From Potential to Contribution: The Effect of Government Policies on the Development Potential of the Bosnian Diaspora in Germany

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Abstract. The diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina currently consists of an estimated 38.9% of Bosnia’s entire population. Together they provide for 13-20% of Bosnia’s national GDP by consistently sending money to family and friends at home. They thereby actively contribute to the socio-economic development of their home country. Nonetheless, there are clear signs that the fulfilment of the existing potential would be much higher if national policies that actively support and assist Bosnian diaspora contribution would be in place. Research on the Bosnian contribution environment is, however, largely absent, predominantly due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the literature view the Bosnian diaspora as former refugees who have not (yet) returned, instead of as a permanent diaspora that can function as ‘agents for development’. This study aims to fill this gap and provide a first cautious step towards an overview of the most salient issues in the Bosnian-German migration and development environment. By applying Brinkerhoff’s model of enabling government roles, this paper argues that a lacking diaspora policy on the side of Bosnia and the restrictionist immigration and refugee policies of Germany form major obstructions to effective home country development contributions of Bosnian migrants in Germany. Hollifield’s theory of the ‘liberal paradox’ and Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias’ approach on ‘northern dominance’ further explain why national and international politics shape the presence of such policies, despite their obstructing effects on diaspora contribution.

Introduction: The Development Potential of Diasporas

With growing right-wing, popular, anti-immigrant sentiment currently strengthening its grip on many European countries with sizeable immigrant populations, there is a dire need to look at the positive impact of diasporas worldwide. Apart from the long-recognized contributions that migrants make to their host countries, academics and politicians in migrant sending and receiving countries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international organisations have, for several decades,
increasingly acknowledged that migrants also provide the possibility of contributing to the socio-economic development of their countries of origin. In this way, migration and development domains have increasingly been linked in both the growing academic and political fields in order to analyse the negative and positive effects of migrants on their home countries. During the last two decades there has been an immense increase in money sent by migrants to developing home countries, from $31.1 billion in 1990 to $76.8 billion in 2000 and $325 billion in 2010, which has led to a renewed interest in migration and development (de Haas 2007; World Bank 2011). These so-called remittances are an important reason for migrants to be viewed as ‘agents for development’, since their financial contributions have shown to have a positive, direct impact on poverty alleviation (Faist 2007). Hence, following these good results, other forms of diaspora contribution, such as the transfer of knowledge and skills (human capital) and networks (social capital), extend the migration development potential and spur worldwide interest from both migrant sending and receiving countries.

However, upon recognizing this potential, the question arises whether the migration and development potential is being fulfilled and what the conditions are for diasporas to effectively contribute to their home countries. One way to formulate that the potential is not fulfilled is when one can identify people who have expressed their interest and have the ability to contribute but are not engaged in doing so. More and more national and international bodies pay attention to the question of how to create an enabling environment with conditions that facilitate the potential of diaspora contribution as much as possible (Brinkerhoff 2012). Even though there are a number of structural conditions that are subject to forces that are out of national reach, such as global economic relations, there is also a large part that is directly shaped by the national government. National government policies, in part, have the ability to create or at least influence the conditions that shape an enabling environment for diaspora contribution. De Haas (2007) even claims that “if states fail to implement general social and economic reform, migration and remittances are unlikely to contribute to nationwide sustainable development” (p. 25). The development effect of migrant contributions is hence conditioned by the government policies of the migrant sending as well as the receiving country – meaning, that the contribution potential of migrants is fulfilled to a higher degree when facilitating government policies are in place (Valenta and Ramet 2011). Some scholars do not only recognise the causal link between the national government and diaspora contribution, but moreover argue that the state carries a responsibility to support this contribution potential. For example Bakewell (2008), and Castles and Delgado Wise (2008) argue that a key responsibility lies with the government to provide ‘an appropriate legislative framework’ and play a proactive role in setting up institutions and programs to facilitate migration and development.

The contribution environment of diasporas differs for each single case. Among many factors, this also has to do with the attention that is given to the topic of migration and development in a certain country. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the interest for this issue is largely shaped by its recent war history. Partly due to this destructive civil war that took place in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, one third of its current population lives outside Bosnian borders. Over the last two decades, many of the refugees that resulted from the war have stayed, integrated, and some have even adopted new nationalities (Valenta and Ramet 2011). Nevertheless, to many, Bosnia still bears the image of the war-torn country, and literature on the Bosnian diaspora in many cases still perceives the diaspora as former refugees who have not (yet)
returned, instead of as a permanent diaspora. As a result, the recognition of the potential of the large Bosnian diaspora to function as ‘agents for development’ develops only slowly. Literature that analyses the Bosnian diaspora contribution environment in general is highly insufficient, and on the Bosnian diaspora in one of the most important destination countries, Germany, is lacking completely. This paper therefore aims to take a first step in filling the large literature gap that currently exists on the development contribution environment for Bosnians, and specifically for the Bosnian diaspora in Germany. This study examines which effects Bosnian and German government policies have on the development contribution potential of Bosnian migrants in Germany and why effective contribution facilitating policies are lacking.

Primary sources such as policy papers and German and Bosnian government documents provide the basis of this paper’s data resources. Furthermore, since Bosnian government institutions such as the embassy in Germany and the relevant ministries provide for a very limited amount of official sources (in English), secondary data—including expert information—has also been put to use. Official correspondence with the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees provided missing information on Bosnia’s official stance towards migration and development and its diaspora policy. Additionally, two Bosnian researchers based in Sarajevo have, based on previous unpublished academic research, contributed further detailed information and provided insights for further analysis. Apart from the lack of information on Bosnian diaspora policy, data on the Bosnian diaspora in Germany in particular is also scarce. Two academics based in Germany who have conducted research among this diaspora community, albeit on a different topic, were able to provide information on the research population via personal correspondence and an informal interview with one of the scholars.

Framing Effects of and Explanations for Government Policies

In order to analyse the role of the government in diaspora contribution, the question that consequently needs to be asked is which government approach and government policies are actually necessary to enable and facilitate diaspora contribution. When this benchmark is established, the effects of an imperfect policy situation on diaspora contribution can be analysed. The following three theories provide this benchmark, as well as a framework that guides the analysis of why such policies are in place. Due to a gap in theories that specifically focus on the migration and development field, development theory and the political approach within migration theory provide for a theoretical basis for this paper’s research.

Brinkerhoff (2012) has developed a framework on the role of the government in diaspora contribution, which aims to outline which actions governments can and should take to create an enabling environment for diaspora contribution to the development of the home country. The framework proposes five government-enabling roles: mandating, facilitating, resourcing, partnering, and endorsing. Mandating refers to the legal and regulatory framework that affects diasporas and the general political and socio-economic development of the sending country that support a general, developing environment. A government’s facilitating role provides incentives for diasporas to contribute, through active government support. Creating government agencies to connect with diasporas, support in improving diasporas’ living conditions abroad, and creating inter-diaspora networks can all lead to providing the conditions
for migrants to get involved in homeland contribution. Resourcing is mainly aimed at providing public funding and financial incentives for diasporas to engage in financial contributions such as remittances and foreign direct investment. In partnering, a partnership based on mutual interest is established between the government and diaspora organisations. Lastly, the role of endorsing points to the recognition by the government of the value that diasporas are to the homeland.

In the model these government roles are then applied to Uphoff’s model on the access to power resources, government strategies of the diaspora option, and government agencies involved (locus). For the clarity of the argument, in this paper the government roles are only combined with Uphoff’s access to power resources in order to analyse the effects of German and Bosnian policies on migrant development contribution to Bosnia. Uphoff argues that diaspora contributions are facilitated when diaspora members have access to five types of power resources: “economic, social (social status based on social roles or on complying with socially valued criteria), political (ability to influence the exercise of authority), moral (perceived legitimacy of actions), and informational” (in Brinkerhoff 2012: 78). Government policies of both the sending and the receiving country can enable diasporas’ access to these power resources, be neutral, or pose barriers to them (Wescott and Brinkerhoff 2006). When applied to Brinkerhoff’s government enabling roles, certain government actions can actively provide support to access power resources and hence facilitate diaspora’s ability to contribute.

Whereas Brinkerhoff only applies her model to the sending country, the application of Uphoff’s power resources enables the model to be extended to the receiving country as well, as this paper will aim to demonstrate. For the use of the model in practice, Brinkerhoff (2012) calls attention to a number of cautions. Firstly, the author remarks that even though it might be desired, governments are not necessarily always the most enabling partner. Secondly, not all governments may be as welcoming to the interference of their diaspora communities abroad. Especially where it concerns political influence, governments may view their diaspora as a threat, posing the ability for fuelling political opposition. This can especially be the case for countries with a history of intra-ethnic conflict, such as Bosnia. Thirdly, diaspora involvement does not necessarily benefit the society as a whole but may only selectively aid some individuals or families. Even more, the government could feel that diaspora contributions counteract the priorities of international organisations and government programs and thereby undermine other sources of aid. Lastly, this model presumes the unquestionable right to access of power for diasporas. For governments, the diaspora can be seen as an extra interest group next to the local residents who are just another group looking for power and resources (Brinkerhoff 2012). All together, these caveats may explain why certain policies are in place, specifically on the side of sending country Bosnia.

When analysing receiving countries’ policies, and in specific immigration policies, Hollifield provides a theoretical basis. In the field of migration and development Hollifield (2000) recognises three major themes: national security, citizenship, and control in the meaning of “the role of the nation-state in establishing rules of entry and exit” (p. 185). Based on these three themes is Hollifield’s theory of the liberal paradox, which aims to explain the difficulty that lies with liberal democratic states in the regulation of immigration. The liberal paradox holds that there are two opposing powers of national immigration interest. The first is an economic liberal interest of openness, recognising the need for cheap foreign labour. Simultaneously, the pursuit of protecting national security produces a political interest of closure. These two
conflicting national interests shape immigration policy to a large degree (Hollifield 1992) and help to explain German immigration policies.

The focus on security and control in the migration and development field can be explained by the approach of Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias on northern dominance. This approach argues that the migration and development field is dominated by the northern hegemony of rich, northern countries and international bodies ruled by those same northern countries. Consequently, rich, receiving countries hold the ability to shape both the debate and set migration and development regulation (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). The result is that an asymmetric relationship exists between the sending and the receiving country, in which the former is subordinate to the interests of the latter. Also, at an international level, migrant sending countries are dependent on international bodies dominated by the northern hegemony (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2010). This approach helps to explain the bilateral relationship between Bosnia and Germany and the effect of international regulation on Bosnian policy.

The Diaspora Contribution Environment of Bosnians in Germany

In 2010, official accounts recorded a flow of remittances that reached USD 2.2 billion, sent by Bosnian migrants all over the world to friends and family in Bosnia. This was six times more than the amount of foreign direct investment and three times the amount of official development aid that Bosnia received. Bosnia places number fifteen on the world list of remittance-receiving countries in relation to GDP, with remittances making up 13-20% of Bosnia’s national GDP (Oruč 2011; World Bank 2011). Not surprisingly, Bosnia is also one of the leading migrant ‘exporters’ in the OECD countries (Nikolić, Mraović, and Ćosić 2010). With currently about 1.46 million Bosnians living abroad, its diaspora consists of an estimated 38.9% of Bosnia’s entire population (World Bank 2011). Nikolić et al. (2010) argue that during the EU accession process, this migration trend is likely to continue and even increase.

One can conclude from this brief picture that Bosnia is a country that has a big potential to put its (very large) diaspora population to use to positively contribute to the development of Bosnia. As the European country containing the highest number of Bosnian migrants (approximately 240,000) except for Croatia, Germany is an important source of remittances to Bosnia (Ministry of Security - Immigration Sector 2011). Hence, the Bosnian migrants in Germany form an important contribution potential to Bosnia. However, for such a development potential to be fulfilled, effective facilitating policies from above are vital (Brinkerhoff 2012). With 10.8 million immigrants, Germany ranks number three on the world list of migrant destination countries, after the USA and the Russian Federation. Being one of the most prominent immigrant countries in the world, its immigration policy receives much attention both at a national and an international level (Bundesministerium des Innern [BMI] 2008; World Bank 2011). Therefore, to combine Bosnia’s extraordinary diaspora potential with Germany’s attention to immigration policy forms a relevant and unique case study on the effect of both migrant sending and receiving government policies on diaspora contribution. This paper attempts to provide a first cautious step towards an overview of the most salient issues in the Bosnian-German migration and development field. It will thereby mostly concentrate on German immigration and Bosnian diaspora policies, as a way to create a picture of the German Bosnian diaspora population and its development contribution environment.
To gain a background picture of the research population at focus, first the context and the general characteristics of the Bosnian diaspora in general and in Germany in particular will briefly be outlined. Subsequently, the most important Bosnian and German policies and their effects on diaspora contribution will be discussed, thereby focussing on three main policy fields. Lastly, an explanation will be sought as to why these policies are in place.

**Bosnia and its Diaspora (in Germany)**

With an unemployment rate of 70% among the youth (aged 18-30), it is not surprising that many young Bosnians view their future possibilities abroad (IOM and IASCI 2010:129). While Bosnia still experiences the aftermath of the destructive civil war that took place between 1992 and 1995, its economic growth rates can be called ‘decent’ but still a little lower than other nations at a similar stage of development (Jakobsen 2011). However, during the last couple of years its economy has stagnated and poverty levels are also considerable, with an estimated 17.8% of the population living below the poverty line (Ministry of Security - Immigration Sector 2011). It is very likely due to those reasons that Bosnia is currently an emigration country, with 20,000 people moving to an EU country each year, versus approximately 9,500 immigrants (ibid.). Estimations of the total number of Bosnians living abroad vary between 1,350,000 (the Bosnian Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees) and 1,461,000 (according to the World Bank) (ibid.). It is, however, very difficult to know whether these numbers are accurate, due to the different identification criteria and definitions of migrants, as well as the varying nature of statistical sources in the various host countries (Valenta and Ramet 2011). Nevertheless, what is certain is that, even though exact numbers are not available, the Bosnian diaspora accounts for a considerable share of the Bosnian population.

An important characteristic of the Bosnian diaspora is its division along ethnic lines. The Bosnian population distinguishes between three ethnicities: Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims, also known as Bosniaks. This ethnic division is consolidated in the political structure as laid down under the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, which consists of two separate entities: Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a weak central authority at the top. Republika Srpska is mostly inhabited by the orthodox Bosnian Serbs, whereas the catholic Bosnian Croats and the Muslim Bosniaks mainly live in the Bosniak-Croat Federation (Jakobsen 2011). While abroad, this ethnic division often continues to exist among Bosnian communities, of which many are organised on the basis of ethnic belonging. Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, who constitute the minority of the Bosniak-dominated Bosnian diaspora, are often more attracted to Serbian and Croat migrant communities respectively than to mixed or Bosniak-dominated Bosnian organisations (Valenta and Ramet 2011). Some argue that this heterogeneity undermines internal solidarity among the diaspora and reinforces ethnic divisions (ibid.).

The approximately 240,000 Bosnians that currently live in Germany arrived in roughly three phases. During the decades before the war and particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, tens of thousands of Bosnian builders, craftsmen and entrepreneurs emigrated with the help of *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) programs to work in Germany (ibid.). At the outbreak of the war in 1992, large refugee streams resulted in a total number of 320,000 Bosnians that fled to Germany. While the largest share of refugees repatriated after the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, new waves of
economic migrants immediately followed, with mostly young people searching for better educational and economic opportunities (Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 2008). Although no clear data exist on the exact legal status of every individual Bosnian case, what is at least clear is that up until 2009, 83,000 Bosnians have obtained German citizenship, and from 2002 no Bosnians in Germany hold refugee status anymore (Ministry of Security – Immigration Sector 2011).

In a report based on information of the Bosnian embassy in Berlin, the Bosnian Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees claims that many, of which mainly highly educated, Bosnian migrants do not participate in migrant organisations, although a wide variety of Bosnian organisations exist in Germany. The majority of these clubs and associations are related to sports, religion, or the preservation of a local or regional culture. Also in Germany many, albeit not all, associations are organised on an ethnic basis and many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are involved in the national Serbian and Croatian associations in Germany (Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 2008). There is no statistical information on exactly how many migrants are engaged in such diaspora organisations, as such networks often work informally and their existence and size highly fluctuate (Bundesministerium des Innern [BMI] 2008). Apart from engagement with fellow Bosnians via migrant associations, other forms that contribute to maintaining the connection to the homeland are radio broadcasts and websites with news from Bosnia and the rest of the world. Furthermore, satellite TV channels and Internet portals form an important source of information and connection with the country of origin (Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 2008). A quick search on the Internet brings about a number of forums where (mainly young) Bosnians who live in Germany discuss a wide range of topics, using both the German and the Bosnian language. Themes range from inter-ethnic marriages to generational conflicts, where it often concerns the integration in German society. However, when compared to, for example, the Serbian diaspora (which is twice the size of the Bosnian diaspora), Bosnian broadcasts and news websites are far less widespread and not as organised.

There are no existing data on exactly how many of those German-Bosnian migrant organisations are involved in some form of development contribution, nor to which degree Bosnians in Germany are individually engaged in any form of capital transfer to Bosnia. However, Dimova (informal interview, 3 March 2012) notes that during her research she found that there is a widespread network among Bosnian migrants in Germany, but that these have mainly social aims rather than philanthropic goals. Also on an individual basis, Dimova notes that there seems to be little involvement in contributing to Bosnia. However, the World Diaspora Association of BiH states on its official website that they aim to serve the interests of the diaspora as well as their home country (World Diaspora Association of BiH 2012). Moreover, they declare their dedication to the transfer of knowledge and experience in a process of cooperation, where they find the possibility (ibid.). Furthermore, the Bosnian Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees (2008) claims that there are many highly educated Bosnian migrants who do not have the time to engage in associations, but have expressed their willingness to cooperate with institutions within their respective professional field in Bosnia. To what degree such individual cooperations exist in practice can be questioned. Nikolić et al. (2010) argue that presently “the BiH highly qualified diaspora presents a largely untapped brain gain potential for the country” (p. 33).

One form of diaspora contributions that is more visible than human and social capital is the transfer of financial capital. According to a 2010 survey among 1.216 long-term
Bosnian migrants worldwide, 67.3% of Bosnian migrants in European countries indicated that they transfer money to BiH. Furthermore, the survey concluded that the overwhelming majority (81.3%) of financial remittances are sent through informal channels, since formal channels such as banks and money transfer operators (MTOs) like Western Union are considered too expensive. In line with international remittance trends, Bosnians abroad predominantly transfer money with the aim of supporting family and friends, and only a minority intends to use this money for saving, investment in a business, or to buy a house (IOM and IASCI 2010). Of all survey respondents only 6% indicated that they have invested in Bosnia, and another 6% that they kept savings in their home country (ibid.). According to Jakobsen (2011), these two sources of income are exactly what is necessary for economic growth to flourish in Bosnia now that, 17 years after the end of the war, the amount of monetary aid is decreasing. Remittances primarily fill this gap, but many question whether they have any positive effect on the Bosnian economy. Several studies note that there is some evidence that remittance flows have helped and continue to positively contribute to poverty alleviation (Jakobsen 2011). Nonetheless, the same studies also argue that remittances alone cannot bring about long-term sustainable economic development if flows of savings and foreign direct investment fail to increase (ibid.).

Taken all together, there are considerable indications that the potential and willingness for the transfer of financial, human and social capital among Bosnian migrants worldwide and in Germany is currently not put to full use. The question then arises, why is this the case and which factors are obstructing larger Bosnian migrant development contribution engagement?

The Effects of Bosnian and German Policies on Diaspora Contribution

There are a varied number of policies that affect migrant contribution either directly or in more indirect ways. In this paper, government policies and measures are chosen that form the most salient points in German Bosnian migrant contribution, according to the characteristics of the chosen case study. Consequently, this study identifies the following three fields of government policies and measures:

I. Policies on the general development environment of the sending country;

II. Policies and initiatives on framing a migration and development policy;

III. Policies that directly affect the mobility of capital or people.

The chosen structure of policy division coincides up to a certain degree with Brinkerhoff’s five government roles. The role of mandating loosely overlaps with policy field I, whereas facilitating is discussed in field II, and resourcing in field III. The other two government roles of partnering and endorsing are not separately discussed, but instead are part of the three policy fields mentioned above.

I. Policies on the Bosnian Economic and Political Environment

After a recovery period that started immediately after the end of the war, the political and economic institutional framework in BiH is not yet where it should be in comparison with European standards (Jakobsen 2011). Data from the World Bank
Governance Indicators show the lack of progression of institutional quality in Bosnia between 1996 and 2008. In five of six dimensions of governance that are measured, Bosnia has consistently scored lower than the world average that lies at 0. Only the indicator for “Voice & Accountability”, which measures the level of human rights protection and democracy, has reached a positive score of 0.1 in 2004. As for the indicators of “Political Stability”, “Rule of Law”, and “Control of Corruption”, scores for all three dimensions have actually worsened during the given time span (The World Bank Group 2011). There are calls that the separated political structure results in an increasing political and social polarisation of the different ethnic groups in Bosnia, which also dominates public institutions, and that this is the major reason for economic progress coming to a halt (Al Jazeera 2011).

As a result of this lack of a mandating role, the Bosnian economy is said to fail to provide a favourable business climate, in which long-term foreign direct investment could effectively lead to economic growth. This is even further exemplified when looking at Bosnia’s low scores on the ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’ of 2012 that is published on a yearly basis by the World Bank. Bosnia ranks number 125 of 183 countries surveyed, and on the indicator of the ease of starting a business, only 20 countries perform worse than Bosnia (World Bank 2012). Consequently, Bosnia receives low levels of trust in its political and economic environment and Bosnia holds a negative image towards potential foreign investors. For successful Bosnians abroad, sending money either to invest or to save in their home country is therefore not financially attractive, and a lack of economic power due to this restriction hinders further potential financial contributions. Another result of this weak economy is a high unemployment rate, especially among young adults. Many Bosnian migrants indicate that they would like to return if there would be worthwhile job opportunities (Al Jazeera 2011), but since their job prospects are almost nil, young migrants abroad are seriously restricted in their options to return to Bosnia. Moreover, the increased role of the informal economy causes a prevalence of corruption and organised crime (Jakobsen 2011), which further limits Bosnian migrants’ access to political and economic power and hinders potential Bosnian diaspora contribution.

II. Policies and Initiatives on Framing a Coherent Migration and Development Strategy

A. Coherent Migration and Development Policy in Germany

Germany was among the countries in Europe that was relatively fast to convert migration and development debates into a political response. After having used its immigrants’ development potential for the industrial development of Germany, the German government has now also recognised the development potential of its 10.8 million immigrants for their countries of origin. In January 2007, a motion was adopted by the German government that officially recognised the development potential of its 10.8 million immigrants for their countries of origin. In January 2007, a motion was adopted by the German government that officially recognised the development potential of German immigrants, as well as the governments’ potential positive role in the assistance and encouragement of realizing this potential (Deutscher Bundestag 2007). In line with the stipulations that were laid down in the adopted motion, the German government has developed a migration and development strategy in which it has largely succeeded in adopting development-related migration issues into national development cooperation policy, which is known as the government approach of co-development. Even though program implementation is to a small degree split between the Ministry of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and the Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), one can certainly speak of German policy coherence in the migration and development field. However, according to Musekamp (2008), program implementation is still in an early stage and relatively limited in comparison to French and English co-development programs.

Aumüller (2005) notes that, in line with the European trend, early German initiatives to implement migration and development programmes were mainly directed at the use of development aid to decrease migration flows. A survey conducted in 2001 showed that repatriation support programs dominated German migration-oriented development aid policy at that time (Aumüller 2005). Nevertheless, in the past ten years German migration and development policy programs have developed and broadened their focus. The BMZ, which is the main ministry responsible in this field, has developed six focus points: to provide consultancy for governments of sending countries; to support migrant organisations in Germany; to relieve the conditions for remitting; to strengthen individual economic engagement via entrepreneurship or trade; to assist in voluntary return; and to encourage intercultural integration and engagement in migrant organisations (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung [BMZ] 2012b). The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is the main implementing partner and has been assigned by the BMZ to develop mechanisms and concepts to put the migration potential to use (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [GIZ] 2012b). GIZ executes programs on four of the above six focus points, where assistance of voluntary return and intercultural integration are dealt with by BAMF. Through its cooperation with already existing programs with diaspora networks, migrants become more and more involved in the shaping and implementation of development projects, thereby putting their knowledge to use.

Even though in practice project implementation is still far from the official objectives, the adopted strategy can already cause a change in the contribution environment. First of all, Germany’s positive official standing point on migration and development gives German immigrants moral power, as their abilities and potential are recognised. Furthermore, by financially supporting diaspora organisations, the German government provides active migrants with the economic power to engage in philanthropic development projects, possibly next to individual contributions. Lastly, by actively including diasporas in close cooperation with the government, the individual migrants and networks involved might be able to increase both their political and their social power, since through political engagement there is potential for their social status to increase. Hence, Brinkerhoff’s enabling government role of facilitating, even though only applied to sending countries’ governments in her model, could here be recognised as currently being developed in Germany, even though its effectiveness is yet to be proven.

It is doubtful, however, whether Germany’s facilitating role is also able to provide Bosnian migrants with access to these power resources. Of all programs currently implemented under one of the six priority fields, only one project has Bosnia as its focus group. There are, in comparison, multiple programs on Serbia that focus on cooperation with the Serbian diaspora population in Germany (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [GIZ] 2012a). The Bosnian bilateral program, in contrast, concentrates on assisting the return of experts to Bosnia. The Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung (CIM), who executes the project for GIZ (Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung [CIM] 2012), thereby mainly works together with the Bosnian Agency of Labour and Employment (A. Telalović, personal correspondence June 2012). Apart from this single bilateral program, there
are also a small number of projects run by international organisations, which all focus on the same topic of the (temporary) return of qualified nationals. Examples are the Transfer of Knowledge through the Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program of the UNDP, and the Return and Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (RQN/TRQN) and the Migration and Development in the Western Balkans (MIDWEB) projects that are run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Nikolić et al. 2010). Although Bosnia supports these international projects to a certain degree, Nikolić et al. (2010) remark that, when the IOM asked the Bosnian government to take over the TOKTEN project, there was no interest from their side to do so.

The bilateral program is part of the general development cooperation strategy of the German BMZ. In this domain the BMZ runs an extensive development program in Bosnia, in which a large share of the attention goes to political and economic reconstruction. Encouraging political dialogue and institution-building are high on the list of priorities (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung [BMZ] 2012a; Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2011). Hence, German general development policy is engaged in exactly those issues highlighted in policy field I as causing a disabling general development contribution environment in Bosnia.

**B. Bosnian Diaspora Framework**

Contrary to the current trend among many sending countries (Bakewell 2008), Bosnia does not have a separate Ministry for Diaspora, nor does it have a coherent diaspora policy framework in place. Instead, duties concerned with Bosnia’s diaspora are dispersed over several ministries and agencies at the central state level (instead of at regional or local levels). According to the **Law on Ministries and Other Administrative Bodies of BiH**, which was adopted in 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the responsibility to protect the rights and interests of Bosnian citizens, both temporary and permanent, abroad. Furthermore, it is concerned with the coordination of the work of Bosnian embassies and other consular bodies, and of the cooperation with emigrated Bosnians, either via the embassies or directly. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an overall general task of cooperation with its diaspora, the main body responsible for diaspora policy is the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, and in particular its Department for Diaspora (Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003). This department is in charge of formulating a Bosnian diaspora policy, but until now they have not succeeded (R. Tihić-Kadrić, official correspondence, 7 August 2012). Lastly, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the BiH Agency for Labour and Employment both have small responsibilities on the education of migrant children abroad and on bilateral agreements on employment (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012).

Bakewell observes a trend among sending countries of an increasing number of government programs on the support and protection of their diasporas, most notably focussing on encouraging investment and facilitating return. However, in comparison with countries such as the Philippines and Morocco (Bakewell 2008), the Bosnian government provides very little support to its diaspora abroad. Programs on government assistance during pre-departure and integration in the host country are fairly absent. More importantly, programs on maintaining diaspora links with the home country, of central concern to migrant contributions, are kept to a minimum (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). As highlighted by Bosnia’s only bilateral program with Germany, the majority of the programs and bilateral
agreements that concern the Bosnian migration population are aimed at migrant return. Furthermore, when, for instance, compared with Serbia, which has a separate ministry for Diaspora relations, Bosnia’s diaspora policy is highly disintegrated.

The Bosnian diaspora themselves are highly unsatisfied with the lack of government support. A survey among highly skilled professionals living abroad shows the perception that the lack of initiative of BiH institutions and organisations causes a major blockage to the establishment of a relationship and cooperation between the diaspora and the home country. According to the same survey, “Thus far, the interest in cooperation is far greater among the actual members of expatriate scientific communities than among and within the institutions that could benefit from this cooperation” (Nikolić et al. 2010: 32). The World Diaspora Association of BiH also disapproves of the lack of government cooperation with its diaspora, since they see it as the government’s responsibility to provide diaspora support. Additionally, they condemn the incoherence of current actions on diaspora issues, as they note that it “brings the whole process to slowdown and inefficiency” (World Diaspora Association of BiH2012, para 16).

Despite repeated calls for a coherent diaspora policy from the diaspora community, no such legislative framework has yet been adopted. This lack of legislative consolidation is in spite of multiple failed attempts of policy adoption and a preparatory process that started in 2008. In line with the promised accomplishments that were laid down in the IOM Framework Agreement on initiatives aimed at linking migration with the development of BiH and signed by the Bosnian Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, the Bosnian government has assisted several research projects such as on the diaspora’s financial contributions (IOM and IASCI 2010). Additionally, it has supported several regional conferences on migration and development in the last three years. These preparations have led to a number of legislative drafts that until now have not been adopted. The first Law on BiH’s Cooperation with her Diaspora/Emigration was drafted and proposed by the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees in 2009, but was refused by the Council of Ministers of BiH two years later without an official explanation. Up until today, no order to re-draft the initial diaspora law proposal has been given by the Council of Ministers. The Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees has, however, included a number of diaspora issues, including reference to the recognition of the development potential of Bosnian emigrants, in drafts of three different national strategy proposals. All three drafts are currently pending at the Council of Ministers, two of which since 2010. If they would be adopted this would finally realise diaspora policy provisions, albeit in a highly incoherent way, and would mean a first step towards official recognition of the diaspora’s development potential on a state level (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012; R. Tihirić-Kadrić, official correspondence, 7 August 2012).

The effect of the BiH government’s lack of initiative to establish effective cooperation with its diaspora is that Bosnia is losing out on a number of nationals who are willing to contribute their human and social capital to the development of Bosnia (Nikolić et al. 2010). The lack of recognition and support hinders the diaspora’s access to moral power, as they are not recognised as contributors to Bosnian socio-economic development. This in turn reduces the motivation of some migrants to transfer any form of capital, especially where it concerns philanthropic projects and not individual aims such as family support. Hence, if Bosnia wants to maintain current transfers of social capital through activities such as lobbying, advocacy, and networking between employers and colleagues in home and host country, formal recognition and administrative support is urgently needed (A. Telalović, personal
correspondence, June 2012). Regarding the transfer of knowledge, Telalović notes that “There is sufficient evidence to claim that contributions of BiH scientific diaspora would be much higher ... if there were some systemic support provided by the authorities” (ibid.). Currently, for example, the absence of adequate legislative arrangements for visiting professors and lack of efficient procedures for the recognition of foreign degrees form great obstacles to the contribution of knowledge that is available (ibid.).

Despite the absence of a coherent policy strategy on migration and development, the Bosnian ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Human Rights and Refugees have executed a small number of programs during the last few years. These activities have mainly been of an assisting role, whereby the ministries participated in programs initiated by international organisations, such as the TOKTEN and TRQN programs, and diaspora organisations like a congress on BiH diaspora scientists organised by the Bosnian scientific migrant organisation BHAAAS (Tihić-Kadrić 2011). One of the few government initiatives that is aimed at the support of diaspora networking is the annual business directory that lists information on Bosnian migrant experts and professionals (Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Ottawa 2010). This initiative is a good example of the focus of government-supported programs on highly educated migrants. Additionally, these programs are of a sporadic nature and are not part of, nor do they lead to an overarching migration and development strategy.

Considering its large diaspora population and the development potential it carries, Bosnia’s passive role in its adoption of a national legal framework is remarkable. Its stance on its diaspora is very much opposite to the current trend in many less-developed sending countries that actively engage their diasporas in homeland contribution. Neither general policies on government engagement with its diaspora nor support in, or encouragement of, diaspora contributions in particular are anchored to a coherent national strategy.

III. Policies that Directly Affect the Mobility of Capital or People

A. German Immigration and Refugee Policies

Whereas the progressive German migration and development policy effectively supports some German diaspora communities in their home country engagement, immigration policies at the same time have a counteractive effect. For example, permanent residents without the German nationality will lose their residence status if they stay outside of Germany for more than six consecutive months (Musekamp 2008). This seriously limits the mobility of migrants to pay longer visits to family and friends, thereby potentially loosening ties with their homeland, and the possibility to transfer social and human capital. Bosnians who want to get around this rule through adopting German nationality are obliged to renounce their Bosnian citizenship, as Germany principally does not allow for dual nationality. It does have a few exemptions to this rule, but this mainly applies to immigrants of Turkish background (Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 2008; Auswärtiges Amt 2006). Upon the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia adopted a law that allows for dual citizenship, but only with those countries with whom a bilateral agreement is signed. Such arrangements are most notably in place with Serbia and Croatia, to which two of the ethnic groups in Bosnia are related, but no such agreement exists between Bosnia and Germany (Štiks 2011). Nikolić et al. (2010) argue that “If the legislation isn’t
modified, the country runs the risk of losing a significant number of its citizens living abroad, and with them its human capital" (pp. 26-27).

Policies that facilitate circular migration could provide a solution to this contribution obstacle. However, to date, German immigration policy does not have any provisions in place that facilitate or promote circular migration patterns. According to a research by Schneider and Parusel (2010), European approaches to circular migration generally seem to be mainly driven by labour market interests and appear to aim for meeting the short-term and sector-specific labour demands. The German focus on programs for temporary workers and highly skilled professionals underline this trend. A clear example comes from a program that was launched in 2000 by former Chancellor Schröder, which aimed to recruit 20,000 highly skilled workers in the software industry. They were, however, not allowed to bring their families. It was only after intervention from human rights groups and experts that they changed this policy so that the immigrant workers could bring their families and settle (Hollifield 2007).

An important factor that shapes the contribution environment is the characteristic of the immigrant population, and specifically the reason for migration. Since approximately half of all Bosnians in Germany were forced migrants that fled from war, German refugee policy at that time shaped their possibilities in Germany to a high degree. At the same time Germany took in the largest number of Bosnian refugees, it also had the harshest return policy. Immediately after the Dayton Agreement was signed, German authorities signed an agreement with Bosnia on the return of refugees and pressured refugees to repatriate. Approximately 300,000 Bosnians left Germany to return to Bosnia or to resettle in third countries after 1995. Apart from a focus on return, German refugee policies limited refugee options during their time of stay. Instead of an official refugee status, most refugees, depending on the province, received temporary protection status, called Duldung (‘tolerated’), which required an unconditional departure from Germany upon the end of the war. After 1995, under duldung status, refugees could stay for six months at most and were expected to leave or apply for a renewal of their residence permit at the end of each given period. Some refugees had their permits repeatedly extended up to ten years and were then refused permanent residence and had to leave the country. People with demonstrable traumas had the chance to be awarded a permanent residence permit, but the criteria to receive this were very strict (Valenta and Ramet 2011).

Since German refugee policy was, to a certain degree, dealt with at the regional level, it depended on the province or sometimes on the city as to whether refugees with duldung status were allowed to work or receive education (S. Pfohman, personal communication, 19 March 2012). However, in the majority of cities, Bosnian refugees were refused these rights (Valenta and Ramet 2011). Consequently, refugees were highly dependent on the German state for their survival and were unable to set up an independent life in Germany. Dimova (2006) argues that because of their uncertain legal status, Bosnian migrants were hindered in integrating into their new communities, expecting to be deported or imprisoned at any moment. Additionally, the same author argues that restrictionist German refugee policies, in particular those resulting in on-going uncertainty about legal status, have led to additional traumas of Bosnian refugees (Dimova 2006). Therefore, many experts perceive Germany as the country with the harshest conditions that Bosnian refugees experienced (Valenta and Ramet 2011). As a result, Bosnian refugees were struggling to survive and often did not have any money left to send home. Pfohman (personal communication, 19 March 2012) notes that some refugees were even dependent on money sent by families and
friends from Bosnia. For those who received permanent residence status, there were often problems in finding a job due to traumas and troubles in acquiring language skills, which was especially the case for the elderly. Consequently, many Bosnians simply did not, and still do not, have the economic power to (financially) contribute to Bosnia (S. Pfohman, personal communication, 19 March 2012; R. Dimova, informal interview, 3 March 2012).

B. Bosnian and German Policies to Facilitate and Encourage Financial Contributions

Germany’s focus point concerning migrant remittances lies on shifting remittances from informal to formal transfer channels (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2011). The positive development effect that formal remittances have, as a result of this formalisation policy, on Bosnia’s unstable economic infrastructure is, however, doubtful (de Haas 2006). At the same time, Germany is involved in assisting the reform of the Bosnian banking sector, although this runs via its regular development cooperation program (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2011). In the long run, this will probably contribute more to an enabling remittance environment in Bosnia than its current remittance formalisation policy. On the side of the sending country, Bosnia has no program in place that aims to provide financial incentives for migrants to engage in financial contribution to Bosnia, and not even a strategy on remittance capture (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). This absence of remittance services from the Bosnian government fits with the picture of a lack of resourcing role on the Bosnian side. With the absence of a facilitating and encouraging force from the Bosnian government, and keeping in mind the unfavourable business environment causing low trust in the Bosnian banking sector, the Bosnian diaspora in Germany is unlikely to increase its investment in its home country. Due to the low trust in the banking sector and a lack of government support, Bosnian migrants in Germany cannot use their money optimally through efficiently sending, investing, or saving in Bosnia.

Explaining Policy Choices in Bosnia and Germany

By researching the policy measures in three main policy fields, it has become apparent that both in Bosnia and in Germany many policy obstructions exist, notwithstanding the high diaspora potential. Consequently, the question arises as to why, despite Bosnian and German recognition of the development contribution potential of Bosnians in Germany, Bosnia has not adopted a diaspora policy and why Germany has obstructive immigration and refugee policies in place.

On the side of the Bosnian government, the main impediment to an enabling diaspora contribution environment seems to be the absence of an official diaspora strategy. Without a government that is actively engaged in establishing a connection with its diaspora, the home country is unable to facilitate an enabling contribution environment. For Bosnia, a lack of state interest to provide support for Bosnian citizens living abroad appears to be widely prevalent. What is more, even for members of the Bosnian diaspora who express an interest in contributing to the development of Bosnia without asking for financial remuneration, little interest is shown by the Bosnian government. This is very much in contrast with the current trend of major emigrant countries who increasingly regard their diasporas as so-called ‘agents for development’ and establish diaspora programs accordingly.
As Brinkerhoff (2012) has explained, for a sending government to take any action towards diaspora engagement, it first has to recognise its positive contribution value. For Bosnia it is rather unclear if the government has recognised its diaspora as such, since several congresses held on the topic and supported by the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees make notion of diaspora recognition, but effective actions are missing. What is clear, however, is that up until now no official statement on diaspora recognition has been adopted in a policy motion, as happened in Germany in 2007. According to Telalović (personal correspondence, June 2012), simply no consensus exists on the reasoning that “diaspora contributions are useful, needed and that they should receive recognition and systemic support from all administrative levels in BiH”. The reason for this absence of general recognition is, according to the assistant minister of the Department for Diaspora of the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, a lack of awareness of diaspora opportunities amongst decision makers in Bosnia and international organisations (Tihić-Kadrić 2011).

One important factor that could provide for an explanation of Bosnia’s deviating diaspora stance is its recent history of civil war. Carling (2008) argues that, whereas diaspora contribution related issues are the same in a variety of migration settings, the context of forced migration can considerably influence the scope for policy intervention. In the case of Bosnia, its war history can be seen to have shaped policy intervention in a number of ways. First of all, immediate concerns such as economic and institutional reconstruction took up most government attention and are still ongoing. Pressing domestic issues such as the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons received policy priority, because of which little space was left for significant initiatives towards Bosnian citizens living abroad (Nikolić et al. 2010).

Whether it is due to the war or because of other issues, another reason for Bosnia’s absent diaspora policy may be the government’s lacking ability to take action. Apart from Brinkerhoff’s caveat on the prerequisite of diaspora recognition, her caveat on governments not always being the most enabling power is also applicable to the case of Bosnia. According to a number of scholars, it is due to the inability of the Diaspora Department that no diaspora strategy has been adopted until now. The department is said to have very low capacity, a limited scope of work, and insufficient funding (N. Oruč, personal communication, 4 June 2012; Tihić-Kadrić 2011). Furthermore, the lack of data on Bosnian citizens abroad and the inability of the Diaspora Department to access such information structurally is also put forward as an obstacle to the establishment of a diaspora policy (Nikolić et al. 2010).

Although a lack of ability provides for a practical explanation, it cannot explain the fact that a proposed law on diaspora policy, which the Diaspora Department has been able to draft, has been refused by the Council of Ministers. Here, Brinkerhoff’s caveat on government diaspora actions being dependent on how the government views its diaspora can provide for clarification. The Bosnian researcher Telalović (personal correspondence, June 2012) argues that, rather than viewing the Bosnian diaspora as a Bosnian community living abroad, they instead see the different ethnic Bosnian groups as being primarily linked to their ethnic roots. Hence, by many politicians in the BiH Parliament, Bosnian Serbs living abroad are considered Serbian diaspora, which is also fully supported by the authorities in Serbia. Likewise, Bosnian Croats are viewed, and treated by current Croat diaspora strategy, as Croat diaspora, and Bosniaks are seen as Bosniak instead of Bosnian diaspora. This political stance is not fully adopted by the entire Bosnian diaspora, as worldwide various Bosnian diaspora organisations exist that are ethnically mixed and foremost consider themselves Bosnians (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). This suggests that, in
fact, the Bosnian government has not recognised its diaspora fully, and do not consider them as being linked to Bosnia in the first place.

In addition, the notion that sending governments may view diaspora engagement as a threat is also pertinent to the case of Bosnia. The core of the reason for a diaspora perception of threat lies in the ethnic division of Bosnia’s political structure. Because of this delicate political structure in the division of power, any involvement of the diaspora forms a threat to the political equilibrium. Even migrant contributions that support economic development might increase the influence of the diaspora or some ethnic groups within it, and could affect the fragile ethnic balance of power (N. Oruč, personal communication, 4 June 2012). Furthermore, some politicians fear that any systemic government support to the Bosnian diaspora might lead to a large-scale return of emigrants, which would alter the ethnic composition and could shift the balance of power (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). All together, it can be argued that whereas many sending countries facilitate the political engagement of their diasporas (Bakewell 2012), Bosnia’s delicate political environment does not provide the possibility for its diaspora to wield any political power.

In addition to explanations at the national level, further explanations can also be found in connection with international actors. The theory of Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias on the northern dominance in setting migration and development regulation can be applied to the role the EU plays with regard to Bosnia. At present, Bosnia has started the EU accession process, and in this regard is expected to fulfil a list of EU accession requirements. Not only does this cause a dependent position towards the EU and EU member countries, it also influences Bosnian policy priorities. Following the dominant northern approach in migration and development, which pursues the western need for workers and at the same time the protection of national sovereignty, the migration agenda of the EU is primarily determined by its security and economic interests and therefore mainly focuses on selective immigration and asylum (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). As a result, according to Telalović (personal correspondence, June 2012), the migration and development pillar of the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility is “just an empty phrase”. Consequently, the issue of emigration is ignored in the EU accession process, and linking migrants’ resources with development is not on the list of EU accession criteria (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012; Tihić-Kadrić 2011). With its limited capacity then, the Bosnian government’s attention goes primarily to those points that the EU requires them to achieve. Since diaspora engagement is not on the list of accession requirements, the government does not feel obliged to include it in their policy priorities. According to Telalović (personal correspondence, June 2012), if the EU were to include the issue of diaspora on the accession agenda, it would be likely that Bosnian local authorities would be more proactive. Moreover, for those who ignore the diaspora issue out of their own political interests, the absence of the issue on the EU list of accession priorities forms a good excuse to ignore the topic, claiming it is not relevant to Bosnia and no consensus within the Bosnian government is required (ibid.).

Another form of international dominance lies in the bilateral relation between Germany and Bosnia, in which Germany can decide the regulation of immigration and also, previously, refugee policies. The German government has consistently put the focus on return in both cases. The focus of German refugee policy was in line with the trend among northern host countries to view repatriation as the most preferred durable solution to refugee problems and can be explained as a component of general political restrictionism (Eastmond 2006). Where it concerns current migration and
development programs, the focus of Germany in many projects also lies on return. An example forms the only bilateral migration and development program between Bosnia and Germany which concentrates on the transfer of social and human capital through return.

This can be partly explained by Germany’s perception of return as a once-and-for-all event (ibid.) and circular migration either as final return or temporary stay, instead of as a permanent stay with the freedom of mobility. More importantly, Germany’s call for circular migration shows more their interest in repatriation and prevention of uncontrolled and irregular immigration (Musekamp 2008). This is in line with Musekamp’s (2008) argumentation that national aims such as the control and restriction of immigration often takes first priority. However, Germany still receives immigrants and even has programs in place to attract high-skilled workers. This apparent contradiction can be explained by Hollifield’s liberal paradox. On the one hand, Germany pursues a policy of political restrictionism so as to warrant security and defend national sovereignty. At the same time, a need for labourers pushes for a policy of economic openness. This may explain why Germany has its main focus in migration on temporary workers and professionals. The previous example of a program introduced by former Chancellor Schröder, on the recruitment of 20,000 highly skilled workers, exemplifies Germany’s liberal paradox of economic openness and political closure that is prevalent in its immigration and migration and development policies. However, for the number of Bosnian immigrants that entered Germany as refugees, it should be noted that they were initially subject to German refugee policy. Hence, their initial entry and treatment cannot be explained by the focus on specific labour policy that forms one side of the liberal paradox, them only being subject to this policy after they received permanent residence status. German refugee policy should therefore, even though it bears a similar restrictive character, be distinguished from the protective immigration policy that forms the second side of the explanation of the liberal paradox.

Conclusion: Politics as Obstacle to Diasporas’ Development Contribution Potential

This study examined the ways in which Bosnian and German government policies affect diaspora contribution potential to the development of Bosnia and asked why contribution obstructing policies are in place as well as why constructive contribution supporting policies are lacking. Due to the very high percentage of Bosnians that live outside Bosnia (38.9%) and the considerable number that live in Germany, the German Bosnian diaspora has a large potential to serve as ‘agents for development’. There are, however, a number of policies from the side of the sending country as well as the receiving country that negatively affect the contribution environment and hence hinder effective Bosnian development contribution. This paper has argued that the Bosnian contribution potential could be more fulfilled if constructive policy support from both German and Bosnian governments would be in place.

For Bosnia, the absence of an official diaspora policy is mainly the result of political unwillingness and inability to form a consensus, whereas Germany’s focus on temporary and high-skilled immigration are brought about by a northern trend of a policy of economic openness on the one hand and political restrictionism on the other. By researching the reasons behind why policies are in place despite their obstructive effects to diaspora contributions, this case study suggests that, both in Bosnia and in
Germany, national and international politics are the main obstructing factors to an enabling contribution environment.

Where it concerns the political implementation of this paper’s conclusions, in order to create the adequate systemic support that is currently lacking from the side of the Bosnian government, an official consensus must be reached that recognises the value of its diaspora and the government’s responsibility to facilitate diaspora contribution. According to Telalović (personal correspondence, June 2012), one of the few methods by which this could be reached would be through public campaigns that would raise wider awareness among the Bosnian population, the academic sector, NGOs, governments at all levels and international development agencies. Nevertheless, looking at the northern dominance in migration and development and Bosnian subordination to institutions such as the EU, the responsibility for taking actions that change migrant potential into contribution should not only be recognised at the national, but also at the international level.

Notes

1. Hereafter referred to as ‘Bosnia’ or ‘BiH’.
2. Following Brinkerhoff’s model, Uphoff’s originally sixth power resource of physical power is excluded here.
3. This amount only includes registered transfers via banking systems. According to the World Network of Bosnian Diaspora, the actual amount, which also includes informal transfers, lies approximately three times higher (Oruč 2011).
4. For example, every other Sunday a life broadcast for diaspora from the Balkan region can be followed via the internet at http://www.rdl.de/stream.htm. Moreover, a whole range of Bosnian radio channels can be accessed online at http://de.delicast.com/radio/Bosnien-Herz.
5. An example is http://www2.dw-world.de/bosnian.
6. It concerns the motion Diaspora – Potenziale von Migrantinnen und Migranten für die Entwicklung der Herkunftsländer nutzen (Deutscher Bundestag 2007).
7. Some examples of these conferences are the TAIEX Multi-country Workshop: Linking Migration and Development of the Western Balkans Countries, MobilizeDiaspora4SD: Mobilization of Intellectual and Financial Resources from Diaspora for Knowledge Based Sustainable Development in SEE, and Emigration Issues in the Western Balkans - joint approach to linking migration and development of the countries of origin, which all took place in 2011.
8. These being the BiH Strategy of Development, the BiH Strategy of Social Inclusion, and the BiH Strategy of Migration and Asylum (R. Tihić-Kadrić, official correspondence, 7 August 2012).
9. The definition of circular migration that is used in this paper comes from the IOM and is as follows: “a continuing, long-term, and fluid movement of people between countries, including both temporary and more permanent movements” (Newland and Agunias 2007: 3).
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