Crisis and Credit: The Case for Running a Financial Inclusion Program through a Public-Private Partnership as a Method of Poverty-Alleviation

Authors: Zahra Gardezi and Muhammad Ahmad Hassan

Abstract

The globally-prevalent crisis of financial exclusion ails millions especially in developing countries, by trapping low-income households in a vicious cycle of poverty. One public policy measure to address this is through the provision of low-cost microfinance under countrywide financial inclusion programs. This paper explores one such financial inclusion program launched as a public-private partnership (PPP) across Pakistan in October 2021, titled "Kamyab Pakistan Program" (KPP). More specifically, it explores the role of AIM, a high-impact Pakistani microfinance organization, as one of the implementing partners under this PPP, and posits this as an ideal PPP with potential for success. This hypothesis generating case study is analyzed through a principal-agent framework by identifying the factors under which the expected success of this PPP is predicated on. Resultantly, three hypotheses are generated that identify the following three factors: 1) ideological confluence between the government-led Program and the microfinance institution, 2) past involvement in design of the Program by the microfinance institution, and 3) creation of subjectively perceived social responsibility by the microfinance institution. This paper reaches the conclusion that a public-private partnership of the nature explored in the case-study – such that there is a certain level of confluence between both parties involved in terms of both a philosophical basis as well as operational processes – is an effective method by which to achieve financial inclusion, which is aimed specifically at poverty-reduction.

Keywords: Public policy; international development; financial inclusion; microfinance; public-private partnership; public-private partnership solution; Government of Pakistan; Akhuwat Islamic Microfinance; Kamyab Pakistan Program; Principal-Agent Theory

Acronyms

AIM	Akhuwat Islamic Microfinance
KPP	Kamyab Pakistan Program
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PPP	Public-private partnership
PPP Solution	Public-private partnership solution

Introduction

Financial inclusion has increasingly been hailed as "a key enabler to reducing poverty and boosting prosperity" (The World Bank, 2021) of a region, and as a tool for poverty and inequality reduction (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, & Singer, 2017). For this reason, it has been prioritized as a policy-objective for governments and multilateral institutions globally in recent times (Arun & Kamath, 2015). Since 2011, over 1.2 billion previously unbanked adults have gained access to a formal bank account and as a result, 68% of adults now have bank accounts globally (The World Bank, 2021). Despite this global trend of increased access to banking, Pakistan lags far behind, with 53% of the population financially excluded (State Bank of Pakistan, 2021). To address this concern, the Government of Pakistan over the last decade has launched various nation-wide initiatives to mainstream the provision of financial services, including the Prime Minister's Interest-Free Loan Scheme (2014) and the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (2015). While these aforementioned programs are ongoing and have met with some success, this paper will explore a different initiative, the "Kamyab Pakistan Program" (KPP). Launched in October 2021, the KPP is the Pakistani government's most recent, and ambitious, umbrella initiative yet (Haider, 2021). The KPP aims to be the largest of its kind in the world (Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2021), and is envisioned to provide PKR 1.4 trillion in microfinance loans to 3.7 million households across Pakistan over the next five years (Haider, 2021). The KPP is one model of a public-private partnership, by which the government of Pakistan will be the prime financier and manager, and various private-sector organizations will be the implementers in a bid to reach marginalized populations (Business Recorder, 2021).

This paper posits that a dedicated public-private partnership (PPP) in which both the financing and implementing parties share common values and operational methods is the ideal manner to approach financial inclusion, which is aimed at poverty-reduction. This addresses the ongoing crisis of financial exclusion that is exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic with consequences including unstable and stressful living, especially for low income households (Arun & Kamath, 2015), and many others that are beyond the scope of this paper. In addition to this public policy contribution of the paper, the aim of this paper is also to provide a theoretical contribution in the form of generating novel hypotheses for future studies on the subject. Since this is a new area for PPP solutions and financial inclusion, this paper is based as a hypothesis generating case study, which will be explained further in the next section.

The reason that PPP was chosen to address poverty resulting from financial exclusion for very low income households – hereafter referred to as “the PPP Solution” – over a fully-government-implemented solution or fully-private entity (usually, a Non-Governmental Organization) solution was due to reasons of inefficiencies occurring in either case, which is discussed in the literature review; this paper takes-off from this plateau of literature.

The case study chosen to explore this thesis is the case of the public-private partnership between the Government of Pakistan and Akhuwat Islamic Microfinance (AIM) under the Kamyab Pakistan Program (KPP), and the only aspect of financial inclusion explored is through interest-free microloans (AIM’s model). AIM is a non-bank microfinance organization – which is therefore inherently more motivated by its poverty-alleviation mandate, which AIM also works to synonymize with its name, rather than profit-gain from beneficiaries who already belong to very low income households and may be unbanked in the first place.

In this case, the government is the financing party and AIM – the world’s largest interest-free microfinance organization (Games, 2020)– is the implementing partner. The shared values include the philosophy behind their approach to the program (a social-welfare model shared by the Government of Pakistan and AIM, as explored in the section ‘Shared Values and Goals’ in the case-study section), and the shared operational methods include the process by which microloans are disbursed. It merits mentioning that the contribution of this paper through the case-study method is not just identification of certain factors in a specific case but rather their larger applicability to the “PPP solution” studied through the lens of the principal-agent theory.

To put it clearly, this paper serves a dual purpose, with the first being to provide policy-makers working on KPP in specific, and the PPP solution in general, with a prescriptive analysis for designing their own most effective PPP solutions. The second purpose is to generate hypotheses through discussion (hypotheses are therefore presented towards the end of the paper) for the PPP solution in financial inclusion programs, which can then be tested in future studies.

Methodology and Case Selection

This paper is based on a case study approach in which KPP is used as a starting point to engage with literature on the two separate topics of financial inclusion and PPP. The KPP case is uniquely positioned in this sense as it bridges the gap between the two topics while also yielding both theoretical and public policy insights. From a public policy perspective, the case is used as a reference point to identify the ways through which a government-led financial inclusion program can be best synergized with a private, high-impact microfinance organization, in which the former provides the overarching framework and financial capital while the latter is the executing agency (or implementer).

From a theoretical perspective, this paper is a hypothesis generating case study in which the single case of KPP-AIM partnership is qualitatively analyzed for identifying factors that suggest causal relationships for the successful implementation of the PPP for a country-wide financial inclusion program. A hypothesis generating case study is different from a hypothesis testing case study since in the case of the former, the aim of the researcher is to look for "relationships and patterns, and then… [propose] hypotheses which may then be tested in subsequent study" (Hartwick & Barki, 1994, p. 447), while in the latter, the hypotheses that are already specified are put to test using a new data set or empirical evidence (ibid.). Therefore, the various aspects of the KPP-AIM partnership case are sifted closely for revealing novel aspects of the partnership that would contribute to the success of the PPP, and those novel aspects would be presented in the form of three hypotheses that will be generated at the end of this paper. Since these hypotheses are being generated within the limitations of this study at this early stage of the KPP's implementation, and in addition to this paper serving as a reference-point for policy-makers, it will be interesting to note how these predictions fare as KPP progresses. It is hoped therefore that this article can also provide insights into how theory is translated into practice in real-time by laying the groundwork for future study.

Since this is a hypothesis-generating case study, the case of AIM-KPP partnership is chosen because it is an extreme case (Gerring, 2008), which refers to a situation in which items of inquiry such as shared values and goals, process and model effectiveness, and extended network of the microfinance institution are present in their extreme values. Here, extreme values do not imply that the explanatory variables identified are simply rare. Rather, it means that in this particular case they are present in such a clear manner that they are very close to the ideal types by which 'concepts are often defined' (Gerring, 2008, p. 653). An extreme case illuminates causal pathways involved and allows the researcher to clearly identify the crucial determining factors in the case. This, in turn, enables the development of hypotheses, which can then be tested in other studies with multiple cases that contain the explanatory variables identified here to develop theory. This naturally means that through close inspection of the case, this paper will generate hypotheses that stem from it towards the end.

The overarching framework of analysis in this paper is the principal-agent problem as developed by Ross (1973) according to which the agent, who acts on behalf of the principal, cannot be actively monitored due to information asymmetry between the two. The principal in this case is the government of Pakistan (financier for KPP), while the agent is AIM (implementer). The problem here arises with the uncertainty of the microfinance institution disbursing the loans under KPP in accordance with the original vision and objective of the government in its design of the KPP. The case study shows how the features identified here overcome the principal-agent problem, thereby expressing this papers empirical contribution to a theoretical problem.

Literature Review

A distinction can be made between two types of modern states in terms of their provision of public goods: the interventionist state and the regulatory state. While the former centralizes administration and directly engages in the provision of public goods, the latter "relies on extensive delegation of powers to independent institutions" (Majone, 1999, p. 1). For the regulatory state, PPPs provide a unique advantage in the provision of public goods, as the state is able to benefit from the efficiencies afforded by the private-sector, such as avoiding the strict "line of hierarchical control by the departments of central government" (1999, p. 2), without foregoing the regulatory oversight provided by state institutions. Numerous other benefits of public private partnerships highlighted in literature include replacement of centralized planning with better metrics of economic viability (Glaister S., 1999), shared goals that optimize partnership (Wang, Xiong, Wu, & Zhu, 2018), and diversification of responsibilities and risks by distributing them between the public and private sector entities (Koppenjan, 2005).

However, where the efficiencies arising from PPPs have been valorized in academic discourse, there is also literature suggesting the contrary. For instance, Barnard (1968) argues that an incongruence of goals between parties engaged in a PPP may lead to issues in cooperation, which has the potential to jeopardize its success Similarly, Savas (2000) suggests that regulatory glut by greater government involvement may create a disincentive for private organizations to engage in PPPs. Another potential inefficiency of PPPs may arise where the high costs of regulatory oversight may offset the expected benefits of lower-cost service delivery by the private organization (Sparer, 1999). Despite the potential inefficiencies including the aforementioned, the promise of PPPs still largely holds in discourse and the debate has moved in favor of the results that such partnerships can potentially foster.

Financial inclusion refers to “the process by which access to and the use of formal financial services are maximized, whilst minimizing unintended barriers, perceived as such by those individuals who do not take part in the formal financial system”, and has been abundantly discussed in relevant literature (Zulfiqar, Chaudhary, & Aslam, 2016). Approaches to financial inclusion usually begin with a discussion from the ethical lens. For instance, Figart (2013) treats financial inclusion as an instrumental freedom borrowing from Amartya Sen’s capability approach to development (Sen, 1999) . Another approach concerns the debate over the effectiveness of financial inclusion in poverty alleviation, as explored by many including Bateman and Chang (2012) who claim that microfinance results in disconnected, disparate and duplicated growth of enterprises which do not contribute to the overall growth of an economy which is usually based on mutually reinforcing networks of industries which enjoy economies of scale. However, this position has been countered by theorists including Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Singer (2017), who instead stress that financial inclusion does in fact play a positive role in poverty alleviation by “helping people invest in the future, smooth their consumption, and manage financial risks" (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, & Singer, 2017, p. 2).

In this regard, this paper suggests that financial inclusion leads to poverty-reduction in two prime respects: firstly, by leading to "education, increased self-employment and human development" (Zulfiqar, Chaudhary, & Aslam, 2016), and secondly, by allocating resources more efficiently. Conversely, financial *exclusion* actively both discourages economic growth and leads to increases in income inequality. The paper also holds that financial inclusion must be considered a public-good for the onus of provision to be on the government, which is then further made more efficient through a public-private partnership. In summary, Ozili (2020)suggests that in order for financial inclusion to be considered a public good, it must:

1. Be available to all in an unrestricted manner
2. Not exclude anyone from access
3. Be accessible to all without payment

Any costs that arise as a result of providing these services must therefore be borne in the form of subsidies by the government (Ozili, 2020).

As previously stated, this paper stands at a nexus between literature on financial inclusion and PPP – research and writing on which is sparse – and works towards the second aim of serving as a starting point for further studies.

Kamyab Pakistan: The Case for a Successful Public-Private Partnership

Akhuwat Islamic Microfinance (AIM), the world's largest interest-free microfinance institution (Games, 2020), has made immense strides in poverty alleviation, including in its role as an implementation partner for various government of Pakistan initiatives over the last two-decades of operations. AIM operates on the principle of zero-interest. Its immense success is evidenced by data: AIM has thus far disbursed over 4.8 million interest-free loans amounting to over PKR 145 billion (approximately USD 850 million), with a sustained loan-repayment rate of 99.9% (AIM, 2021).

The Kamyab Pakistan Program (KPP) has five Programs under its umbrella, namely: Kamyab Kissan, Kamyab Karobar, Naya Pakistan Low-Cost Housing, Kamyab Hunarmand and Sehatmand Pakistan. However, the programs most relevant to this paper include the first three, which deal with the provision of microloans (Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2021). The Program is intended to generate employment, encourage economic activity, work towards poverty alleviation, encourage Gross Domestic Product growth and most pertinently for this paper, encourage financial inclusion of the un-banked and very low income households – in other words, poverty-alleviation.

There are several factors which have the potential to foster success for the KPP - evaluated only to the extent of AIM's role, in this paper - and they will be discussed below.

Shared Values and Goals

Ideological confluence between a principal and an agent naturally reduces information asymmetry due to an alignment of the incentive structure between the two parties. More concretely, if the overarching belief system is one that is shared, the agent is intrinsically motivated to achieve the same results as the principal. As this ideological confluence exists between the government and AIM, it is reflected in the KPP. The KPP is underpinned by Prime Minister Imran Khan's vision of "Naya Pakistan," the hallmark philosophy of Pakistan's ruling party, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf. The KPP reflects Prime Minister Khan's vision of "Riyasat-e-Madina," a welfare-state model originating from nascent Islamic history in present-day Madina, Saudi Arabia. This welfare-state model is vital to Prime Minister Khan's philosophy of "Naya [New] Pakistan" (Hoodbhoy, 2018).

Shared philosophical leanings inspired by Islamic understandings of fraternity between AIM and the government's "Riyasat-e-Madina" outlook work to underpin the KPP in a shared ideology. A defining feature of AIM is the concept of "Mawakhat," an Islamic concept loosely translated to "fraternity." Mawakhat is based on the welcoming of the Mujahideen (people of Mecca) after they fled Mecca to escape religious persecution by the Ansars (people of Medina) in which they shared their resources with them (Khan, Siddique, & Muhammad, 2018). Mawakhat stresses upon a shared bond of solidarity in which the financially more affluent help the financially constrained members of the society. The very act of loan disbursement is presented as a practical manifestation of the concept that binds the borrower in a subjectively perceived spiritual relationship with the organization in addition to the formal contractual relationship.

There is considerable overlap between Riyasat-e-Medina and Mawakhat, for which reason there is ideological confluence between the two parties engaged in this PPP solution. At the level of the state, the ideology of Riyasat-e-Madina is an overarching value system in which KPP is one of many welfare state oriented policies achieving redistribution of wealth. This overlap has also publically been announced by Prime Minister Imran Khan in a tweet in which he recognized AIM as a move in the direction of “creating a welfare state based on Riasat e Madina Model.” (Khan I. , 2021).

This complementary relationship of harmonized ideological beliefs and instrumental manifestation of those beliefs is expected to create a confluence on the goals of the principal and the agent, therefore aligning incentive structures and decreasing friction on the subject of the agent acting on behalf of the principal.

Synergies Through Process Overlap

In addition to the ideological confluence, there is also considerable operational overlap regarding the requirements of borrowers and in the loan-disbursement process itself, between AIM’s model and KPP. This process overlap makes the operational relationship between the principal and the agent more streamlined, as it obviates the need to create new processes solely for KPP. The reason for this overlap is because the KPP is inspired by the Akhuwat model (Khawar, 2021).

With regard to process overlap in this case study, for both AIM and under KPP, the prospective borrower is expected to have a valid CNIC, a valid bank account, be a resident of Pakistan, and meet certain financial requirements. Additionally, and for illustrative purposes, the following is a generalized and simplified process for both AIM and KPP: the prospective beneficiary first expresses their interest in availing a loan, following which staff (either AIM or KPP-implementing partner) then verify the case by checking documentation and screening potential borrower, as well as by conducting what may be loosely classified as social and business appraisals. The funds are then disbursed and loan recovery begins the following month (Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2021). This process overlap also results from the fact that microfinance institutions provide a model for the government to use as guidelines for their own financial inclusion programs. Even if the models of microfinance institutions are not replicated exactly in government programs, technical input through participation in steering committees finds its way into the design of these programs. For example, the Founder of AIM (Dr. Ajmad Saqib) was a member of the steering committee constituted by the government on KPP for providing “support in design, launch and implementation of KPP at the technical side” (Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2021, p. 22), which naturally creates synergies, thereby further solidifying the grounds on which this PPP has the potential to translate to future success.

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

When it comes to financial inclusion programs run by the government, the risks of moral hazard and adverse selection are amplified. This is because of the incentive structure created by the low-cost loans provided by the government with a number of features. First, it is reasonable to expect that borrowers are less likely to invest low interest loans wisely (Harper, 2012). This moral hazard of risky spending behavior thereby increases the chance of default. Second, if the borrower also has borrowed money through either informal channels of microfinance institutions that charge higher interest rates, then they can be expected to give precedence to repayment of those loans as they incur higher costs as compared to the low interest loan thereby creating another moral hazard (ibid). Finally, in the absence of an elaborate web of specialized microfinance networks for disbursing funds, government executed financial inclusion programs run the risk of attracting those borrowers most likely to default as low or zero interest loans are more likely to be taken by those who are most financially constrained. In essence, government owned institutions are likely to do “inefficient credit allocation that results in high credit losses” (Beck, 2015, p. 4).

These issues of moral hazard and adverse selection are addressed through AIM’s group lending used in KPP. While traditionally it is believed that group-lending models increase the risk of moral hazard, AIM’s experience over the last twenty years has certainly shown otherwise through its sustained loan-repayment rate of 99.9% (Ahmed, 2021). The case illustrates certain intrinsic factors at play which have contributed to AIM’s past success, and which is predicted by this paper to have the same impact in the KPP Program thereby making it an effective PPP. The first is the sense of ownership fostered in AIM's borrowers, resulting from AIM's principle to convert borrowers into donors. This subjectively perceived responsibility in the borrower ascribes to the loan a social value that cuts across conventional systems of checks and balances. Another such factor stems from the sense of religious value instilled in the borrowers from the start of the process by holding disbursement ceremonies for microfinance loans in places of religious worship (mosques, churches, others). However, this does not mean that loans are restricted to those who belong to these religions – even though they account for approximately 99% of Pakistan's population (Fuchs & Fuchs, 2020)– AIM is a religiously impartial organization, for which reason this is not a point of concern (Akhuwat, 2022). When combined with the expectation that borrowers will use their loans to help themselves and ultimately those around them and remain honest in their dealings, this mechanism fosters a kind of normative pressure which is reflected in AIM's remarkable success. The unique advantage conferred onto AIM by its strategic social value and dynamic incentive structure for its borrowers is predicted to have a positive impact on the outreach, impact and sustainability under KPP as it rolls out across Pakistan in the years to come.

Finally, KPP is also predicted to solve the issue of adverse selection through AIM's extensive network of over 800 microfinance branches in over 400 localities across Pakistan (Akhuwat, 2021) .This naturally provides the kind of on-ground expertise which ensures a check on borrowers thereby reducing the risk of default. Moreover, this is also undergirded by an extensive social network that creates an additional linkage with borrowers and obviates adverse selection.

Hypotheses

The Hypotheses generated from this case study have multiple applications. For instance, they may act as tentative theoretical guidelines for analyzing the KPP as a PPP which addresses the crisis of financial exclusion. Additionally, they hold prescriptive value for analyzing the PPP solution for financial inclusion in other cases. Therefore, their public policy value is relevant beyond the limitations of the case study. They also act as a set of predictions for KPP which gives both policy professionals and academics qualitative parameters to track the success of the program, by a process-tracing study for instance. Theoretically, these hypotheses ultimately provide generalizable predictions for the PPP solution for financial inclusion. This is also a starting point for future studies that can test these hypotheses.

The first hypothesis generated in this paper stems from the ideological confluence between the underlying principles of AIM and the government's overall guiding philosophy. As illustrated in this case study, this confluence comes very close to an ideal-type concept level agreement. Placing this in the theoretical framework of the principal-agent relationship, the first hypothesis generated in this paper is: Ideological confluence decreases the impact of information asymmetry of the principal-agent relationship by aligning the incentive structure of the government and the microfinance institution.

The second hypothesis generated in this paper works at implementation-level by the agent identifying the role of involvement in process design of the financial inclusion Program by the microfinance institution. Here, instead of making a causal claim, the factor of involvement in design of the financial inclusion Program by the microfinance institution is claimed to have an intervening role of increasing process overlap between the financial inclusion Program and the microfinance institution that would consequently increase the chance of smooth execution thereby contributing to successful implementation. The second hypothesis is therefore: past involvement in design of the financial inclusion Program by the microfinance institution acts as an intervening variable for successful implementation by creating process overlap between the Program and the microfinance institution.

The third hypothesis generated in this paper relates to the creation of a relationship between the borrower and the microfinance institution to address the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection that may exist in government-led financial inclusion programs. Borrowing from AIM's own model that uniquely addresses these issues, the hypothesis is: Creation of subjectively perceived social responsibility in loan repayment decreases chance of default for government-led financial inclusion programs.

Conclusion

Government-led financial inclusion programs are an essential part of poverty alleviation strategies of developing countries. Access to finance remains a prime hurdle for the often low-income and financially excluded to overcome this crisis by investing in sustainable and self-determined means out of poverty. This paper therefore has made a policy relevant contribution by identifying features of a PPP that are predicted to achieve successful implementation of a financial inclusion program, in the sense of providing an analysis of this particular case which can be used by policy makers for further action. Furthermore, this paper has posited that the PPP of the Government of Pakistan with AIM to provide financial inclusion as a public good holds promise for a large-scale and efficiently-delivered intervention with potential for scalability and international replication in countries, which face resource-constraints similar to Pakistan.

At the theoretical level, this paper has bridged the gap between literature on PPPs and financial inclusion. It has made a theoretical contribution by generating hypotheses for a PPP aimed at financial inclusion, paving the way for future studies to explore financial inclusion through the lens of PPP in a systematic manner by using the hypotheses generated here as a starting point. Fundamentally, this paper's use of the principal-agent framework acts as a guideline on future work that may take place on the subject. Its hypotheses will also contribute to understanding other such cases of PPPs for financial inclusion programs around the world, specifically in the context of developing countries.

Furthermore, this paper is a unique attempt at setting the stage for seeing how theory is translated into action. It extracts theoretical principles from a case during the start of a Program under study thereby giving a starting point for a future study to see how these principles turn out towards the end of the Program. This has a great deal of relevance to public policy because it illuminates the relationship between theory and practice, and how they influence each other. Specific to the case, this paper has provided a theoretical guideline for both policy professionals and academics to understand the KPP and focus on explored factors as they evolve over the course of its implementation.

Finally, it merits mentioning that this paper is bound by limitations which leaves a gap for future studies to fill. While financial services hold immense potential, as explored, large-scale and publically-available data remains outdated and scarce; future studies conducted after a new census may allow for better monitoring and evaluation, as well as more effective post-program analysis. Further, such studies may also factor into account disparities between genders, and rural and urban areas for a more "inclusive" approach. Specifically for studies on KPP, it may be productive to note the impact of charging interest on microloans, as according to some Islamic beliefs (presumably held by a majority of KPP beneficiaries), charging interest is prohibited (Germani, 2012).

Authors' Affiliation

Zahra Gardezi

MSc. Social Sciences, Development Studies and International Relations (specialization: Global Refugee Studies), Aalborg University, Copenhagen (2020)

MSc. Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London (2018)

BSc. Hons. Political Science, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore (2015)

Muhammad Ahmad Hassan

MA Political Science (specialization: Comparative Politics), Central European University, Budapest (2018)

BSc. Hons. Politics and Economics, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore (2015)

Bibliography

Ahmed, S. I. (2021, September 12). *I Have a Dream of Eliminating Poverty*. Retrieved October 30, 2021, from The News: https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/890666-i-have-a-dream-of-eliminating-poverty

AIM. (2021). *Ramon Magsaysay Award*. Retrieved November 30, 2021, from Islamic Microfinance: https://aim.org.pk/ramon-magsaysay-award/

Akhuwat. (2021). *Home*. Retrieved November 30, 2021, from Akhuwat: https://akhuwat.org.pk

Akhuwat. (2022). *Akhuwat's Story*. Retrieved February 7, 2022, from Akhuwat: https://akhuwat.org.pk/about/#:~:text=While%20inspiration%20for%20the%20philosophy,of%20solidarity%20is%20for%20all.

Albalate, D., Bel, G., Bel-Piñana, P., & Geddes, R. R. (2015). Risk Mitigation and Sharing in Motorway PPPs: A Comparative Policy Analysis of Alternative Approaches. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 17*(5), 481-501. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2015.1010788.

Arun, T., & Kamath, R. (2015). Financial Inclusion: Policies and Practices. *IIMB Management Review, 27*(4), 267-287. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.2015.09.004.

Barnard, C. I. (1968). *The Functions of the Executive.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bateman, M., & Chang, H.-J. (2012). Microfinance and the Illusion of Development: From Hubris to Nemesis in Thirty Years. *World Economic Review, 1*, 13-36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2385482.

Beck, T. (2015). *Microfinance: A Critical Literature Survey.* The World Bank Group. Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Group. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23546/Microfinance000al0literature0survey.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Business Recorder. (2021, October 10). *KPP Affordability*. Retrieved November 30, 2021, from Business Recorder: https://www.brecorder.com/news/40125674/kpp-affordability

Càmra, N., & Tuesta, D. (2015). Factors that Matter for Financial Inclusion: Evidence from Peru. *The IEB International Journal of Finance*, 10-31. https://www.ieb.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/n10/6.pdf.

Demirguc-Kunt, A., Klapper, L., & Singer, D. (2017). *Financial Inclusion and Inclusive Growth: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence.* Washington,DC: The World Bank Group. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/26479.

Figart, D. M. (2013). Institutionalist Policies for Financial Inclusion. *Journal of Economic Issues, 47*(4), 873-893. https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-3624470404.

Flinders, M. (2005). The Politics of Public-Private Partnerships. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7*(2), 215-239. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00161.x.

Fuchs, M.-M., & Fuchs, S. (2020). Religious Minorities in Pakistan: Identities, Citizenship and Social Belonging. *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 43*(1), 52-67. https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2020.1695075.

Games, R. (2020). *Akhuwat - World's Largest Interest-Free Microfinance Organization*. Retrieved November 30, 2021, from Vatican News: https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2020-05/pakistan-akhuwat-micro-finance-interest-free-lender-saqib0.html

Germani, A. (2012). Public-Private Partnerships in Islamic Finance. *European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, 7*(4), 218-220. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26694409.

Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection for Case‐Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques. In J. Box-Steffensmeier, H. Brady, & D. Collier, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (pp. 645-684). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gestel, K., Willems, T., Verhoest, K., Voets, J., & Garsse, S. (2014). Public–Private Partnerships in Flemish Schools: A Complex Governance Structure in a Complex Context. *Public Money and Management, 34*(5), 363-370. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2014.945808.

Glaister, K., & Falshaw, J. (1999). Strategic Planning: Still Going Strong? *Long Range Planning, 32*(1), 107-116. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-6301(98)00131-9.

Glaister, S. (1999). Past Abuses and Future Uses of Private Finance and Public Private Partnerships in Transport. *Public Money and Management, 19*(3), 29-36. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9302.00176.

Haider, M. (2021, October 04). *PM Imran Khan Launches Kamyab Pakistan Programme*. Retrieved October 30, 2021, from Geo:

https://www.geo.tv/latest/373832-pm-imran-to-inaugurate-kamyab-pakistan-Program-today.

Ham, H., & Koppenjan, J. (2001). Building Public-Private Partnerships: Assessing and Managing Risks in Port Development. *Public Management Review, 3*(4), 593-616. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616670110070622.

Harper, M. (2012). Akhuwat of Lahore: Breaking the Rules. *Enterprise Development & Microfinance, 23*(1), 70-80. https://practicalactionpublishing.com/article/2258/akhuwat-of-lahore-breaking-the-rules.

Hartwick, J., & Barki, H. (1994). Research Report—Hypothesis Testing and Hypothesis Generating Research: An Example from the User Participation Literature. *To cite this article: Information Systems Research, 5*(4), 446-449. https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/isre.5.4.446.

Hoodbhoy, P. (2018, December 8). *Madina State and 'Naya' Pakistan*. Retrieved November 30, 2021, from Dawn: https://www.dawn.com/news/1450178

Islamic Microfinance. (2021). *Loan Process*. Retrieved November 30, 2021, from AIM: https://aim.org.pk/loan-process/

Khan, I. (2021, August 31). *Tweet*. Retrieved October 30, 2021, from Twitter: https://twitter.com/imrankhanpti/status/1432756003808874506?s=24

Khan, Z., Siddique, M., & Muhammad, M. (2018). Minimizing Operating Cost of Islamic Microfinance Institutions: A Case of Akhuwat. *Journal of Islamic Business and Management, 8*(S), 320-329. https://doi.org/10.26501/jibm/2018.080S-012.

Khawar, H. (2021, August 17). *Kamyab Pakistan Progamme*. Retrieved October 30, 2021, from The Express Tribune: https://tribune.com.pk/story/2315905/kamyab-pakistan-programme

Koppenjan, J. (2005). The Formation of Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Nine Transport Infrastructure Projects in The Netherlands. *Public Administration, 83*(1), 135-157. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0033-3298.2005.00441.x.

Majone, G. (1999). The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems. *West European Politics, 22*(1), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389908425284.

McQuaid, R., & Scherrer, W. (2010). Changing Reasons for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). *Public Money and Management, 30*(1), 27-34. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540960903492331.

Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. (2021, October 10). *Kamyab Pakistan Program Operational Framework.* Retrieved November 30, 2021, from Ministry of Finance: https://www.finance.gov.pk/jobs/Operational_Framework_10102021.pdf

Mithe, A. (2015, January 29). *Mobile Financial Services for Microfinance Institutions: Case Study of Easypaisa and Tameer.* Retrieved November 30, 2021, from International Finance Corporation: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/08c6745c-e2b0-4f3b-bf25-c975b7d48582/Tool+11.3+Mobil+Finan+Serv+Tameer+in+Pakistan+1-29-15.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=kNd8DHC.

Ozili, P. (2020). Theories of Financial Inclusion. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3526548.

Ross, S. (1973). The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. *The American Economic Review, 63*(2), 134-139. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1817064.

Savas, E. (2000). *Privatization and Public Private-Partnerships.* New York: Chatham House Publishers.

Sen, A. (1999). *Development as Freedom.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sparer, M. S. (1999). Myths and Misunderstandings: Health Policy, the Devolution Revolution, and the Push for Privatization. *American Behavioral Scientist, 43*(1), 138-154. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027649921955209.

State Bank of Pakistan. (2021). *Financial Literacy and Capacity Building*. Retrieved November 30, 2021, from State Bank of Pakistan: https://www.sbp.org.pk/Finc/FL.asp#:~:text=Out%20of%20the%20total%20adult,financial%20products%20and%20their%20usage

The World Bank. (2021). *Financial Inclusion*. Retrieved October 30, 2021, from The World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion

Tvarnø, C. (2016). Legal, Financial and Governmental PPP Initiatives. *Fifth International PPP Conference* (pp. https://research-api.cbs.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/58766576/2016_tvarno_legal_finansiel_and_governmental_PPP_initiatives.pdf). Antwerpen: Copenhagen Business School.

Wang, H., Xiong, W., Wu, G., & Zhu, D. (2018). Public–Private Partnership in Public Administration Discipline: A Literature Review. *Public Management Review, 20*(2), 293-316. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2017.1313445.

Zulfiqar, K., Chaudhary, M. A., & Aslam, A. (2016). Financial Inclusion and its Implications for Inclusive Growth in Pakistan. *Pakistan Economic and Social Review, 54*(2), 297-325. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26616711.