple and short-lived text-worlds to be constructed, others may involve many dozens of complex conceptual structures, built and sustained over an extended period of time. Our experience of these worlds can be as real to us as our experience of the everyday world in which we live. The feeling of being so immersed in a text-world as almost to lose sense of who and where we are is familiar to just about anyone who has ever read a novel. We can populate our text-worlds with living, breathing, thinking characters, carrying out complex physical and mental activities, in authentic material surroundings. We are able to predict and replicate human behaviour,

> while at the same time remaining susceptible to having our own behaviour affected by the text-worlds we create. The emotional and physical responses our text-world experiences can induce, may reduce us to tears, provoke laughter, even start revolutions. (Gavins 2007: 10)

When making sense of literary fiction – or constructing a text world – we draw on general human cognitive processes and structures, and it may be this which, to use a bit of a platitude, makes literature resonate with one's soul. The arguably socio-cognitive ability of mind-modeling, for instance, is clearly vital to readers making sense of characters, or enactors in Gavins' (2007) terminology.

In reading literature, the discourse world corresponds to an instantiation of the AUTHOR-TEXT-READER part of the frame in Figure 2, while the text world – or text worlds, as text worlds may be embedded in other text worlds – corresponds to what is inside the TEXT box in the same figure. I assume that lay people probably have some awareness that they are engaged in an interpretation process (at least to the point that they know that READING FICTION requires them to use their imagination). They probably also apply the CONDUIT metaphor in their understanding of the situation of reading literature. This is why the frame in Figure 2 is represented as a unidirectional structure. In the perspective of cognitive linguistics, the reader essentially constructs the narrative and applies cognitive processes and structures in the process, resulting in a text world representation.

In any case, while text word theory is obviously a descriptive model adopted by scholars and cognitive scientists in the study of how readers interact with texts, I hold that the distinction between discourse worlds and text worlds has cognitive status (essentially represented by the bold boundary in Figure 2).

4. Metalepsis and double deixis

Metalepsis, in Genette's (1980) terminology, is a stylistic device in which the boundaries between narrative levels are transgressed (for more on metalepsis as a literary phenomenon, see Fludernik 2003; Pier 2005; Kukkonen 2011; Ben-Merre 2011; Cohn 2012)[3]. A famous example of metalepsis is seen in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, in which the author, John Fowles, inserts himself into the narrative as a fellow passenger on the same train as the protagonist Charles and starts thinking about what to do with the character and discussing the conventions of the genre that he associates his novel with:

(2) A stare of a minute or so's duration, of this kind, might have been explicable. Train journeys are boring; it is amusing to spy on strangers; and so on. But this stare, which became positively cannibalistic in its intensity, lasted far longer than a minute. It lasted beyond Taunton, though it was briefly interrupted there when the noise on the platform made Charles wake for a few moments. But when he sank back into his slumbers, the eyes fastened on him again in the same leech-like manner.

You may one day come under a similar gaze. And you may – in the less reserved context of our own century – be aware of it. The intent watcher will not wait till you are asleep. It will no doubt suggest something unpleasant, some kind of devious sexual approach… a desire to know you in a way you do not want to be known by a stranger. In my experience there is only one profession that gives that particular look, with its bizarre blend of the inquisitive and the magistral; of the ironic and the soliciting.

[3] Note that, in some terminologies, metalepsis, also called transumption, is seen as a figure of speech in which a figurative expression is used in a new context. That is not the sense of the term used in this paper.

> Now could I use you?
> Now what could I do with you?
> It is precisely, it has always seemed to me, the look an omnipotent god – if there were such an absurd thing – should be shown to have. Not at all what we think of as a divine look; but one of a distinctly mean and dubious (as the theoreticians of the *nouveau roman* have pointed out) moral quality. I see this with particular clarity on the face, only too familiar to me, of the bearded man who stares at Charles. And I will keep up the pretense no longer.
> Now the question I am asking, as I stare at Charles, is not quite the same as the two above. But rather, what the devil am I going to do with you? I have already thought of ending Charles's career here and now; of leaving him for eternity on his way to London. But the conventions of Victorian fiction allow, allowed no place for the open, the inconclusive ending; and I preached earlier of the freedom characters must be given. My problem is simple – what Charles wants is clear? It is indeed. But what the protagonist wants is not so clear; and I am not at all sure where she is at the moment. Of course if these two were two fragments of real life, instead of two figments of my imagination, the issue of the dilemma is obvious: the one want combats the other want, and fails or succeeds, as the actuality may be. Fiction usually pretends to conform to the reality: the writer puts the conflicting wants in the ring and then describes the fight – but in fact fixes the fight, letting that want he himself favors win. And we judge writers of fiction both by the skill they show in fixing the fights (in other words, in persuading us that they were not fixed) and by the kind of fighter they fix in favor of: the good one, the tragic one, the evil one, the funny one, and so on. (Fowles 2010: 407-408)

This type of metalepsis is categorized as exterior metalepsis (Cohn 2012: 106), which is when the boundary between the text and the actual reader (that is, between the text world and the discourse world) is transgressed. Cohn further proposes interior metalepsis, which is when the boundary between two narrative levels, or text worlds, is transgressed. In this paper, I shall focus on exterior metalepsis in that, as will become very clear, double deixis is a type of exterior metalepsis. Neither type of metalepsis would make any sense to readers without the knowledge structure represented in Figure 2 (see also Kukkonen 2011: 7), as the boundary between the discourse world and the text world is key to metalepsis as a stylistic device.

Returning to deixis, deictic forms can be simple, yet powerful, metaleptic devices. Elsewhere, I have proposed a distinction between diegetic deixis and discursive deixis (Jensen 2014). I do not draw on text world theory in Jensen (2014), but the connection between the dichotomy proposed by me and text world theory is easy to make: diegetic deixis is confined within the text world, as it were, while discursive deixis transgresses the boundary between text world and discourse world and points out into the participation structure of the text in question. Diegetic deixis helps the reader construct spatial, temporal, social, etc. relations in the text world, as seen in (3) and (4):

(3) There was silence, only the sea washing over the rocks below. Steiner's face turned pale, the skin stretched tight on the cheek-bones, eyes dark. 'All right, tell me.'
'The Gestapo have him at Prinz Albrechtstrasse. Suspicion of treason.'
And Steiner, remembering the week he had spent at his father's headquarters in France in 'forty-two, remembering what the old man had said, he knew instantly that it was true.
'Ah, I see now,' he said softly. 'If I'm a good boy and do as I'm told, it would help his case.' Suddenly his face changed and he looked about as dangerous as any man could and, when he reached for Radl, it was in a kind of slow motion. 'You bastard. All of you, bastards.'
He had Radl by the throat. Devlin moved fast and found that it took all his considerable strength to pull him off. 'Not him, you fool. He's under the boot as much as you. You want to shoot somebody, shoot Himmler. He's the man you want.' (Higgins 1976: 107)

There are several deictic forms involved here, all of which set up relations within the narrative. For instance, the use of past tense forms in the narration indicates that the narrative takes place in the past relative to some narratological now; in contrast, all the dialog is in the present tense, thus specifying the present of the exchange between Steiner, Radl, and Devlin. Along with the temporal adverbial *in 'forty-two*, the past perfect in *he had spent at his father's headquarters* and *what the old man had said*, which are temporal-deictic as well due to the tense inflection of the operator *HAVE*, set up a point in time which is in the past relative to the exchange (which is of course in the past relative to the narrotological now). This should clearly demonstrate how temporal relations within the narrative are set up. The personal pronouns in the dialog point at the enactors as participants in the communicative situation that this excerpt recounts.

(4) Because I work in the time travel industry, everyone assumes I must be a scientist. Which is sort of true. I was studying for my master's in applied science fiction – I wanted to be a structural engineer like my father – and then the whole situation with Mom got worse, and with my dad missing I had to do what made sense, and then things got even worse, and this job came along and I took it.

Now I fix time machines for a living.

To be more specific, I am a certified network technician for T-Class personal-use chronogrammatical vehicles, and an approved independent affiliate contractor for Time Warner Time, which owns and operates this universe as a spatio-temporal structure and entertainment complex zoned for retail, commercial, and residential use. The job is pretty chill for the most part, although right this moment I'm not loving it because I think my Tense Operator might be breaking down.

It's happening now. Or maybe not. Maybe it was earlier today. Or yesterday. Maybe it broke down a long time ago. Maybe that's the point: if it is broken and my transmission has been shifting randomly in and out of gears, then how would I ever know when it happened? Maybe I'm the one who broke it, trying to fool myself, thinking I could live like this, thinking I could stay out here forever. (Yu 2010: 5)

As with (3), tense forms serve to set up temporal relations in this excerpt. This narrative is primarily in the present tense (supported by the time adverbial *now* in *Now I fix time machines for a living*), but reference is made to events in the narrator's past, which is specified through the use of past tense forms. While past and present are kept clearly separated in the first three paragraphs, they seem to collapse through an interchanging use of present and past tense forms in the last paragraph. Now, this is of course not the author being sloppy, as the mishmash of tense forms signals that the narrating enactor – a time traveler – genuinely does not know when in time he is and when, relative to his unknown temporal position, his Tense Operator breaks down. There are also instances of social-deictic forms in this excerpt in the form of the noun phrases *my father*, *Mom*, and *dad* which, of course, signal social relations between the narrating enactor and other enactors in the narrative. Lastly, *this* in *this job came along* and in *I could live like this* signals proximity between the narrating enactor and the job that he currently talks about and the situation he currently finds himself in. In both cases, *this* is arguably used metaphorically and does not signal literal spatial proximity. In both (3) and (4), with the exception of the first person references in (4), the deictic forms discussed clearly serve world-building purposes and their referentiality is confined within the text world without pointing out of the text[4]. That is, they are not metaleptic and thus clear instances of diegetic deixis.

[4] The first person forms in the novel that (6) is an excerpt from are potentially metaleptic, as the narrator, like the author, is named Charles Yu. This could indeed be a case of double deixis in first person pronominal forms.

In contrast, (5) below illustrates metaleptic, discursive deixis. As mentioned above, person deixis essentially serves to relate the communicative situation to its participation structure by pointing at participants and non-participants. English has an inventory of pronominal forms that allow for this, which is listed in Table 1 for the reader's convenience.

Table 1: Primary person deictic pronouns in English

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2" rowspan="2">Reference</th><th colspan="2">Personal pronouns</th><th colspan="2">Possessive pronouns</th><th>Reflexive pronouns</th></tr>
<tr><th>Singular</th><th>Plural</th><th>Singular</th><th>Plural</th><th>Singular</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">1st person (UTTERER)</td><td>I, me</td><td>we, us</td><td>my, mine</td><td>our, ours</td><td>myself</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">2nd person (ADDRESSEE)</td><td colspan="2">You</td><td colspan="2">your, yours</td><td>yourself</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">3rd person (NON-PARTICIPANTS, PRESENCES, etc.)</td><td>masculine</td><td>he, him</td><td rowspan="3">they</td><td>his</td><td rowspan="3">their, theirs</td><td>himself</td></tr>
<tr><td>feminine</td><td>she, her</td><td>Her</td><td>herself</td></tr>
<tr><td>Neuter</td><td>It</td><td>Its</td><td>itself</td></tr>
</table>

With that in mind, consider the following example:

(5) How deeply I felt within my spirit the blissful happiness of Anselmus, who was now inwardly united with his gentle Serpentina, and who had withdrawn to the mysterious KINGDOM of Marvels which he recognized as the home toward which his heart, filled with strange foreknowledge, had always yearned. In vain, I tried, gentle reader, to set before you those glories which surrounded Anselmus, or even to create in the faintest degree an impression of them in words. I was reluctantly obliged to admit myself to the feeble quality of all my attempts at expressing this. The meanness of commonplace life made me feel chained and silent. I grew thick in the torture of my own futility; I wandered about as if in a dream (Hoffmann 1969: 87).

In (5), the sentence *In vain, I tried, gentle reader, to set before you those glories which surrounded Anselmus, or even to create in the faintest degree an impression of them in words* quite clearly transcends the boundary between text world and discourse world, as it directly addresses the reader, using the second person pronoun *you*, even using the noun phrase *gentle reader* as a vocative, and comments on the narrator's failed attempt at imagery. In doing so, the narrative briefly breaks into the participation structure, as it were, by deictically pointing at the reader.

We are now able to address double deixis. The term was introduced by Herman (1994; 1997), who characterizes it as a metaleptic phenomenon. Put very simply, double deixis is when a deictic form points at two referents simultaneously. In theory, any type of deictic form may be used double-deictically, but the phenomenon has primarily been observed in second person forms – in particular *you* and derived forms (see Fludernik 1994; Herman 1994), whose grammatical profile harbors a particular potential for double deixis:

> Functionally speaking *you* superimposes the deictic role of the audience or overhearer (in this instance the reader) onto the deictic role(s) spatiotemporally anchored in the fictional world elaborated over the course of the narrative. The grammatical profile of *you* thus drastically underdetermines its deictic functions; the text projects itself into a range of contexts that cannot be strictly delimited. (Herman 1994: 390)

Herman (1994: 380-381) argues that, *you* can be thought of as having an actualized addressive function in which the actual addressee is the referent (as seen in, for instance, (5) above) or a fictionalized addressive function in which a fictional addressee at the diegetic level (or text world level) is the referent. Double-deictic use of *you* falls between the two types of addressive functions:

> In doubly deictic contexts, in other words, the audience will find itself more or less subject to conflation with the fictional self addressed by *you*. The deictic force of *you* is double; or to put it another way, the scope of the discourse context embedding the description is indeterminate, as is the domain of participants in principle specified or picked out by *you*. (Herman 1994: 339)

Seeing that a double-deictic second person form points simultaneously to a deigetic enactor in the text world and the actual reader in the discourse world, double deixis is indeed a metaleptic phenomenon. It should be emphasized that the use of *you* in (5) above, while metaleptic and discursively deictic, is not double-deictic because it exclusively points at the READER. In order for a second person form to be double-deictic, it has to display both discursive deixis and diegetic deixis.

Herman (1994) argues that the potential for double deixis in *you* lies within its grammatical profile. Interestingly, the generic use of *you*, in which *you* is used with reference to a generic participant in a generic situation, also seems to be double-deictic in that, while at first blush not referring to the addressee, it still invites the addressee to simulate that the addressee is involved in the generic situation (Gast et al. 2015: 150-151). That way, generic *you* technically does refer to the addressee while at the same time referring to an actor in a generic situation. This is seen in Kitagawa & Lehrer's (1990: 749) example:

(6) You're going down the highway, you're having a wonderful time, singing a song, and suddenly – you get into an argument.

This example describes a perceived generic, or typical, scenario. Through the use of *you* rather than a more impersonal form, the sentence prompts the addressee to simulate being in the situation of driving down the highway, having a wonderful time and getting into an argument. As Gast et al. (2015) suggest, that type of simulation creates empathy in the addressee, empathy being yet another socio-cognitive ability.

My assumption is that a similar simulation process is prompted in readers through double-deictic use of second person forms. Moreover, in double-deictic use of *you* in literary fiction, the interactional frame in Figure 2 is evoked by virtue of the communicative situation being that of engaging with a literary text. These cognitive processes and structures allow readers to understand double deixis as double deixis, and they generate in the reader a type of empathy that draws the reader into the narrative, as it were, more so than first or third person narratives would do.

5. Double deixis in solitaire adventures

Having defined double deixis, drawing on text world theory (Gavins 2007) and frame semantics (Fillmore 1982), I will now turn to some examples of double deixis and examine the functionalities of this phenomenon in closer detail.

The solitaire adventure is a literary genre in pop culture in which readers have to make choices to determine how the narrative, which has a branching plot structure, develops. Branching plot narratives in literature can be traced back to the 1930s and 1940s through the likes of Doris Webster and Mary Alden Hopkins, Julio Cortazar, E.W. Hildick, and Betty Orr-Nilsson. However, it was the growth in popularity of roleplaying games such as *Dungeons & Dragons* in the 1970s and

1980s that popularized branching plot narratives in the form of solitaire adventures. This is why branching plot narratives are now closely associated with the roleplaying game industry. Solitaire adventures were particularly popular in the mid-1970s and the 1980s; among the most popular franchises in this period were *Choose Your Own Adventure*, *Tunnels and Trolls* solo adventures, *Lone Wolf*, *Fabled Lands*, and *Fighting Fantasy*. Although their popularity waned in the 1990s, the solitaire adventure industry remains active today.

Most solitaire adventures are written in the second person so as to give the impression that the reader is the hero of the narrative in question. This is reflected in, for instance, the *Fighting Fantasy* slogans *A thrilling fantasy adventure in which YOU are the hero!* and *A Fighting Fantasy Gamebook in which YOU are the hero!* Solitaire adventures are also called gamebooks because, rather than simply being read, gamebooks are designed to be played and are interactive in two senses. Firstly, structurally, a solitaire adventure consists of enumerated paragraphs each of which presents a scenario that is part of the overall narrative. At the end of the majority of such paragraphs, the reader is presented with a number of actions the protagonist can perform; the reader must then turn to a specific enumerated paragraph describing the action in question and the scenario it amounts to. Below is an example of the end of a paragraph in a typical solitaire adventure (Schweighofer 1997: 10) in which the protagonist is a teenage boy who has stowed away on a spaceship:

(7) Well, you're not about ready to fly the ship yourself. If you could do that, you wouldn't need to hitch a ride. There isn't much room to hide up here. Perhaps you should continue your search for a good place to stow away …

To search the cockpit for a good hiding place, go to 12.

If you want to punch into the ship's main computer, go to 16.

To figure out what all these controls do, go to 19.

If you'd like to check out other areas of the ship, consult the freighter's deck plans and go to the numbered entry corresponding to the section of the ship you want to explore.

Secondly, the reader must roll dice to determine whether the protagonist can successfully solve a task or defeat an antagonist. Typically, the protagonist and antagonistic characters have skill sets, each skill having a numerical value, and tasks have certain numerical difficulty ratings. Based on these so-called stats, the reader is required to roll dice within a certain numerical range. If the dice fall within this range, the protagonist is successful, and if they do not, the protagonist fails. Here is an example from another typical solitaire adventure (Schweighofer 1995: 161), in which the protagonist is an android on a quest to break his owner out of prison:

(8) You scan your droid memory for any information about Byblos and the starport there – a Moderate task with a difficulty of 15. You must use your planetary systems skill of 4D+1 – roll four dice and add one.

If your roll is 15 or higher, go to 11.

If your roll is 14 or less, go to 2.

In both examples, the narrative is accompanied by reading instructions. Such instructions are a conventional feature trait of the solitaire adventure. They are normally in the imperative mood and often have some type of causal syntactic structure, such as *if X, then go to Y* or *to do X, go to Y.* As mentioned above, the second person perspective is a typical feature of solitaire adventures, but, unlike the mandatory reading instructions, second person narratives are not *per se* genre-defining, as solitaire adventures narrated in a third person perspective do exist. Here is an example of a third person solitaire adventure in which the protagonist is the famous *Star Wars* character Han Solo (Denning 1990: 7):

(9) More TIE fire blossoms in front of the *Falcon*. Han starts to target the laser cannons, then pauses. If he hopes to hit anything, he will have to fly a fairly steady course. That will make the *Falcon* an easy target. Instead of asking for damage, he can rely on his piloting skill to evade the TIE fire until he reaches Mon Torri's rings.

If Han returns the TIE fire, turn to section 115.

If Han tries to evade fire, turn to section 79.

We can hypothesize that in (9), unlike (7-8), the reader is not drawn into the narrative to the same extent: because it is narrated in the third person, it does not prompt the reader to empathize with the protagonist to the same extent. Following Stockwell & Mahlberg (2015), I assume that the reader engages in the process of modeling Han Solo's mind (probably in accordance with what the reader knows about the character from the movies, novels, comics, video games and any other media Han Solo appears in). In contrast, because they are from second person narratives, (7-8) make use of second person pronouns to double-deictically refer to the protagonist and to the reader simultaneously, prompting the reader to engage in the empathy-generating simulation process. Consequently the reader not only models the mind of the protagonist but also empathetically projects the reader's own mind onto the protagonist.

This might involve yet another process of what could be called enhanced personification of a fictional character, because the process of empathy and projection that the double-deictic use of second person pronouns prompts might link up with the phenomenon of graded person-ness described by Stockwell & Mahlberg (2015: 132-133) as follows:

> Our model and default presumption here is that you are conscious of yourself. In this sense, you are the best example of person-ness, and other people that you encounter are modelled on your sense of person-ness as relatively good and less good examples of persons. So your family and close friends are also very good examples of persons, but acquaintances, passing strangers, faceless crowds, people in the news, people in history, and so on, are less and less good examples of persons. … Usually, animals, objects and abstractions are very weak examples of persons, prototypically, although linguistic manifestations such as personification and animation can make them better examples. Even here there is scaling: your own cat or pet dog is likely to be a better example of a person than someone else's pet, and that steak or fish you are about to eat has undergone depersonification at some level in your mind ...

It should be mentioned that graded person-ness is based on the cognitive phenomenon of prototypicality (see Lakoff 1987); to quote Stockwell & Mahlberg (2015: 132), "it is not a moral nor evaluative scale!" Thus, in the radial prototype network of person-ness, Han Solo has a

relatively high degree of person-ness as a character in (9) when the reader models Han Solo's mind, but the protagonist in (7-8) has an even higher degree due to empathetic simulation process.

Turning to the metaleptic nature of second person narratives in solitaire adventures further, consider the following example from Green (2007: 7), which very clearly demonstrates the double-deictic nature of second person forms in such narratives:

(10) It will take too long to make the journey back to Hallow's Well and follow the other road going west, so you decide to cut across country and rejoin the road once you are well past Aryll. Once off the road, however, you are at the mercy of the creatures roaming the wilderness that surrounds the small human settlement. It is not long before your scent is picked up by a pack of wolves, and moments later they are upon you. You must fight all these beasts at the same time.

	SKILL	STAMINA
First WOLF	7	6
Second WOLF	6	7
Third WOLF	8	7

If you survive the attack, you continue across the moors until you can rejoin the road, several kilometres west of Aryll; turn to **367**.

There are no less than seven instances of *you*/*your* in this excerpt, in which the protagonist is attacked by three wolves. It should be very clear that *you*/*your* refers to the protagonist enactor as the character who is traveling to Aryll and decides to go off-road to get there only to be attacked by the three wolves. It is of course not the reader this happens to. Although it says *if you survive the attack*, it would be absurd to think that the author actually expects the reader to drop dead if the fight with the wolves does not turn out in the reader's favor and the protagonist enactor is killed in the narrative. This is all confined within the text world. Still, the excerpt concludes with a reference to the discourse world in the form of the reading instruction *turn to **367***. This also applies to the reading instructions in (7) – namely, *To search the cockpit for a good hiding place, go to 12*, *If you want to punch into the ship's main computer, go to 16*, *To figure out what all these controls do, go to 19* and *If you'd like to check out other areas of the ship, consult the freighter's deck plans and go to the numbered entry corresponding to the section of the ship you want to explore* – and (8) – namely, *If your roll is 15 or higher, go to 11* and *If your roll is 14 or less, go to 2* as well as *a Moderate task with a difficulty of 15. You must use your planetary systems skill of 4D+1 – roll four dice and add one*. The juxtaposition of narrative and reading instructions suggests that the second person references in (7-8) and (10) simultaneously point at the protagonist enactor and the reader, making the second person pronouns metaleptic and double-deictic. The reading instructions themselves are, of course, purely metaleptic as well. We see something similar in (11-13):

(11) You settle the ship into orbit around a blue planet and check your scanners. It appears that the entire surface is covered in water, although there do seem to be life-forms within the water. You may either beam down, taking two crew members from your *Adventure Sheet* with you (turn to **288**) or leave orbit and head for the green planet (turn to **136**). (Jackson 2005: §259)

(12) The masked man reaches into the cabin of the bus and brings out a mahogany box. Inside are two magnificent pistols. He places one bullet in each hand and says, 'Choose your weapon.' You pick up one pistol and balance it in your hand to get a feel for its weight. You both then

stand back to back and the man tells you to walk ten paces, turn, and fire when ready. You breathe deeply and count out loud the ten paces walked. You then turn and see the masked man with his pistol pointed straight at you. Both of you fire at once.

DUELLIST SKILL 9 STAMINA 9

Carry out one Attack Round using the Shooting rules. If you survive the duel, turn to **208**. (Livingstone 2005: §291)

(13) As you accelerate, the ogre sticks his legs out and tries to trip you. Test your Luck. If you are Lucky, turn to **78**. If you are Unlucky, turn to **255**. (Livingstone 2003: §310)

I all three cases, metaleptic reading instructions appear, with varying levels of integration, intermingled with narrative text: the adventure sheet[5] is mentioned in (11), (12) features NPC[6] stats as in (10) and mentions game mechanics and combat rules, and (13) refers to the protagonist enactor's own stats.

The simulation that the double-deictic use of second person forms prompts causes the perspective of the reader to meld with the diegetically deictic relations in the text world. Consider the following paragraph from Thomson & Smith (2006: §208):

(14) The footsteps come on and from the air above you a dull rasping voice intones: 'I am a spirit of the dead and we are beyond number.' Suddenly a terrible blow knocks you backwards. Lose 2 STAMINA points. You must fight the UNSEEN STALKER striking out blindly and hoping your thrusts will harm it.

UNSEEN STALKER SKILL 9 STAMINA 8

If you win, turn to **250**.

There are several layers of interaction between diegetic deixis and the double-deictic use of *you* here.

Consider the following expressions *come* in *the footsteps come on*, *above* in *the air above you*, and *backwards* in *a terrible blow knocks you backwards*. These are all arguably diegetic spatial-deictic terms. *Come* is, as Fillmore (1997) has proposed, spatial-deicic as it specifies motion in space towards a vantage point that coincides with the deictic center; the vantage point also coincides, through the above-mentioned simulation, with a reader perspective that has been projected onto the protagonist enactor. The directional adverb *backwards* expresses motion in the opposite direction of what is perceived as the front. Ordinarily, this is a matter of absolute orientation rather than relative orientation as backs and fronts are often inherent in the structure of entities. However, *forwards* and *backwards* can also coincide with the perspective of a vantage point, such as the deictic center, in such a way that *forwards* corresponds to what is in front of the vantage point and *backwards* corresponds to what is behind the vantage point. Arguably, that

[5] The adventure sheet is a piece of paper where the reader can keep track of the protagonist's stats, inventory of items, companion characters and the like.

[6] NPC stands for *n*on-*p*layable *c*haracter. The term is common in computer game terminology but also applies to characters in roleplaying games and solitaire adventures that are not played by the player (or reader). In solitaire adventures, NPCs are thus all other enactors than the protagonist; this includes antagonists, such as the wolves in (10), The Duellist in (12), and the ogre in (13).

applies here in the description of the protagonist enactor being knocked over. It is by virtue of the second person reference and the melding of the reader's perspective with the perspective of the protagonist enactor that *backwards* qualifies as a spatial-deictic expression. The same applies to *above*: ordinarily, *above* and *below* are a matter of absolute coordinates, but, due to the double-deictic use of *you*, *above* is construed as spatially relative to the vantage point of the reader and protagonist enactor. We also see this at play in *There isn't much room to hide up here* in (7), in which the proximal locative adverb *here* specifies the protagonist enactor's location in the spaceship's cockpit. Similarly, the directional adverb *down* in *beam down* in (11) becomes deictic through the second person narration, making the downward direction relative to the vantage point of the reader and protagonist enactor.

We see an interplay between the double-deictic use of *you* and diegetic person-deictic relations in The Unseen Stalker's dialog in (14), with *I* and *we* referring to The Unseen Stalker and the other spirits of the dead as enactors relative to the protagonist enactor. Similarly, The Duellist in (12) addresses the protagonist through *your* and the imperative form of *choose*. This use of *your* is not double-deictic but purely deigetically deictic, as it only refers to the protagonist enactor as the recipient of The Duellist's directive speech act.

Common to (14) and all the other examples is the fact that they are narrated in the present tense. This makes sense as it gives the impression of a narrative that literally unfolds as one reads it. This, of course applies to all narratives, but the sense of immediacy that the present tense gives seems to be particularly compatible with a branching plot narrative in which the reader must choose on behalf of the protagonist enactor how the narrative unfolds.

6. Final remarks

In this paper, I have proposed a theory of metaleptic double deixis in second person narratives, drawing on insights by Fillmore (1982), Gavins (2007), and Herman (1994; 1997), which may be useful in the description of cognitive processes involved in the generation of empathy in readers with protagonists in second person narratives.

It was proposed that double-deictic uses of second person pronouns evoke in readers an interactional frame that represents the experience of READING LITERARY FICTION. The frame not only specifies the participation structure in that particular communicative situation but also distinguishes between the fiction in the text and the real-world situation of the reader reading the text. Thus, despite the fact that readers apply everyday cognitive processes and structures in mentally constructing the narrative, such as for example mind-modeling, they ultimately are able to distinguish between the real world and the world in the narrative. I further suggested that the "real world" and the "world in the narrative" correspond to Gavin's (2007) notions of the discourse world and the text world.

Importantly, the take-home message here is that the boundary between discourse world and text world has cognitive status. Double-deictic uses of second person pronouns evoke in readers the interactional frame of READING LITERARY FICTION and metaleptically transgress the boundary between discourse world and text world in that they refer to both a protagonist enactor and to the reader; consequently, they prompt readers to project themselves onto the protagonist rather than simply modeling the protagonist's mind. This, it is held, generates a very strong relation of empathy between reader and protagonist.

It must be emphasized that this theory is not the final say on the matter, and much work is yet to be done. It should be considered a first step towards understanding the mental processes involved in reading second person narratives, such as, for instance, solitaire adventures.

References

Ben-Merre, David (2011). '"I'm so vain, I bet I think this song is about myself": Carly Simon, pop

music and the problematic “I” of lyric poetry’. In Karin Kukkonen & Sonja Klimek (eds.), *Metalepsis in Popular Culture*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 65-82.

Bühler, Karl (1999 [1934]). *Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache*. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.

Clark, Herbert (1996). *Using Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohn, Dorrit (2012). ‘Metalepsis and *mise en abyme*’. *Narrative*, 20(1): 105-114.

Croft, William A. & Esther J. Wood (2000). ‘Construal operations in linguistics and artificial intelligence’. In Liliana Albertazzi (ed.), *Meaning and Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Approach.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 51-78.

Croft, William A., Chiaki Taoka & Esther J. Wood (2001). ‘Argument linking and the commercial transaction frame in English, Russian and Japanese.’ *Language Sciences*, 23: 579-602.

Denning, Troy (1990). *Scoundrel’s Luck*. Honesdale, PA: WEG.

Fillmore, Charles (1982). ‘Frame semantics’. In The Linguistic Society of Korea (eds.), *Linguistics in the Morning Calm: Selected Papers from SICOL-1981*. Seoul: Hanshin. 111-137.

Fillmore, Charles (1997). *Lectures on Deixis*. Chicago: Chigaco University Press.

Fludernik, Monika (1994). ‘Second person narrative and related issues’. *Style*, 28(3): 281-311.

Fludernik, Monika (2003). ‘Scene shift, metalepsis and the metaleptic mode’. *Style*, 37(4): 382-400.

Fowles, John (2010 [1969]). *The French Lieutenant’s Woman*. London: Vintage Books.

Gast, Volker, Lisa Deringer, Florian Haas & Olga Rudolf (2015). ‘Impersonal uses of the second person singular: A pragmatic analysis of generalization and empathy effects’. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 88: 148-162.

Gavins, Joanna (2007). *Text World Theory: An Introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Genette, Gérard (1980). *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method* (J. E. Lewin, trans.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Goodwin, Charles & Marjorie H. Goodwin (2004). ‘Participation’. In Alessandro Duranti (ed.), *A Companion to Linguistic Anthropology*. Oxford: Blackwell. 222-244.

Goffman, Erwing (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Goffman, Erwing (1981). *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Green, Jonathan (2007 [1993]). *Spellbreaker*. Cambridge: Wizard Books.

Herman, David (1994). ‘Textual *you* and double deixis in Edna O’Brien’s *A Pagan Place*’. *Style*, 28(3): 378-410.

Herman, David (1997). ‘Toward a formal description of narrative metalepsis’. *Journal of Literary Semantics*, 26(2): 132-152.

Higgins, Jack (1976 [1975]). *The Eagle Has Landed*. London: Pan Books.

Hoffmann, Ernst T.A. (1969). *Tales of E. T. A. Hoffmann* Leonard J. Kent & Elizabeth C. Knight (trans., ed.). Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Jackson, Steve (2005 [1983]). *Starship Traveller.* Cambridge: Wizard Books.

Jackson, Steve & Ian Livingstone (2003 [1982]). *The Warlock of Firetop Mountain*. Cambridge: Wizard Books.

Jacobsen, Erling (1971). *De Psykiske Grundprocesser*. Copenhagen: Det Berlingske Forlag.

Jensen, Kim E. (2015). ‘Beware the beast in black: The cognitive poetics of terror in “Night Crawler”’. *Philologie im Netz*, 71: 24-61.

Jensen, Kim E. (2018). ‘Drabelig dobbeltdeiksis’. *Ny Forskning i Grammatik*, 25: 53-69.

Kitagawa, Chisato & Adrienne Lehrer (1990). ‘Impersonal uses of personal pronouns’. *Journal of Pragmatics,* 14: 739-759.

Kukkonen, Karin (2011). ‘Metalepsis in popular culture: An introduction’. In Karin Kukkonen & Sonja Klimek (eds.), *Metalepsis in Popular Culture*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 1-21.

Lakoff, George (1987). *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lawler, John M. (1989). 'Lexical semantics in the commercial transaction frame: *Value*, *worth*, *cost* and *price*'. *Studies in Language*, 13(2): 381-404.

Levinson, Stephen C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Livingstone, Ian (2003 [1986]). *Trial of Champions*. Cambridge: Wizard Books.

Livingstone, Ian (2005 [1985]). *Freeway Fighter*. Cambridge: Wizard Books.

Pier, John (2005). 'Metalepsis'. In David Herman, Mandred Jahn & Marie-Laure Ryan (eds.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory.* London: Routledge. 303-304.

Reddy, Mickael J. (1993). 'The conduit metaphor: A case of frame conflict in our language about language'. In Andrew Ortony (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 164-201.

Schweighofer, Peter (1995). 'Crimson jailbreak'. In Peter Schweighofer (ed.), *Star Wars Adventure Journal 5*. Honesdale, PA: WEG. 154-171.

Schweighofer, Peter (1997). *Imperial Double-Cross*. Honesdale, PA: WEG.

Shannon, Claude & Warren Weaver (1949). *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press.

Stockwell, Peter & Michaela Mahlberg (2015). 'Mind-modelling with corpus stylistics in *David Copperfield*'. *Language and Literature*, 23(2): 129-147.

Thomson, Jamie & Mark Smith. (2006 [1984]). *Talisman of Death*. Cambridge: Wizard Books.

Yu, Charles (2010). *How to Live Safely in a Science Fictional Universe*. London: Corvus.