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DECENTRALISATION IN NAMIBIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE ERONGO REGION

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Abstract
This article gives a general understanding of decentralisation focusing on the context in which decentralisation is planned and implemented. A conceptualisation of the 'African state' is developed and analysed in order to understand the difficulties in applying a European concept in an African context. A case study of regional planning in the Erongo region is used to illustrate how the decentralisation process in Namibia is influenced by the African state in terms of the pace and direction of decentralisation.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is the result of my internship at the Erongo Regional Council[1] in Namibia, as part of the ninth semester of the Master's programme in International Development Studies – and involves a study of the decentralisation in Namibia.

The Namibian government launched a "Decentralisation Policy" in March 1998 designed to enhance and guarantee participatory democracy, improve rapid sustainable development as well as improve the capacity of the government to plan and administrate the development (MRLGH 1998:5). The overall theme of the "Decentralisation Policy" is democracy and development.

In the following year after the launch, new structures were established at the regional level down to the local level, in the shape of local committees involving the different parties, and not least the local community in the regional planning (MRLGH 1998:25-8). Initiatives were taken by the central government to transfer some of the planning functions and decision-making to

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[1] Namibia is divided into thirteen Regional Councils, recently established in 1992 with the purpose of co-ordinating the overall development within the region. The Erongo Regional Council Office is, if one should draw a parallel to the Danish system, basically the same as a Danish Amt with similar responsibilities such as health, education and environment within the region. The Regional Councils together with the Local Authorities respectively constitute the second and third tier of the government structure in Namibia.

the lower levels. The whole idea of decentralisation was to make the Regional Council the overall coordinating body regarding development within the region, which besides coordinating the input from the Local Authorities and the Line Ministries, also had to manage the input from the people living in the urban and rural areas (ARC 1997). This new decentralised structure would enable the people living in urban areas and particularly those living in rural areas to participate through various community committees in matters related to the future development of their communities.

This paper examines the *current* situation of the decentralisation process in Namibia, as decentralisation in Namibia is still an ongoing process. It is based on a case study of regional planning in Erongo with a focus on community participation in the rural areas. The study can be divided into three questions, namely:

1. What is the situation concerning the transfer of planning, decision-making and administrative authority from the central government to the regional government in Erongo?
2. How are the local communities in the rural areas incorporated in the decentralised structures?
3. How has the local community responded so far to the new "political role" as decision-makers on local matters?

In other words, what are the possibilities for participation, and is there a will to participate among the communities?

These questions are attached to the question of *how* the decentralisation process has proceeded so far. This leads to another important question, namely, *why* has the decentralisation process proceeded the way it has? Examining the latter question is maybe more important in order to achieve an understanding of the current situation regarding the decentralisation process in Namibia, which is why both questions will be studied in this paper.

The decentralisation process in Namibia is interesting to study, because a new relation between the state and civil society must be established. This way of doing politics is not seen earlier in the history of Namibia due to the German military colonial rule, which was followed by South Africa's apartheid rule (Pisani 1986:23-35, 52-63). Furthermore, the general experience with African countries and decentralisation is that it is difficult to transfer functions from the central government to the regional and local governments, since decentralisation is about distribution of power (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1996:81). Regardless of the degree of decentralisation, mobilisation and participation of

the people is more difficult than imagined. Some authors would even claim that it has more to do with rhetoric than reality (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1996:81).
In the following part, the theoretical framework is presented which links the concept of decentralisation to the political setting in which it is planned and implemented. In this case, it is linked to a conceptualisation of the 'African state', which is deduced from the foremost common features of the African states. The case study of regional planning in Erongo is subsequently presented.

THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISATION

Decentralisation is just a policy, which depends on the degree and the form of decentralisation, and not least the political setting from which the decentralisation policy emerges. This is important in order to understand the constraints and opportunities for the implementing organisations to translate policies into actions (Rondinelli 1983:27).

The general definition of decentralisation is:

> "*... a transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority from the central government to its field organisation, local government, or NGO's*"
>
> (Rondinelli 1983:18)

The definition is very broad, however most refer to the four major forms of decentralisation, namely: *devolution, deconcentration, delegation* and *privatisation.* ***Devolution*** is considered to be the most extensive form of decentralisation, and involves a transfer of functions and authority to local units of government which are *autonomous,* meaning their activities are substantially outside the direct control of the central government and only bounded by the broad national policy guidelines (The Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research 1997:19). This form of decentralised structure invites a greater amount of participation, and is referred to by some authors as *democratic decentralisation* due to the more open political forum (Mawhood 1983:3). ***Deconcentration,*** contrary to devolution, is about a redistribution of selected functions and authority to lower levels within the central government, which are situated outside headquarters (Rondinelli 1983:18). The decision-making is settled internally within the administration, where the delegated authority can be altered or withdrawn (Mawhood 1983a:1). ***Delegation*** is a transfer of selected administrative functions to organisations that are not under the direct control of the central government ministries (Huda 1996:113). Deconcentration and delegation are more associated with *bureaucratic* or

administrative decentralisation than political decentralisation (Mawhood 1983:3). The motive for choosing these two forms of decentralisation is effectiveness and efficiency rather than democracy (Hyden 1983:86). Finally, ***privatisation*** is a form of decentralisation where the central government transfers some of its planning and administrative responsibilities to volunteers or NGO's (Rondinelli 1983:24).

These forms of decentralisation are all associated with some kind of a transfer of functions from the central government to either lower units of the government, NGO's or other organisations. However, the degree of decentralisation varies, which in turn has different impacts on the government structure, the political structure, the amount of community participation and the preconditions for successful implementation (Rondinelli 1983:25).

The four forms of decentralisation do not exist in their pure form, which makes the use of the above definitions complicated and stereotypical when studying decentralisation. This is why Conyers (1986:89), a recognised author within this field, suggests that instead of focussing on the different forms of decentralisation, one should start examining:

1. the functional activities over which authority is transferred;
2. the type of authority or powers which are transferred with respect to each functional activity;
3. the level(s) or area(s) to which such authority or power is transferred;
4. the individual, organisation or agency to which authority or power is transferred at each level and;
5. the legal or administrative means by which authority or power is transferred.

This approach gives a better understanding of the concept of decentralisation, as well as a more meaningful way of studying and measuring the different degrees of decentralisation, than just comparing the different policies to the four major forms of decentralisation. Conyers also focuses on the distribution of *power: policy-making power*, *financial power* and *power of personnel matters* (Conyers 1986:94). It is important to identify all three types of power when studying decentralisation, as the three types of power are interrelated. For example, it is often seen in less developed countries that both regional and local governments have planning authority, but because of the lack of control or access over financial powers or personnel powers, the planning authority becomes ineffectual (Conyers 1986:94).

ASSUMPTIONS SURROUNDING DECENTRALISATION AND PARTICIPATION

Participation is often mentioned in connection with decentralisation and vice versa. It is a well known assumption that decentralisation enhances popular participation, since decentralised structures create a more open political forum for planning and decision-making (Conyers 1986:92). Participation is therefore one of many objectives associated with decentralisation, but participation is also considered an important means to achieve both administrative and political objectives (Marsden 1991:29). The latter is important to note. Participation is often a precondition for administrative and political objectives to succeed. For instance, it is believed that community participation[2] in terms of participation in the appraisal, implementation and evaluation of a development project is beneficial for the effectiveness and efficiency of the project (Marsden 1991:30). In connection with decentralisation, participation can be described as both a means to an end, and an end in itself (Marsden 1991:29), which makes participation an important part of decentralisation.

LIMITATIONS TO DECENTRALISATION AND PARTICIPATION

The extent and thriving of community participation depends on the transfer of the different powers and how the local community is incorporated in the decentralised structure. This is because community participation is mostly an idea generated from decentralisation policies, which are initiated entirely at the national level, and not requested by the lower units of the government or the people themselves (Conyers 1986:92).

There are several barriers for successful implementation of decentralisation. One of the main barriers is lack of political commitment from the central government to transfer sufficient power to the local and regional governments, since doing so would reduce their own power. This generally limits the impact of decentralisation including community participation (Huda 1996:115). Decentralisation is, like many other development concepts, a European concept[3] based on the experience, norms, and value systems of European countries (Brown 1995:2-4). Throughout the history of development, European concepts and norms have been imposed and applied to solve the "underdevelopment" of Africa without any noticeable improvement (Leys 1996:188-196). Lately, it has become a well-known fact that African countries

[2] Community participation has been defined as a process by which the different groups in the community are involved with the appraisal, implementation and evaluation of a development project with the view of enhancing their well being in terms of income, personal growth, self-reliance or other values.

[3] Decentralisation was used in the 1950's and 1960's in Europe to deal with the rapid growth of the welfare state, which left the central government unable to satisfy the expectation of increased responsibilities (Hyde 1983:84).

have a unique history, and that they differ from European countries in various ways such as culturally and in terms of social structure. This makes it difficult to apply European concepts to an African context (Brown 1995:3).

THE AFRICAN STATE

After studying the development of Africa for some time, Goran Hyden has made a general conceptualisation of a typical African state, in which he describes the main features and their influence on how the state functions (Hyden 1983). It is within this context decentralisation should be seen.

THE STATE STRUCTURE

The African state is, first of all, known for being a 'socialist state' associated with a central planning bureaucracy (Hyden 1983:51-2). After independence, African leaders/governments were in favour of socialism, because capitalism was associated with the colonial powers and their economic system which was imposed on African countries ((Hyden 1983:1). During the 1980s, there were some attempts to minimise the state's influence on the economy and depoliticise other sectors (Hyden 1983:3). However, the African state has been about central planning and decision-making up until now, that is, until the recent introduction of decentralisation policies.

THE POLITICAL CULTURE

There are distinct differences between the political culture of African and European countries. Most African countries are ruled by a single party, often with a charismatic leader in front and usually without any opposition (Hyden 1983:33). In this one party system, there is a large concentration of power. Political affiliation to the party is demographic, meaning that certain tribes or clans located in a part or parts of the country belong to the party (Hyden 1983:37). The different clans have great influence in society, since there is no ruling class. A clan can be described as:

> *"[...] a political faction, operating within the institutions of the state and the government party: it exists above all to promote the interests of its members through political competition, and its first unifying principle is the prospect of the material rewards of political success. Political office and the spoils of office are the very definition of success: loot is the clanic totem."*
>
> (O'Brien 1975:149)

This cultural phenomenon exists in various degrees throughout Africa, and the general aim for clan leaders in Africa is to benefit from political office and allocate resources and income to their own members. African politics is therefore not about allocation of public goods as we know it, but about getting the most public goods as possible (Hyden 1983:39).

The strong existence of clans in African society has made it necessary for African leaders to incorporate clan leaders in the government, which limits room for popular participation (Hyden 1983:48). However, the need for organisation and mobilisation of civil society in political matters is at the same time little, because the clans attend to their interests (Hyden 1983:35). The unions and other interest groups are therefore more or less invisible in the political arena where clans and individuals set the agenda. It is therefore not a surprise that in most of these African states participation by civil society has not yet been institutionalised (Hyden 1983:35).

The above description of the political culture differs distinctly from that in Europe, due to some existing cultural and social relations in African societies, which are reinforced by a peculiar type of economy, namely, 'economics of affection'. This has affected the economic and social organisation in Africa, including the African state (Hyden 1983:37). This type of economy is especially prevalent in the rural communities, though it is an integrated part of society and political life more generally (Hyden 1983:9). An economy of affection is characterised by a person's or household unit's exchange of goods to another person in order to secure the physical and social maintenance of the person or household, whereby a patron-client relation occurs. An economy of affection can be defined as:

> *"[...] a network of support groups, communications and interactions among structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other affinities for example religion. It links together in a systematic fashion a variety of discrete economic and social units which in other regards may be autonomous."*
>
> (Hyden 1983:82)

This network is often *ad hoc* and informal rather than regular and formalised. This type of economy, or network, complements the operation of the clan and vice versa. The tradition in African politics is to make use of public resources in order to "cut a deal", which is a result of the earlier mentioned patronage

politics.[4] The African state bureaucracy is used to accommodating competing clan interests, and is often portrayed as a 'soft state', due to its sensitivity towards clan pressures that occur from the use of an economy of affection (Hyden 1983:69).

Politics in the African state therefore are much more based on personal networks and power than institutionalised processes, in which the different stakeholders including civil society are represented. The African state is known for having a little but powerful political elite, with strong reference to their clans, who conduct the decision-making. The African state, therefore differs from a western understanding of a state. When applying political or administrative concepts to the African state one must be aware of these differences.

THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF REGIONAL PLANNING IN ERONGO

The theoretical understanding of the current situation of regional planning in Erongo with respect to community participation is that the political setting, i.e. the political structure and culture in Namibia, has influenced the decentralisation process, and the reasons for this are found in the political setting. The African state, often a new democracy, is based on a single party rule with strong references to the clans, which makes the structure of the state so different from the European model. It is in this political setting that decentralisation is planned and implemented. The context in which decentralisation occurs is illustrated in Figure 1.

As illustrated, the African state is influenced by the historical setting as well as the surrounding African society, which also indirectly influences the decentralisation process.

[4] The purpose of patronage politics is to secure, insure and protect certain interests, for instance, a clan's.



Figure 1

It is quite obvious that the implementation of decentralisation in the African state requires a new way of doing politics in terms of intergovernmental relations, institutionalisation of the state and new political actors. It is therefore presumable that those holding power and benefiting from it will meet the changes, like others, with suspicion and maybe an unwillingness to support these new political changes. The institutionalisation of the African state regarding administrative and political processes will likewise become a challenge, considering the often informal and ad hoc structures that dominate the African state due to the economy of affection. Furthermore, the historical background of African countries, the single rule party and other prevailing features of the African state have more or less excluded civil society from political matters, which makes it difficult to mobilise community participation. In other words, it is rather difficult to implement decentralisation in this political setting, because at some point decentralisation will undermine the prevailing political structure and culture in which the elite has gained their power. Decentralisation is therefore not a blueprint that guarantees democracy

and development regardless of where in the world it is implemented:

> "*In the end every country has to find a form of decentralisation which is adapted to its own political culture and circumstances, and there is no standard model to imitate*".
>
> (Mawhood 1991:53)

The concept of decentralisation is a European concept in an African context and, due to a different set of circumstances, decentralisation cannot be expected to proceed as it did in Europe.

CASE STUDY OF REGIONAL PLANNING IN ERONGO

THE CURRENT SITUATION OF REGIONAL PLANNING IN ERONGO

The regional planning process starts with the Settlement Committee (SC), the lowest political level in Namibia, which identifies and evaluates local needs/problems and monitors the different development projects. The SC reports to the Constituency Development Committee (CDC), whose tasks do not differ from the SC's. It just operates at the constituency level and reports to the Regional Council. However, it is the Regional Development Coordinating Committee (RDCC) which coordinates the overall development in the region (MRLGH 1998a:47). The regional planning is approved by the Regional Council and the Governor, who submits the plan to the National Planning Commission (NPC), which in the end determines the priorities and direction of Namibia's development.

However, regional planning has not taken form as hoped. The lower level of the decentralised structure is rather weak, and not nearly as established as desired (Larsen 2002:41). The CDC's are on the other hand quite well established, but cooperation between the different members, e.g. government agencies, sector ministries, Local Authorities and NGO's in the area, is lacking, which hinders them in coming up with serious suggestions for a development plan for the constituency (Ibid.:42). The RDCC has the same problem. Most of the general planning is, at some point, still conducted by the Line Ministries and the Local Authorities, which makes it difficult to integrate any development proposals coming from the SCs, CDCs, and Regional Council (Ibid.:43). The new decentralised structure is more used to implement national policies and is more a top-down than bottom-up planning. The possibilities for community participation in the regional planning are rather limited, given that most SCs are not established yet. Together with the fact that the RDCC in Erongo is not functioning leaves the communities without any influence on

regional planning. Many people living in the settlements are still not aware of the decentralisation policies and the new structure which enables them to participate (Larsen 2002:44).

DECENTRALISATION IN NAMIBIA

In order for regional planning to function, a transfer of political, administrative, legislative, planning and not least financial authority from the central to the regional level is necessary. The government preferred devolution as the decentralisation model in Namibia, though admitting that decentralisation is a long-term process starting with delegation and then devolution (MRLGH 1997:13).

Starting with the transfer of functions, only few functions were transferred, which made it difficult for the Regional Council to successfully plan and coordinate development in the region, when most of the various functions were still the responsibility of the Line Ministries. The personnel decentralisation or powers of personnel has partly taken place in the shape of adequate numbers of staff, but personnel with skilled expertise and experienced have not been transferred (Larsen 2002:47-8). They are still positioned in the central government and its Line Ministries, which has made regional planning more challenging than necessary. Regarding financial powers, it is evident that funding of the decentralisation process has not taken place. The Erongo Regional Council is still dependent on the central government to fund the different project (Drake 2000:iv). This naturally affects the development planning in the region at all levels, hence the Regional Council lacks financial means to realise their development plans. Furthermore, the little political power that has been transferred to the Regional Council has, due to the lack of both personnel and financial decentralisation, had a limited effect (Larsen 2002:50). The Erongo Regional Council may prioritise and make a development strategy at its monthly meeting, but in order to realise this, the Council depends on the central government. As a result, most of the decentralised policy-making in Erongo tends to be advisory at all levels.

After having identified the different functions, powers, levels of authority and legal means regarding decentralisation in Namibia, exemplified by the Erongo region, it is obvious that the form of decentralisation taking place is delegation. This does not come as a surprise, since the Ministry of Regional, Local Government Housing (MRLGH) declared that the first phase of the decentralisation process would begin with a delegation of functions. What is surprising is the low degree of delegation. It is evident that Regional Councils are under the control of the central government.

The pace and direction of the first phase of the decentralisation process, which one day might become devolution, has not proceeded as planned. This leads us to the question: why has the decentralisation process proceeded the way it has?

THE POLITICAL SETTING IN NAMIBIA

The "Decentralisation Policy" was planned and implemented in a centralised state structure. The central government and the Line Ministries carried out all the policy-making and the implementation with the help of some well-established Local Authorities. The Regional Councils were added to the government structure in 1992 and, compared to the Local Authorities, were not nearly as economically resourceful, experienced nor educated. The establishment of the Regional Councils, therefore, demanded an exceptional effort and support by those who were involved in the decentralisation process.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE

After independence in 1990, the South West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), a liberation movement transformed into a political party which most of the population supported, ruled Namibia (Tötemeyer 2000:105). Like many other single rule parties, SWAPO had a tendency to keep the power within the members, and at the time of independence, members of SWAPO were in favour of promoting their own interests in terms of political power and material rewards (Tötemeyer 2000:100). In fact members of SWAPO did not approve of the plans for decentralisation, even though it seems so in the different official government publications (Ibid.:100). The regions and Regional Councils were a compromise between SWAPO and the opposition during the drafting of the Constitution (Ibid.:95) - the opposition at that time was more powerful than today (Pisani 1996:34). One of the main reasons for not supporting these Regional Councils was the fear of becoming a federation.

THE TENDENCY TO PATRONAGE POLITICS

The members of SWAPO still believed in the all-power party after independence, where government power had to be based on party patronage and ruled untouchable by any constitutional arrangement, which should make the party superior to the national Constitution (Tötemeyer 2000:100). Because of this attitude, the rationales for doing politics in Namibia were inevitably associated with some kind of clan or patronage politics, since many of the politicians and officials were members of SWAPO. Namibia was therefore at some point too exposed to the patronage politics, which reinforced the "economy of affection" in the civil service in Namibia (Pisani 1996:30).

Though the clan phenomenon existed in Namibia, it had not advanced to the stage of a corrupt, unrepresentative and kleptocratic state. However, some public incidents regarding mismanagement have occurred, which can be linked to the national level (Pisani 1996:33). The image of the state as being an obstacle to distributive democracy and development is therefore prevalent in Namibia (Tötemeyer 2000:108). Hence, the demand for economic satisfaction in terms of self-enrichment exists side by side with the desire for democracy (Tötemeyer 2000:105).

THE LACK OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT

Up until the launch of the "Decentralisation Policy", there was a wish in SWAPO to keep power within the party or the clan, which wanted to profit from the political office and promote the interests of its members and do politics in the traditional way. SWAPO was far from ready to distribute powers to the lower governments or any other organisation. In fact SWAPO never approved of the idea of Regional Councils and decentralisation. After having fought so long for independence SWAPO was not about to lose the power once gained, and the last thing SWAPO wished to promote were separate political and administrative areas which were created during the apartheid era. Furthermore, if decentralisation was to be implemented, it would undermine SWAPO's way of doing politics.

The MRLGH and the NPC were the leading national agencies in Namibia and had the responsibility of promoting, strengthening and facilitating sustainable regional planning (NPC 1997:19); but it has not been an easy task, given that the political commitment and support have been lacking, especially from the other Line Ministries.

The lack of political support is one of the main reasons for the slow pace of the decentralisation process in Namibia. For instance, the Act that entails a clear division of responsibilities and procedures between the government units and enables financial transfer to take place, has been in motion for a long time but not passed yet despite pressure from many stakeholders both inside and outside the government (Tötemeyer 2000:97). This delay of constitutional and legal provisions of decentralisation has affected the regional planning in every possible way. As for the direction of decentralisation in Namibia, it was outlined as devolution starting with delegation, but the extent of delegation along with the capacity building of the Regional Councils have been relatively low compared to the original plan, and the lack of political commitment is obvious through the failed attempt to delegate.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN NAMIBIA

The slow pace and the low degree of decentralisation in Namibia have made it more difficult to mobilise community participation. Civil society has never been strong in Namibia, given the country's history of colonisation. Namibia became South Africa's protectorate in 1919, and the government extended its laws to Namibia, including the racial laws (Tötemeyer 1987). Today, the centralised structure, along with the strong political elite with reference to the clan, leaves little room for civil society to participate. Up until now, there have been few initiatives to include the ordinary people in the matters. The spin off effect of community participation has therefore been rather limited. For one, the political, financial and personnel powers which should have supported the work of the different committees, including mobilisation of the people to participate in different projects, have not been transferred to the regional level. Secondly, the people living in the settlement areas are not fully aware of the decentralisation policy and the work of the SCs. This makes it difficult to mobilise participation with respect to implementation and evaluation of the development projects.

The general conclusion of the case study is that the lack of political commitment has stalled the decentralisation process, which has affected the work of the Regional Councils and made it rather impossible for the regional planning, including community participation, to function.

CONCLUSION

Decentralisation has become the new development concept which most African countries, due to the last decades of democratisation, have encountered with the hope of obtaining sustainable democratic development. Namibia, which is a relatively new democracy, wanted to improve the participatory democracy and development of the country, and saw decentralisation as an instrument to achieve these objectives. However, most governments tend to forget that:

> "*[...] greater decentralisation does not necessarily imply greater democracy let alone "power to the people". It all depends on the circumstances under which decentralisation occurs*".
>
> (Rondinelli 1983:17)

Decentralisation is therefore far from a guarantee for participatory democracy or development, which the Erongo case illustrates very well.

The study of the decentralisation process in Namibia has shown that the Namibian state is based on different values and norms, i.e. the clan phenomenon, patronage politics and economy of affection, which makes the Namibian state function somewhat differently from what we know. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that decentralisation in Namibia would have the same outcome as in Europe at this time. The decentralisation process in Namibia has so far illustrated very well that decentralisation is a European concept in an African context. Most African states are not nearly as established as western states, and are non-institutionalised, which makes it even more complicated to apply the decentralisation concept to the African state.

However, considering that decentralisation is a relatively new concept in a relatively new democracy the regional planning and community participation is functioning as well as can be expected. The decentralisation process in Namibia is still an ongoing process, and there is still a long way to go for the Namibian government, if devolution is the final aim. The Deputy Minister of the Regional Local Government Housing predicts that it will be implemented in 2030 (Tötemeyer 2000:101).

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Interview with the Councillor in the Constituency of Arandis, National Council member and elected President of the ARC, Mr. A. Kapere.

THEORIZING EURO-ATLANTIC SOCIALIZATION: INFERENCES FOR A STABLE BALKAN ORDER

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Abstract

The article attempts to provide a theoretical framework of international socialisation that helps initiate a security community-pattern of relationship in the Balkans, in its process of Euro-Atlantic accession. It focuses on the interaction between "ideas" and "institutions", and their import for the international socialisation of the Balkans. However, it delineates to what extent the ideational aspect of neoliberal-constructivism can be applied in regional policy-making; and to what extent the process of Southeast European socialisation within Euro-Atlantic structures can be used as an instrument for attaining regional stability. For this purpose, the investigation defines the concept of order for the Balkans. The suggestion is that Euro-Atlantic organisations are equipped to address the Balkan sources of conflict and encourage inter-state cooperation. The prospect and conditionality of membership provides them with significant influence in the region, which in turn facilitates regional cooperation and thus, the emergence of a nascent security community.

"It would be conceited to claim that we have an important role to play. Who are we to teach others lessons?"

Simeon Saxcoburggotsky, Prime Minister of Bulgaria[1]

INTRODUCTION

The major objective of the Euro-Atlantic (i.e. the EU and NATO) accession of the Balkans is the establishment of "a peace order" (Mintchev 2001:3) for the region.[2]

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[1] Interview with Simeon Saxcoburggotsky on 22 March 2002 at: http://www.government.bg/PrimeMinister/Interviews/2002-03-22/1485.html

[2] In "the Balkans" I include the following states: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro and Slovenia. For the purposes of the present paper I am using the Balkans and Southeastern Europe interchangeably (as synonyms); nevertheless, I am aware of the conceptual debate on their different connotations.

However, the above statement by the current Bulgarian Prime Minister is indicative of a major stasis of meaning in the Balkans, underscoring its fragmentation: the belief that Southeast European actors have *nothing to offer* for the stabilisation of the region. This evinces a kind of regional reliance on the international community not only to "sort out" the Balkan mess, but also to *suggest* (i.e. *dictate*) the way for its implementation. That is why the "existence of this international high authority... has freed the local parties of ever having to agree on anything meaningful" (Sletzinger 2001:7). Thus, it is the lack of regional initiative, rather than the oft-quoted "endemic antagonism", that is the main poser for the successful accession of the region to Euro-Atlantic structures.

This is especially clear in the post-September 11 environment, when the "Balkan fatigue" (particularly in the US) has nearly developed into "abandonment" of the region. Such noticeable lack of interest must put the pressure on Balkan actors to initiate joint projects for tackling common problems. Thus, the present theorising of Southeast European accession to Euratlantic structures aims at depicting a desirable *optimal* end state: the establishment of a security community in the Balkans. The purpose of accession is perceived by this exploration not simply as individual regional states becoming members of these institutions; but that in the process they establish a particular type of *order* in the Balkans. In this respect, the launch of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (SP) in 1999, *in theory* suggests the institution of a patterned relationship around the buzzwords of socialisation, reciprocity and intersubjectivity.[3] However, its praxis (and the fact that it took the international community several "Balkan wars" and thousands of dead and displaced to formulate the SP) has, so far, failed to materialise this expectation.

The current article queries whether it is possible to detect in the theory and praxis of international socialisation cooperational frameworks that can be initiated without (necessarily) requiring trust or solidarity among the actors; but which (in the process of interaction) can lead to establishing trust and solidarity among them. Evincing such patterns would help the development of similar frameworks for Balkan cooperation that can establish long-term trust and solidarity among regional actors. In its essence, this is an attempt to provide a theoretical framework of international socialisation that helps initiate a security community-pattern of relationship in the region, in its process of Euro-Atlantic accession. Broadly defined socialisation involves the transmission of the rules of socially appropriate

[3] For an insightful study of the topic see Vucetic (2002).

behaviour among actors and in practical terms it provides guidelines to states and their leaders about how they are supposed to behave in the international system. Consequently, in such an altered and complicated environment as the one in the Balkans, the challenge to policy-makers of order formation in the Balkans is both pragmatic (how to adjust policy and devise new policy to changing circumstances) and substantive (how to adjust pre-existing perceptions and attitudes to accord with new realities).

This research focuses on the current debate in International Relations (IR) theory on the interaction between "ideas" and "institutions", and their import for the international socialisation of the Balkans. However, it delineates to what extent the ideational aspect of neoliberal-constructivism can be applied in regional policy-making; and to what extent the process of Southeast European socialisation within Euro-Atlantic structures can be used as an instrument for attaining regional stability. For this purpose, the investigation defines the concept of *order* for the Balkans. The objective of its theoretical considerations is to inform regional policy-making and decision-taking with the prospects from cooperation and community-building in the process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures.

The suggestion is that Euro-Atlantic organisations are equipped to address the Balkan sources of conflict and encourage inter-state cooperation. The prospect and conditionality of membership provides them with significant influence in the region. This socialisation occurs in terms of altering domestic practices through compliance and learning, and in changing external behaviour. These processes, in turn facilitate regional cooperation and thus, the emergence of a nascent security community.

WHAT IS ORDER

The pragmatic purpose for grappling with the issue of international order is to provide a definition that suggests a potential for reform in the Balkan region. Thus, order is understood to be a framework of predictability. Predictability (in the sense of self-sustaining continuity) is rationalised as a mechanism for maintaining a structure of power; and power stands for the exchange between different forms and sources of authority. In this way, a political order gives meaning to and makes sense of the relations and interactions in the international society. That is why, order is about control (in the sense of checks and balances): regulating the participants' resources, their use and distribution. It sets the framework within

which they can be meaningfully utilised and the types of interactions that the members can have.

Since the aim of this exploration is not to exhaust the meaning of the concept of order, but, instead, to suggest a framework for the discussions of Balkan order, this study would like to emphasise three distinct aspects of order: *solidarity*, *regulation* and *security* (Rengger 2000). In spite of the fact that more often than not these aspects overlap it is the distinct interaction between them that can suggest a relationship-pattern for overcoming the current stalemate in the meaning of order in the Balkans. The order that this study wants to proffer for Southeastern Europe is security community.

The self-sustaining continuity of order derives from the interaction between actors, whose behaviour in the international arena is embedded in intersubjective understandings and expectations. This intersubjectivity is constituted by the collective meanings that actors hold for each other. At the same time, interaction is as much the result of a "social contract" (in the sense of a recognition of the negative effects the disintegration of this system of exchange can have on the actors' own interests and that of the other participants) as well as a consequence of the "*solidarity*" among the participants, deriving from their "shared values" and "shared interests" (Wallace 1997:228. Emphasis added). The recognition of the interests of the rest points to an awareness of the existence of international community. This communitarism stems from a belief that actors have to work together for the internationalisation of the democratic community so that they can protect themselves from the negative effects of global economic and social forces. In other words they embed their roles in the context of belonging to an international society (Bull 1979). The understanding of their actions as conforming to a pattern of predictability is borne out of the social interaction between actors to preserve the structure of order.

Order can be "defined primarily in terms of negotiated connections among externally autonomous and internally integrated" actors (March and Olsen 1998:5). It *regulates* the relationship between actors' corporate identities and their social roles as participants in the international arena. The current international order establishes different structures for accommodating the objectives of individual actors. In this way, through the regulatory aspect of order, what used to be interstate interaction gradually developed into (or more precisely is still developing towards) supra-national, non-territorial relations. In this way, order identifies actors as separate entities and develops a pattern of predictability

through which it mediates their individual goals. At the same time, however, it initiates a process of structural change within its participants, in which they substitute a portion of their identity in favour of their own (as well as that of the system of order) stability. Such identity transformation results from the process of social interaction among actors. Changing the context of interaction (i.e. increased interdependence and societal convergence) modifies actors' expectations (in the context of "character planning"), which, subsequently, affects not only their behaviour, but brings about "critical self-reflection... to think of oneself in novel terms" (Wendt 1992:419). Thus, their identity is influenced by the relationship-pattern of predictability, where order allows for re-evaluation of actors' interests and identities without endangering the continuity of its stability.

The other important aspect of international order is the establishment of a sense of *security* (among the individual participants). Security is understood as knowledge of order's ability to overcome successfully (without disintegration into violence) disruptions to its patterns of predictability. Security is a process of continuous sanction (in the sense of guarantee) that the system of order protects the participating actors from adverse contingencies. In an applied sense, security indicates "a low probability of damage to acquired values" (Baldwin 1997:13). Therefore, the stability of order indicates its ability "to contain and overcome disturbances to order" (Ikenberry 2001:45). This is where the importance of the normative culture among actors in the international arena, becomes so important: because it constitutes a base that buttresses individual confidence in the potentiality of the mutual control over the system's checks and balances.

Such definition of order as interaction between its three aspects (solidarity, regulation and security) articulates a distinct pattern of predictability, which regulates the intersubjective relationship between actors. The significance of this framework of order (i.e. for the discussion of Balkan order) derives from its emphasis on international relations as a process of learning and socialisation, during which actors develop a cognitive understanding (based on their experience of interaction in the international arena) of the reciprocity of international society as a security community. This reciprocity (in the context of solidarity) underscores the belonging to a community sharing a common normative base. Such interdependence mediates actor's interests and regulates their exchange within a secure framework of order's stability. Thus, this particular understanding of order constitutes a pattern, which allows for peaceful exchange and interest-mediation, as well as joint decision-taking and non-territorially-based policy-making.

However, prior to dealing with the socialisation dynamic some theoretical matters for the understanding and explanation of this process are on order.

DIFFERENT THEORETICAL VIEWS AND ORDER

Bearing in mind the pragmatic approach to the socialisation dynamic of the Balkans – i.e. the purpose of this examination of order is not to exhaust its meaning, but rather to position it in a way that would suggest an analytical framework for establishing a security-community-type of order in the Balkans in the process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures – this investigation is objective to the extent of its awareness of the different theoretical perspectives on order, but it is at the same time prescriptive as to its goals. For the purposes of clarity this article looks only at the dominant orthodoxies of IR theory: neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. The focus is on the "kind of knowledge" (Wendt 1999:377) of international relations that the three analytical frameworks produce, and in what way can it be used for theorizing the present state of order in Southeastern Europe. Thus, this is an attempt to arrive at a set of useful theoretical indicators of a security-community-type of order, which can suggest the necessary pragmatic instruments for establishing cooperative relations among Balkan actors. This overview suggests the potential for adopting "neoliberal constructivism" as the theory underscoring the establishment of a prospective Balkan order.

NEOREALIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER

From a neorealist (Waltz 1979) perspective, *the* actor of the international system of order is the nation-state; while, international politics is the struggle for power – understood as the ability to influence or resist such influence on the behaviour of actors (Buzan et al. 1993). Interstate relations are "always power politics: for it is impossible to eliminate power from them" (Carr 1981/ 1939:145). Thus, international order is viewed as anarchy, meaning that there is no central authority to mediate the relations between states and these states are dependent upon themselves (their resources) for the protection of their national interests. Interstate interaction is driven by the logic of a "self-help" system, in which collective security and closer cooperation are impossible, because of the egotistic, self-interested and suspicious-of-the-other attitude of each actor. For realists, the only means to avoid conflict (war) in such an anarchical system is through the development of some sort of hierarchy among states (based on their material resources to exert influence). State preferences are usually fixed and conflictual, that is why interstate politics become a constant bargaining game (Powell 1999).

The pattern of actor-socialisation within a neorealist order is very much conditioned by anarchy, rather than the internalisation of ethical norms of international relations linked to rights, justice and morality. Actors are led by the logic of anarchy, or they are eliminated (Sigel 1970). Thus, compliance is achieved only to the extent that an actor is forced to abide by certain rules, delineated by the threat from an immanent punishment. For instance, one can take the post-Dayton Accords behaviour of Serbia/Montenegro as such example. As soon as what was left of the former Yugoslav union perceived that the threat from the international community would not be acted upon the Kosovo conflict became: (a) a trial of the military capabilities and mostly commitment of the international community to deliver on its promises – a test, which as far as Serbia/Montenegro is concerned, the Yugoslav army won (Ignatieff 2001:91-219); and (b) it brought into question the neorealist concept of non-intervention in intra-state affairs, and to a certain extent a case may be made that it violated current international law set up to protect state-sovereignty.[4] Nevertheless, the Kosovo conflict proved that without compulsion an actor would not submit to the signals of the international system.

The unfeasibility of providing a viable solution to the problem of Southeast European security (in a neorealist international order) comes from the virtual impossibility of collective security based on cooperation. The system of anarchy (a complex balancing act between states, each desiring to become a hegemon) makes collaboration between states almost unattainable. In the realist model, the closest nation-states can come to working together is by forming alliances. However, alliances (seen as temporary organisations) are formed according to perceived hostile intentions of a state (or a group of states) against another (or a group), and as such they represent a "balance-of-threat" mechanism as opposed to balance-of-power (Walt 1987).

As a policy framework, the neorealist view of order is problematic when elaborating a prospective relationship-pattern in the Balkans, because of its underlying pattern of enmity. On a pragmatic level, it would be very difficult for a neorealist framework of analysis to be translated into a practical foreign-policy mechanism rooted in a relationship-pattern that would allow actors (not just states) to identify positively with one another in the context of a security community. The reason being the neorealist assumption that anarchy (the lack of centralised

[4] Although as Malcolm (1998:264-5) argues Kosovo was never legally recognized under international law as part of Yugoslavia.

authority) at the international level (the macro-structure) is interpreted in state (highly-centralised) policy-making during international interaction (the micro-structure) as preserving one's survivability in the natural selection process of the neorealist marketplace (Archer 1995). Thus, neorealist theory presents a pattern in which actors behave in a way that is dictated by the framework of anarchy of international relations (and the perceived malicious intentions among actors), rather than from the actual knowledge of the other actors' intent (Wendt 1999:264). Partly, the reason for the current instability of the Balkans is this "lack of interaction" (acting according to assumptions rather than knowledge of the other), which hampers the prospect for regional interaction.

NEOLIBERAL PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER

The other major tradition in IR is neoliberal institutionalism (Baldwin 1993). For neoliberal institutionalists the main actors in the international arena still continue to be nation-states; however, they suggest a plethora of non-state actors (international and transnational organisations, non-governmental organisation, multinational corporations, etc.) as important participants in the process of international relations. Institutions in this context are understood to be "a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations" (March and Olsen 1998:8). Neoliberal institutionalism presents interstate relations as the complex interdependence of distinctive political processes, which translate power's sources into power as control of outcomes (Keohane and Nye 1997). The institutions, suggested by neoliberal theory, seek "to reduce the uncertainty [of the anarchic system], lower transaction costs, and solve collective action problems" (Ikenberry 2001:15).

Both the anticipated and unanticipated consequences of neoliberal institutionalism make it a very interesting proposition for outlining a framework of analysis, which can support the development of a prospective order for the Balkans. However, the post-Cold War years have posed a number of challenges in the Balkans, which suggest certain limitations to the logic of neoliberal institutionalism. The benefits of socialisation within the rules and procedures of neoliberal institutionalism are subjected to the costs of rationalist materialism. Institutionalism alone would not introduce an awareness of "common fate", "shared identity" and "we-feeling". It can initiate such a process, but there is also the opportunity that it can generate a Balkan alliance system of regional divisions and suspicions. In this sense, the institutional approach can be effective if it is internalised by all actors involved as a mechanism for building trust among them (and not one-way monologue from the

EU and NATO towards the Balkans). Thus, the process of enlargement of the EU and NATO often tends to be interpreted as a lack of commitment by Euro-Atlantic structures to the region, something that brings into question the policies used to promote regional stability and security (as for instance the rhetorical hype during the launch of the SP and its virtual non-functioning, let alone delivery today). Alterations in state behaviour alone within institutional limits (at least in Southeastern Europe) are not enough to make the region a place of economic, political and social stability, security and cooperation. Achieving this requires a thorough investigation into actors' interests and identities: how do they take shape and how (if at all) can they be influenced (and changed) in the process of interstate interaction.

CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER

The end of the Cold War era has posed a number of questions to rationalist analysis (both neorealist and neoliberal) of international relations, the majority of them querying its focus on the state-centric model. Developments in the former Eastern Bloc, and especially in the Balkans, during the 1990s emphasised the importance of maintaining peaceful relations through cooperation. However, both neorealism and neoliberalism failed to deliver a pattern of cooperative and stable relations (in the sense of social, political and economic development) among the Southeast European states. Instead the strategy of deterrence, attempted by a number of international actors, further exacerbated the situation in the region. Partly, the reason for this failure of rationalist approaches, was (1) their inability to comprehend the complexity, as well as the diversity of the security dilemmas in the Balkans and (2) take into account the individual human input into the construction of these dilemmas (and hence their solution). Their models remain to a large extent on the state (inter-governmental) level, without considering the process of formation of state preferences and interests on the societal level.

The theoretical basis for the study of actors' identities and interests has been called constructivism (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999). Constructivism investigates the influence of international interaction on actors' interests and identities, and challenges the rationalist (both realist and neoliberal) "two-step" (Legro 1996). Constructivism proposes that systemic interaction transforms state interests and, in the process, even affects their identity (i.e. the logic of anarchy is not fixed). Actually, it asserts that the dynamics of international relations are the result of actors' need and purposes. Thus, actors' actions (or inactions) are constituted by collective meanings. For example "states act differently towards enemies than they

do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not" (Wendt 1992:397). Constructivism also posits that the process of interaction informs the meanings in which actors' behavior is organized. The underscoring mechanism in interstate relations is learning: interaction reinforces some international processes by rewarding actors "for holding certain ideas about each other", and, at the same time, discourages them from holding others (Wendt 1992:405). Constructivism asserts that actors' identities and interests are formed in the process of interaction and are not given prior to it (hence they are not primordial). State identity is defined through relations with other states. The process of international relations gives meaning to concepts such as "state sovereignty" and "national territoriality".

Constructivism develops the role of identity and interests in international interaction. The experience of inter-actor relations develops a repository of knowledge about each other, which they use as a basis for their action towards one another. However, constructivism alone would not be sufficient to construct a theoretical model for a prospective Balkan order. Its idealism (in the sense of emphasising how ideas and culture constitute the content and meaning of materialist power and interests) provides a rather abstruse theoretical framework for influencing decision-making in the region (Wendt 1999:370-7). In order to overcome the abstraction of constructivism and also to assist the incorporation of its analysis into Balkan policy-making there is a need of rationalist tools to instantiate the practices that lead to shared identification among regional actors into a security-community-type of order. Owing to the prevalent rationalism of Southeast European relations, as well as the dominant position of negative identification among the main actors in the region (mainly nation-states, or entities aspiring to such status), the only viable approach would be one that would combine neoliberal practices with constructivist ideation.

NEOLIBERAL-CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER

Neoliberal constructivism (being an eclectic approach) combines in its understanding of international order rationalist (interest-based and power-based) and cognitive (knowledge-based) perspectives. Applying it to the Balkans involves foregrounding the aspects that hold the promise of establishing a stable and cooperative pattern of relations. The main aspects of neoliberal-constructivist order are: institutions - based on mutual agreements, whose normative "stickiness" and institutional autonomy proffer cooperation; and interaction - the process of interest and identity formation, which develops experiential knowledge among actors and introduces positive identification and community building. Thus,

neoliberalism provides the rules and procedures for institutional co-binding, while constructivism facilitates the learning of new practices and the establishment of trust among actors. Combining these two theoretical concepts of international relations allows putting the issue of prospective Balkan order in its rightful context: as a distinct pattern based on the interaction between the solidarity, regulation and security aspects of order.

Establishing such an order in the Balkans entails the development of institutional networks that help develop positive intersubjective meanings among actors. The theoretical basis for such pattern can be elicited from the emphasis on the weakening position of state actors, followed by the diminishing relevance of military security in the context of "complex interdependence". The neoliberal notion of "complex interdependence", emphasises that "(1) states are not the only significant actors - transnational actors working across state boundaries are also major actors; (2) force is not the only significant instrument - economic manipulation and the use of international institutions is the dominant instrument; (3) security is not the dominant goal - welfare is the dominant goal" (Nye 1993:169). In this way, institutionalism stresses its pragmatic qualities for facilitating the establishment of closer cooperation among Southeast European actors. Within the context of the SP, the promotion of economic and social welfare is understood as a tool for initiating regional actors into a process of working together. This in turn is expected to promote peaceful coexistence (in the sense of actor-behaviour that would make the recourse to violence obsolete), which offers solution to some of the current problems of Balkan order. Thus, institutions can be helpful for creating expectations among actors that they would "behave" in an accepted (or agreed upon) way in particular situations.

However, what constructivism contributes to this process is the understanding that "complex interdependence" translates into "complex learning" – i.e. the dynamics of identity-/interest-formation (Wendt 1999:170). Namely, the process of interaction *makes* actors learn about each other, which provides them with knowledge of what to expect from each other. Thus, within the context of neoliberal institutionalism they agree to work together, which initially affects only their behavior. However, the continual practice (re-enaction of the norms, which initiated the process) prompts them to "internalize" the rules and procedures, which subsequently affects their identities (how they perceive themselves and the other actors) (Wendt 1999:327). In this way actors participate in the pattern of

international relations according to the expectations that its rules (instituted through "complex interdependence") have been established (and are beneficial).

Within such a framework, neoliberal-constructivism should be understood as a "common sense" pattern of international relations (Wendt 1999:296). It is this context that allows developing a certain pattern of interdependence, based on shared norms and collective identity, which emphasises order as a security community.

A security community is an inter-actor relationship that maintains "dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett 1998:30). It represents a peaceful, nonviolent international order that elicits the importance of non-national, collective identity. In many respects it is the very opposite of realist power politics. A security community arises from the process of interaction in which actors develop their knowledge of shared meanings and values. The self-sustaining continuity of security communities is the result from the institutional self-enforcing agreement among actors. Neoliberalism offers an opportunity to socialise the actors within the norms and rules of the security community. Institutions provide the framework for internalising the values beliefs and behaviour consistent with their rules, which establish a political culture of legitimacy (Wendt 1999:272). In this context, actors' acquisition of the institutional rules, helps overcome adversarial polarisations in their relations, which subsequently leads to developing stable expectation about each other (owing to the internalisation of institutional procedures). Thus, the legitimacy of the institutional basis of inter-actor relations within a security community ensures "that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way" (Deutsch 1957:5). Thus, the normative base of institutions constitutes the regulatory authority of order. It is in this way that the establishment of common rules for involving actors in a relationship of complex interdependence allows them to begin developing collective interests and knowledge of each other. Being always in process, actors' interests and identities constantly relearn the benefits from developing positive meanings of each other.

Thus, combining the insights of neoliberalism and constructivism informs the study of international orders, and proffers a potential model for theorizing a Balkan pattern of international relations. The analytical implications of combining institutionalism with interest and identity-interaction suggests a pattern of order based on the exchange between different forms and sources of authority, which regulate actors' resources (their use and distribution) in the environment of a

security community. It provides the basis for promoting institutions for interaction between regional actors that can contribute to a process of shared identification. The dynamics of common intersubjective meanings has been referred to as socialisation. The current process of accession and association with Euro-Atlantic structures is expected to put forward a development suggestive of regional cooperation in the Balkans.

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND SOCIALISATION

The defining moment of any international order is its handling of crises. Crisis marks the boundary of a security community. It indicates a denial of the "trust and shared values among actors" (Bially-Mattern 2001:356). However, the question for establishing order in the Balkans is how to initiate a security-community-relationship among regional actors out of the current crisis (marked by a lack) of intra-regional interaction in Southeastern Europe? In the context of the theoretical analysis of neoliberal-constructivism the query can be modified as to what type of socialisation facilitates the establishment of regional institutions that can introduce cooperative exchange in the region? And what is the role of Euro-Atlantic structures in assisting (or hindering) such process?

The establishment of a security community in the Balkans can be achieved through instituting cooperation among regional actors around issue areas of common concern. The expectation is that joint work for tackling such problems can help socialise not just the expert-groups directly involved in this exchange, but also can contribute to trust-building among societies. Naturally, in its initial stages, this could not be the *optimal* form of a security-community-order. It can be an "organisational emulation" of the Euratlantic pattern of institutionalised behaviour (Vucetic 2002:113).

The assumption of this research is that the establishment of peaceful order in the Balkans is premised on the *external* promotion of a "nascent security community" (Adler and Barnett 1996:36) in the region. Its institution could set the Balkans on the course of developing intersubjective relationships that (in the long run) could lead to the *optimal* form of regional security community. However, owing to the pragmatics of its promotion, this research would focus primarily on the socialization practices that can *initiate* a nascent security community. Being the first stage of a process of regional (re-) building, the nascent security community requires material incentives (for instance, conditionality) to sustain its pattern of

relationships. Nevertheless, its institutional framework could provide the environment for interaction, which could lead to the development of shared expectations for appropriate behaviour (i.e. logic of predictability, which can facilitate the building of trust).

The expectation is that the current involvement of international structures (i.e. Euro-Atlantic institutions) in the Balkans can create the facilitating domestic conditions for regional actors (by diffusing "'selected' liberal practices") to initiate a security community-type of order (Adler 1997:250). Such relationship can result from a redefinition of the *acquis* process for Balkan actors that would reflect their particularism (in the sense of providing assistance, according to specific needs and problems), and at the same time stress the importance of the *idea* and *practice* of cooperation.

Probably the main obstacle for instituting cooperative behaviour in the Balkans is the unwillingness of regional actors to identify with each other. The reasons are: (1) the current involvement of Euratlantic structures in regional conflict resolution focuses on individual actors (i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Macedonia) without involving more regional actors (or the region as a whole) in their mediation; and (2) the subsequent pejorative connotation of the region as a symbol of instability and division (hence, "Balkanization"). Some regional actors (i.e. Croatia) fear regional cooperation, because of its reputed threat to whatever stability individual actors have succeeded to maintain.

However, both these points help not only in understanding the need for cooperative behaviour in the Balkans, but also for initiating regional cooperation. The starting point is the definition of *region* as an area within which there is a more "*intensive co-operation*" between countries and communities than in their interactions with the other parts of the world (Simai 1994: v. Emphasis added). The first issue that strikes one is the definition of the Balkans as a region in the sense of *intensive co-operation*. The recent developments in Southeastern Europe have indicated just the opposite kind of processes - antagonism and confrontation. So, in this sense, is Southeastern Europe a region? According to this definition - not! But when one takes into consideration the external perception on Southeast European developments, then the answer is - yes! The Balkans is defined not by its awareness of itself as an entity, but by the other regions' discernment of the area as idiosyncratic. Because of the connotations from Balkan identification, regional actors try to disassociate themselves as much as possible from their neighbours in an attempt to dispel this view of the Balkans as a peculiar entity.

However, these efforts (ironically) further entrench the belief of the outside world, that Southeastern Europe is an area with its own, inimitable characteristics of antagonism and instability. In this sense, perhaps paradoxically, *working together can help regional actors disassociate themselves from the negative identification of their belonging to the Balkans*. That is why, within such context, the relationship of the region with the Euratlantic structures needs to satisfy the diverse interest of all actors (which can come only from cooperation). This understanding beckons an explanation of how socialisation works and what in the current process of Euro-Atlantic accession proffers the initiation of a security community.

More formally, the international socialisation of Southeastern Europe through the accession process is premised on the development of stable institutions of inter- and intra-state relations. In itself it is a "process that is directed toward a state's internalisation of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalised in its international environment" (Shimmelfennig 2000:111. Emphasis original). In other words, it refers to a process through which institutions, practices, and norms are transmitted between international actors. Being a *complex* and *context-specific* process, socialisation (for the purposes of this study) is understood to comprise two complementary aspects: compliance (socialisation *by* international organisations) and learning to comply (socialisation *in* international organisations). This indicates that the process of international socialisation has two sides: one, potentially coercive and the other – educational. Both of them are characterised by their own set of means for achieving adherence to the externally promoted rules, however their effectiveness can be assessed in their complementarity.

The process of conditionality linked to accession is the main proponent of the socialisation *by* international organisations. In this context, the level of compliance is related (i) to expected rewards, and (ii) to avoiding specific punishments (i.e. threat of sanctions). The implications for generating cooperative behaviour in the Balkans are that enforcement is required to deter states from shirking (Tallberg 2002:612). The power of attraction of the socialising agencies (the EU and NATO) puts them in a strong bargaining position, which allows them to shape the procedures and monitor the implementation of rules and norms. For example, the "New PHARE Orientations for Pre-Accession Assistance" adopted in 1997 emphasise that it is the EU (through its Accession Partnerships) and not the beneficiaries that decide how PHARE money is spent. Thus, "mandatory

adaptation" (Barbara Lippert and Peter Becker quoted in Brusis 2002:534) effects adherence to rules by conditioning the actors. Conditionality – "the use of incentives to alter a state's behaviour or policies" (Checkel 2000:1) – emphasises the role of the sanctioning authority, which is responsible for monitoring the degree of adherence to the promoted norms and rules. In the Balkans (as it has already been stated) the principal socialising agencies are the EU and NATO, which set up the criteria for accession to their structures. For instance, the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 introduced the broad political and economic criteria for EU membership, which provided the EU with a mandate to monitor, control and guide policy-making in the accession countries. This position was re-emphasised in the conclusions of the Luxemburg European Council of 1997, which suggests the "threshold principle" adopted by the EU, indicating "the qualitative and subjective judgements about minimum standards" that applicant states must meet in their bid for membership (Jacoby 2001:181). In other words, the presence and constant monitoring of this process by the EU offers some guarantee that Balkan elites institutionalise and act according to community-compatible practices. Within this context their compliance with the socialising mechanisms is ensured by both the symbolic and instrumental pulling incentives of these extra-regional organisations. However, coercive means are required (i) to diminish the possibility of free-riding, as well as (ii) to indicate commitment by the socialising agency and if necessary make an example of the negative effects of non-compliance (as the case of Yugoslavia illustrates). This conclusion emphasises the unique position of the Euro-Atlantic institutions (the EU in particular) to enforce compliance through the leverage of their supranational institutions, and thence (possibly) initiate cooperation in the region.

The socialisation *in* international organisations occurs through the actual interaction by the socialised states with the EU and NATO in partnership and association activities. Very often non-compliance occurs not because of a deliberate decision of the target to violate the promoted norms and rules, but because of the lack of capacity building, rule interpretation and transparency (Tallberg 2002:613). Thus, Euro-Atlantic organisations have developed programs of *learning* for accession countries by enhancing the accountability of state bureaucracies and providing technical assistance and expertise in the implementation of certain programs. For instance, the European Commission recognised in 1998 that the "only alternative to long transitional periods is a major *investment* effort" to help applicant countries "adapt to Community norms and standards and to develop their infrastructure" (*European Report* 1998. Emphasis added). This conviction is reflected in subsequent initiatives developed by the EU

(mainly PHARE and CARDS) aimed at strengthening the programming and administrative abilities of candidate countries with the purpose of boosting their absorption capacities. One example of the EU fostering domestic institutional change is the PHARE "twinning" programme introduced in 1999, in which experts from the EU Member States (called "Pre-Accession Advisors") assist and partner their counterparts from accession countries (EC 2001:5). Similarly, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, introduced at the January 1994 Brussels Summit of NATO, is a major initiative to enhance stability and security in the applicant countries through capacity building "by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance" (NATO, 2001). In this context, the Balkan accession to Euro-Atlantic structures can be viewed as a transnational arrangement to allow time for adapting to behavioural requirements (Tallberg 2002:615). In its course, the socialising organisation provides authoritative interpretation as well as time for the socialised to *learn to comply*. The *power of attraction* of extra-regional actors offers the stimuli that lead to learning, i.e. policy change (Haas 1990:27-28). Said otherwise, the socialisation *in* international organisations seeks to overcome the ambiguity of the promoted norms and build the capacity of the socialised entities to carry out their obligations by providing a temporal framework for their implementation (Chayes and Chayes 1993:188).

Thus, the *power of attraction* that the Euro-Atlantic institutions have, allows them to become a legitimate authority for evaluating the degree to which its preferred norms and rules have become integral part of (i.e. constitutive to) the decision-making practices of the Balkan states. As it has been outlined in the previous chapter, the legitimacy of their involvement derives from the complex discourse on accession dynamics, in which "actors regularly refer to the norm to describe and comment on their own behavior and that of others, *the validity claims of the norm are no longer controversial*, even if the actual behavior continues violating the rules" (Thomas Risse cf. Cortell and Davis 1996:456-57. Emphasis added).

In this way, the two aspects of the international socialisation of the Balkans – compliance and learning to comply – are brought together by the Euro-Atlantic organisations and promote rule conformity both as a rhetorical practice and operational mechanism to justify and facilitate the reproduction of their pattern of order. These mutually reinforcing aspects of socialisation develop a common process, which develops in three phases: interaction, interpretation and internalisation (Koh 1997:2645-649).

Interaction occurs in the course of conditioning the target to comply with the external agency by convincing it to delegate its sanctioning authority to an international institution. This is best evidenced by the influence that Euro-Atlantic institutions have in shaping policies in the region through the conditions for accession (as well as the prospect of membership). For instance, the 1994 concluding document from the inaugural conference of the Pact on Stability in Europe held in Paris, states that the participants' "aim is *to encourage* countries which have not yet concluded *cooperation* and *good neighbourliness* agreements and arrangements, extending also to issues concerning minorities and borders, *to do s*o" (EU 1994:100. Emphasis added). Such adoption of superiority powers through institutional designs to Euro-Atlantic institutions is a crucial aspect for the effectiveness of the socialising interaction (Tallberg 2002:638). It encourages (and ensures) respect for appropriate practices and adherence to acceptable patterns of behaviour.

Interpretation indicates the mechanisms through which the socialising agency translates its requirements to the domestic arena so that it can achieve the necessary levels of understanding and, hence, effect compliance. For example, the 1995 declaration of the Pact on Stability in Europe indicates that the Euro-Atlantic institutions "*undertake* to combine [their] efforts *to ensure* stability in Europe… [by encouraging] states to cooperate across frontiers" (EU 1995:112. Emphasis added). This conviction in the teaching capacities is reflected in the words of Commission President Jacques Delors, who asserts that the "[European] Community has a special responsibility not only because of its importance as a pole of stability and prosperity, but also *because it has an armoury of instruments to deal with the most pressing problems*" (Delors 1994:11. Emphasis added).

Internalisation is a matter of practice. It indicates the degree to which the rules and norms introduced in the process of interaction and interpreted according to the needs of the internal context of the state are actually domesticated in policy-making. In other words, internalisation "does not require deviant desires or behavioural preferences to be completely absent, only that *internal* (rather than external) *sanctioning mechanisms* are sufficiently *effective* to prevent deviant preferences from becoming norm-violating actions" (Schimmelfennig, 2000:112. Emphasis original). However, in the early stages of socialisation, the internalisation aspect is *induced* by the conditions of the socialising agencies. The statement of France's European Affairs Minister, Alain Lamassoure, indicates such externally-*encouraged* internalisation: "No country with unsettled border or

minority conflicts will be allowed to join [the EU]" (quoted in *The Economist* 1995).

This triple dynamic of socialisation suggests a possibility that can lead not only to the transfer of Euro-Atlantic norms and rules to the Balkans, but also the replication of their pattern of international relations (i.e. influence foreign-policy-making in the region). Or as the External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten put it at the Western Balkans Democracy Forum, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements "are extremely demanding because they are not just frameworks for dialogue and for good relations… Signatories *undertake* to align their entire legal and economic frameworks with that of the EU. They begin *to take on the obligations* of EU membership, and to put in place *a network of cooperation* and free trade agreements with their *immediate neighbours*" (Patten 2002:2. Emphasis added).

Thus, as Jonas Tallberg asserts, socialisation premised on the complementarity of enforcement and teaching tends to be "particularly effective in securing rule conformance" and demonstrates "an enhanced capacity to handle non-compliance" (Tallberg, 2002:610). Moreover, the Euro-Atlantic institutions have both "*sufficient credibility* and *sufficient potency*" (George 1999:12. Emphasis original) to maintain this process. The promise of membership once the appropriate procedures have been domesticated (i.e. internalised) by the acceding states serves as a positive incentive that makes regional actors susceptible to international socialisation. The presence of the Euratlantic institutions creates favourable conditions that make it possible for the actors in the domestic political process (i) to internalise international norms and rules, (ii) to appropriate them "to further their interests in the domestic political arena" (Cortell and Davis 1996:471), and parallel with that (iii) to reproduce it in their international relations. In other words, learning becomes a process of "managed interdependence", where Southeast European states are *induced* to question "older beliefs and… to institutionalise new ways of linking knowledge to the task the entity is supposed to carry out" (Haas 1990:37). In short, the emulation of the transparent and accountable Euro-Atlantic institutions by Balkan elites, makes them more prone to cooperation, since the socialising dynamic makes regional bureaucracies less able to disguise their capabilities and intentions (Keohane, 1984:258-9). The existence of similar democratic domestic institutions can lead Balkan states to consider each other as "not-threatening", and hence, potential partners. Thus, the norms and

rules promoted by Euro-Atlantic structures can become the foundations of shared meanings that can suggest the initiation of a nascent security community.

CONCLUSION

The promotion of a secure and stable order in the Balkans must (if not resolve, at least) find a way to ensure that all actors involved in the region work together for solving common problems. Said otherwise, the establishment of an institutionalised setting of Balkan relations can contribute to the introduction of stability in the region. Its framework of patterned behaviour involves regional actors in a dialogue on common issues and provides them with opportunities to exchange information. Thus, this process of exchange based on certain rules and procedures can establish shared expectations about each other, which in the process of interaction can lead to the establishment of a security community in the region. The study of this dynamic entails an examination of the role external actors play in the promotion of security-community-relationships in Southeastern Europe, as well as the domestic dynamic, which initiates their involvement.

As it has been suggested, in their nascent stage, prospective security communities rely (to a large extent) on a complex process of organisational emulation, initiated and maintained by third parties. For the Balkans, these extra-regional structures are Euro-Atlantic organisations. Their involvement in the region is underlined by the policy of promoting a particular intra- (and by implication inter-) state relationships aimed at *teaching* them certain norms and rules of appropriate behaviour. In this respect, conditionality (adherence to particular requirements of extra-regional actors) has become a pragmatic approach for achieving compliance. In other words, the Euro-Atlantic institutions are involved in a process of transforming the post-Cold War order in the Balkans to one that is less likely to resort to violence for the solution of conflicting issues. Their conflict resolution approach can be described as an attempt to socialise Southeast European states within a pattern of appropriate behaviour, which can (in the process of accession) introduce cooperation (based on shared understandings); and, hence, mitigate the instability deriving from the threat of violent conflict.

The argument, then, is that Balkan state-interaction with Euro-Atlantic organisations (principally the EU and NATO) leads the latter to propagate norms on accepted practices to Southeast European states. These practices relate to domestic politics and also to inter-state relations. The rules and norms are

propagated in a number of ways. These processes of socialisation, in turn, can encourage inter-state cooperation by the Balkan states (i.e. because they have adopted similar norms and thus types of practice), which can suggest the development of a regional security community.

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POLITICAL ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:[1] AN EMERGING TRANSDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO SUSTAINABILITY

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Abstract
Serious attempts to come to terms with the issues underlying the current environmental crisis is calling into question some very basic assumptions within the mainstream traditions of economics and development. This article explores some of the insights which are arising from a combination of the fields of ecological economics and political ecology. The aim in combining these two fields is to facilitate an inquiry into the political processes and institutions involved in questions of unequal ecological flows and distribution.

INTRODUCTION

> *"You claim that greater prosperity is the best way to improve the environment. On what economy's performance in what millennium do you base this conclusion?...To claim that a massive increase in global production and consumption will be good for the environment is preposterous. The audacity to make such a claim with a straight face accounts for much of the heated opposition to the World Trade Organisation."*
>
> Thilo Bode, Executive Director of Greenpeace[2]

There is a growing consensus that the conventional model of development, based largely on principles from neo-classical economics, is leading humanity down a dangerously unsustainable path. While it has certainly produced some marked successes, such as rapid economic growth, advanced technological progress, and increased levels of consumption, inequality between nations has reached

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[1]This title reflects the combination of the fields of political ecology and ecological economics.

[2] Written in a letter to *The Economists* December 11, 1999, after the formation of the WTO in Seattle. Quoted in Martinez-Alier 2002: 16.

historically unprecedented levels (UNDP 1998). Statistical evidence has shown that poverty, hunger and disease have persisted or got worse in many countries, while the basic needs and rights of women, indigenous people and small farmers are often not being met or, worse yet, are being threatened by development (Shiva 1989, Sachs 1993, Sutcliffe 1995). At the same time, more energy and materials have been consumed during the last half a century than in the whole preceding history of humanity (Altvater 1993). While a few people have attained material abundance through industrialisation and economic growth, resource depletion and environmental degradation now pose an immediate threat to many, and affect the future of us all (Costanza et al. 1997, Rees 1999).

Serious attempts to come to terms with the issues underlying the current environmental crisis is calling into question some very basic assumptions within the mainstream traditions of economics and development. This article will explore some of the insights which are arising from a combination of the fields of ecological economics and political ecology. Ecological economics examines the physical flows of materials and energy that bind the economy and ecosystems.[3] It combines an understanding of thermodynamics with complex systems theory and systems ecology (Costanza et al. 1997). Political ecology, which originates in geography and anthropology, emphasises the structural conflicts between society and the environment. As its name suggests, politics and power dynamics are of central importance (Bryant 1997). The aim in combining the two is to facilitate an inquiry into the political processes and institutions involved in questions of unequal ecological flows and distribution. Before moving into the main focus of the inquiry, the investigation will begin with a brief look at the mainstream approach to solving the environment-development dilemma.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS

Whereas environmental problems were once commonly believed to be solvable in isolation from social issues, the concept of sustainable development introduced a new quest for reconciling environmental and social concerns with economic growth. The concept of sustainable development was popularised in 1987 by the influential Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). For the first time, a strong link was made between eradicating poverty and achieving environmental sustainability. In the report, it was pointed

[3]It should be noted that the field of ecological economics is conceptually pluralistic. The perspective presented here is based on the assumption that ecological studies must be grounded in biophysical assessments.

out that poor people are often forced to destroy their immediate environment in order to survive. This is what Martinez-Alier (1990) refers to as the "too poor to be green" perspective. Poverty and pressure of population on resources were consequently pointed to as the main problems related to environmental degradation. Unfortunately, the report did not go so far as to inquire into the political or economic interests which may cause or perpetuate poverty. Nor did it include the fact that many environmental conflicts actually involve poor people defending the environment and their livelihoods against encroaching economic forces (Martinez-Alier 2002). Rather, the view put forward regarded poverty as an "original state of being" and, as such, economic growth was turned to as the main answer to help the poor out of "their" predicament (Bryant 1997: 6).

At the same time, however, the Brundtland report did acknowledge that much economic activity as currently conducted was having negative environmental consequences. The problems identified were basically the same as those previously named by environmental critiques of development, such as in the *Limits to Growth* report (Meadows 1972). Both reports agreed that economic activity was causing pollution, using up scarce resources, disturbing ecosystems and destroying habitats. The point of disagreement, however, was what the ultimate cause of these problems was.

From the perspective of neo-classical economic theory, environmental problems are seen to arise not as a result of economic growth *per se*, but rather due to the fact that many environmental goods are provided for free, and therefore more of them is demanded than if they had to paid for (Pearce in Hayward 1995: 90). The outcome of this overuse results in external environmental or social costs which are imposed on third parties. This is what environmental economists term "externalities". The solution, from an environmental economics perspectives, is to correct prices by calculating the market value or "shadow price" of these environmental costs and benefits, and then bring them back within the market by raising prices of damaging activities through taxes, charges, tradable permits and so on (Jacobs 1997: 371). Using a single measure of monetary value, costs and benefits can then be compared to one another. Then, assuming that prices have been correctly calculated, total environmental damage will be reduced to the point at which marginal costs equal marginal benefits.

While this argument reveals some important deficiencies in conventional economics, some are still not convinced that environmental concerns can be sufficiently addressed through the market mechanism. This is particularly the opinion among many ecological economists (e.g. Altvater 1993, Røpke 1999,

Rees 1998, Martinez-Alier and O'Connor 1996). In addition to critiques concerning practical problems with pricing externalities[4] or more fundamental questions of whether all things can or should be valued in money terms,[5] ecological economists argue from a more scientific nature that mainstream economic approaches have failed to understand the physical dimensions of ecological problems.

THERMODYNAMICS AND THE ECONOMIC PROCESS

Up until the recent rise of ecological economics, the sustainability concept has been largely restricted to economic criteria. By contrast, ecological economics examines the physical aspects of material and energy flows from nature, through the economy, and back to nature in degraded form. These material and energy flows are essential for all production and consumption, and often determine the actual ecological and social impacts resulting from economic activities (Georgescu Roegen 1971, Daly 1996, Rees 1999). Yet these vital flows are completely invisible to conventional economic analysis.

Ecological economics therefore begins with a conceptual model that sees the economy connected to and sustained by a flow of energy, materials and ecosystem services. This is in contrast to conventional economics which views the economy as an isolated and self-sustaining system which remains largely unconstrained by the physical environment (Rees 1999). To help understand the ecological economics perspective, an analogy can be made to the biological concept of metabolism, whereby all living systems maintain themselves by continuously consuming a flow of materials and energy from their environment and discharging the corresponding wastes. In the same way, industrial metabolism and human social systems maintain themselves by converting raw materials into manufactured products and services and discharging the wastes (Fischer-Kowalski et al. 1998).

[4] For example, how does one measure the cost of health impairing pollution? If, for example, it is based on lost earnings from sickness and death, does it make sense to pollute in countries with the lowest wages? How can the cost of things we don't even know about be measured? Consider that it was only relatively recently that the importance of the ozone layer was first recognised. How can an interdependent ecosystem be divided into individual pieces which can be measured in price? (See Rees 1999, Røpke 1999, Jacobs 1997, Martinez-Alier 1994, Mayumi and Gowdy 1999 for further discussion.).

[5] It has been pointed out that if all things are reduced to their market value, then the activities and processes that are not monetised or don't involve cash transactions get undervalued. What is, for example, the value of security, beauty, traditions, or community?

What then becomes evident from a thermodynamic perspective are the unidirectional and irreversible flows which are taking place.

To explain briefly in thermodynamic terms, the First Law of Thermodynamics says that matter and energy can neither be created nor destroyed. This means that in any physical transformation, the quantity of raw materials and energy taken from nature must be equal to the quantity of the waste materials ultimately returned to nature. What this means, in terms of economic processes, is that all resources extracted from the environment must eventually become unwanted wastes and pollutants (Ayres 1998: 190). While recycling helps to reduce waste, it also requires fresh inputs of energy, and in the final end still leaves a residue of unusable waste. Moving on to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, it says that while the quantity of energy will remain constant in an isolated or closed system, the energy will tend to dissipate into less useful forms with every physical action or transformation (Ayres 1998: 190). In other words, while the quantity of energy remains the same before and after a physical transformation, there is a qualitative difference in it. This difference is measured in terms of "entropy". Putting the two laws together, in any physical transformation, energy and matter are transformed from a state of highly concentrated and easily available resources into a state of highly dispersed and non-available wastes. What gets used up are "low entropy" useful materials, such as fossil fuels or high grade metal ores which are dispersed to unusable concentrations over time. What accumulates are other generally harmful materials, such as waste products, mine tailings, or thermal pollution (Rees 1999: 31).

The problem, in terms of sustainability, is that there are limits on the availability of environmental resources and, more significantly, on the absorption capacity of the biosphere. In order for an economy to be ecologically sustainable, when it has reached the systemic limits of the biosphere, flow rates must be held constant (Rees 1999). Signs of stress on the environment, such as loss of top soil, contamination of surface waters and oceans, acid rain, the hole in the ozone layer, and global warming, strongly suggest that this point has already been reached. If this is the case, there must now be a limit on the rate of throughput of energy and matter, and therefore a limit on the rate of material production and consumption in order to achieve sustainable ecological processes (Altvater 1998: 30-31). From this perspective, if the current structure of economic growth is maintained, the existing ecological crises can be expected to get worse.[6]

[6] While many environmental economists and industrial ecologists emphasise the potential for dematerialising the economy through more eco-efficient production processes, this is not actually occurring, despite gains in efficiency. This is because the environmental load of the economy is

This thermodynamic critique has serious implications for the conventional model of development which relies on economic growth, in both the North and South, as the only practical means to alleviate poverty, address material inequalities between countries, and provide resources for addressing environmental problems. It also brings up the question of distribution between countries in a quite different way since, in the face of biophysical limits, the overconsumption of environmental resources and services by one party must necessarily be compensated by the underconsumption by another party, if the world is to maintain some degree of ecological stability (Rees 1999, Sachs 1999). Furthermore, if limited access to resources is a cause of poverty, the environmental overconsumption of the rich has an enormous effect on the potential for the poor to achieve sustainable development. When questions of distribution and access to natural resources and services are linked to social structures and questions of power, ecological economics enters the field of political ecology (Martinez-Alier 2002).

ECOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION AND UNEQUAL EXCHANGE

An understanding of biophysical limits reveals the importance of reducing the throughput of matter and energy in order to achieve ecological sustainability. However, ecological limits are still only half of the story. This becomes clear when one considers, for example, the fact that the advanced industrialised countries use an enormous amount of non-renewable forms of energy in food systems alone, compared with its use for *all purposes* in poor countries; yet it is only a small proportion of the total amount of non-renewable energy used by rich countries (Martinez-Alier 1987: 247). The 20/80 "rule of thumb" captures, in a nut shell, the huge geographical differences in the use of natural resources and services in the world; that is, 20% of the world's population uses 80% of its resources (Sachs et al. 1998: x). Moreover, at present, the wealthy 25% of humanity living in OECD countries can be seen to require a biologically productive space, to produce the resources it consumes and to absorb the corresponding wastes it generates, equal to the entire biologically productive surface area of the earth (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). This means that whole

determined not only by production but also by consumption, which is not diminishing on a world scale (Martinez-Alier 2002). Moreover, spontaneous efficiency gains in the economy have been shown to increase profits or lower prices, both of which lead to increased consumption and accelerated resource depletion (Rees 1999: 45).

countries survive by appropriating the carrying capacity[7] of an area of land vastly larger than their own physical territories (Ibid.; Rees 1999). As a way of visualising this, Wackernagel and Rees predict that if all people were to live like North Americans, three planets would be required to produce the required resources, absorb the wastes, and otherwise maintain life-support.[8] Such statistics give an idea of both ecological limits and North-South inequalities. Furthermore, they suggest that economic activity is dependent not only on physical materials and energy, but also on social and political organisation in order to acquire and transform these resources.

Various critiques are now suggesting that international trade may be providing the means by which advanced industrialised nations are able to import sustainability from poorer Southern countries (Rees 1992, Satterthwaite 1999, Røpke 1994). This is because if environmentally intensive goods can be imported, then the importing region may be able to improve its local environmental standards at the expense of environmental degradation elsewhere. Muradian and Martinez-Alier (2001) point out that this relationship between free trade and the environment is one of the main areas of disagreement between environmental economics and ecological economics.

One reason for this disagreement can be found in the very different results which are obtained depending on whether monetary or physical units are used for measuring. Recent studies are showing that while trade between two countries may be shown to be balanced in conventional monetary terms, these same trading arrangements can be shown to be very unequal in terms of environmental inputs and outputs (Giljum 2001, Giljum and Hubacek 2001, Muradian et al. 2001b). By thinking in terms of flows of energy and materials rather than national monetary trade statistics, the material realities of North-South relations becomes much more explicit. For example, if monetary units are used to compare imports and exports, the European Union can be shown to have more or less balanced trade relations with the rest of the world. However, if physical units of weight are used to compare the imports and exports, the EU can be clearly shown to be a large net importer of materials and resources (Giljum and Hubacek 2001). Likewise

[7] Carrying capacity can be defined as the maximum rate of resource consumption and waste discharge that can be sustained indefinitely in a given region by a given population (Wackernagel and Rees 1996).

[8] This is based on ecological footprint analysis, which measures the amount of biologically productive space necessary for a given population to produce the resources it consumes and to absorb the corresponding wastes it generates. For a more in depth discussion of the method, see "Forum: The Ecological Footprint" in *Ecological Economics* 32(2000)3.

considering the production of pollution-intensive products, if monetary units are used, the EU can be shown to be a net exporter of pollution-intensive products in some years. However, if physical units are used, the EU always appears as a large net importer of these products (Muradian and Martinez-Alier 2001).

Seen from the perspective of conventional trade theory, this all makes some sense. Going back to conventional trade theory for a moment, a cornerstone of it is the "law" of comparative advantage, which states that a country will have a comparative advantage as long as the commodity which it "produces" requires locally abundant factors and few scarce factors (Muradian and Martinez-Alier 2001). At the core of the theory is the role of specialisation. Typically, the advanced industrialised countries of the North specialise in producing goods for internal consumption and export, while the less industrially developed countries, particularly in Africa and Latin America, specialise in particular extractive exports, and depend on importation of transformed commodities for their own consumption. According to the theory, as long as each country is trading what it can produce at a relatively lower cost to other things, then both sides of the trading arrangement will benefit. The problem however is that not all comparative advantages are equal.

A new theory of ecologically unequal exchange is now emerging which questions the gains from trade for exporters of natural resources. As such, it challenges the wisdom of the export-led development model, which is currently actively promoted by international institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. By examining the net flows of energy and materials, new aspects regarding the differential costs and benefits to extractive and productive regions can be shown (Bunker 1985).

Previous arguments put forward in theories of imperialism, dependency, and unequal exchange based on wage or productivity differentials have all recognised primary material export as a defining characteristic of most forms of under development (Emmanuel 1972, Amin 1977). The approach of ecologically unequal exchange, however, extends these theories by taking into consideration the large environmental impact of the specialisation in the exports of natural resources (Sustainable Europe Research Institute 2001, Bunker 1985). Ecologically unequal exchange can be seen to stem from two sources: 1) the fact that local resources are sold cheaply or given away or health damaging substances are tolerated, not because of a lack of awareness but because of a lack of economic and social power in the exporting region; and 2) the fact that primary commodities produced for export from the South frequently take a much longer time to

regenerate than the rapidly manufactured products or services which they are traded for in the North (Martinez-Alier 2002: 214). The concept of ecologically unequal exchange is summed up well in the following:

> *By ecologically unequal exchange we mean the fact of exporting products from poor regions and countries, at prices which do not take into account the local externalities caused by these exports or the exhaustion of natural resources, in exchange for goods and services from richer regions. The concept focuses on the poverty and the lack of political power of the exporting region, to emphasise the idea of lack of alternative options, in terms of exporting other renewable goods with lower local impacts, or in terms of internalising the externalities in the prices of exports, or in terms of applying the precautionary principle to new export items produces with untested technologies.*
>
> (Ibid.: 214)

Seen from this perspective, the exploitation of resources and ecosystems, together with the exploitation of labour and unequal distribution of monetary wealth, must be considered as important factors affecting the potential for long-term regional development.

INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF EXTRACTION AND PRODUCTION

In one of the earliest studies of ecologically unequal exchange, Bunker (1985) emphasised the internal dynamics of extractive and productive social formations in order to demonstrate how extractive economies become impoverished through the export of their resources; while productive economies, which appropriate these resources for their industrial processes, develop economically and increase their power to ensure the continued flow of resources to them.[9] Part of his explanation focussed on the effect of space (Bunker 1985: 22-27). Bunker pointed out how productive enterprises are able to locate close to one another to benefit from shared infrastructure and labour forces. In this way, even when one enterprise collapses, the infrastructure remains for subsequent enterprises. In contrast, extractive processes must locate near the natural resource which they exploit, often far from other enterprises and existing demographic or economic centres. Therefore, they often require the development of new infrastructure for resource removal and transport, labour recruitment, shelter and so on. However, once the resource is depleted or no longer in demand, the infrastructure and labour force

[9] This study focussed on the history of the Brazilian Amazon Basin over 350 years.

established at these sites are no longer of any use. Consequently, social development in extractive regions tends to be discontinuous in time and space.

Another part of his explanation focussed on the dynamics of scale. Bunker pointed out how, in industrial systems, the unit cost of commodity production decreases as the scale of production increases (Ibid. 25). In this way, productive processes benefit from labour saving technology and the use of fossil fuels. In extractive economies, however, the more resource which is extracted, the more difficult and expensive it becomes to extract remaining supplies. Therefore unit cost tends to rise as the scale of extraction increases, and the amount of resource available for further extraction decreases. Eventually the increasing cost of extraction gives new locations or industrial substitutes a competitive advantage, seriously reducing or eliminating the original extractive enterprise.

Bunker also pointed out that extractive processes frequently entail a much lower ratio of both labour and capital to value than do productive processes (Ibid. 23). This means that the majority of value in an extractive economy is in the resource itself, and profit occurs in the exchange itself rather than in the sector. Therefore, while extractive processes may initially produce rapid rises in regional incomes, this may be followed by equally rapid collapses when the depletion of easily accessible resources requires additional inputs of labour and capital without corresponding increases in volume.

From this perspective, it becomes apparent how resources, which may take thousands of years to regenerate (if at all), are extracted and exported with little or none of the extracted materials or energy flowing through the extractive economy to be conserved in durable infrastructure, or embodied in complex social organisation.[10] In productive economies, on the other hand, imported materials and energy flow through the economy and create an accelerated energy flow which permits the development of specialised technical and social organisation, and allows for more powerful means of exploiting the energy in the environment. Bunker concludes that the hierarchies of power and control, associated with these developments, can be seen to have culminated in the present global market system.

[10]This is based on the understanding that matter both stores energy and can be converted to energy. While the conservation of energy and matter into more durable forms is most perceivable as physical infrastructure, at a more abstract level, it may also take the form of learning, complex social organisation, and technology (Bunker 1985: 45). Bunker points out that, while energy and matter cannot in themselves cause these development, they are a necessary prerequisite since none of these development can occur without the conversion of energy and matter (Ibid. 245)

MARKET INSTITUTION AND THE TRANSFER OF WEALTH

The theory of ecologically unequal exchange can go one step further and ask why market prices and the market mechanism have not provided a fair and reciprocal exchange. From the perspective of standard economic theory, the problem is seen to lie in the existence of incomplete markets, and the need for establishing property rights (Martinez-Alier 2002). Bunker and other "political ecological economists", however, emphasise the issue of power. It seems quite evident that those suffering unfavourable rates of exchange are likely to have less power, and that such unfavourable rates of exchange will, in turn, tend to enhance power differentials over time (Bunker 1985: 247).

An interesting approach taken by Hornborg (1998) focuses on how the market institution organises the net transfer of energy and materials to world system centres. He points out that, in order for industrial centres to appropriate the goods and services they require from other regions, it is helpful if such flows are represented as reciprocal exchange (Yoffee, Godelier in Hornborg 1998: 134). One way that this gets represented as reciprocal exchange is through the notion of market prices. Hornborg points out that since industrial processes necessarily entail a degradation of energy, then the sum of products exported from an industrial centre must contain less energy than the sum of its imports. However, in order to stay in business, the finished products will need to be sold for more money than the amount spent on the fuels and raw materials used in their manufacturing. His research reveals that for any given set of fuels and raw materials to be used in manufacturing a particular product, the more that its original energy is dissipated, the higher the finished product will be priced. What this means, in short, is the more resources that flow through an economy, the more money that can be made, and the more new resources that can be purchased.

Once again, this situation makes sense from a standard economic perspective. It is exactly this logic that allows for an expanding cycle of production and keeps industrial production profitable and competitive. However, as Hornborg points out, this logic has also provided industrial sectors the means by which to appropriate accelerating quantities of energy (Ibid. 133). This accelerating appropriation of resources from other countries has not only deprived certain countries from developing sustainably, but it has also led to massive ecological damage.

Such understandings point to the socially contextual nature of neo-classical economics, and emphasise the fact that sustainability is much more than a

technical issue. As Norgaard (1994: 222) comments, "It is not an accident that neo-classical economics addresses the piecemeal correction of resource and inefficiencies through improved markets, largely ignoring the historical role of markets within a broader vision of viable relations between economics and the environment". This is an important point since how systems are understood historically affects not only our actions within those systems but also efforts to re-design them (Toulmin in Ibid. 222).

A NEW LOOK AT "WHO OWES WHOM"

Contrary to the conventional view that environmental degradation in the South is caused by people "too poor to be green", the perspective of ecologically unequal exchange emphasises the way in which resources are appropriated by world industrial centres at prices which do not reflect the many environmental externalities of export production nor their social impacts. In contrast to the fundamental assumption of free trade, which claims that prices in the international trading system always reflect the full costs of production, studies of ecologically unequal exchange show that unrecognised and uncompensated externalities are an inherent part of the world trading system. When countries export commodities at prices which do not take into account the negative local externalities caused by the extraction of resources or the production of pollution-intensive products, then costs get shifted from the importing region to the exporting region (Sustainable Europe Research Institute 2001, Muradian et al. 2001a).

There is now increasing reference to the "ecological debt" which the advanced industrialised countries have to the developing South. Ecologically unequal exchange is one source of this debt, and its beginnings can be traced back to the stripping of resources and loss of life associated with centuries of colonisation. However, this ecological debt continues to accelerate today, with increased pressure for exports from structural adjustment programs, intellectual appropriation of ancestral knowledge, or degradation of the best soils for cash crops.

There is also another, more commonly referred to source of the ecological debt, and that is the historic and current levels of carbon dioxide emissions. This stems from the fact that the advanced industrialised countries produce around three quarters of the total world carbon emissions, but correspond to only one quarter of the world's population (Martinez-Alier 2002: 231). Based on equal emissions per person, the International Panel on Climate Change calculated that the rich countries use around 3 billion tons of carbon more per person per year than what

would otherwise be their fair share (Ibid. 231). The ecological debt can then be calculated according to how much it would cost to reduce these excessive emissions. With an approximate cost of reducing carbon emissions at US $20 per ton, the carbon debt of the advanced industrialised countries can be calculated to be around US $60 billion per year (Ibid. 231).

This puts a new twist on the question of "who owes whom" in the world, since the accumulated Latin American external debt in 1999 of US $700 billion is equivalent to only 12 years of carbon debt (Ibid. 231). From this perspective, not only does the ecological debt make evident the multiple inequalities in the present world market system, it also makes the external debt of third world countries appear illegitimate.[11] It also puts clear responsibility on the North to reduce emissions proportional to their current ecological debt, and to assist other countries in dealing with the effect of climate change who are not responsible historically for its causes. Likewise, it puts a certain obligation on those who have benefited from ecologically unequal exchange to restore or compensate areas in the South which have suffered from the extraction of natural resources and export of monocultures. Furthermore, with the external debt being used as political pressure for the over-exploitation of natural resources, it can be concluded that in order to effectively deal with the current ecological crisis, both the external debt and the ecological debt need to be redressed.

Recognition of the ecological debt could, therefore, have far ranging political and economic consequences. However, making progress on this issue obviously requires a great deal of concerted effort from people, organisations, and governments in the South, as well as people and organisations acting in solidarity in the North. At present, there are several international campaigns which are applying the concept of ecological debt towards progressive ends.[12] The point, however, is that as long as economic theory only investigates connections between countries in terms of monetary relations, the existing ecological asymmetries will

[11] With regards to this point, it is of significance to mention the recent ruling in Argentina on the foreign debt, which established the responsibility of civil servants of the dictatorship that contracted it and co-responsibility of international organisations like the IMF, who approved illegal and fraudulent loans. This legal approach may be the most effective means of establishing the ultimate illegitimacy of foreign debts in many third world countries (Gaona 2001).

[12] See for example "Ecological debt campaign" (http://www.cosmovisiones.com); the Dakar declaration for the total and unconditional cancellation of African and third world debt" (http://www.anotherworldispossible.com/socialforumA_history_dakar.html); or the International Institute for Environment and Development's "World Summit on Sustainable Development" news letter.

remain largely invisible. Therefore, increasing awareness and continuing pressure is necessary to make these ecological arguments into conscious and more widely acknowledged political issues.

CONCLUSION

A political ecological economics approach directly challenges some basic assumptions within conventional theories of economics and development. A thermodynamic understanding of production and consumption challenges the mainstream orthodoxy of economic growth by pointing to the physical limits of all growth, and more profoundly to the entropic nature of all economic activity. With environmental systems already showing signs of stress, attempts to maintain the existing structure of economic growth can only be expected to deepen the current ecological crisis. As Altvater (1993) argues, ecological limits eventually turn into social limits and finally into barriers to the dominant economic rationality.

By considering the net flows of energy and materials between extractive and productive social formations, it becomes evident how specialisation in the export of abundant raw materials and primary commodities in the South, as recommended by the theory of comparative advantage, can lead to short-term "illusory" growth, but that such development tends to be unsustainable in the long-term. In addition, the theory of ecologically unequal exchange helps explain how Northern advanced industrial countries are able to maintain a high level of production and consumption, while improving their local environmental standards, by shifting environmental costs to the South. From this perspective, reliance on the extraction of primary goods as a basis for development can be concluded to be not only economically unsound, but also socially, politically and ecologically detrimental.

The understandings expressed through the theory of ecologically unequal exchange and ecological debt provide fresh insights into the causes of uneven development and new perspectives towards what needs to be done to resolve this imbalance. By focussing on aspects which have largely been neglected in development debates, an approach drawing on ecological economics has the potential to side-step hardening conflicts and access new points of entry into discussions on free trade, economic specialisation and (un)sustainable development. Furthermore, its more accurate and complete understanding of the interaction between human and environmental systems is essential in order to develop appropriate strategies and innovations for achieving both ecological sustainability and a more equitable distribution of resources and wealth.

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THE TRIUMPH OF AN ISLAMIC PARTY IN TURKEY: EFFECTS OF THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS ON THE RISE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP)

Bezen Coskun*

Abstract
The triumph of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has an absolute majority in Turkish Parliament, is not a sudden incidence. It is worth exploring the roots of this triumph within the democratisation process of the country. During the Turkish democratisation process, several breakdowns and restorations have occurred and military regimes have attempted to change the Turkish party and election system in accordance with their expectations. However, many of these interventions, which were imposed by the military regimes, have had positive affects on the recent rise of the Justice and Development Party.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has promoted the establishment and maintenance of formal democratic systems. Therefore, Western democratic countries have insisted on supporting so called second and third wave democratic countries, which have tried to establish or maintain democratic regimes.

By the late twentieth century, many more transitions from non democratic to democratic regimes have occurred. In this context, Samuel Huntington defines three waves of democratisation: the first wave had its roots in the American and French revolutions; the second wave is a short wave, which started in the Second World War; and finally the starting point of the third wave is the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974, which has led to transitions to democratic regimes in approximately thirty countries (Huntington, 1991:15-21). In spite of their transition efforts, in some second wave countries and in many third wave countries the democratisation process has been problematic. Turkey is one of these countries, which still has problems consolidating its democracy.

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Although Huntington classifies Turkey as one of the second wave democracies, it is not still accepted as a liberal democratic country by academic and political circles. Diamond and Myers (2001:3) classify Turkey as a non-liberal electoral democracy.

According to Ozbudun (2000:1), *"Turkey is an interesting test case for many recent theories on democratisation."* This is mainly because Turkish democracy has experienced several democratic breakdowns and restorations because of military interventions, and Turkey is still far from having reached the level of a consolidated democracy. At the same time there are anti-democratic cases which have occurred in Turkey, for example some political parties have been closed and some party leaders have been banned. Moreover, Turkey is the only democratic and secular country in the Islamic world. Especially after the last election which resulted in the triumph of an Islamic party, the question of compatibility of Islam and democracy has been another reason for why Turkey is an interesting case for democratisation theories.

Following Turkey's general election on November 3, 2002, for the first time in fifteen years one party has an absolute majority. Despite hindrances - the leader of the Party, Tayyib Erdogan, was banned from participating in elections - the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an overall majority within the Turkish Parliament. Since the most debatable characteristic of the leading party (AKP) is its Islamic roots, the sort of thing that the secularist armed forces would not normally tolerate, the major question for academic and political circles is: "Can Islam and democracy live together without military intervention?"

As a result of the fragility of the new political situation in Turkey, within the context of the democratisation process, it is worth examining ***how the democratisation process in Turkey, with its party system and electoral behaviour, has affected the recent rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).***

This article will attempt to explain the effects of the democratisation process on the rise of Islamic parties. In this context, conjuncture of the party system and electoral behaviour will be analysed as major angles of the Turkish democracy.

In order to explore the effects of the Turkish democratisation process on the rise of the AKP, Joseph Schumpeter's and David Held's well-known definitions of democracy will be presented. In addition to these definitions, a "western model of liberal democracy" will be discussed and compared with a "non-liberal electoral democracy model". Moreover, the phases of the democratisation

process and characteristics of the consolidation period will be briefly touched upon. In the second section of the article the Turkish case of democratisation will be explored and analysed.

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION

Virtually, every country may define itself to be a democracy. On the one hand, most military regimes which seize power without legitimacy claim that they came to power in order to restore a democratic regime. On the other hand many non-democratic governments create some strange formulations for their regimes such as "guided democracy", "people's democracy", or the "people's democratic dictatorship" as the Chinese People's Republic officially terms itself in the Preamble to its constitution (Parry & Moran 1994:2). If every government can define its own democracy with different aspects, how can democracy be defined?

In general, democracy might be defined as a form of government in which the people rule. In spite of the existence of this simple definition, the concrete way in which the government should be organised and the question of which conditions and preconditions it requires have been debated for several centuries (Sørensen 1998:3).

One of the widely accepted definitions of democracy has been formulated by Joseph Schumpeter. He defines democracy as a mechanism for choosing political leadership:

> *"The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote*".
>
> (Schumpeter cf. Sørensen, 1998:10)

In contrast to Schumpeter's narrow definition, David Held's definition of democracy is very comprehensive, and mainly focuses on democratic autonomy. According to Held, democratic autonomy requires both a high degree of accountability of the state and a democratic existence of civil society:

> *"Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to*

> *them, so long as they don't deploy this framework to negate the rights of others."*
>
> (Held cf. Sørensen 1998:10)

Schumpeter's and Held's definitions are two different sides of the debate about what democracy is and what it ought to be. As democracy is a dynamic entity, this leads to emphasising different aspects of democracy in framing different understandings of the concept (Sørensen 1998:10).

In practise, for new democratising countries, the "western model of liberal democracy" has been accepted as a reference point of view for their democratisation processes. Liberal democracy might seem a safe alternative for those countries since it has been tried and tested by the Western world. In addition to this, within the context of international political economy, institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the committee of the G7 countries have a tendency towards encouraging conformity to liberal democratic practises with the economic policies of these countries (Parry & Moran 1994:7).

Since the Western model of liberal democracy has been overwhelmingly accepted as a reference point, for democratising countries, the democratisation level of countries is evaluated within the definition of liberal democracy. As a result, it is necessary to define the characteristics of liberal democracy and its differences with other regime forms. In this context, four types of regimes are defined by Diamond and Myers: liberal democratic regimes, non-liberal electoral democratic regimes, pseudo democratic regimes and authoritarian regimes. For our purpose, only liberal democratic regimes and non-liberal electoral democratic regimes will be explained here.

Non-liberal electoral democratic regimes exemplify the narrow conception of Schumpeter. In non-liberal electoral democratic regimes, the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage. In some of these non-liberal electoral democratic countries, the rule of free and fair election is followed. In these cases, in spite of democratic elections, the political system suffers some democratic defects. For instance, extensive violations of human rights, suppression of minority group rights, abuses of state power, hidden domination by the military or other centres of power, and serious constraints on the ability of various interests to organise. Today, more than 30 states hold regular, competitive and relatively free, fair and meaningful elections but their citizens have considerably less freedom than in liberal democracies. On the other hand, in addition to the elements of electoral democracies, liberal democracy

constrains executive power and upholds constitutional rule with extensive individual and group freedoms and a strong rule of law (Diamond & Myers 2001:2-3).

Transition to democracy is a complex process, which involves several phases (see Figure 1). In a typical case, the beginning of the process is marked by crises within the non-democratic regime. But generally, the new regime which comes after the breakdown of the former non-democratic regime will often be a restricted democracy. Therefore, several phases of "democratic deepening" may be necessary for consolidation of the democratic regime (Sørensen 1998:39).

FIGURE 1. TRANSITIONS TOWARD DEMOCRACY: A MODEL



Source: Georg Sørensen (1998, 40)

Consolidation of the democracy is the most problematic phase in the democratisation process. During the consolidation process, crises and breakdowns may occur. The typical pattern for new democratising countries has been a see-sawing between authoritarianism and frail democracy. The full process of consolidated democracy may take several decades. For instance, in Great Britain the full process took more than two hundred years (Ibid.:39). If Great Britain, USA and France are accepted as examples of consolidated democracy, how can "full consolidated democracy" be defined? According to Juan Linz, consolidated democracy is:

> *"one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers. This does not mean that there are no minorities ready to challenge and question the legitimacy of the*

> *democratic process by non-democratic means. It means, however, that the major actors do not turn to them and they remain politically isolated. To put it simply, democracy must be seen as the "only game in town."*
>
> (Juan Linz cf. Sørensen 1998:44)

Consolidation is not a purely political process but also demands some economic and social changes, and at the final phase of consolidation, democratic institutions and practices become an indispensable part of the political culture. Not only political leaders but also the majority of political actors and the majority of the population should see democratic practises as part of their social life (Sørensen 1998:44-45).

In conclusion, the democratisation process is not an easy and linear process. There is no historical law which defines the transition process, since, all countries have their own unique characteristics. As mentioned before, the common case in many democratising countries seems to be a see-saw between authoritarianism and frail democracy. Today there are few countries, which can be considered as consolidated democracies. Many of the second wave and third wave countries including Turkey have serious problems in consolidating their democratic regimes.

THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN TURKEY

A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEMOCRATISATION IN TURKEY

The first parliament in Turkish history was founded in 1876 during an imperial period. This was a short experience. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk led the way to establishing a constitutional parliamentary system in 1923. With respect to universal suffrage, Turkey has had a better record compared with many contemporary consolidated democracies. For instance, Turkish women were granted the right to vote in 1930 and only four years later they had the right to stand for elections; while French women had to wait for ten, Greek women eighteen and Canadian women twenty-six more years to have their unrestricted political rights (Esmer 2002:1).

The first multi-party election was held in 1946. It was not absolutely free and fair, and, four years later, the government changed democratically through popular election. In this election, the opposition party (Democrat Party - DP) won 83.6% majority. For observers of Turkish politics, this was an unexpected

outcome, which also exceeded the hopes of the Democrat Party itself. The DP governed Turkey for more than ten years and its rule ended with a military intervention on May 27, 1960. This was the first breakdown of democracy. In this period electoral politics were revised with a new constitution, and an election law based on proportional representation was introduced. Since the introduction of proportional representation, coalition governments have been the rule and one-party governments have rarely been realised (Esmer 2002:1).

There were three transition periods from military rule in Turkey: 1960-1961, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983. These three periods corresponded to three military interruptions of the democratic process (Ozbudun 2000:24). During the 1980s' military rule, a 10% national threshold system was introduced in order to eliminate the more ideological minor parties and to transform the system into a more manageable two or three party system (Ibid.:75-76).

As a result of these military interventions,

> "*despite a history of fourteen multiparty elections, parliamentary rule, and most important, a peaceful change of governments through elections a number of times, Turkey has had a difficult time being accepted as a democracy by international academic and political circles* "
>
> (Esmer 2002:2)

PARTY SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN TURKEY

Commenting on Turkish politics in the 1950s, Frederick Frey argued that:

> *"Turkish politics are party politics…Within the power structure of Turkish society, the political party is the main unofficial link between the government and the larger, extra governmental groups of people…"*
>
> (Frederick Frey cf. Ozbudun 2000:73)

However after the 1950s, the Turkish party system has changed dramatically. Since the 1950s, the pattern of Turkish party politics has passed through most types of party systems, which is defined by Giovanni Sartori as: predominant party, two partism, moderate multi partism and atomised multi partism (Sartori 1976:283). According to Sabri Sayari, the Turkish party system:

> *"...changed from bi-partism (1950-1960) to moderate multi-partism (1961-1980) to moderate multi-partism with a dominant party (1983-1991) and to extreme multi-partism with no dominant party (1991-[2002])"*
>
> (Sayari cf. Esmer 2002:4)

Especially after the 1970s, parties and the party system have been decaying with *growing fragmentation, ideological polarisation* and *declining public support and identification with individual parties* (Ozbudun 2000:73). During this period, the two parties' dominance has eroded and centrist parties have been weakened. In their place, extremist Islamic and extremist right wing parties have risen as a major force in electoral and parliamentary politics (Sayari 2002:9).

In 1990, two-party rule was replaced by a coalition of minority governments. It was a system based on a highly fractionalised parliament in which there were three-to-five relatively equal parties. Governments could only be formed through coalition arrangements (Ibid.:10). The major characteristic of the parliaments between 1990 and 2002 was a high level of fragmentation. The proportion of votes going to the largest parties declined, along with their number of seats in the parliament, as shown in Table 1 (Tachau 2002:42). As a result, these fragmented coalition governments were unable to produce effective economic and social policies, and dissatisfaction among voters increased. This period, which is characterised by highly fragmented coalition governments, ended with the last general election, held on November 3, 2002.

Table 1. Party Fragmentation, 1961 - 1999

Year	Percentage of Vote Won by Two Strongest Party	Percentage of Seats Won by Two Strongest Party	Number of Parties Winning Seats
1961	71.5	73.5	4
1965	81.5	83.1	6
1969	74.0	88.6	8
1973	63.1	74.2	7
1977	78.3	89.3	6
1983	75.6	82.2	3
1987	61.0	87.9	3
1991	51.1	65.1	5
1995	41.1	53.2	5
1999	40.0	47.2	5

Source: Tachau (2002:42)

One of the general characteristics of the Turkish party system which leads to the formation of highly fractionalised parliaments is *volatility***,** that is, sudden and significant changes in party votes from one election to the next (Ozbudun 2000:74). Nearly one-fifth of the electorate transferred their votes from one party to another in the elections during the decade following the 1960 military intervention. Besides the volatility the Turkish electorate has tended to divide its votes among a number of parties (Carkoglu and Avci 2002:115). Rising volatility and the lack of stable partisan support has hindered the stabilisation of the party system (Sayari 2002:10). Ali Carkoglu estimates that average volatility for the 1954-1995 period was 21.1% (Ali Carkoglu cf. Sayari 2002:22). In comparison with the established democracies of Western Europe, party loyalty is lower in Turkey. On the other hand:

> *"when examining electoral volatility through aggregate data, it is important to note that the support given to party families on the right and the left has not changed significantly over the years. Centre-right and far-right parties have consistently received about two-thirds of the total votes in the eight parliamentary elections between 1961 and 1999. During the same period, approximately one-third of the Turkish voters have supported the centre-left and extreme-left parties.*"
>
> (Sayari 2002:23)

When we examine the recent election results, vote distribution between the rightist and the leftist parties is almost the same as the proportions given by Sayari (see Table 2).

Another characteristic of the party system since 1990 is the broad ideological spectrum of the system (Sayari 2002:10). Since 1991, extremist parties are getting more powerful than before. During the last elections, which were held on November 3, 2002, two openly Islamic parties and an ethnically based pro-Kurdish party participated in the elections.

> *"Since 1991, the country has witnessed the burgeoning of an Islamic party to the point where its leader was able to become prime minister. The party emerged from the 1995 election with more votes and seats than any other party, roughly twice the highest proportion it had achieved in the past. The extreme rightist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) emerged as the second largest in 1999 and joined in coalition with Democratic Left Party (DSP) and Motherland Party (ANAP)."*
>
> (Tachau 2002:43)

Table 2. Share of the Vote, % * in the November 3, 2002 Election

Party/ Party Leader	2002	1999
Justice and Development Party *Recep Tayyip Erdogan*	34.3	-
Republican People's Party *Deniz Baykal*	19.4	8.7
True Path *Tansu Ciller*	9.6	12
Nationalist Action Party *Devlet Bahceli*	8.3	18
Young Party *Cem Uzan*	7.3	-
Democratic People's Party *Mehmet Abbasoglu*	6.2	4.8
Motherland *Mesut Yilmaz*	5.1	13.2
Felicity *Recai Kutan*	2.5	15.4 **
New Turkey Party *Ismail Cem*	1.2	-
Democratic Left *Bulent Ecevit*	1.1	22.2
Others	5	6

Source: The Economist, 9 – 15 November 2002

Non-electoral forces (i.e. policies of the military and bureaucratic elites, electoral laws, and the actions of party elites) have been equally important in shaping the party system in Turkey as well as mass electoral behaviour. The efforts of the military and bureaucratic elites have shaped the system from above by banning some parties, removing their leaders from political activity, and altering the constitutional context of party activities. In this respect, the Turkish experience is totally different from the Western European experience (Sayari 2002:25). In Western European democracies, forces come from below rather than the actions of the state elites from above. Social cleavages have played a major role in political party and voting behaviour in Europe (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:14-21). On the other hand:

> *"there is 'a de facto dual-track government' in contemporary Turkey in which the elected political leaders are constrained to operate within parameters maintained by the military"*
>
> (Lowry 2000 cf. Tachau 2002:50)

The military exercises power through the National Security Council, a constitutional body which consists of civilians and officers (Tachau 2002:50).

EFFECTS OF THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS ON THE RISE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP)

Turkey, one of the second wave democratising countries, is accepted as a non-liberal electoral democratic country by academic circles. From its characteristics, Turkish democracy reflects Schumpeter's definition of democracy but is still far from both Held's and Linz's definitions.

Turkey clearly has many of the characteristics of a non-liberal electoral democratic regime. On the one hand, it has a history of more than fifteen multiparty elections, decades of parliamentary rule and universal suffrage. On the other hand, the political system does have some defects. One of the most visible examples of this is the hidden domination of the military. Compared to first wave countries of the democratisation process, the Turkish democratisation process has been forced down from state elites, and has been always exposed to the open or hidden effects of the military, which defines itself as the main protector of:

> *"the existence and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society*"
>
> (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982 cf. Tachau 2002:50)

Introduction of proportional representation in 1961, 10% national threshold system, and the laws which led to the weakening of the local party organisations are all major examples of the military interventions on the democratisation process which have given way to the rise of the AKP.

According to the election results, only two parties have seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly: the AKP (Justice and Development Party) with 363 seats and the CHP (Republican People's Party) with 178 seats. In addition to these two parties, there are nine independents. None of the parties in the former coalition government won the minimum 10% of the national vote needed to have seats. This triumph of the AKP is not a coincidence. The characteristics of the Turkish party system and related electoral behaviour since the 1970's positively affected the rise of the AKP. As previously mentioned, especially after the 1970's, parties and the party system have been decaying with *growing fragmentation, ideological polarisation and high volatility* (Ozbudun 2000:73).

In the last election, former governments were punished severely by Turkish voters, the majority of whom have accepted the AKP as a "clean party" - the Turkish initials, "A" and "K" (AK), mean white or clean in the Turkish language. The elections results show the fact that the majority of the volatile votes have gone to the AKP as protest votes. Protest voting, which is the typical basis for extremist movements, is a danger signal for the system. Therefore, it reflects dissatisfaction and disillusionment with politics and often the political system itself (Tachau 2002:33). As is evident in this election, protest votes supported the Islamic party instead of other moderate alternatives which entered Turkish politics as new alternatives to the old centrist-right and social democratic parties just before the last elections.

In the Turkish case, the major reasons for these protest votes are the ineffective policies of the fragmented coalition governments and increasing political corruption. As previously mentioned, since 1961 coalition governments have been dominant in Turkish politics because of the proportional representation system. In addition, the high level of fragmentation and ideological polarisation within the parliament has also led to a coalition of minority governments that have lacked the tools of effective governance. These fragmented coalition governments were far from producing constructive solutions to the social and economic problems of Turkish society. As a result, dissatisfaction among voters has increased. Moreover, a dramatic rise in political corruption, resulting from the colonization of state owned banks and industries by parties, threatens the legitimacy of the political regime on behalf of the voters (Sayari 2002:10). Increasing political corruption and the deprivation effects of the economic crisis led to the volatile votes being cast as protest votes to the AKP. All centrist parties have been pushed out of the parliament so that the AKP now holds absolute majority within the parliament.

Another important reason for the rise of the AKP is the weakening of the local party organisations of the centrist parties, due to the effects of the laws imposed by the 1980s' military rule. The main beneficiaries of this weakening are the extremist parties, which had a small portion of the electorates, but which have become key players in Turkish politics since the beginning of the 1990s. In contrast to the weakening of the party organisations of the centrist parties, Islamic parties' organisations, which became actively involved in Turkish politics after the 1990s, are getting stronger. Islamic Parties' staff have worked as missionaries, particularly in ghettos of the big cities and in rural areas, where they have targeted people suffering from socio-economic problems which could not be solved by centrist parties' policies. As a result of these strong organisations, they have had an enormous number of supporters from ghettos and rural areas.

As I have attempted to explain, the triumph of the AKP is not a coincidence. The rise of the party has its roots in the democratisation process of the country which began in the 1960s. The party system and election laws, which are mainly imposed by the military, have positively affected the rise of the AKP. Turkish democracy is still in the consolidation phase, and the country is far from being a consolidated democratic country because of *the de facto dual-track government*. Turkey is now at a crossroads. The political future of the country cannot clearly be predicted, due to the hidden clash between the Islamic roots of the leading party and the Turkish military which still stands as the main protector of the unity and indivisibility of the country.

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CAPACITY BUILDING FOR WTO PARTICIPATION: AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has emerged as a key organ of governance and management of the globalising world economy. Its establishment as a forum for continuous negotiations on a range of trade and trade-related issues is creating new challenges for African countries. An essential requirement of participation in the trade regime under the WTO is more rapid investment and overall economic growth by securing better market access for products. For African countries, this can be possible only if they can participate more effectively in the design and enforcement of trade rules as well as strengthening the institutional mechanism that shapes the trade regime on appropriate terms. This article explores the question of why African countries' participation in the WTO has been marginal and suggests recommendations to improve the situation.

INTRODUCTION

The need to build Africa's capacity and its participation in WTO meetings and related fora has been iterated for long. It has been established that many African countries cannot participate effectively in the WTO due to their limited capacity in finance and human resources.

The situation needs urgent help and action. Many African countries, which are members of the WTO, do not have a mission in Geneva, where the WTO is located. Even countries those that do have a mission in Geneva do not have the

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required capacity. For instance, Congo had only one WTO official, Côte d'Ivoire two, Zimbabwe four, Ghana two, Mali none, and Senegal two. Furthermore, all of these had very limited assistance or none at all from their capitals or back-up research teams.

There are three core sets of competencies required for effective participation at the WTO process. First, a country's delegation in Geneva should be skilled in negotiations and diplomacy, as it is a country's arrowhead in pursuing national interests in the WTO. Secondly, is the requirement of having key staff in national capitals with analytical and policy-making skills to provide operational support and guidance to the trade delegation in Geneva. Finally, there are requirements for personnel with technical, legal, political and legislative skills in trade policy institutions for effective participation of a country in the WTO process.

The WTO is a member-driven organisation. It has a wide and growing mandate therefore active participation of trade delegates is essential for its work. Among others, the WTO's activities include about fifty meetings and consultations per week. This requires a large, skilled and versatile delegation in Geneva. A country's capacity also depends on the significance of learning by doing and the development of institutional memory. These attributes get diluted in inadequately sized delegations, which may also undergo frequent changes in staff composition.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The establishment and functioning of the WTO is best understood through regime theory. Defining regimes simply in terms of explicit rules and procedures risks formalism, i.e. purely nominal agreements could be considered to be a regime, even though they had no behavioural implications. International regimes are defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. In an international society, faced with issues transcending the physical and political limits of nation-states, any analysis of international politics should be centred on issues of global governance.

Regimes can occur in a given area of international relations according to the notion that international politics can be sub-divided. In a pluralistic society all individuals find their lives encompassed by many over-lapping issue-areas. Each issue area can have, even if analogous, its own governance structure as a result of interaction of interests and powers at stake. Power in the trade issue-area, for

example, is not consistent with an elite theory model: the largest traders tend to have the greatest influence, while countries important in other domains have little influence.

The question is why should one then bother about the WTO? On the one hand, its existence would be pointless if states feel free to do as they please, or if small states simply follow the rules announced by large states. On the other hand, the WTO as an organisation is not the sole source of order in the global trading system.

The answer lies in a number of reasons for why regimes should matter. There are two categories of international regimes. First, those having significant powers, tightly controlled by states and limited in their ability to extend their authority to other areas. The second category consists of those which are not tightly controlled but have limited powers. The WTO falls in the first category, while organisations like the World Health Organisation fall into the second.

The criticism of regime theory hinges on its specificity of legal rules and the broader structure of an international system. In today's world, structural power is exercised through technology, market domination and the financial system. Large corporations take decisions, which either extend or restrict the range of choices available to sovereign governments over their economic development. Thus, the power over outcomes in international political economy cannot be limited to that exercised by governments only. Structural power counts more than relational power. This notion goes beyond the state-centric tradition that characterises the regime theory.

With respect to the trade-regime, critics of regime theory argued that bargaining and trade negotiations are related to power and thus, called for the empowerment of trade negotiators and trade officials in the political system. In this respect, the following perspectives of empowerment are important:

- Personal: developing a sense of self and individual confidence and capacity, and undoing the effects of internalised oppression.
- Relational: developing the ability to negotiate and influence the nature of a relationship and decisions made within it.
- Collectiveness: where individuals work together to achieve a greater impact than each could have done alone. This includes involvement in political structures, but might also cover collective action based on co-

operation rather than competition. Collective action may be locally focused or more institutionalised as happens in the United Nations or the WTO.

African countries' participation in the global trade regime under the WTO should be analysed by taking into account these perspectives of empowerment.

THE REALITIES

To date, Africa has derived minimal benefits from the multilateral trading system under the auspices of the WTO. Africa's participation in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was very minimal. A study by the African Economic Research Consortium revealed that the participation of African countries in the rules-making exercises during the WTO ministerial conferences was marginal, largely because these countries lacked the capacity to engage substantively on a wide range of issues on the agenda. They were overwhelmed by the complexities of negotiations and lacked negotiating experience and expertise in economic policy analyses and international trade law. A case in point was their inability to seek credit during negotiations for measures already undertaken under Structural Adjustment Programmes that included trade reforms.

African countries had seldom chosen to "bind tariffs" even though they could have received negotiation credits for having done so, as some Latin American countries did. Furthermore, the focus of African countries was on preserving or enhancing the generalised system of preferences (GSP) or Lome Convention's Tariff Preference, not fully appreciating that in the long run these provisions would have to be WTO compliant.

A key factor behind the unbalanced nature of the Uruguay Round agreements has been the unequal negotiating power of members. Even today, there is not much change in the situation. Many developing and least developed countries are under-represented, or even totally unrepresented, in the day-to-day activities of the WTO. The WTO procedures rely on consensus for decision-making but, in practice, smaller countries cannot wield a veto and are therefore effectively disenfranchised. Much is decided in a multitude of committees, where many developing countries even if they could attend, would be outmanoeuvred technically and politically. Furthermore, there are approximately fifty WTO meetings a week, meaning that even when developing countries are represented in Geneva, they cannot participate in many discussions relevant to their countries' trade interest.

Another appalling situation is regarding trade policy making in Sub-Saharan Africa. For many countries, it is not well defined and, more often than not, several ministries and institutions handle trade policy issues. The situation becomes much more complex when dealing with issues of multilateral negotiations, where both political and commercial diplomacy are involved. This brings in the ministry of foreign affairs and at times in some countries, the process of multilateral negotiation is conducted mainly through the ministry of foreign affairs.

Participation is likely to be weaker if foreign ministry officials are not aware of the issues. For example, the participation of Kenya in the Uruguay Round has been described by local policymakers as lacking in commitment and displaying an apathetic attitude towards the negotiations. They further note that representation at the ambassadorial level did not provide the needed technical competence and the specialisation required for negotiations.

A civil servant from Ghana's Ministry of Trade and Industry represented the country at the WTO meetings. In other countries, trade policy matters are dealt through the ministry of trade but decisions are cleared through the cabinet. Since implementation of trade policies is through various ministries, co-ordination is often problematic. There are significant differences between Sub-Saharan African countries regarding the location of real, as compared to nominal, authority with respect to articulation and implementation of trade policy.

Also, there are differences in terms of which institution has the responsibility for trade policy and which government agency has the power to negotiate and sign international agreements. For example, in Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce has a role in trade policy matters but does not appear to have the eminence. It is the Industrial Tariff Committee, which advises the Ministry of Finance in setting tariffs and other import surcharges as well as the granting of tariff exemptions.

In Senegal, trade measures are generally the subject of consultation among a host of ministries and departments and the Ministry of Trade, in principle, serves as the co-ordinator. In reality, however, the Ministry of Finance assumes control with respect to tax-related matters. Since trade taxes constitute a major component of the national budget, the Ministry of Finance in effect assumes a major role in trade policy formation and implementation. In countries such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, the same pattern prevails.

Africa's Plight in the International Economic System

'According to a report of the World Bank, Africa's share of world commodity trade has fallen as a result of wrong-headed policies. For example, high tariff barriers made inputs expensive and added to production costs. That path proved an expensive failure.

If Africa had maintained its share of world trade from the late 1960s, its exports and income would be some $70bn higher today. But another statistic stands out from the report. Agricultural subsidies in the developed industrial member states of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) total $300bn a year, which is equal to Africa's entire annual income.

No single measure to assist Africa's battle to recover would provide a greater incentive, and have a greater impact, than reducing this support and opening up this market for African products. Lower tariffs on processed agricultural products would be an important benefit, making it easier for African countries to add value to their natural products, and improving prospects for agro-industry.

Change is under way. There is recognition of the need for greater transparency in government, and general acceptance of market-driven prices and exchange rates. But it is also critical to help Africa to negotiate WTO regulations, and then to apply them. Rules seen to be imposed by an alien organisation will never be enacted with enthusiasm.

Africa's recovery is a two-way process. The biggest challenge is at home. Good governance is critical. Giving them better access to the developed world's markets is an urgent and essential step.

Source: *Financial Times*, London, UK; 1.6.2000

Table 1 demonstrates the situation of the African trade missions in Geneva. It is important to keep in mind that these figures provide a rough approximation of the number of officials actually available to work directly on WTO issues. The vast majority of them are obliged to spend some of their time with other international organisations in Geneva and thus cannot dedicate more time to activities in the WTO. Several delegations have personnel whose principal functions involve support activities (communication, accounting etc) but are occasionally called upon to cover WTO meetings during busy periods and perhaps only with a listening brief.

Table 1. African Trade Missions in Geneva, Switzerland

No.	Country	Number of Represenatives[1]	Population[2]	GDP/Capita[3]
1	Angola	3	12.1	523
2	Benin	0	5.8	405
3	Botswana	0	1.6	6 103
4	Burkina Faso	0	11.3	249
5	Burundi	2	6.5	149
6	Cameroon	3	14.3	1 474
7	Central African Republic	0	3.5	340
8	Chad	0	7.3	231
9	Congo	2	2.8	995
10	Côte d'Ivoire	2	14.3	1 598
11	Democratic Republic of Congo	1	49.1	124
12	Djibouti	1	0.6	757
13	Gabon	2	1.2	6 353
14	Gambia	0	1.2	1 453
15	Ghana	3	19.2	1 735
16	Guinea	2	7.3	573
17	Guinea Bissau	0	1.2	173
18	Kenya	3	29.0	980
19	Lesotho	1	2.1	485
20	Madagascar	3	15.1	231
21	Malawi	0	10.4	169
22	Mali	0	10.7	264
23	Mauritania	1	2.5	478
24	Mauritius	5	1.1	8 312
25	Mozambique	0	18.9	169
26	Namibia	0	1.7	5 176
27	Niger	0	10.1	216
28	Nigeria	6	106.4	795
29	Rwanda	3	6.6	279
30	Senegal	2	9.0	1 307
31	Sierra Leone	0	4.6	160
32	Swaziland	0	1.0	3 816
33	Tanzania	5	32.1	173
34	Togo	0	4.4	337
35	Uganda	5	20.6	338
36	Zambia	4	8.8	427
37	Zimbabwe	4	11.4	3 669

Note: 1) Number of representatives (as of August 2001); 2) In million and data for 1998; 3) In 1995 US dollars and data for 1998

Many African countries (fifteen in total) do not have a resident delegate in Geneva and four maintain one-person offices. For example, in one mission, four people spent 100 percent of their time on WTO work, and in two others there were two delegates who spent 95-100 per cent of their time on WTO work. In five missions, the figures were 40 and 80 percent, with the number of full time equivalent officials ranging from 0.75-2.1 (compared to two or three officials as mentioned in the directory). Finally, in two delegations the range was from 10-25 percent, i.e. each of them was giving only one quarter of the full time equivalent person working on WTO matters.

Priority subject areas were: the Committee on Trade and Development, as listed by nine out of eleven delegates; market access and agriculture were mentioned by eight; and the Committee on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and dispute settlement were mentioned by six.

Moreover, virtually all of the Sub-Saharan African missions in Geneva are staffed by officials from the ministry of foreign affairs rather than from the ministry of commerce and trade. That is, they are staffed by people who have little or nothing to do with WTO matters when they return to their homeland. This means not only do they know nothing about WTO work when they arrive, but that the WTO experience they gain while in Geneva is not likely to be used when they return home.

Any meaningful effort to improve the participation of Sub-Saharan African countries in the WTO must deal with this problem. An interesting example comes from the list of officials who were selected by their countries to attend the trade policy course in Geneva, 2001. Togo selected a customs officer, Ghana, a civil servant, Benin a tax officer. These officials play a very little role in the implementation of trade policies in their countries and this means that they go home with little to put back into the system.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The WTO agreements and their operation are and will have a profound impact on the economies of African countries. Hence, it is imperative that they do not remain indifferent and handicapped, but actively participate in the negotiations and other activities in this forum and make themselves effective in its decision-making and operations.

The current process of being pushed into making one-sided concessions or facing a sudden collapse at the end should naturally be changed to one of engaging in a meaningful negotiation of give and take and insisting on commensurate concessions from others before finally agreeing to any concession from one's own side. Opposition and resistance to harmful proposals is legitimate, and whenever a decision is taken to yield, it should be done in a proper and planned manner, after negotiating for commensurate concessions from the beneficiaries of the proposal. Thus, the need for effective regional alliances arises.

All this requires the support of a detailed analytical examination of the issues involved and identification of interests. The African Group should undertake such an examination, but their capacity is limited. They should build and strengthen their capacity through empowerment schemes. The universities and institutions in their countries could sponsor this work. A network of institutions in developing countries should be formed for this purpose. But considering the limited resources and capacity in these nations, it is doubtful if they will be able to undertake studies and analyses of their own, and on a sustained basis.

Earlier, particularly during the Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) undertook technical assistance programmes to help empower the developing countries in the negotiations. UNCTAD is still engaged in studying the subjects and issues relating to the WTO, but its work in this area is mainly centred on the inter-governmental meetings.

By taking into account the political economy of regime and empowerment theories and the situation as described above, the following recommendations are made for effective participation of African countries in the WTO. First, they have to identify specific interests and objectives in respect of the subjects of the WTO. This can be done through a broad-based and in-depth examination of the issues and implications. It also requires some institutional changes in the decision-making process. WTO matters are complex with widespread implications and any particular ministry in a government would not be fully equipped to handle them. Almost every issue being taken up in the WTO involves different interests of various wings of the government. They also involve a c1ash of interests among various industry groups and economic operators. These subjects demand a very comprehensive examination of their implications and the balancing of differing interests. A government ministry working in the traditional manner is hardly equipped to perform this task.

Secondly, it is necessary to have a permanent expert body of high standing credibility and objectivity to supplement the efforts of the current machinery. This body should examine the issues critically, taking into account all aspects and interests, and should hold wide consultations with the affected groups in trade and industry, consumer fora, various wings of the government and other interested groups and persons.

Thirdly, there should be a change in the African countries' strategy and approach. The current feeling of helplessness, that they cannot have their say in the WTO, should be replaced by a perception that they can achieve their objectives if a number of them are united and well prepared. Developing countries make up a very large number in the WTO and even if one does not expect all of them to come together on all the issues, one can at least expect a large number of them to have a common perception and common stand on a number of issues.