Editorial comment: Introduction

We are proud to announce the relaunch of the The Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies (IJIS).

The Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies is an academic space where students critically engage with key theories and issue areas in the social sciences and humanities in an interdisciplinary perspective. The IJIS is an independent student-driven and faculty-refereed academic journal based at Aalborg University, Denmark. It was established in 2002, and with this relaunch we hope to (re)establish a platform for academic student engagement in debates and critical procurement of studies within international affairs at Aalborg University.

IJIS is a journal that combines student publications from the Master programs of Development and International Relation Studies, European Studies and Global Refugee Studies.

The Department of Culture and Global Studies is a cross-faculty department linking together The Faculty of Humanities and the Faculty of Social Sciences. Research activities within the Department of Culture and Global Studies cover a wide span, emphasizing the interplay between cultural, social and political processes in a globalized world, and with a special focus on intercultural communication, transnational relations, creation of identity and the production of culture.

Development and International Relations provides theoretical insight into international relations from a social science and historical perspective, as well as knowledge on different social and cultural patterns and their evolution. Development and International development students analyze aspects of the economic, cultural, political, social and societal development from an interdisciplinary perspective, when engaging with theories with focus on social relations in an international and development perspective.

European Studies is an interdisciplinary master with focus on European problem areas in a social science and historical perspective. Engaging in different social and cultural patterns, European Studies provides a thorough insight on central aspects of European integration processes while drawing on theories on international relations to analyze central aspects of European development.

Global Refugee Studies aims to foster and communicate a deeper understanding of what happens when the world is moved and people move within it. Whether conflict, land-grabbing or poverty are

the critical moving factors, a multidisciplinary research approach offers analyses of the relationship between large-scale political and economic processes and the lived experiences of people before, while and after movement. Global Refugee's students explore the underlying dynamics of forced migration, the ways in which refugees and marginalized people maneuver, and the intersection between these groups and authorities' attempt to curb, tap into, or manage these movements, through inter alia border control, humanitarian interventions or integration policies. Global Refugee Studies contributes with critical analyses, such as how the colonial encounter still shapes how we today relate to displacement and social hierarchies including, but not limited to, relations of race, gender, and class.

The theme of this issue is a 'mosaic' of topics to display the broad, diverse, interdisciplinary nature of the studies of international affairs at Aalborg University. The purpose of this issue is to show what inspires, concerns and separates the waters in a student perspective within the respective disciplines included in the journal. As such has seven previous students published articles and essays portraying their diverse, interdisciplinary and critical engagement.

Helene Blensted investigates the socially constructed narratives that surround development assistance in a small town in Côte d'Ivoire in her article. Through participant observations and qualitative interviews, she finds that field staff of aid agencies and beneficiaries of development assistance have constructed opposing narratives, which explains why the two groups do not always agree on what has happened and why. Blensted argues that the two narratives maintained by field staff are counterproductive to the mission of aid agencies, because the narratives imply that beneficiaries are to blame for a multitude of problems. As the narratives turn a blind eye to programme failures and structural causes for poverty, it consequently makes sustainable development unattainable.

Donya Kahil argues in her article that the security interests of Israel have developed a highly controlling "mobility regime" that discriminate Palestinians from Jews as unequal citizens and non-citizens. Her article addresses the challenges that Palestinian tourism actors faces, and reveals how Israel's implementation of security measures, affects the mobility of Palestinians and challenge the Palestinian tourism actors' access to the tourism field. Kahil's article show how Israel's mobility regime is based on discriminatory procedures and practices, rather than on an assumption that local Palestinians constitute a danger or a risk to Israel.

In Ana Paula Caruso's article, she analyzes how local human resources are appointed, managed and dismissed in rural communities in Argentina. Based on the notion that bureaucracies are not only an instrument for policy implementation, but an actor that participates in policy formulation, enhancing democracy and local economic development, her research reviews the human resource appointment and management strategies followed by rural municipalities in Buenos Aires Province, Argentina. Caruso's article describes how and why Mayors consistently choose to build teams prioritizing loyalty and political support over capacity with the result of a bureaucracy that lacks both autonomy and capacity.

José Joaquin Arce Bayona writes about anti-colonial struggles in metropolitan France in his article. On October 28th 2005, the death of two French youth of immigrant background provoked the eruption of three weeks of rioting that quickly spread from the Parisian quartiers populaires to the rest of France. Media coverage was symptomatic in its homogenizing of a heterogeneous population, externalizing the youth of the banlieues as a foreign, hostile other, despite the fact that many of these youths were actually French citizens. Intellectuals and leftist organization, while more sympathetic, saw in the riots a lack of a political direction that could take its subversive potential, to orient it towards a revolutionary dynamic. Absent from both analyses was the long history against racialized oppression in France. The riots were symptomatic of a process that has been long in the making not only in France, but all over Europe: the emergence of multicultural minority communities engaged in social movements and political organizations. Bayonas explore the emergence of one of those political organizations: the Parti des Indigènes de la Républic (PIR), with a focus on their critical thinking and philosophies. Drawing on decolonial theories and methodologies, as well as woman of colour feminism, Bayonas conclude that the PIR makes important contributions to understanding the relation between the state and communities of colour in France, our understandings of contemporary dynamics of colonization/decolonization, and provide relevant political strategies for articulating anti-colonial struggles with other forms of emancipatory struggles from within metropolitan societies.

Anna Akou Bakmand Bernthsen writes a narrative essay on where she is today professionally, and how she has used and are still using her educational background from Global Refugee Studies (GRS). Bernthsen is among the first batch of GRS students to graduate, and in her essay, she describes her experiences as a graduate in a labor market that has not previously received GRS

students. "The world did not seem as ready for us, as we thought we were ready for the world" she writes, in her description of the challenges as well as the opportunities she experienced as a GRS graduate. With a point of reference in Søren Kierkegaard, Bernthsen's essay is a description of her own journey into the labor market, and how GRS has been, and continuously is, a foundation for her professional career in its many unexpected varieties.

Sif Lehman Jensen's essay takes departure in unconsidered ethics in relation to her first long-term ethnographic fieldwork amongst female rebel suspects in a prison in the Philippines in 2014-15. Jensen argues that much can be learned from reflecting on one's own beginner's mistakes when entering into a field of particular sensitive character. In her essay, she discusses the potential risks and precariousness that follow analyzing and writing about this group of women as part of her master thesis, and how to make up for her initial lack of awareness. With female participation in the armed Muslim rebellion at the core of her research question, Jensen aims to emphasize the importance of thorough ethical consideration throughout the research project and concludes that being well-informed and reflective about the ethical dimension of research in social sciences, is what justifies inquiring into the precarious lives of people at risk.

Freja Toft Stagsted Sørensen discuss South Sudan in her essay. After independence in 2011 the country was characterized by peace and hope, but the peace was short-lived as internal conflicts in government broke out in 2013. This caused Sørensen to wonder how and why South Sudan, which for so many decades were part of a civil war, is now itself facing what appears to be the exact same civil war internally in South Sudan that it endured as part of the Sudan. South Sudan experience discrimination of different ethnicities and a power struggle to a such extent that it is putting independence and recognition of the state at risk. In her essay, Sørensen discuss what happened to the dream and the state-building process in South Sudan and asks: Has it failed?

With this relaunch of the Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies, we encourage graduate and postgraduate students of International Affairs at Aalborg University to submit publications and engage in the aim of making student research visible in the academic debates.

With the wish of an inspiring and instructive reading,
Nina Maegaard Sharar
Journal Editor

CONFLICTING NARRATIVES: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

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Introduction

This article is based on my anthropological research conducted over a period of three months in 2017, while holding an internship position at the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in Côte d'Ivoire. During my time in Tabou, a small town in the Southwest of the country, I became aware of what seemed to be a mismatch between field staff of aid agencies and beneficiaries' understanding of their shared experiences. Beneficiaries' actions (or more precisely their inactions) and attitudes were frequently a source of frustration and incomprehension for many of the staff members that I met. Interestingly, beneficiaries had a significantly different understanding of the situation in Tabou, and their stories revealed a distinctive view on life opportunities and development assistance. I had several thought-provoking discussions with both staff and beneficiaries, which led me to inquire on the logic behind these divergent explanations and worldviews. Hence, the questions that are explored in this article are as follows: *Why is there a mismatch between beneficiaries and field staff's understanding of development assistance and life opportunities in Tabou? What consequences derive from these divergent interpretations?*

From a social constructivist standpoint, it is important to understand how individuals interpret their experiences, because this impacts the individuals' behaviour and thus has real consequences. Accordingly, certain beliefs and attitudes can either enhance or limit the impact of development assistance. To ensure that the assistance provided is as effective and sustainable as possible, it is therefore important to investigate how and with what consequences field staff and beneficiaries interpret assistance and life opportunities in Tabou.

My analysis is focused on two groups, which I refer to as 'beneficiaries' and 'field staff'. It is important to distinguish between field staff and staff at other levels in the organisation, as they

might not share the same understanding of beneficiaries. During my fieldwork in Tabou, I mainly interacted with staff from DRC and UNHCR, but occasionally I met employees from other agencies too. The line between humanitarian aid and development assistance is blurred (Barnett 2005: 723), and thus, humanitarian organisations, like DRC, also provide development assistance. I will refer to this diverse group of organisations as simply 'aid agencies'. The group denoted 'beneficiaries' are current or former beneficiaries of humanitarian and/or development assistance in Tabou Department. Secondly, it has likewise been important for the analysis that they are former refugees. The majority of interviewees had fled to Liberia in 2010/2011 and returned to Côte d'Ivoire by the end of 2016.

Theoretical framework

In order to understand the divergent interpretations, I apply the concept of 'narratives'. A narrative can be defined as *"a representation of a particular situation or process in such a way as to reflect or conform to an overarching set of aims or values"* (Oxford Dictionaries). My use of the concept is furthermore inspired by Simon Turner, who, in *Politics of Innocence* (2010), describes how refugees in Tanzania used 'tales' and 'standard narratives' of moral decay and loss to make sense of social life in a refugee camp. Like Turner, I understand narratives to be socially significant and collectively constructed accounts of real life events. It means that an individual's experiences are seen through the prism of a certain narrative, and will thus be interpreted and retold accordingly. The narratives are not myths or stories that are always told in the same way, *"but a way of making sense of what has happened and why. It is like a master story or a framework for interpretation, which brings together a multitude of different events and situations in a socially meaningful way."* (Blensted 2017: 26). The concept of narratives thus relies on a social constructivist ontology, which implies that social reality is continuously constructed by humans (Collin, n.d.).

Context and methods

A dangerous cocktail of political rivalry, ethnic tension and economic decline caused the outbreak of civil war in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, and for a decade, the armed conflict continued with varying intensity (Bjarnesen 2013). Since April 2011, the security situation has rapidly improved, and today, the large majority of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have returned home (UNHCR February 2016: 68; UNHCR 2017: 3). Aid agencies have worked intensely to facilitate

repatriation and reintegration of the displaced, especially in the Western regions of Côte d'Ivoire, which were hard hit during the armed conflict.

The small town of Tabou was not spared by the conflict either. Tabou is located in the Southwest of the country, only 15 km from the Liberian border, and is surrounded by large plantations. The infrastructure of Tabou is weak, but the main public institutions are present. Several aid agencies are working in Tabou, but people still struggle to make ends meet. According to a UNHCR survey on 51 households of repatriated refugees in Tabou Department, close to 45% live under the national poverty line (equivalent to 39.5 USD per month (Institut National de la Statistique, n.d.)) and 65% live in food insecurity. The survey furthermore documents that 36% are illiterate (Ilunga Sulu February 2016: 71-74).

It was in this context that I made observations and conducted a total of 24 semi-structured interviews. The internship at DRC facilitated my access to the field and allowed for participant observation and everyday conversations with field staff. Likewise, DRC helped set up meetings with beneficiaries. For practical reasons, a staff member was present during the majority of the interviews but did not intervene. The methodological and ethical implications of the data collection is discussed elsewhere (Blensted 2017).

The social construction of development assistance and life opportunities

I have identified four narratives, which give meaning to the social world that beneficiaries and field staff have to navigate on a daily basis. In relation to life opportunities, beneficiaries have constructed a *narrative of hopelessness*. In stark contrast, field staff interprets life opportunities according to a *narrative of cultural laziness*. They furthermore understand development assistance in the light of a *narrative of dependency*, whereas beneficiaries on the other hand have constructed a *narrative of unfair assistance*. While the narratives are different, they are not independent from each other. Firstly, some narratives share values and worldviews and thus reinforce each other. Secondly, the narratives are upheld by virtue of being opposed to other narratives. Their interconnectedness will become apparent in the following pages.

Narrative of hopelessness

During interviews, beneficiaries would always evoke their problems. Often, they would not only be facing one but a multitude of problems, including poverty, lack of jobs, lack of proper housing, untreated illness or injuries, and the loss of family members. The fact that life in Tabou is not easy, and the fact that interviewees talk about their hardship is not what makes it a narrative of hopelessness. What is important is the way in which they frame their situation and how they interpret new opportunities. For example, my interviewees never said, "*I will soon have saved up enough money to build my house*" or "*Next month, I will participate in a UNHCR project, so everything will become easier.*" Moreover, whenever I asked if they were working, the answer was most often *"no"*, but when asked follow-up questions, it turned out that they were engaged in different sorts of economic activity, e.g. selling fruits or cooking small cakes. This is yet another way of maintaining a narrative of hopelessness – while not acknowledging their economic activities as 'work' because it was not an official job with a salary, they also did not acknowledge the possibilities that could follow from this kind of activity. They believed that their current situation was unchangeable, and they did not dare to hope for a better future.

When describing their situation to me, they often expressed feelings of sadness and resignation, which underpinned their narrative. They would not express hope or optimism about their future, because, according to their understanding of the reality in Tabou, a better future was impossible. Hence, I argue that beneficiaries have constructed a narrative of hopelessness around their personal struggles.

Nevertheless, it is not evident that the hardship that repatriates encounter upon their return from Liberia is perceived in terms of hopelessness. Research has shown that people in similar conditions can choose to construct different narratives. Liisa Malkki has written about how Hutu camp refugees understand their struggle as a necessary moral trial to make them worthy of returning to Burundi (Malkki 1996). Thereby, these refugees have created a social construct, which helps them to understand and positively engage with their current situation. Similarly, Simon Turner explains that Burundian refugees in Nairobi interpreted their daily struggles as waiting for miracles. As clandestine refugees, they suffered hunger and harassment from authorities, but they nevertheless maintained a narrative of hope and faith in God (Turner 2015).

The above-mentioned are examples of how the struggles that refugees go through can be constructed and given meaning according to very diverse narratives. On the other hand, Barbara Harrell-Bond, among others, has described how confinement in camps and the way in which assistance is administered can provoke feelings of helplessness. It is argued that refugees are stripped of their agency and autonomy when being forced into camps where they rely completely on humanitarian assistance (Harrell-Bond 1994). Additionally, there are several examples of how aid agencies and media represent refugees as helpless victims (Malkki 1996, Nyers 2006). It seems likely that these experiences become internalised by the refugees and repatriates, who then start to interpret life according to a narrative of hopelessness.

Narrative of unfair assistance

In addition to the narrative of hopelessness, beneficiaries in Tabou have constructed a narrative of unfair assistance. Of course, in theory, beneficiaries understand that aid agencies have limited budgets and that they can only assist those who are particularly vulnerable, but the narrative of unfair assistance nevertheless took over when they discussed their personal experiences.

The narrative of unfair assistance was often constructed around issues with medical assistance. Several of the beneficiaries I met were struggling with different diseases or pain from old injuries, which had a huge impact on their ability to work. Hence, they felt extremely vulnerable and therefore expected assistance from aid agencies. When the assistance did not cover their needs, they were very disappointed.

Furthermore, many of whom I met were worried about their participation in the housing projects. UNHCR, DRC and other NGOs often demand that beneficiaries provide half of the materials for the construction of the house. Beneficiaries were also expected to buy the plot of land themselves. For poor families, these demands were difficult to meet, and some of the interviewees were afraid that they would have to give up on the project, because of the associated costs. Because of these experiences, beneficiaries felt almost betrayed by the system. They could not understand why they, as vulnerable repatriates, had to face such unfair and unattainable demands from aid agencies. Interestingly, even beneficiaries who had received a lot of assistance maintained the same narrative.

Another important layer in this narrative was the fact that many beneficiaries felt misinformed or lied to, which created confusion and disappointment in the system. The interviewees explained that,

while in Liberia, UNHCR had promised assistance until the repatriates were able to take care of themselves. Upon arrival in Tabou they experienced a different reality, where assistance was limited. Therefore, many whom I spoke to felt that they had taken the decision to repatriate based on incorrect information, and they blamed UNHCR.

Adhering to social constructivism, the purpose of this article is not to determine whether the narrative of unfair assistance is objectively true. The purpose is to show that social constructs are not objective, but depend on the perspective applied. For example, by applying certain theories on fairness and distributive justice (e.g. Rawls 1971, Singer 1972, Van Wyk 1988), a narrative of unfair assistance can be supported. On the other hand, aid agencies are subject to donors' demands, which require tangible results, accountability, and effectiveness (Barnett 2005). Rational choices about intervention zones, vulnerability criteria and time limits are necessary in a non-ideal world, where agencies have limited resources. Unfortunately, this sometimes entails more or less arbitrary selection among very vulnerable individuals, because the assistance would otherwise be stretched too thin and the impact would be lost (Blensted 2017: 41). This perspective thus contradicts, to some extent, the narrative of unfair assistance.

Narrative of cultural laziness

As already stated, field staff does not understand their experiences according to the same two narratives as beneficiaries. Clearly opposing the beneficiaries' narrative of hopelessness, field staff has constructed a narrative of cultural laziness, which they use to interpret beneficiaries' actions. The staff members who I met believe that there are plenty of opportunities, which are not being exploited by the beneficiaries, because they are too lazy. The staff members would very often explain to me that *"Kroumanes are lazy"*. Kroumanes are the ethnic group, which originally inhabit the Southwest region of Côte d'Ivoire, including Tabou, and according to field staff this laziness was a *"cultural thing"* which could only be explained by the Kroumanes' cultural heritage (Blensted 2017: 32).

The narrative of cultural laziness is constructed around a series of examples of how Kroumanes allegedly prefer to make easy money instead of thinking long-term. The Kroumanes traditionally own land and should therefore be better off than other ethnic groups who have immigrated to the

region. Nevertheless, according to field staff, today, the Kroumanes are poor, as they have sold most of their land to other ethnic groups, instead of cultivating it. Moreover, many of the jobs in the large plantations or adjoining factories, are occupied by non-Kroumanes. One of my interviewees illustrated this situation by saying that *"without the Liberians [who sell fruits and vegetables at the local market], the Kroumanes would starve"* (Blensted 2017: 33). Hence, this narrative is maintained by stories about other ethnic groups who succeed in taking advantage of the possibilities in Tabou.

Meanwhile, this laziness does not only affect life in general, it also negatively impacts the sustainability of the aid agencies' work. During participant observation and interviews with staff members, I often heard them complain about beneficiaries' lack of motivation and lack of participation in development projects, which require collective work. According to field staff, the same projects are being implemented with success in other regions of the country, inhabited by populations that are mostly not of Kroumane ethnicity. Therefore, the failure of these projects in Tabou is interpreted as being a result of the specific Kroumane laziness.

Other researchers have shown that stereotyping beneficiaries is common among humanitarian workers. For example, expatriate staff in a refugee camp in Tanzania had categorised refugees as idle, criminal, or proactive according to their different nationalities (Turner 2010: 48). Similarly, Mark Graham has shown how civil servants in Sweden have developed an 'emotional cartography', which helps them understand the behaviour of asylum seekers from different countries (2003: 208-209).

Important to note is the fact that these stereotypes are usually rather negative. In a study of humanitarian staff in a refugee camp, Harrell-Bond explains that these negative stereotypes are part of a defence mechanism developed by staff to protect themselves from the misery they witness and the responsibility they carry:

> *"In addition to blaming politics, their superiors, the donors, the bureaucracy, or the host government, they also begin to blame the victims. [...] 'refugees cease to be people with problems; refugees become the problem'"* (Harrell-Bond 2002: 73)

Narrative of dependency

In continuation with the above, field staff has furthermore constructed a narrative of dependency. Evidently, this narrative is also opposed to beneficiaries' narrative of unfair assistance.

The narrative of dependency is closely linked to a belief in the dependency syndrome, which has been the topic of many discussions and investigations. Regardless that much research points to the fact that a dependency syndrome amongst beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance does not exist, it remains an influential concept (Harvey and Lind 2005, Kibreab 1993). Field staff in Tabou does not directly mention the syndrome but has constructed a narrative of dependency by emphasising beneficiaries' never-ending demands for more assistance. In this narrative, the legitimate claims of vulnerable individuals as well as examples of successful repatriates are forgotten or ignored. When directly asked about legitimate claims to more assistance, field staff answered with a *"yes, but…"*. According to the narrative of dependency, the persistent demands for additional assistance revealed that beneficiaries expected assistance to continue infinitely, and therefore they would not look for other ways of providing for themselves. This 'fact' was extremely frustrating for field staff.

The concept of gift-giving can help explain why simply asking for additional assistance was so badly viewed by field staff – a gift is a moral exchange, which places expectations of reciprocity on the receiver. A gift can be reciprocated materially, with another gift, or symbolically. If development assistance is (unconsciously) thought of as a gift and not as pure charity (which comes with no strings attached), then field staff expects reciprocity (Harrell-Bond 2002: 54-57). Because beneficiaries are poor and therefore cannot return the 'gift' in material terms, it demands symbolic reciprocity, e.g. expressions of gratitude and responsible behaviour. Whenever beneficiaries do the opposite and ask for additional assistance, it was interpreted as them being ungrateful.

Several staff members told me the same story, to prove that they were right to say that beneficiaries in Tabou are irresponsible and too dependent: UNICEF had ensured the production of late birth certificates for those who had either lost their papers or who had never been registered. Beneficiaries only had to pick up their certificates a few weeks later, but many never did. According to field staff, this was a prime example of the dependency that had been developed – beneficiaries were no longer capable of taking responsibility or being proactive. This interpretation is not specific to field staff in Tabou. In fact, it is common to think that refugees and other beneficiaries are

passive recipients, but several researchers have shown that, on the contrary, they are often innovative, proactive and entrepreneurial (Harvey and Lind 2005: 23, Kibreab 1993).

Lastly, this narrative was constructed around stories of repatriates, who would cheat and manipulate the system. Field staff told me that an uncertain number of Ivorians were continuously crossing the border in order to rebuild their homes and businesses in Côte d'Ivoire, while officially being registered as refugees in Liberia and waiting for repatriation assistance. Some had heard about children being sent back to Liberia to allow their parents to benefit from family reunification assistance several times. Moreover, Income Generating Activities and Food for Work programmes were not sustainable, because beneficiaries allegedly did not take them seriously. This is not actually cheating, but field staff perceived it as such, because the beneficiaries acted in ways that undermined the purpose of the programmes.

Obviously, cheating should not be accepted, but it was interesting to see how these examples were integrated into the narrative of dependency. Field staff would interpret cheating as evidence of the narrative of dependency – beneficiaries allegedly preferred assistance instead of normal work and did not search for ways in which they could provide for themselves in a sustainable manner.

Hiding the causes for poverty and vulnerability

Social constructs are important to understand, because individuals act on them, as if they are unchangeable, objective facts. Hence, I argue that the narrative of cultural laziness and the narrative of dependency have a serious impact on development interventions, because they solely focus on beneficiaries.

Firstly, the narratives serve to shift the blame away from programme failures. According to field staff, the large majority of problems are caused by the actions and attitudes of beneficiaries. For example, the projects which require collective work are continuously being implemented by aid agencies, because *"it makes more sense"* (Blensted 2017: 50)*,* while at the same time the staff explained to me that in the Kroumane culture, people do not appreciate collective work. This contradiction clearly shows that the two narratives prevent field staff from questioning programme failures and design new programmes, which match the local culture better. Again, when beneficiaries complain that they do not receive all the assistance that they had been promised by

UNHCR Liberia, it is interpreted as laziness and dependency. What staff ought to investigate is whether UNHCR Liberia communicates clearly and gives accurate information in order to avoid that beneficiaries get too high expectations.

Secondly, this tendency of blaming the beneficiary is problematic, because it hides the underlying structural causes for poverty and vulnerability. The story about the uncollected birth certificates is a good example of how the narratives of field staff can blur the 'real' causes. The field staff who I met, seemed unable to consider that not only irresponsible beneficiaries were to blame. Other reasons for not picking up the birth certificates could be lack of awareness about the importance for their children, not being present in the village when UNICEF distributed the new certificates, not being able to pay transportation to UNICEF's offices, etc. Moreover, the low sustainability of Income Generating Activities could be due to market failures, low educational levels etc. but according to the staff's narratives it is simply due to the beneficiaries' bad decisions.

Lastly, the fear of creating dependency among beneficiaries helps justify the participatory approach. As described earlier in this article, many beneficiaries were worried about the costs of benefitting from the housing projects. Field staff admitted that the participatory approach could be a challenge for some, but they underlined the need for it anyhow. According to the narratives, staff believed that free hand-outs would only lead to more laziness, and beneficiaries would never realise that they had to make sustainable choices for the future. The result was that the most vulnerable were excluded from the projects.

As noted earlier, the narrative of dependency draws parallels to the concept of the dependency syndrome. Researchers have investigated several cases, which show consequences similar to what I have described above: The fear of the dependency syndrome is taken into account when designing projects and often underpins decisions of reducing assistance. Furthermore, to avoid creating too dependent beneficiaries, agencies often choose to switch to development assistance, which entails a participatory approach, similar to the housing projects in Tabou (Harvey and Lind 2005, Kibreab 1993).

Conclusion

By applying 'narratives' as the bearing analytical concept of the analysis, I have been able to explain why beneficiaries and field staff interpret life opportunities and development assistance in

different ways. The analysis shows that they have constructed highly contradicting narratives, which obviously creates misunderstandings, confusion, and frustration among beneficiaries and field staff. More importantly, the narrative of cultural laziness and the narrative of dependency tend to shift the blame onto the beneficiary, whenever a problem arises. I have argued that the consequence of always blaming the beneficiary is that the structural causes for poverty and vulnerability in Tabou are hidden, and so are programme failures. In the end, these narratives are thus counterproductive to the mission of aid agencies, as it makes sustainable development unattainable.

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The Israeli mobility regime and its impacting on Palestinians

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Introduction

The research setting for this article is Palestine-Israel, an area known for being highly controversial and politically unstable. Since the establishment of the state of Israel in May 1948, the conflict regarding land and territories, and the crucial question of who is most entitled to control and live in the area, remain the focal points for both parties. Under the Oslo II Agreement, the control over some areas of Gaza and the West Bank where transferred to the Palestinian National Authority, as the West Bank was divided into three types of areas, namely area A, B and C (Newman, 1997, p.4). Area "A" consists of 18% of the West Bank and includes all the Palestinian urban areas (except for East Jerusalem), and refers to cities under the full control of the Palestinian National Authority. Area "B" includes all Palestinian villages and rural areas, and covers a total of 22% land. In these areas, Palestinian jurisdiction is responsible for the civil control, while security controls are shared between Palestinian and Israeli authorities. The rest of the West Bank, area "C", represents the largest territory, as it covers 60% of what we know as Palestine. These areas include all of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and these are under the full control of the Israeli authorities (Kołodziej, Garner, Azza, n.d; Newman, 1997, p.5). However, although this area falls under Israeli control, the Palestinian authorities remain responsible for providing educational and healthcare means for Palestinians, living in areas C. Thus, all Palestinian residents in area C are under military law, while the Israeli settlers are under Israel's civil law (Kołodziej et.al, n.d).

Figure 1: The Oslo II Accords (Newman 1996: 366).

After the second intifada (popular uprising against Israeli military occupation) in 2001, the Israeli authorities decided to build a separation wall, known as the West Bank Wall, with the purpose of separating Palestinian territories from Israeli territories (Jones, Leuenberger, Wills, 2016, p.1). Under the justification of "protecting Israel", the Israeli authorities have introduced several regulations such as, buffer zones, differentiated IDs, checkpoints, turnstiles, bypass roads, military zones, watch points, amongst other security measures. This was done in order to ensure, hinder and control unwanted entry from Palestinians, into Israeli controlled areas (Ben-Eliezer, Feinstein 2007:

171, Giacaman, Khatib, Shabaneh, Ramlawi, Sabri, Sabatinelli, Khawaja, Laurance 2009: 839, Tawil-Souri 2012: 170-172). In the following paragraph, I trace the impacts of the Israeli mobility regime and demonstrate some of the discriminatory practices that are inherent in the (political) system imposed by Israel on Palestinians. This study will be based on Palestinian tourism actors' experiences in the tourism field, and the concept of "mobility". By departing from theories of mobility, this study reveals how Israel's security regulations and implementation of security measures, work as instruments of a widespread surveillance mechanism. It further showcases these measures, as a principal mean for discriminating Palestinian's basic freedom to move across certain spaces.

Mobility theory

Questions related to the concept of mobility, primarily include issues of movement, too little movement, or too much of the wrong sort of movement (Hannam, Sheller, Urry, 2006: 2). Schiller and Salazar (2013) point out that the issues of (im)mobility are, to a great extent, based on certain safety institutions and risk factors, in which mobility is perceived as something dangerous and threatening, whereas immobility is considered necessary to ensure "political and personal security" of some nations and people (p.184). According to Shamir (2005), mobility is closely connected to globalization processes, which ultimately have resulted in an era of growing restrictions on movement (p.197). Shamir (2005) argues that mobility regimes are based on a paradigm of suspicion, in which power holders use an integrated "risk management system", to limit the mobility of some people, if their mobility is perceived as a threat or a risk of crime, immigration or terrorism (p.200). The "suspicion" paradigm presents four elementary forms, which constitute some of the physical features of the mobility regime. These include: borders and fences, quarantines and gated communities, osmotic properties, and profiling (Shamir 2005: 203-213). In this conceptualization, it is demonstrated that (im)mobility rests on human's identity, locality and social and economic status. The suspicion paradigm reveals the unequal power structures that exist, among primarily two "groups" of people or countries. These two groups consist of a "dominant group" and a "dominated group". The dominant group is characterized by their power to stigmatize, isolate and increase the immobility of the dominated groups, by controlling their exit privileges. At the same time, the dominant group can exercise their power to isolate themselves from the suspect group, by controlling their ability of entry into certain designated social spaces (Shamir 2005: 206). Thus, mobility is largely caught up in power geometries of everyday life, whereto the development

of new technologies assists to increase the mobility of some people and increases the immobility of others (Hannam et al. 2006: 3). Ahmed (2004) stresses that increasing mobility for some people essentially means the exclusion of other people, who are not considered equal (p.152). According to Schiller et al (2013), there are several "intersecting regimes of mobility that normalize the movements of some travelers while criminalizing and entrapping the ventures of others" (p.189). Thus, although Schiller et al (2013) acknowledges Shamir's (2005) conceptualization of the "mobility regime", the authors highlight the necessity of understanding the movement of imaginaries, and the role which imaginaries also play in determining the (im)mobility of nations and people (p.191). The term 'regime' refers to both the role of individual states and of changing international regulatory and surveillance administrations, that influence individual (im)mobility (Schiller et al. 2013: 189). In this study, Shamir's (2005) conceptualization of the "mobility regime" and the "paradigm of suspicion" will be used, in order to understand the physical features of the Israeli mobility regime and its impact on Palestinians ability to move.

Research methods

The empirical data for this article was conducted during my two weeks visit in January 2018, where I travelled around the region, and stayed in both Israeli and Palestinian territory. During my stay, I met with local Palestinian tourism actors, families, shop owners and non-governmental organizations such as the Danish House in Palestine (DHIP) and the Alternative Tourism Group (ATG). I gathered my data through the use of ethnographic methods (Adams 2012: 339, Hammersley, Atkinson 2007: 3). In this study, it was important to get an understanding of the factors that influence and limit the Palestinians, in their daily lives and gain insight into how Israel's regulations affect the Palestinian tourism actors work in the tourism field. Therefore, my ethnographic work entailed obtaining ten unstructured in-depth interviews (Bauman, Adair, 1992: 10), participatory observations, engaging in informal conversations with Palestinian taxi drivers, local shop owners, employees, local residents and foreign tourists and taking field notes throughout my field trip. The use of the unstructured interviews, allowed the informants to navigate the conversation around subjects that matters to them and affects them in their daily lives (Qu and Dumay 2011: 243). As a result, many new topics, issues and themes were raised, which allowed me to generate further questions. The information gained from the interviews, was supported by participatory observations and my field notes were used to assist in the understanding of issues, such as the context of the interviews and the characteristics of the Palestinian community.

Following the fieldwork, the data was categorized and analyzed using means and elements from the grounded theory approach (Junek and Killion 2012: 325). This entailed using the selective coding technique on my transcribed data, in which I categorized the data through the identification of themes, patterns and issues that emerged continuously in my material, after which I chose my theoretical frameworks to assist me in examining my data. Lastly, I conducted a thorough desk research, using search engines to assist me in gaining an insight into relevant theories.

Analysis

In this case study, it becomes evident that the mobility regime in Palestine-Israel have great consequences, for the Palestinians living conditions. Palestinians daily lives are centered around a regime based on closures, permits and licenses, which determine all movement and traffic into- and out of Palestine. Thus, this article discusses the Israeli security system and its impacts on local Palestinians in the region. During all the interviews with the Palestinian informants, issues of movement, traveling and entry to Israeli territory, were expressed. The challenges that Palestinians face on a daily basis, exist on different levels and are caused by the numerous control regulations, which Israel imposes upon Palestinians. When interviewing Rami, the director of the ATG, it was stated that the restrictive system imposed upon Palestinians, is both complex and complicated, which makes it difficult for Palestinians to navigate around. Rami stated:

"Of course we are living in a difficult situation. We don't have freedom of movement as other people have these privileges, and as you know Palestine is divided between different categories, so even if we were to talk about Palestinians themselves you cannot consider Palestinians inside Israel the same as Palestinians in Gaza. Everybody have their own restrictions, reality, challenges and space of freedom and movement"

Essentially, Rami's statement implies that Palestinians that are living in the West Bank, are subject to many more restrictions than Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, Haifa or other Israeli areas. This was further supported during an informal conversation with Isa, a local Palestinian young man from Haifa. Isa stated that he is one of the fortunate Palestinians that holds the Israeli citizenship, referring to his ability and freedom to move and travel more easily, than Palestinians from the West Bank or East Jerusalem. Isa was one of many Palestinians to explain that the Israeli government, differentiates between Palestinians and Israelis who live in Jerusalem, as Jerusalem, in many ways,

is perceived as a war zone, due to the many clashes in the area between the Palestinian and Israeli residents. Through my fieldwork, it became clear that the Israeli government regulates and determines the mobility of Palestinians and Israeli residents, based on a risk management system (Shamir 2005: 200). In this case, the risk management system distinguishes and discriminates between Israeli and Palestinian residents, by only limiting the mobility of the Palestinians in Jerusalem, as the Israeli government assesses that Palestinians from this area represent a greater risk factor than the Israeli residents, or for instance the Palestinians from Haifa. However, during the interviews with the Palestinian business owners, tour guides and the DHIP, it was stated that while Palestinians from (East) Jerusalem experience more restrictions than for example Palestinians from Haifa, Palestinians from (East) Jerusalem are still more mobile, than Palestinians from the West Bank, living in areas such as Ramallah or Hebron. According to Tawil-Souri (2012), these different levels of (im)mobility result from the fact that since 1948, the Israeli authorities have handed out differentiated ID cards to Palestinian residents, which function as an instrument to control and limit the Palestinian geographic (and economic) mobility (p.153). Hence, the ID cards system becomes a visible evidence of the symbolic discrimination, that Israel executes. In addition, this mean that Palestinian citizens of Israel, are subject to other restrictions than Palestinian non-citizens in East Jerusalem, just as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are subject to other restrictions than Palestinians from the two aforementioned areas. Thus, Palestinians ability to move is, (1) defined by which area in the West Bank one is from, and (2) based on which ID card they are in possession of, as each of these areas constitute its own risk and dangers, according to the Israeli government, which ultimately either eases or restricts Palestinians' access to movement, economic and social resources. The numerous regulations Palestinians are subject to, specifically in the West Bank, has taken its toll on local Palestinians on several levels. Palestinians from the West Bank are facing economic issues and social inequality due to their immobility, restricted import/export permits and scarce access to resources. During the interview with Malik, a young Palestinian tour guide from Nablus, it was stated that the regulations he is subject to, prevent him from travelling and move freely to other cities in the region. Malik explained that his inability to move, hinder him in performing guided tours outside of his respective city, which makes it difficult to have a regular income. In great frustration, Malik expressed:

" We that are living here in this part of the country (the West Bank), are living our lives as if we are in one big prison, and that involves everything"

The causes of the Palestinians' struggles and the contributory factor that enables Israel to control and determine the mobility of Palestinians, lies in the simple fact that the Palestinian authority lacks control over Palestinian borders. The Palestinians' lack of control over national and regional borders, has enabled the Israeli political system to both set and control the parameters, of national (and international) movements. Given Israel's means and power to determine the mobility of individuals in the region, Israel has immobilized the Palestinian population, by implementing numerous security measures that makes it difficult (and in some cases impossible), for Palestinians to cross national, regional and international borders. The physical features of the Israeli mobility regime are visible everywhere in the region, especially when travelling from one area to another. During my fieldwork I chose to stay in Ramallah (area A) for a few days, from which I travelled to other cities and areas such as Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron. As I crossed from one area to another, I observed that all traffic was going through a border control, before being allowed access to the area in question. At the checkpoints, Palestinian non-citizens and Palestinians from the West Bank had to get out of a bus and go through another control check undertaken by Israeli soldiers. At the same time, other passengers in the bus (tourists and citizens of Israel) had to remain seated, and two soldiers would board the bus and control passports, visas and other relevant papers. Based on an assessment of people's papers and permissions, the soldiers would determine whether or not one was allowed to cross the border, at each checkpoint. When interviewing Palestinian tourism actors in the West Bank, who try to cross the checkpoints on a daily basis, it was stated:

"Most of the tour guides working in Hebron faces problems with the soldiers in charge of the borders on a personal level… of course it is a problem when I can't take my client to other places than Hebron"

During another interview with Salah, a Palestinian non-citizen from East Jerusalem, who owns a tour operator company, it was said that Palestinian tour operators face great challenges in applying and obtaining approved visas and permits, for travelling to Israeli territories. Saleh explained that:

"In many cases if a Palestinian operator applies for a visa for one of his groups, chances are not all of them would be approved, or the whole group would be disapproved. There have been cases where a Palestinian tour operator has a list, submit it, and 90 percent get rejected. He takes the same list gives it to an Israeli tour operator for money, and they all get the visa, so this is a huge

disadvantage"

According to Israeli authorities, Israel's main reason for restricting Palestinians ability to move, is due to security reasons. In fact, the Israeli authorities has previously stated that the primary reasons for Israel's survival, is due to their "defensible borders" (Tawil-Souri 2012: 154). The rationale of defensible borders, is deeply tied to Israel's view of its own existence or threat to existence (Tawil-Souri 2012: 154). However, Israel's execution of the mobility regime, suggests that the national security is based on Palestinian mobilities and flows, rather on geographic or territorial boundaries. Thus, as the Palestinians are perceived as a threat to Israel's further existence, Palestinians are being stripped of their freedom to move on equal terms as Israeli residents, and therefore blocked from working outside of their respective city. Following Shamir's (2005) illustration of the paradigm of suspicion, Israel's increased control and implementation of borders in the region is an attempt to separate and isolate themselves from "suspect people", such as the Palestinians. This is done by Israel implementing national and regional borders, and carrying out related rules and regulations in the name of "securing Israel", to protect a perceived Israeli stable and secure social district from unwarranted Palestinian infiltration. The Israeli government's double standards makes it possible for Israeli residents to travel and move freely, whilst limiting the Palestinians ability to move more and more. This suggests that that Israeli territories act as gated communities, while the West Bank areas function as quarantines. Instruments such as checkpoints, document controls, permits and licenses are installed outside of Israeli territories, to make it difficult for non-Israeli residents to enter Israeli controlled areas. This indicates that the physical features of Israel's mobility regime, in this case, work through the prevention of entry, while the same borders and checkpoints in the West Bank, work through the prevention of exit, as the Palestinians are experiencing major challenges in traveling outside of their respective city. In addition, this observation was supported during the interview with Amir, the local guide from Hebron, as he explained that Israel's implementation of checkpoints, is an attempt to make it more difficult for Palestinians to travel outside of the West Bank, as well as to make it more time-consuming for tourists, to travel into the West Bank. Then, Israel's use of visa regulations, serve as a tool to sort between people, by distinguishing those people that are allowed to cross borders, from those that are considered to be a threat, and therefore not allowed to cross borders. Thus, the visa systems assist the Israeli government, in further limiting and controlling the movement of the Palestinians from the West Bank, by subjecting them to a particular treatment of protocols and procedures, which hamper their ability to move. This was

further supported during the interview with Rami, as it was stated that Palestinian tour operators from the West Bank, have to apply for a special "guide visa" from the Israeli authorities, if they wish to perform tours in Israeli areas. However, according to Rami, since the year 2000, the Israeli government has refused to approve Palestinians guides permits. Rami stated that the tourism field in the region, is highly centered around the political situation, which explains why the Israeli government refuses to increase the number of issued guide permits, to Palestinians. Thus, based on this, and in light of the Israeli government's double standards, highlighted above, one could claim that Israel's mobility regime is based on discriminatory procedures and practices, rather than on an assumption that local Palestinians constitute a danger or a risk for Israel. Consequently, these procedures assist Israel in hindering and limiting the Palestinians ability to provide for themselves. In this case, Israel hinders Palestinian tourism actors, in developing a Palestinian tourism sector and increase the economic flows, to Palestinian areas. The checkpoints, permits and other control measures, are just some of the physical elementary features of Israel's mobility regime. Issues regarding negative notions and imaginaries of Palestinians are also great challenges that several of the local Palestinian informants mentioned. Malik stated that a huge disadvantage that Palestinian tourism actors' experience, is that the tourists' first impression of Palestine and Palestinians, is not presented by Palestinians themselves. Rather the tourists' first "encounter" with Palestine, is big red signs that are placed outside of all entrances into the West Bank, which warns tourists against entering the area, and inform them that entering this place is dangerous and even life threatening. Malik explained that the signs assist Israel in strengthening the negative images of Palestinians, which consequently makes it difficult to develop tourism initiatives and increase the tourism flows to the Palestinian side. According to Malik, the signs cause tourists to develop a wrong idea of who Palestinians are, which ultimately scare tourists to travel into Palestinian areas.

The warning sign.

Schiller et al. (2013) have pointed out the crucial role of which imaginaries play, in both determining and defining the (im)mobility of nations and people (p.191). In this case, it seems that the negative imaginaries of Palestinians, along with Israel's implementation of borders, checkpoints and security procedures, play a crucial role in defining and determining both the tourist flow to the West Bank, as well as the Palestinians ability to move. This is further confirmed during several of the interviews with the local tourism actors, as they expressed that the negative imaginaries about Palestinians, are problematic in two ways. Firstly, the negative stereotypical images of Palestinians make it difficult to increase the tourism activities in Palestinian territories, and secondly, the negative imaginaries of Palestinians assist in legitimizing the restrictions and limitations of the Palestinians mobility. Thus, this demonstrate how the Israeli mobility regime operates on several levels. Aside from the regime's practical and visible features, such as the checkpoints and military zones that restrict local Palestinians in their physical mobility, the hidden elements, such as the tourist's response to the signs and the negative imaginaries, also play a great role in undermining Palestinians' ability to move and chances to develop a tourism sector in Palestine on equal terms as Israelis.

Conclusion

Israel limits and controls the mobility of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Israeli territories, by subjecting Palestinians to particular discriminating regulations, treatment and procedures that hinder them in crossing borders. Israel's ability to maintain the high level of control over the Palestinians mobility, is enabled by the Israeli mobility regime, which encompasses numerous elementary features, all of which work through the prevention of exit from the West Bank. By fragmenting Palestine into three areas and handing out differentiated ID cards, Israel has succeeded in limiting both the geographical and economic flows and mobility into the West Bank. Thus, Israel's mobility regime has caused different levels of (im)mobility in Palestine-Israel, as the ability to move across borders is either permitted or restrained, depending on which ID card the Palestinians possess and where they live. Israel's implementation of numerous security measures, is an attempt to maintain the defensible borders, which accordingly is one of the primary reasons for Israel's survival. Consequently, this mean that Palestinians from the West Bank are more or less physically immobilized, while Palestinians from East Jerusalem or Israeli territories, holding the Israeli citizenship or non-Israeli citizenship, move more freely across borders, as they are perceived to constitute less of a threat. From a tourism perspective, the analysis demonstrated that the immobility of Palestinian from the West Bank, means that tourism actors living in area A, B or C experience great challenges when working as tour operators, as the many restriction imposed upon them, hinder them in executing guided tours outside of their respective cities. The Palestinians' limited ability to move and their lack of control over own borders, further challenge the Palestinians in increasing the tourism flows to the West Bank, due to the negative stereotypical image of Palestine and Palestinians.

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Local bureaucracies in rural Argentina: who is behind the desk?

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Introduction

Bureaucracies are a crucial element of modern democracies. They are the material expression of the abstract concept of the state, in charge of providing services, goods and regulations (Oszlak, 2006). They are in charge of implementing policies outlined from elected officials, but they are more than just an instrument. Bureaucracies ensure stability in public policies and might limit the discretionary power of elected officials or governments (Iacoviello et al. 2010), while also generating positive economic impacts and reducing corruption (Evans and Rauch 1999, Rauch 1995). Bureaucratic agencies are not only the 'face of the government', but rather an actor that can determine the content of public policy and its implementation, impacting in this way local development.

The formulation of public policies, rather than its mere execution, is a defining element of public bureaucracy (Ejersbo and Svara 2012). Specially in small communities, where there is a proximity between elected officials, administrators and citizens, bureaucracies have a crucial role in providing solutions for local problems, conveying citizens problems to local elected officials and guaranteeing a long-term implementation of policies across administrations and political parties.

Last but not least, bureaucracies provide a fair and stable employment for those employed in the public service (IACPS 2003). This is a crucial point given that public employment is, for rural areas, one of the main sources of employment and, as such, may influence local economic development, becoming a mechanism to reduce inequalities or crystallizing them (CEPAL et al. 2013: 24).

Of critical importance is then the relationship that elected officials have with bureaucracies, since they are credited with the responsibility of hiring public officials. Bureaucracies need to achieve certain independence from politicians in order to guarantee stability and implementation of long-term policies, however, their actions also need to reflect policies outlined from democratically

elected officials. Bureaucracies that become too independent and unresponsive to elected officials might possess a threat to democracy while, on the other hand, bureaucracies that respond exclusively to politicians in office might forget altogether to pursue policy goals choosing instead to build political support for the patron (Grindle 2012).

However, there is another variable that becomes important when explaining results achieved by public bureaucracies: their technical capacity. Public service needs to have the right balance of independence and autonomy from elected officials but also be technically capable of accurately performing activities related to their job description, providing services, anticipating and solving problems. Different authors stressed the importance of analyzing bureaucracies looking at both autonomy and capacity (Iacoviello et al. 2010, Fukuyama 2013, Cingolani et al. 2015). Iacoviello et al (2010) identify four types according to the level of autonomy and capacity: meritocratic, administrative, parallel and patronage bureaucracies. Administrative bureaucracies have relatively high autonomy, but they lack technical capacity to influence in policy design or innovation: they are dedicated to standardized routine activities. In units where patronage bureaucracy prevails, individuals could lack technical capabilities (because they are not hired by their credentials or experience) nor have incentives to promote any policy outside the political patron that facilitated the job. Parallel bureaucracies are usually part of specific projects, they have high technical capacities but because of the nature of the contract and task are expected to have low long-term impact on policy development. Meritocratic bureaucracies are the closest type of a Weber's ideal type, where personnel are recruited in a merit base having both the technical capacity and the relative autonomy to express opinions and contribute to policy development (Iacoviello et al. 2010).

This article analyzes *how local human resources are appointed, managed and dismissed* in rural communities in Argentina, looking to identify if they function closer to the meritocratic model or the patronage model.

Public bureaucracies in Latin America have followed different paths from bureaucracies in developed countries. While bureaucracies in developed countries have been characterized as excessively independent and lacking flexibility (Olsen 2005), the reality of Latin America shows a general lack of professionalism and accountability, transparency and the presence of corruption (CLAD 2010), usually exacerbating political swings. There are, however, differences between Latin American countries. Iacoviello et al (2010) distinguish three groups of countries: Brazil, Chile and,

to a lesser extent, Costa Rica as examples of a more advanced level of recruitment and retention. Second, Argentina and Uruguay are in the intermediate group with some 'isles' of meritocratic bureaucracies but presence of patronage and administrative types, therefore showing large disparities between agencies and levels of the state. Finally, within the weakest bureaucracies we find countries like Bolivia, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and El Salvador, where the widespread use of patronage and low institutionalization places their bureaucracies far away from the meritocratic model.

This article represents an opportunity to highlight the differences between the challenges faced by public administrations in Latin America, but also within countries. While some outstanding articles have explored the differences between agencies in a country (Bersch et al. 2017), most of the literature covers national agencies rather local structures. In Argentina, previous research has been focused on the national level or geographically within Buenos Aires city and its suburbs, leaving relatively unexplored the reality of rural communities.

Methods

The research has adopted a qualitative method for different reasons. In the first place, data availability. Both the country and the nature of the phenomena being studied entail serious limitations to data access. In the first place, Argentina does not collect data about public employees in a periodical manner, that covers basic attributes such as gender, age, education. Instead, the only sources of data are the national census that is completed every 10 years. Apart from the census information, the data collected and published as well as the methodology used varies between governments and their goals. Municipalities are not responsible for keeping any particular record or complying with any statistical way of reporting. The result is that data is not being captured, making it difficult to tackle other types of analysis based on quantitative methods. Instead, the article sets up an explanatory question, using a case study to focus on explaining how personnel are appointed and managed (Yin 1994).

In the second place, the use of a qualitative method is the result of the theoretical approach. This article analyzes the topic of public bureaucracies through a historical institutionalist approach. Historical institutionalists focus the particularities of the local background, analyzing cases in specific space and time, and although they include a wide array of methods, this approach relies to a greater extent in qualitative methods that highlight the process and the history rather than statistical

analysis of natural experiments (Fioretos et al. 2016: 16). But institutionalism also helps emphasize the presence of both informal and formal institutions: local bureaucracies in the Buenos Aires province operate in an extremely weak formal context, where the only laws that need to be followed are those concerning workers' rights. In an environment where there are no formal procedures that guide the hiring and management practices, informal rules become even more important. This attention to informal institutions has an impact on methods of collecting data, in which semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions have better chances to capture informal rules of the game that might not come clear with other methods. Lastly, institutionalism becomes a valid heuristic tool to understand the incentive for local politicians to continue certain practices, even at the cost of general efficiency.

The data was collected through interviews to seven key players in the municipal environment in Bolivar. The focus was on municipal Executive power because this is the key player that decides who enters the local public administration. Representatives of all political parties have been interviewed, including past Mayors and current officials closely linked to human resources management.

The case study is based on a typical case within the 'cattle cluster'. Buenos Aires is a very heterogenous province in term of geography, population distribution and economic activities. The cattle cluster is a grouping of municipalities (Aramburú and Cadelli 2012) whose predominant economic activity is cattle raising, with very low participation of industry and economic diversification, where the public sector is the greatest source of employment along with agricultural activities. These municipalities share a similar financial situation, with a rigid income structure that is very dependent on external funding, very different from the situation of governments in the Buenos Aires suburbs. The municipality of Bolivar, within this cluster is used as a typical case study. They also show a low population density and high expenses in public salaries per habitant. The intention is to explore the reality of hiring practices some in rural municipalities, opening the avenue for further research to explore the consequences for development and inequality in local environments.

Results

Bolivar's bureaucracy is characterized by a two-tier system: a first level comprised by the Mayor's

closest advisers, who act as department heads and a second level that forms a permanent body of employees functioning under the direction of department heads.

First tier

This groups represents the Mayor's closest team and advisors. They are in charge of implementing policies through the teams they manage. It is formally the Executive's exclusive right to appoint his team and all the interviewees seem to agree that no other actors participate informally in this decision. In Bolivar, this accounts for an average of 60 people that the Mayor appoints directly trying to ensure the highest degree of support. There is no formal post description and recruitment process designed to select the individual that matches the skills required. On the contrary, it is the Mayor who through an informal process selects the individual that, firstly, needs to be loyal to his political project and secondly, can efficiently coordinate his or her area.

While serving as employees, their performance as well as other management components such as remuneration is linked to political considerations rather objective standards. Typically, these employees are dismissed when the Mayor changes, especially when there is a change in the political party.

Second tier

The second tier of municipal employees is comprised by the bulk of the public employees that are employed by the municipality providing services that range from waste collection, cleaning services, administrative and medical staff. The city had 969 municipal employees in 2010 increasing to 1280 in 2018[1]. This represents an increase of 32%, while its total population increased over the same period by 5.4% (INDEC census 2010). The personnel are divided in permanent, transitory and independent contractors. Independent contractors, although a legal form utilized to hire services in a one-time manner, became an under-covered way of hiring personnel that is extremely difficult to track and monitor. It is believed Bolivar has in between 300 and 400 contractors.

The prevalent appointment strategy in this second level is patronage. Interview No. 6 confirms that "In the lower layers [second tier of public employment], an impartial recruitment is not guaranteed

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[1] Information from 2001 census is not separated among different levels of government. It can be estimated that the municipality counted in that year with 569 employees. This would imply an increase of the staff from 2001 to 2018 is of 125%.

in Bolívar, on the contrary, the militancy and political identity are prioritized to their technical profile". Similarly, interview No. 2 corroborates that "The decision of hiring employees responds more to electoral politics than to the specific necessities of the municipality". Each election, the interview continues, brings 60 to 70 new employees to the municipality that are expected to bring not only their votes but also their entire families' support. This forms what M. Grindle calls a 'patronage system': not just a few, closest advisors designated by its loyalty, but a situation "where discretionary appointment for personal and/or political purposes is a principal route to a nonelected position in government for a large portion of those enjoying such positions" (Grindle 2012: 18).

To families in this second tier of employees, the most important benefit they get from the relationship with the patron, is the prospect of a stable job. This differs greatly from the first tier of employees who join the public administration to influence local politics and policies, and where the salaries (although higher than those from the second tier) do not represent the biggest incentive.

The fact that municipal jobs are such a crucial element of the lives of these people explains why employees keep their support to their patron through their employment. Oliveros (2013) describes that it is in the client's interests to have the patron in power, because these employees perceive that their fates are tied to the political fate of the politician who hired them (Oliveros 2013: 4). One of the interviews summarized in this way the link between patron and employees in Bolivar: "[…] They don't even have the ability to complain [for better work conditions] because they feel that the Mayor or the official who gives them the job are doing a favor for them".

In exchange for a stable job, clients not only ensure a vote for their patrons, and some dedicate time for their political campaigns, but also provide 'favors' (i.e. routine tasks simplified to the beneficiary) to friends, family and party supporters (Oliveros 2016). This is a source of benefits for the incumbent party that come at no cost for them and provides an enormous advantage over their political opponents. This explanation is critical to understand why the system lasts over time, even when it brings inefficiencies to the overall performance of public bureaucracy. Politicians gain more support the more people they hire, which becomes an activity with high exit costs, thus changing will imply the Mayor to renounce unilaterally to patronage recruitment, putting his or her party in a disadvantageous position, abandoning a practice that increases support at virtually no cost for the

party. Patronage is therefore a strategy that shows increasing returns and high exit costs, matching Pierson's definition of path dependency[2].

The likelihood of a change promoted from other levels of the state is also unlikely, given that provincial and national governments operate under an informal understanding that state resources can and should be used for political purposes. At the national and provincial levels, the transfer of funds is used to gain political support within the system, at the municipal level, Executive body uses the municipal civil service. Consequently, the municipal staff growth is driven by political dynamics rather than organizational needs.

As a result of patronage, the recruitment process works in the opposite direction as most bureaucratic organizations: individuals get a job in the municipality if they contributed to the (elected) Mayor's political campaign and then they are assigned a task. Interview No. 7 explained that there is a surplus of 300 to 400 people in the municipality that do not have a specific task assigned. They are granted a position if they collaborate with the Mayor's political campaign and once they get the job it is quickly assessed what they can do: if they can mow the lawn they work in parks and recreation, if they can use a computer they are assigned to an administrative area that can absorb one more employee.

A partial exception to this process are positions that require professionals of a specific field, e.g. medical staff. In this respect, oftentimes more qualified positions are open to politically independent or even opponents to incumbent parties because in the local environment the pool of qualified people in certain areas is limited. Still, the process is run in most cases without a formal post description and the requirements of the candidates are flexible. In none of the cases are impartial selection processes, conducted by independent bodies, granted.

Management during their time as employees is also critical. Management includes how employee's performance is evaluated, the training they receive, opportunities in their career path, and workspace responsibility i.e. how are they held accountable on their attendance, work hours, care of the public property, etc. Management also includes remuneration, which is a critical element to

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[2] Path dependence is a critical concept in historical institutionalism (Fioretos et al, 2016: 9), although it is not unequivocal on its interpretation (Fioretos et al, 2016: 9; Rixen and Viola, 2014; Pierson, 2000). According to Pierson (2000) a path dependent process implies increasing returns. In his view, path dependence describes how preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction by augmenting the costs of exiting that path.

retain qualified personnel. However, in Bolivar remuneration is the only management element discussed.

The reason why salary is the exclusive element being discussed by employees, unions and the Mayor's Office is because salaries are very low. A great number of employees earn less or the minimum salary, which represent a big challenge to recruit and maintain qualified personnel. In 2017 it has been reported that the salary of the majority of municipal employees was less than 10.000 pesos a month (Conciencia Medios 2017), while the poverty line for the month of July 2017 for a family of 4 was at15,024.72 pesos/month (INDEC 2017). This results in a great number of employees receiving less than the minimum to provide for their families.

The reason for low salaries lies on the deficit municipal budget. Like other municipalities in the cattle cluster, 65% of Bolivar's expenses are comprised by personnel's salaries (SCE 2014). This precarious situation is the result of external constraints and internal decisions. Within the external factors that explain this situation, there is a chronical deficit product of a decentralization process that transferred responsibilities to lower levels of the state without transferring financial resources (Falleti 2005). However, this is paired with an internal decision of increasing the staffed public employees. This generates a vicious circle on every election: local authorities incorporate more people that helped in the Mayor's political campaign; these jobs add more pressure to local budget; local budget cannot afford substantial increase on salaries and training of the existing personnel. In spite of the budget restrictions, the next election more personnel are hired.

Education and training are not only absent through the hiring process but also throughout the professional career of the personnel. Those interviewed agreed that the elements that hinder the development of a more trained or qualified workforce can be summarized in: lack of support from other levels of government that do not provide resources and support for employee's training; lack of incentives for local actors, meaning it is not a priority for the Mayor nor the employees or the unions; low salaries that hinders the Municipality's ability to recruit and retain already trained personnel, captured by the private sector; and lastly the local restrictions on the pool of candidates where qualified personnel in certain areas is scarce, a situation partially attributed to the 'local brain-drain', that is, students that leave Bolivar to study in bigger cities and do not return once trained.

It is important to emphasize how patronage affects not only the appointment phase but the management of the existing staff. Grindle explains that the "processes of recruitment determine expectations about obligation -to the person and his or her priorities or to the "service," its norms of behavior, and the responsibility of office" (Grindle 2012). We can see this in Bolivar where political loyalty and connections replace an objective performance evaluation system and clear professional career advancement. Furthermore, the lack of clear workplace obligation rules leads to the widespread misuse of state resources, leaving to personal and ethical considerations to judge basic elements of any employment contract such as hours the employee should work or whether they can make personal use of municipal assets, etc. It has been reported that employees with good political connections do not respect working hours, openly misuse public goods and engage in corrupt activities.

Dismissal follows also a political line. Although conforming to the legal framework unjustified dismissal of employees is in general terms very rare, political opponents are demoted, transferred to other areas or given less resources to work with compared to those that are aligned to the Mayor's party.

To conclude, municipal bureaucracy in Bolivar shows low autonomy and low technical capacity. Within the first tier, political loyalty takes precedence over technical capacity in the selection process, leading to a staff with very low levels of autonomy but varying degrees of capacity. There is a recent experience of an elected Mayor that focused on forming a team with young and educated appointees, trying to give Bolivar a 'fresh start' and differentiate from his predecessor's team. While more capacity might be understood as a positive impact in development and policy formulation, more competence in this tier of appointments can hardly bring structural changes without accompanying levels of autonomy. Because of their connection with the Mayor and technical knowledge they have great chances of promoting strategies of local development, however, their temporary nature represents an obstacle to structural changes. During interviews several promising projects were mentioned that were not continued once their champions were gone. Additionally, they fail to give the tools to the second tier of employees, that enjoy more stability, to generate themselves these projects and initiatives.

Within the second tier, as a consequence of patronage appointments, the levels of autonomy are also very low. It is important to note that patronage does not necessarily result in low capacity (Grindle

2012). In Bolivar, the absence of merit recruitment is combined with a great disregard for technical capacity. As Grindle puts it: "in patronage systems, competence can be a criterion of hiring, but whether or not it is depends upon the preferences of the hiring patron" (Grindle 2012: 22). Technical capacity is only valued, to some extent, in first levels of recruitment and professional positions.

Discussion

Low autonomy and low capacity jeopardize the ability to fulfill the main goals of public bureaucracies, outlined at the beginning of this article. Low autonomy disrupts the most basic goals of the bureaucratic organization that no longer works 'for the municipality' but rather 'for the Mayor's political project', favoring an environment prone to corruption and misuse of public resources. Low technical capacity reduces the municipality's efficiency in the provision of the most basic services, limiting economic development.

As a result, this type of human resource management (or the lack of it) limits the possibility of bureaucracies of implementing policies, but also importantly, it reduces the bureaucracies' ability to formulate policies, to come up with original solutions to local problems utilizing its unique position in between citizens and elected officials, to guarantee a long-term implementation of policies and to reduce discretion. Moreover, it reproduces inequalities present in the local environment inside and outside the municipality. A topic that deserves special attention is the reproduction of gender inequalities: according to current figures, there's a 13% pay gap between men and women in the municipality, where men hold 60% of the management positions. An analysis of the areas where men are employed shows that there is a reproduction of cultural stereotypes (e.g. women employed in medical care and initial education services, men in charge of construction and budget) and municipality lacks the data to understand the phenomenon as well as the willingness to actively promote policies to change it.

This highlights the need for further research to explore the nexus between bureaucracies and development in small communities, as well as between bureaucracies and reproduction of gender inequality.

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Anti-Colonial Struggles in Metropolitan France: Indigènes, Subaltern Knowledges and The Politics of Decolonization

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Introduction

On October 2005, the death of Zyad Benna and Bouna Traoré, French youth of colour, at Clichy-sous-Bois, while running from the police, provoked weeks of rioting that spread from the Parisian quartiers populaires[3] to the rest of France (Hajjat 2006: 27). Violence was concentrated in the banlieus of the larger cities resulting in arrests, cars torched, and buildings burned down (Kipfer 2007). The conservative government lead by Jacques Chirac reactivated a state of emergency law first introduced in 1955 in response to the anticolonial revolt in Algeria (Kipfer 2011). Former president Nicolas Sarkozy, then minister of the interior, came out in 'defense of the nation' by threatening the deportation of the youth, as if most of them had not been French citizens (El-Tayeb 2008: 661). Soon, diverging analyses of the events emerged. While these proposed different explanations they all shared a certain anxiety when it came to making sense of the identities of the rioters: Where they Arab? African? Muslim? Migrants? Little was said of the fact that the large majority of the youth involved were actually French citizens (Boubeker 2013, Blanchard et. al.: 2005). Political discourse and media coverage proved to be symptomatic in its homogenizing of a heterogeneous population, externalizing the youth of the banlieues as a foreign, hostile other and reinforcing the narrative of a distinct, separate non-European 'culture of poverty' dominating communities of color in France (El-Tayeb 2008, 2011, Boubeker and Hajjat et. al.: 2008). More sympathetic analyses were also present. This criticized integration policies and accused the French state of failing the so-called 'second generation'. However, like their counterparts, these analyses naturalized this largely French citizens as foreigner with no rights nor claims upon the nation-states in which they were born (Grewal 2009, Gueye 2011, Khiari 2006, 2009).

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[3] Quartiers populaires refers to socially mixed and racially stigmatized social spaces inhabited by working class people, particularly racialized communities (Kipfer 2011). This has been the privileged territory of the political struggles of these communities in France (Khiari 2009: 212-213). I use this notion interchangeably with another the notion 'banlieues', another term referring to these spaces.

Contrary to the culturalist framework through which the riots came to be interpreted – identifying radical Islam, hip-hop gangs, a lack of 'integration' and a 'culture of poverty' as culprits – the causes of the riots are socio-economic and political (Hajjat 2005, 2006). The banlieues are spaces symptomatic of the European postindustrial condition of spatial segregation producing structurally neglected, isolated neighborhoods (El-Tayeb 2008: 662, Kipfer 2007, 2011). Police brutality in these spaces is not the exception, but the norm. Its inhabitants experience daily rounds of identity checks and systemic arrests, which might explain why Zyad and Bouna ran away (Khiari 2006, 2009). The massive de-industrialization of Europe since the 1980's has especially affected working class communities of color living in these spaces (Gueye 2011). The consequence of this process has been the creation of a 'multiethnic underclass', which has not only deepened the *racialization of class*, but also its *de-nationalization*. The riots rather than being the product of 'culture', can be interpreted as the outcome of processes of socio-economic marginalization and subalternization of racialized working class communities (El-Tayeb 2006: 664, El-Tayeb 2011).

Another characteristic of the way the riots were framed was by emptying them of their political content and of their connections to the histories of political struggles of communities of color. Without analyzing the riots through these connections, they are framed as having no clear political horizon, thus reinforcing the view that in the banlieues only a political dessert exists (Hajjat 2006: 28). However, in contrast to some of the dominant views of politicians, the media and academics, the riots have a history of more than 50 years of political experiences (Boubeker and Hajjat et. al.: 2008). As such, this article examines the political struggles of racialized communities in France. My point of departure is 'the Parti des Indigènes de la République' (PIR), a political party composed of different activist of African, Arab-Muslim and Caribbean ancestry engaged in 'the luttes de l'immigration'[4]. Their appearance in 2005 produced an upheaval of the political field, as they pointed out to the persistence of forms of domination rooted in colonial histories used against racialized communities (Khiari 2006: 20). In engaging with the PIR's political praxis, the paper focuses on what postcolonial and de-colonial theorists have conceptualized as *subaltern knowledges*

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[4] In the French context, this notion is used to refer to the larger assemblage of political engagements of activist and movements heralded by racialized communities. Like with other notions throughout the thesis, such as quartiers populaires and banlieues, I have decided to leave the French version, because of the political meaning and implications they have had in a French context.

(Guha and Spivak et. al.: 1988, Bogues 2003, Walsh 2005, Suárez-Krabbe 2015, Nelson Maldonado-Torres 2007). These are ways of knowing that emerge from the lives, struggles and perspectives of marginalized populations (Berger 2016: 215): theorizations and analyses that are trivialized by hegemonic Eurocentric epistemologies (Walsh 2015, Santos 2014, Suárez-Krabbe 2014). By engaging with the PIR's subaltern knowledges, I explore how they conceptualize questions of race and colonialism, identity and politics, as well as resistance and decolonization.

Subalternity, Knowledge and Politics

Questions of race and colonialism have been of particular scholarly interests in the French context. In recent years, it has been addressed in the latest wave of scholarship on postcoloniality, partly explained by current debates on Islam and terrorism, national identity and migration, and the legacies of colonial history and slavery (Bancel, Blanchard and Lemaire 2005, Boubeker and Hajjat et. al.: 2008, Kipfer 2011: 1156). However, very few studies explored these issues from the perspectives of political movements and their subaltern knowledges - as forms of 'valid' critical thinking and political theorizing (Icaza and Vasquez 2013, Kelley 2002). This reflects a wider trend within the social sciences whereby people, particularly 'Others', are studied as 'objects' of knowledge, people whose ideas can be extracted and used as 'data' that researchers, the 'subject' of knowledge production, can produce 'theory', or make authoritative 'scientific' statements about (cf. Smith 1999: 1, Brown and Strega et. al.: 2005, Tuck 2009). By studying people as objects, devoid of any epistemic authority (Shilliam 2015: 377), a certain blindness accrues to researchers, a failure to acknowledge the "theorizing developed by the people [researchers] are concerns with" (Suarez-Krabbe 2009: 4).

To counter these tendencies, I draw inspiration from postcolonial and decolonial theorizations of subalternity, knowledge and the political. 'Subalternity' was a notion articulated by Gramsci (2000[1988]) to interrogate the possibilities of the emergence of political critique in the lived consciousness of the oppressed (Chari 2012: 503, 507). As the concept travelled to South Asia, it gained a new life (Shilliam 2016: 5, Guha and Spivak et. al.: 1988). Postcolonial theorists used it to challenge colonial historiography and *to think from* the 'small voices of history', those of colonized subjects (Guha 1983, 1996). While colonizers had dominated India, they had not managed to establish hegemony, as the colonized had resisted colonialism through their own 'subaltern' forms of political consciousness (Shilliam 2016: 4-7). Subaltern subjects produced their own forms of

knowledge, which informed the kind of politics they engaged in (Maldonado-Torres 2008, Dussel 2000, Bogues 2003, Al-Hardan 2014): their own "readings and knowings of the dominant" (Mohanty 1996: 68), analyses of power and the powerful. As such, I argue that the struggles of the PIR are not only political and social, but also as *epistemic* (Icaza and Vásquez 2013). Political movements are incubators of new knowledge (Kelley 2002: 9). They raise new questions and produce alternative conceptualizations of the problems and power structures we study (Casas-Cortés et. al.: 2008). Consequently, my approach resonates with Suárez-Krabbe's (2014) endeavour to 'pluriversalize Europe', to "understand the struggles of [racialized] populations in relation to European history" and ask "what insights do we get concerning contemporary Europe when taking these movements analysis of reality seriously..." (2014: 155). My article is based on research carried out in 2015. It engages with the extensive political archive of the PIR. Since its inception, the PIR has published extensively, including articles in their website, as well as a monthly magazine. My analysis draws on this. I also focus on the critical thinking of two founding members: Sadri Khiari, a Tunisian exile and Houria Bouteldja, French woman of Algerian descent, co-founder and main initiator of the Appel of 2005.

We Are the Natives of the Republique!

The PIR's origins can be traced to early 2005, as several anti-racist activists sent out the 'Appel des Indigènes de la République', a manifesto outlining their political perspective. This was sent out in a conjuncture of sharpening political conflict with girls wearing hijabs being thrown out of school, and racialized youth rising up in the banlieues. A context in which Nicolas Sarkozy could openly deny colonial legacies in Senegal by arguing that the problems of the continent, the 'drama of Africa', as he put it, was explained by the fact that 'African Man' has not left the state of nature and entered the 'course of history' (Kipfer 2011: 1155-1156). The Appel was a reminder that any discussion of our colonial present (Gregory 2004) is of utmost political importance in contemporary France. As such, the PIR constitutes a response to postcolonial conditions, where racialized communities are excluded from political spaces, segregated and confined to the banlieu. Theirs is a 'postcolonial anti-colonial' politics based on a materialist analysis of the 'postcolonial situation': the rearticulation of forms of domination deployed against colonial migrants and their descendants, through which they are relegated to the status of the 'indigène' (Khiari 2006: 20). As I argue below, indigène refers to colonized subjects under French colonialism (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2011). By

using this, the PIR traces the parallels between the fate of colonial peoples and the situation of those who migrated to France from the colonies (Kipfer 2011: 1158). In their words:

"Discriminated from employment, housing, healthcare, education... the peoples coming from the colonies, old or current, and from post-colonial migration are the first victims of social exclusion... Independently of their actual origins, the population from the 'quartiers' are 'indigenized', relegated to the margins of society. The figure of l'indigène continue to haunt political, administrative and judicial action; it is imbricated to other logics of social oppression, discrimination and exploitation" (MIR 2005).

As part of the issuing of the Appel, the PIR lead the 'March of the Indigènes of the République', gathering up to eight thousand people who marched in Paris from the Place de la République to Saint-Bernard church. African, Caribbean and Asian peoples, part of France's colonial and postcolonial populations, gathered to protest "against the colonial, postcolonial and neo-colonial politics of France" and "remembered that the anticolonial struggle is far from achieved… it continues in France against the discrimination, police brutality, racism and inequalities" that racialized communities face (Khiari 2005: 59-61). The date of the march and the spaces where it began and ended were both political and symbolic: The Place de la République represented "The republic of inequality", and Saint Bernard church represented "the center of a major struggle for equality" (Khiari 2005: 60), a place occupied by 300 sans-papier (paperless migrants) in 1996, demanding equality, dignity and 'papers'. The date represented both the re-establishment of the République after Nazi occupation in 1945, a day celebrated all over France; and the same day that the République sent its army to massacre rebel Algerians in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata. It marked "the contradictions of the Republique of yesterday and of today, a racial and unjust Republique" (Boutelja 2012: 27). The march represented the irruption of the 'colony within the Metropole' (Guye 2011) re-vindicating their own concerns and priorities. For the PIR, it was to state bluntly that "equality is a myth" (MIR 2005: 21). Significantly, the march inscribed itself in the long history of political struggles of communities of color in France. It was also important in that it marked the emergence, or re-appropriation, of ''indigène' as a political identity and an analysis of the French State in terms what Bhambra (2015) has called 'our connected histories of colonialism and empire'.

France was a colonial state, France continues to be a colonial state!

Despite a re-emergence in recent years of debates regarding French colonial legacies, a silence over this and its postcolonial manifestations has predominated in both political discourse and historiography. Through this absence, the national narrative is amputated of the 'zone of nonbeing' (Fanon), 'the colonial parenthesis' (Gueye 2011: 3) that was central in the inception and development of the French nation-state (Khiari 2006, Coquery-Vidrovitch 2011). Colonial history puts into question the ways in which national history is narrated: "the mythologies of an assumed specificity of 'the French genius', composed of revolutionary values and a universal mission, Republican righteousness and undifferentiated tolerance towards the other" (Blancel, Blanchard and Lemaire 2005: 10). By silencing the colonial question, national narratives not only amputate French history of its colonial underside (Dussel 1996), but also of "those whose contribution to the sustainability of the national formation is decisive" (Gueye 2011: 3): colonial subjects and racialized communities. It is this history, and its articulation with other social relations in the present, that gives meaning to a political identity such as 'indigène'. This identity would not exist if the juridical texts under the name of 'the Code de l'Indigenat', regulating and controlling the lives of colonial subjects in the French colonies, would not have preceded them (Blanchard and Bancel 1998, Grewal 2009, Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2011: 23). To understand the political and symbolic significance of this notion, it is important to historicize it and located in French colonial history. This history gives indigène a two-fold meaning: as a racialized socio-political status and as a political identity.

The Code de l'Indigenat, invented in Kabyle in 1874 following the great insurrection of the colonized in 1871, was the legal architecture through which French colonial power was maintained. Formally established on June 28th 1881, the Code established a legal difference between citizens (colonizers) and French subjects or 'indigènes', who were people subjected to a special juridical system (Blanchard and Bancel 1998, Gueye 2011). Legally, this system of institutionalized inequality was designed to 'maintain order' in the colonies. Politically, it consisted of rules that enabled colonial administrators to impose fines and prison sentences, as well as curfews and forced labor, to indigènes (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2011: 23). More broadly, l'indigenat constituted statutory groups demarked in terms of race. The relations between these groups were hierarchical. The existence of an individual came to be determined by their racial status, by their belonging to one of the groups delimited as a superior or inferior race (Khiari 2009: 23). Despite its official abolition,

according to the PIR, a fraction of the population living and working in France, remains deprived of citizenship, and thus treated as second-class citizens, in much the same way as colonial subjects under the Code. This includes both "immigrants who remain attached to their nationalities of origin" (Khiari 2006: 53-54) who continue, because of their status as foreign, to be excluded from rights; as well as their children, who despite their status as French nationals, are "discriminated against in housing, health, schools" and remain "the first victims of social exclusion and precarisation" (MIR 2005: 19). Thus, for the PIR, l'indigenat constitutes *a structure* not an event (Wolf 2016). It persists, as Khiari (2009: 23) argues, as "the mechanism of differentiation and hierarchization of humanity between one pole endowed, in terms of race, of privileges, invisible or manifest, and another racial pole whose submission to all sorts of violence, invisible or manifest, guaranties the privilege of the dominant" *(ibid)*.

The treatment of the peoples descended from colonization extends, without limitation, colonial politics. Not only is the principle of equality before the law not respected, but also the law itself is not always the same for everyone... The figure of the "indigenous" continues to haunt political, administrative and judicial actions; it innervates and imbricates other logics of oppression, discrimination and social exploitation (MIR, 2005).

Underlying this process of indigenization is the return of a 'colonial ideological framework' visible in the social and political treatment of the 'problem' of the banlieues (El-Tayeb 2011). Through this framework, the banlieues are framed in political discourse and the media, as zones that escape the control of the République, and thus that must be 'reconquered'. The response to the progressive 'ghettoization' of the banlieues is to 'civilize' the 'problematic', 'dangerous' bodies and spaces of racialized communities (Bancel and Blanchard 1998: 149-161). Here, we find the meaning of indigène, as a racialized socio-political status ascribed to communities and people by virtue of their ancestry, culture, religion or skin color. Bouteldja (in Kipfer 2011: 1158), puts it as follows:

"When they refuse to accept us as French citizens, they deny us equality. We need to name this reality; we cannot be French, so we are indigène. We are second-class citizens; ours is a lumpen-citizenship, just as at the time of the colonies. This imagery linked to colonization and the history of slavery continues to determine how they perceive us, for the body of the indigenous was constructed in the colonial era. As long as this imaginary is alive, we remain Native".

For Bouteldja, 'indigène' is constituted through socio-political relations of force. That is, there is no indigène outside of the relations of force that constitutes them as subaltern vis-a-vis the 'citizen'. These relations posit the indigène as exterior, non-citizen, from the social formation where they live. By defining themselves as indigènes, the PIR reveals the absences that the colonial Republique produces, as well as *the politics of emergence* that their struggle reveals: "the community of political interests", composed of "all those that originate from the colonies or the ex-colonies" (Khiari 2007: 237). By using indigène, the PIR does not want to equate the present situation with the colonial experience, but rather to characterize both the ruptures produced by formal decolonization, as well as the continuities produced by a complex colonial heritage (Héricord, Khiari and Lévy 2005: 39). Thus, Khiari (2006: 20) proposes to understand the racialization of the indigène through the notion of postcolonialism: the *recomposition, re-inscription* and *articulation* of colonial legacies with other social, economic and political relations. In his words,

"The notion postcolonialism indicates that the historical rupture with colonialism is far from being achieved. It points out to this continuity and… the recompositions of forms of domination and their goals, the persistence and reproduction these procedures of domination inherited from the colonial period and deployed against postcolonial immigrant populations. These are not simple residues nor the expression of an un-finished postcolonial transition... [It] designates the entanglement of this forms of domination to other relations of oppression and exploitation" (Khiari 2006: 20).

The postcolonial situation is no simple replication of colonialism in the metropole, but the transformation and re-inscription of colonial modes of domination in Northern societies. These forms of domination are also entangled with other relations of oppression and exploitation. In this sense, the PIR conceptualizes postcolonial relations as multiform, ideological, hierarchical, cultural, social, political and economic simultaneously (Kipfer 2011: 1159). Through this notion, the PIR builds from, and recasts insights from previous movements. For instance, the slogan of the sans-papiers that occupied Saint-Bernard church in the 90's was "Hier mort pour la France, demain morts pour des papiers?" (Yesterday dying for France, tomorrow for papers?), making a reference to the Senegalese Tirailleurs, the colonial infantry recruited by the French colonial empire in its African colonies, in the nineteenth and twentieth century (Héricord, Khiari and Lévy 2005: 41). Similarly, the Mouvement pour L'immigration et la Banlieues (MIB) used the slogan "colonial

management of the planet, colonial management of the neighbourhood" to make reference to the interconnections between the post-9/11 offensive led by Western powers (and Israel) in the Middle East and the backlash of this offensive in the banlieues: racial profiling, surveillance, police brutality (Héricord, Khiari and Lévy 2005: 41, Khiari 2009: 208-209). The re-inscription of colonial legacies in the metropole was also invoked to conceptualize the infamous law on secularism in public education passed in February 2004 (Kipfer 2007: 701-702). Activists opposing the law emphasized its colonial dimensions, by drawing on the history of the public unveiling of colonized women by French Authorities in Algeria, as a counter-insurgency method to debilitate the resistance.

Thus, when the PIR argues that French society is colonial they are trying to grasp it as the space where the relation of force that produce the indigène as subaltern is deployed, the relation that opposes a (racially) privileged pole from a subaltern pole:

"Those that, in one way or another, endure the direct or indirect consequences of racial oppression, and that resist, even without realising it, and those that benefit, in one way or another, of the consequences of racial oppression and that contribute to its reproduction, without realising it"

(Khiari 2007: 238).

Constituting a movement and then a political party was part of trying to give a political incarnation to this bipolar relation of force that the Indigenat reproduces.

Conclusion

The PIR constitutes an example of a process that has been long in the making not in France and all over Europe: the emergence of multicultural communities in European urban centers, living in spaces characterized by precarious material conditions. These communities continue to be excluded, through racialized understandings of what constitutes proper 'Europeanness'. The perception of so-called 'visible minorities' in European public discourse is largely determined by racialized concepts of national, and by extension, European, identity that posit these communities as Other. While present for decades, they continue to be perceived as 'foreign matter': individuals born in a European nation, of parents born and raised there as well, are systematically identified through notions such as 'third generation migrants' that emphasize their position as outsiders to the national community (El-Tayeb 2008: 650 – 653, 2011: xii-xiii).

As a result, European urban centers have witness they irruption of the 'colony within the Metropole' (Guye 2011), movements and organizations based on the experiences of ethnically diverse people faced with demands to 'integrate' that are in blatant contrast with their lived experiences (El-Tayeb 2011: xiii). My paper explored the emergence of one of these movements, their modes of resistance and their analyses. Through the subaltern knowledges of the PIR, I addressed issues of race, identity, resistance and colonization/decolonization. Although I focused on France, further research could explore how the conceptualizations of the PIR can in fact help us understand the realities of communities of color in other European nations. Particularly relevant for this is the PIR's conceptualization of the 'indigène'. As a racialized socio-political status, it could help us understand how communities of color are 'indigenized', racialized as 'problematic' and inferior – a practice that is arguably not restricted to the French context. As a political identity, it points out to alternatives forms of constructing political subjectivities that go beyond the exclusionary frameworks and analyses of state organizations and leftist movements. These are grounded in experiences of systematic racism and exclusion, in the memories of political struggles of past generations, and in the potentialities of anticolonial struggle.

The notion of the indigène delinks territorial occupation from that of the subordination of peoples living there. While these are connected in many contexts around the world, they are far from exhausting the meaning of contemporary colonialism (Khiari 2015: 65-66). Dominant leftist paradigms tend think of the colonial phenomenon as an opposition between hegemonic countries in the center, and subaltern countries in the periphery (Grosfoguel 2008). While this is certainly accurate, the PIR's analysis reveal how colonialism also proceeds through the deployment of racial hierarchies *within* nationalized spaces in both metropolises and 'ex-colonies' (Maldonado Torres 2008: 63 – 65). Their critical thinking and anti-colonial politics remind us that decolonization is no longer a notion making reference to political processes of the past. It has acquired new meanings through the struggles of the present (Maldonado Torres 2008: 63-66).

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"Life can only be understood backwards; but must be lived forwards"

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"*Life can only be understood backwards; but must be lived forwards*", wrote Søren Kirkegaard, the father of existentialism. My parents have the book at the bookshelf in their living room, and the title has provoked me ever since I learned how to read. Probably because the quote constantly reminds me on how I will always be unaware of how I later on in my life will reflect on the current stage of my life. Will I look back at this moment and conclude that I made a wrong decision? Will I be happier or more successful in the future or look back at this very moment thinking of it as the peak of my happiness or success?

When I studied Global Refugee Studies, I had all sorts of dreams about the future. Most of them included working abroad. I could see myself at embassies or at NGOs in Latin America or Africa. Whenever we got courses from guest lecturers, I always felt inspired and hoped to end up somewhere very interesting and meaningful like them. I was impatient but also ensured that I was heading somewhere big, when I got my dream internship in Madrid on third semester and when Danish Demining Group in South Sudan agreed to cooperate on my thesis. My expectations and ambitions were high.

However, my thesis did not end the way I expected. I finished, of course, but with much lower ambitions and grade than I had hoped and prepared for. Getting married and pregnant along the way, had changed my perspective. I gave birth to my daughter a month after I defended my thesis. A few months after, I started feeling stressed about my insecure future. All my former classmates, including my husband, were struggling to find jobs. It was not as easy as we had expected. The world did not seem as ready for us, as we thought we were ready for the world. Some ended up taking jobs outside the field of studies, just to make ends meet. Others entered the humanitarian field, but mostly as interns or volunteers, hoping to get to know the right people and the right experience on their CVs.

When my daughter was 4 months old, my contact person from Danish Demining Group during my thesis wrote to me about their project in South Sudan. I had visited the project during my thesis. There was a junior position opening and he recommended me to apply for it. I was so excited. It was not a direct job offer and I was not at all sure to get it, but just for the fact that he had me in

mind, despite it had been a couple of months since I had concluded my work with them, I was so happy and grateful. I called the HR department to hear more about the position. Their message was clear. They offered no family postings in South Sudan. My husband was supportive and said he would manage everything at home with our daughter, if I wanted to apply for the position and if I actually ended up getting the job. We even talked about how he could stay in a more stable neighbour country with our daughter, just so we could be closer to each other. Nevertheless, I just could not get myself to apply for the job. My expectations for my career were sincere and high, but I just could not bear the thought of not seeing my daughter in real life every day.

To keep my brain going and not getting depressed during my maternity leave, I started volunteering at Refugees Welcome – a very small NGO that offers legal counselling to asylum seekers in Denmark. Shortly afterwards, my previous student job at Falck Global Assistance offered me a fulltime position. Though it was not an academic position, in my field of studies or my dream job, I was happy not having to apply for jobs. Besides, this was a job that I already knew and loved, though the working conditions and hours were hard. Meanwhile, at Refugees Welcome, I made an appeal to the Office of the United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) concerning an asylum seeker who had been rejected asylum in Denmark. OHCHR accepted to investigate the case, which meant that the deportation got suspended for the time being, and I was officially representing him in his case against Denmark. This was huge. I used all my knowledge and notes from GRS's International Law course, recalled many of Claus Haagen Jensen's small anecdotes and spent many hours on studying OHCHR cases and how to process a legal case. I read so much about the legal processes and systems; I almost regretted not to have studied law. My interest for legal counselling and case working definitively began at Refugees Welcome.

It was also through Refugees Welcome I got to know the Palestinian Mission in Denmark, who ended up offering me a part-time job as Communication Officer. My fulltime job at Falck Global Assistance got converted into a part-time job, so I could manage both jobs, volunteering and also being there for my family. I loved being at the Mission of Palestine. I learned so much about the diplomatic world and my colleagues were great. However, juggling between two part-time jobs was hard. I had to work both weekdays and weekends, which I did for five months. Then, a former classmate from GRS convinced me to apply for a job opening at the Turkish Embassy in Copenhagen as secretary for the Turkish Ambassador. My classmate knew one of the secretaries at the Embassy whom she put me in contact with, and after an interview and some tests, I got the job.

The Turkish Embassy in Denmark is a big embassy, but I did my best to integrate and met some incredible people there. It was great not having to juggle between two jobs. However, I never really felt settled or happy there, so after a while, I began to apply for jobs. My union helped me out with my applications. Though I applied for several jobs, I was only called in for one interview. After having applied for jobs for two months, another former classmate suggested that I applied for a job at the Danish Immigration Service, where he was working. I applied and got it.

I have now worked at the Danish Immigration Service for more than three years, and I like it. I feel like I have found a place, where I get to grow professionally and my work is important. It is not abroad or at an NGO as I used to dream about. Nevertheless, it is a stable and very interesting job, and after having our second child, I have completely settled with the thought of not working abroad. At least it will be like this for me until the kids get bigger.

Previously, I worked at the Asylum Center Sandholm for the Danish Immigration Service, where I held asylum interviews. It was very interesting and relevant work for someone with a GRS background. We can learn many things about refugees, their backgrounds and the politics of migration, but interviewing asylum seekers every day is probably the most direct and relevant job for a GRS graduate, from my point of view. Today, I work with identifying and analysing fraud of residence cards. I get to make use of my knowledge from my former workplaces and my knowledge from GRS, while I still learn new things. In my daily work, I approach all my tasks using the Problem Based Learning model. I guess after five years at Aalborg University, it is just part of my DNA. I find it a very applicable method and at times maybe even more functional, in my personal point of view, than the legal method law students learn. Moreover, I use the knowledge from the international law course and the courses on culture, identity and globalisation. I do not use them in the sense that I on a daily basis get to academically debate the different theories and analyse referring to related theories. But, with GRS as my foundation I have an overall understanding of migration, globalisation and culture, which is useful for my job, and the International Law course has been a good basis for me to learn more about law and practice.

Reflecting on my time at Falck Global Assistance I had a hard time seeing how I used my GRS knowledge when I worked there. But Falck is an international organisation with a very humanitarian mind-set. Like working in an NGO, I had to juggle with vast amounts of tight deadlines and a demand for high communication skills using different languages. Thus, it was a very hands-on experience.

At both the Mission of Palestine and the Turkish Embassy, the courses of international relations and political change and development theories have been useful. There is a vast difference between theories and reality, but on the second semester of GRS, I actually wrote a project work on the obstacles of implementing politics and guidelines in reality, which was interesting to be part of in real life at both diplomatic missions.

With all this in mind, I am not sure I will agree completely with Søren Kirkegaard and conclude that my life only can be understood backwards. I may not be old and wise yet, but I have already learned many things about both my past and future. Though it has been more than six years since I graduated, I still consider myself to be at the beginning of my career. I still have many years left to work and learn. For everything I learn, I get to understand better, how my experiences and my reflections are the crucial keywords for building and developing my career.

To conclude, my current best advice for future GRS graduates, based on my own personal experiences, would be to network wherever possible, lower your expectations about job searching for the first job after graduating and participate as much as possible in the courses at GRS. What you think is relevant or irrelevant for you here and now, may be completely different or even opposite later on in your career.

Networking can happen anywhere, even amongst your classmates who are in the same position like you. However, thinking back at 2012/2013 and my former classmates, I cannot recall that any of them started out with a fulltime and well paid academic position. I do not believe it has anything to do with us being the first class to graduate from GRS. I have met graduates from various other educations who started out in the same situation. It is very rare to find and get hired at your dream job right after graduating. Finding your way into the labour market and figuring out what you like to do is a long, hard and lonely journey. In my case, it was not until three years after I graduated, I found myself in a real fulltime academic position where I felt comfortable and happy. I had never thought about how hard it could be getting an academic job, even though you have an academic education. Before that, only parts of my job contents could be classified as academic work. With that said, almost no days in my work life has past where I have not used my knowledge from the courses at GRS.

Everything related to Problem Based Learning and the courses on culture, identity, globalisation, international relations and law is relevant and useful in the real world. You just have to crack the code on how to use it outside the university, which will not really be possible before you have

graduated and find yourself in the real world. Thus, Søren Kirkegaard is probably right, when he says our lives can only be lived forwards.

Ethics I did not consider

Research ethics and fieldwork amongst vulnerable groups

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When choosing a research field a long list of methodological and analytical approaches must be considered to get access, find relevant participants, collect data, review scholarship and come up with theoretical frameworks that can provide insights into the research question. Moreover, each stage of the research inquiry, from formulating a research question to publishing or handing in the written project requires ethical considerations on the fundamental principle of do no harm. How do we as researchers protect the people, we engage with and turn into becoming the subject of our study? To what extent can we even ensure that our writings about a certain group of people do not end up as material that can be used against them? Ethical considerations are crucial particularly when inquiring into the lives of people belonging to vulnerable groups in societies. Migrants, refugees, minority groups, political opponents to governments, criminals, the list is long of people at risk due to lack of protection from authorities; due to widespread persecution against the undesirables.

This essay takes departure in the ethics that I did not consider in relation to my first long-term ethnographic fieldwork amongst female rebel suspects in a prison in the Philippines in 2014-15. In retrospective, I believe much can be learned from reflecting on my own beginner's mistakes, what I was not aware of when I entered into a field of particular sensitive character. In particular, the potential risks and precariousness that follow analysing and writing about this group of women as part of my master thesis, and how I had to make up for my lack of awareness. In the following, I will start out describing the discomforting moment, where my ethical unawareness struck me in terms of my inadequate handling of confidentiality in relation to my research inquiry. Then the essay moves on to afterthoughts on how my research field materialized through relatively coincidental meetings with various gatekeepers, through whom I came into contact with participants as well as my insistence on making women's participation in armed conflict the topic of my master thesis. The unplanned and unpredictable nature of gaining access to the field combined with my own excitement about pursuing the study resulted in absence of thorough ethical reflection along

the way; reflections that in hindsight probably would have prevented me from conducting fieldwork with exactly the participants I ended up engaging with. I do not aim at any argument about how to handle the ethical dimensions of conducting ethnographic fieldwork. Rather I simply point out the importance of thorough ethical consideration and as an integral part of the different processes of making a research project. Taking ethics immensely serious, I believe is what can justify research about the lives of people at risk.

Belated senior consultation and sense of panic when discovering ethical flaws

Upon return from my stay in the Philippines while writing my master thesis about women's participation in the Muslim separatist movement in the South of the country, I was given the chance to participate in a workshop on ethnographic lessons, and present my work to scholars on southeast Asia from around the world. Being merely a master student, and not even an anthropology student, I was honoured about getting this opportunity and considered it a recognition of the fieldwork I had been conducting to be invited into this group of experienced and respectable ethnographers. My presentation took departure in the methodological considerations I after all had done. In brief, I focused on dilemmas of positionality and power relations, as below excerpts of the presentation demonstrate.

> *In the jail setting various conditions influenced my engagement with the women and it was clear that they could not speak openly about their participation in the struggle for independence, as it was the reason why they were imprisoned. The fact that they were not convicted yet and that several NGOs, including the one I was affiliated with, were working for their release both for humanitarian reasons and due to lack of evidence, speaking about their involvement with the Muslim organizations inside the jail constituted a risk of harming their cases. Thus, in my engagement with the imprisoned women I aimed at carefully considering, which questions to ask in order to avoid topics that could possibly interfere with their imprisonment. This naturally posed a dilemma as the scope of my research is their very involvement in or relationship to the separatist movement for which they were charged. It also became clear that the women repeatedly, yet in varying degrees, emphasized angles and incidences in their stories that could support a story about their own innocence, and that they positioned themselves accordingly as well as they often changed their narratives.*

> *Furthermore, I was wearing two hats initially in my interaction with the women in jail and*

some of the women I got to know in Mindanao during my two first visits; one as an intern with Balay [NGO] and another as an ethnographer. This generated some ethical dilemmas as my affiliation with Balay, which provides the women with different services, resulted in that I inscribed myself in an already established relationship between the organization and its beneficiaries that carries a degree of reliance. Thus, this double role may have put the women in a situation where it was difficult to decline my inquiry about interviewing them for my study, or (...) they might have had an expectation that their engagement with me could result in favouring by Balay and perhaps further assistance. To appear as a privileged foreigner, I sensed added to the expectations that I might had a certain power and the means to help. (Lehman, 2015 Paper for Nordic Southeast Asian Network workshop, unpublished)

A short comment followed about that I had ensured their anonymity in the sense of changing their names and leaving out their places of origin.

As such the presentation was well-received. During the subsequent round of feedback, the participants accredited that I had been able to gain access to an unexplored research area and gather reasonably comprehensive data. However, the conversation quickly moved into the theme of research ethics, when one of the workshop participants asked, "what did the ethical board say to this", how it had been approved and what ethical precautions it had required. The questions puzzled me, mostly because I was not familiar with an ethical board at my university and in terms of having the research approved, my only concern had been that it fulfilled the requirements listed out in the handbook of student regulations. Rather off guard, I answered that I had just started collecting data during my internship and had not consulted my supervisor nor the university. Particular American scholars were surprised that my research inquiry had not been through any ethical board at the university beforehand to be approved. A Danish researcher clarified that institutionalized ethical guidelines for master students were still to be made at most Danish Universities. Indeed, many universities did not have an ethical research board. The pros and cons of having clear procedures for ethical guidance were discussed and, whether it had gone too far with protocols for researchers limiting what can be studied. Returning to my fieldwork, I made a small objection saying that most of my informants had insisted on participating with their full name and identity disclosed to make the point that there might also be a danger of patronizing ones' participants when going against their wishes and deciding on their behalf to separate their entrusted stories from them as persons. A male

anthropologist replied with great authority that, "but end the end of the day it is your responsibility to make sure that your work cannot cause them harm!" specifically referring to the fact that the female prisoners were still to face trial for their alleged involvement in armed insurrection against the Filipino state. I could obviously not agree more; having female participation in the armed Muslim rebellion at the core of my research question, anything that could reveal their identity and even more pressing, prove their guilt had to be carefully left out of the thesis. The discussion went on, and different suggestions about how I should deal with these ethical concerns were brought up: to not reveal in which country the ethnographic accounts had been gathered (any specific historical and political context and events would also have to be left out), to change their sex (the analytical lens looking at armed conflict, gender and female agency would not be possible), or to simply leave out the accounts from the female prisoners (which would reduce my empirical material significantly).

At the end of the session, I sensed a growing unease realizing that I had not taken the necessary precautions to ensure the safety of my participants and was suddenly doubting if it would be morally responsible to complete the thesis. The thought that the information conveyed in my thesis could travel back to the Philippines, be obtained by authorities and used to harm the participants overshadowed my ability to assess to what extent the empirical material should be revised, altered or left out. Simultaneously, I found it conspiratorial that the Philippine Intelligence services, police, jurisdiction or other state agents would go as far as to look into student's written work in Denmark in their search for evidence. Dealing with a rather abstract and potential question of "if" something could happen, the decision about when risk assessment and precaution measures are adequate to protect the participants seemed indeterminable. Suffice to say, in any case these new insights required that I rewound back to the beginning and reviewed my ethnography with an ethical lens. I will return to which concrete measures I decided to apply in order to hand in a thesis that was loyal to my actual ethnography as well as ethically responsible in the final section.

Stumbling upon a field, and continuous uncertainty about whether it really serves as field
Now reflecting on my insufficient attention to ethics along the way during my fieldwork, one of the explanations might be found in how the ethnographic field came into being. The reason why I was in the Philippines in the first place at this time was that I was doing an internship with a human rights organization in Manila. I was assigned with the programme for internally displaced people in

the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao and since the following semester would be dedicated to writing my thesis, I had planned to combine the work with data gathering. However, not having any previous experience working on the Philippine context, I had not decided on a specific topic nor made any plan for the data gathering.

Early on during my internship, I discussed my particular interest in women's roles in armed conflict with one of the staffs, who was part of the team that provides assistance to political prisoners. The staff member mentioned a small group of women that were detained and accused for rebellion, and invited me to tag along during their prison visits twice a week. I did not think twice about accepting that offer, as it would be a chance to pursue research on a topic that for long had been my field of interest. The staff and I agreed that I should tag along to the prison a few times, become familiar to the women, and that a certain degree of trust was crucial before I should think of requesting them to be research participants. As above extract from the workshop presentation indicates, my key concern was my own conduct inside the prison and awareness that my conversations with the women could not in any way touch upon their involvement in armed activities nor the separatist organizations. In this way, occupied myself with the here-and-now concerns of not causing harm, which kept the larger picture of what it would mean to include them in a project that would designate them as involved in the conflict out of sight. Meanwhile, along the way as I continued to engage with the women, I continuously doubted that these interactions could really qualify as fieldwork and as data for my thesis, exactly because we did not talk about their participation in rebellion.

Not until the end of my internship, did I feel assured that what I had been doing and the data I had collected was eligible to serve as empirical basis for my thesis. Complementing the prison visits, I had been connected to a number of women with whom I met travelling around Mindanao. Including the conversations and interviews with these women who in varying ways belonged to the Muslim insurgency, it all together served as a proper foundation to actually say something about the topic. In this sense, the ethnographic field emerged along the way and was stitched together by more or less random encounters with people, who served as different entry points. One of the dangers with this kind of snowballing became that I for most part went along with the opportunities to access a relatively closed field without much thought on the potential consequences of disclosing their stories in writing for the participants. Moreover, other and more tangible concerns such as security measures when travelling in conflict areas, trying to go under the radar of government officials, and

ensuring to meet with the women in locations where they could safely share their stories were my focus in the heat of the battle for pushing through with the research. In this way, my eagerness and dedication to do this study paradoxically pushed aside essential ethical considerations.

Concluding remarks on making ethical neglect right

Following the workshop outlined in the above, and a thorough revisiting what I had written so far, I decided that a number of details should to be left out and that parts of the ethnographic material should be deleted. Taking into account that the women in this particular prison, where I had conducted fieldwork most probably belong to a relatively small group of women charged with rebellion in the Philippines, any description of the events that had led to their arrest was removed, as well as names of specific locations including the prison itself. Most importantly, I found it necessary not to make the thesis publicly available. To be on the safe side, I refrained from circulating the thesis via internet and uploading it to the university library. In addition, I made sure to keep all field notes safe both those on my computer and those written in notebooks. Whether these safety precautions were sufficient or I should simply have refrained from writing about the imprisoned women all together, I believe can be discussed and now four years after handing in my thesis I still contemplate about the rights and wrongs related to this particular fieldwork. I know for a fact that my research has not been used against the women and that they eventually got released due to lack of evidence.

This essay does not suggest any clear guide to have the right ethical standards in place when conducting research about people at risk. Rather it serves as a case of the contrary: to not be sufficiently aware about the potential far-reaching consequences it may entail to document the stories of people. By drawing on my own ethical unawareness and realization of how I had overlooked crucial questions of security for the participants, my aim is to emphasise the importance of thorough ethical consideration throughout the research project. To have appropriate ethical standards in place in the different processes of a research project, obviously concerns a wide range of questions of how to keep participants safe from harm. It is paying attention to how we engage with participants in a respectful way. It is being loyal to the stories, they have shared when writing, while at the same taking the necessary precautions to not disclose sensitive details. What it entails to take ethics into account in concrete terms might vary depending the research subject, context, methodology and so forth. To be well-informed and reflective about the ethical dimension of

research in social sciences, is what I believe justifies inquiring into the precarious lives of people at risk.

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Who is failing whom? South Sudan and a new notion of the state

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Introduction

On July 9 2011 South Sudan gained independence after the longest running civil war. Before independence, South Sudan was part of the United Sudan, where differences in terms of culture and heritage between North and South are not unknown to the public. The North is predominantly Arab Muslim and the South is composed of many different religious groups. It divided the country in an "us" versus "them" situation that grew ever more prominent during the decades of civil war, 1955-1973 and 1983-2005 (Howden 2013b).

After independence in 2011 the country was characterised by peace and hope. However, the peace was short-lived: In 2013 internal conflicts in government broke out. Power dynamics and conflicts between the president, Salva Kiir, and the ex-president, Riek Machar, resulted in the third biggest refugee crisis in the world today.

The hopes in South Sudan for the new state was in 2013 replaced by fear, despair and insecurity and have led 2.4 million people to flee the country and 1.8 million are internally displaced.

This caused me to wonder how and why South Sudan, which for so many decades were part of a civil war, is now itself facing what appears to be the exact same civil war internally in South Sudan that it endured as part of the Sudan. South Sudan experience discrimination of different ethnicities and a power struggle gone so much out of hand, that it is putting independence and recognition of the state at risk. With a strong hope of creating a new state based on one identity that would stand together, Salva Kiir said these words in 2011: "We have waited 56 years for this day. It is a dream that has come true!" (Kiir 2011), but what happened to the dream and the state-building process in South Sudan? Has it failed?

A short walk-through of South Sudanese Becoming

Many of the borders in Africa were drawn up in the 18th century during colonialism. The borders were often negotiated between two colonial powers, based on a question of access to oil reservoirs, among other things, thus separating Africa's many different cultural, religious, etc. groups making

them belong to two or more countries. This immediately brings up a question of identity and a sense of belonging or not belonging within the borders of ones designated country. I do not claim that it is not possible for a country with various cultural, religious, political groups to peacefully live together, allow and respect each other and still have a sense of belonging and identifying with the overall identity. However, many conflicts in African countries have been characterised by ethnic differences and disputes over land (Burke 2018).

With the new borders and external reign from colonial powers came new political systems, which were imposed on communities, where new local rulers were chosen without any consideration of the existing hierarchy, social norms, history, etc.

During colonialism, European-like institutions were implemented throughout colonies in the world in order to maintain control over resources. Welfare and security for the people were low on the agenda for colonial rulers, which of course had consequences for the countries after they gained sovereignty. Money was not spent on infrastructure or rural development, only in areas where this was necessary in order to get to oil or trade roads or seas (Eriksen 2010: 38).

In the unified Sudan, the British-Egyptian colonial time had influence on the future of the independent South Sudan. The colonial period for Sudan lasted until 1956. During this period the North was always more important than the South. This was evident by the fact that schools were made to better educate people in the North for certain jobs in government that the British would not take upon them themselves. Though it was a selfish act from the British side, the North would later benefit from it by taking over power from the British, when they left in 1956. Moreover, the South was left to itself and was cut off from the benefits of living in the North. This created an even bigger divide between the two regions (Sharkey 2003: 4-7).

With the British leaving, the North took over governing the country, a so called *institutional appropriation,* where the colonised do not necessarily have the same interest as the colonisers, but merely an interest in maintaining a certain social order that had already been established. An order where the North would be able to access oil in the South and be in charge of its people. This also meant that the South again did not have any influence in government, just like during British rule, and still no money was granted for development of the South. This marginalisation of the South led to two civil wars in the united Sudan, before the South finally got independence in 2011, which a few years later was overshadowed by power struggles between the President, Salva Kiir, and the Vice-President, Riek Machar.

South Sudan had ambitions to become a great state that would no longer force its people to flee; it would create economic stability; and not least, peace and safety for the people (Kiir 2011). Instead, after the euphoria of independence waned off, Salva Kiir seemed only interested in maintaining power (Johnson 2016: 160). Offers from official international counsellors to help strengthen and build a stable and strong structure for the state was declined, and the people in charge would rely on their own skills and knowledge – not saying that the situation would have looked any different, as there is examples around the world of international interventions gone very wrong or at least have left again and the country being at status quo.

By creating a government based on personal ties or common ethnicity, the structures in society reproduced themselves (Eriksen 2010: 40). By prioritising power, development policies, infrastructure and security were given lower priority, and thereby sustaining the people in the same position as they had been in for decades, both during colonialism and within unified Sudan. These signs of a weak government, people fleeing the country and ethnic disputes, made the international community call South Sudan a failed state.

The Notion of the State and Discourse of State Failure

The discourse of failed states has a tendency to centre on the notion of state and its characteristics. The notion of the state is usually one built on European/Western ideas and norms. The discourse of failed states is often used to describe countries in the global south due to political instability and violence. Stein Sundstøl Eriksen (2010) has tried to challenge the way we perceive and understand the notion of the state. The most common ways to understand the state is to see it as a service provider or one that is able to uphold its monopoly of violence (2010: 29); these services could be security, rule of law, protection, infrastructure, etc. So, when a state is not able to provide these services nor able to uphold its monopoly of violence, then it will be characterised as "failed". Eriksen argues that with these two definitions of what a state is, nearly all states in the world would be characterised as failed. Furthermore, he categorises this way of thinking as a test you have to fail or pass in order to be part of the international community and seen as a state.

Basically, Eriksen is calling the notion of the state an out-dated and idealised version of a Western state, which is why we need to come up with a new definition:

> "[…] the experience of non-Western states can only be understood as
> deviations from the 'normal' development experienced by Western states. By
> implication, the absence of anything like a modern state in many countries is

seen as a problem to be addressed, to enable a 'normal' state to emerge."

(Eriksen 2010: 32).

Eriksen instead proposes a model that is more inclusive and truer to the collection of countries of which the world consists today, where there is room for variation from the standard. That is, a state is not failed just because it sits outside the 'normal'. We, the people in the Western states need to remember that the Western model is not the only model. What works for us, might not work in other countries with different history, cultures, religions, etc. At the same time, we can agree that a state characterised by violence, ethnic conflict and corruption is also not an optimal way to rule a country and build a state. With a new model of the notion of the state, both these types of states will be able to see themselves in the notion of state without being 'failed'.

The new notion should focus on the process and the outcome of choices made in a state-building process, where you not only look at what is currently happening, but also at why, who and how the state is shaped, for example by looking at colonialism, the external factor bringing in European-like institutions, etc.

All states consist of a territory with an appertaining population, and this territory has a government, which is recognised by the other states (ibid: 36-38) Moreover, the state have laws, an army, police and other formal institutions. These components of the state are allowed to come in different shapes and sizes, that is, the laws may vary, the police do not have to have the monopoly over violence, the services the state provides can differ. By allowing for these differences in the way of governing the state is less likely to be characterised as failed, as the definition will be more inclusive.

Weak Institutions

The reasons for South Sudan to end up in yet another civil war are many and can vary, depending on how one chooses to analyse the situation. The power struggle between Kiir and Machar, who belong to the Dinka and Nuer respectively is an important factor in potential conflicts. During years of fighting they both found a way in which to mobilise people in order to gain power. These years have had severe consequences on not only the people, but also on state institutions that might have been weak in the first place. Institution structures were inherited by the old regime, Sudan, whose institutions were not strong themselves. Institutions are supposed to correspond to the time in which we live, but when state institutions are based on a Western ideal, as Eriksen mentions, it can be challenging for a non-Western country to comply with international standards. To the outside it seemed like South Sudan was trying to change, e.g. by creating new laws against corruption. These

laws were just not complied with, which in time will weaken institutions as they no longer have any effect and, in the end, make them irrelevant (Johnson 2016: 90-92). Alongside this, big changes in government personnel has also been a contributing factor to why the South Sudanese government/state is viewed as weak or according to the discourse of failed states, failed.

The mobilising of the Dinka and the Nuer respectively, by Kiir and Machar, is a contributing factor in leading South Sudan on the road to undermine state institutions, on which the state should be built: "Through their practices, actors may either contribute to or undermine the possibility of creating the kind of state presupposed by the idea of the state underlying formal institution" (Eriksen 2010: 36).

According to Eriksen, the choices made during its independence have contributed to the shaping of weak institutions, in that sense making main actors, both government personnel and rebels, responsible for the shaping of the South Sudanese state. The paradox is that South Sudan is recognised as a state, but yet some experts still choose to fail the country as a state, maybe showing that the standards of the current notion of state is too high or too one sided and non-inclusive of non-western states, why Eriksen's view on the discourse of failed states is a breath of fresh air.

Who failed whom?

What can be said about South Sudan is that the dream of a unified South Sudan has failed for now. Salva Kiir had a big dream of uniting the South under one identity and finally building the peaceful state all had hoped for in so many decades. In that sense the dream failed, Salva Kiir failed his people and the standards he set forth for the state more than the state has failed within the classical discourse of state and state-failure.

> "Let all citizens of this new nation be equal before the law and have equal
> access to opportunities and equal responsibilities to serve the motherland.
> We are all South Sudanes." (Kiir 2011).

What failed was the idea of a unified South Sudan, where power struggles instead took over and changed the focus from wanting to build a strong state for the people to a situation, where the people are now fleeing their homes.

In the understanding of the state suggested by Eriksen, South Sudan meets the overall requirements of what a state is. It has a territory, a government, a fragile one, but it is there, it does have a population, laws, armies and institutions inspired by those from Europe, a remnant from the colonial period. These factors just tell us how the state is operated, not that it has failed at being a state.

So, who failed whom? Is it possible to speak of a situation where the notion of failed state has failed? Or are we in the West even in a position, where we can define what a state is supposed to do or what requirements it has to meet in order to be member of the international community?

One way could be to follow the idea that Eriksen has posed that is based on looking at processes of state building and state-maintenance and look at which processes lead to a strong or weak state and hereby learn more about the individual states.

So maybe both internal and external actors have played a role in the reproduction of the 'old' notion of the state, which has made it more difficult to build a state that corresponds to its history, people and conditions in the states' territory.

In South Sudan the British, Sudan (the North) and Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and other government actors have influenced the current state of the country and its state-building process. The youngest country in the world is still struggling to find the right way that works for it. In the meantime, people are still fleeing the country, which is not a great testament to the choices being made by actors in South Sudan. A new peace agreement has just been signed by both parties, Riek Machar and Salva Kiir, on 13 September 2018 in Ethiopia. It states that Riek Machar will be reinstated as Vice-President in South Sudan, from which he was dismissed in 2013. If reinstating Riek Machar as Vice-President, one out of five, will be complied with only time will tell, as both parties of the conflict have broken peace agreements before.

Maybe this new way of perceiving the state will be a more inclusive one and will lead to more understanding of why some states act as they do and thereby allowing states' mistake without categorising them as failed, and hence shutting down the possibility for the Western world to intervene in yet another conflict in the World, for which they may also carry some of the responsibility. Maybe it is taking it too far, but change is long overdue in my opinion in relation to what a state is, what it is based on and how it should act both domestically and internationally.

So, what happened to the dream in South Sudan? The dream seems to have been overshadowed by other things for people in power positions in South Sudan that instead got caught up with conflict over power, people and territory, thus ending up with fragile state institutions and slowing the state-building process down. For the people the dream continues, the dream of living in one's own country in peace. Even state leaders seem to remember the dream that once was by signing a new peace agreement and showing its people that two persons with different cultural backgrounds can

agree on one thing – that peace is best for South Sudan. Failure or not, the state still stands and is recognised by the international community, with or without help from the outside. South Sudan and its leaders are on a road to exchange conflict and fear for peace and a state with strong institutions. The way they choose to do it is not important as long as it gets there without harming more people and thus leading them with no other choice than to flee the country. Maybe we all failed South Sudan, the British, the Egyptians, Sudan even themselves, what it shows is that it is a tough and difficult task leading and creating a state that all parties can be satisfied with, why focusing on original dream of South Sudan is to be remembered, when trying to recreate a state with value for all its people.

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