

**The “Asia-Pacific Dream”: Is China Using Economic Integration Initiatives as Ideological Weapons?  
– On The Link Between Free Trade Agreements, Soft Power and “Universal Values”**

Anke Berndzen<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** This article examines the function and role of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” (including the FTAAP) in China’s foreign policy strategy by analysing the speech in which Xi Jinping promoted this dream, and creating a link between China’s push for regional economic integration, soft power strategy and “universal values”. While China is promoting this concept and the FTAAP to increase its influence in the region, the U.S. have also been rebalancing to Asia through different means, such as its push for the TPP. These two free trade agreements (FTA), though not mutually exclusive, are considered to be directed against each other, indicating a struggle for influence in the region, and also seem to entail an ideological agenda. As both the “Asia-Pacific Dream” and the U.S. “pivot to Asia” are connected to major FTA’s, this paper argues that the motives for promoting these FTAs go far beyond economic interests; the research suggests that they are used to increase soft power in the region as well as to influence the discourse on “universal values”.

**Keywords:** Asia-Pacific Dream, Chinese Foreign Policy, U.S. pivot to Asia, soft power, universal values.

### **Introduction**

Over the past decades, the influence of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as China) in East Asia has increased remarkably; not only in terms of economic and military might, but also in terms of soft power that has played a major role in increasing influence in the region. China’s increasing engagement in international institutions and regional cooperation in East Asia has been subject to growing concern in the international community, and China’s neighbors in particular, who are wary of the rising superpower and thus engage in hedging activities against China. At the same time, the United States are also trying to increase influence in the region, shifting major resources away from the Middle East and its war on terror to the East Asian region. This movement is also known as the U.S. “pivot to Asia”. Currently, there are several FTA initiatives that the two world powers are pushing for, including the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the China-led Free Trade Area of

---

<sup>1</sup> Anke Berndzen is an Independent Scholar holding a Master’s degree in Business, Language and Culture (Chinese) from the University of Southern Denmark. E-mail: a.berndzen@posteo.de

the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) – the latter playing a significant role in Xi Jinping’s promotion of an “Asia-Pacific Dream”.

In his speech at the opening ceremony of the 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out three major topics for APEC which are: advanced regional economic integration; promoting innovative development, economic reform and growth; and strengthening comprehensive development in infrastructure and connectivity (Xi, 2014). The three key elements that constitute the concept of China’s “Asia-Pacific Dream” similarly focus on (1) development, (2) economic connectivity, and (3) Asian unity with an emphasis on harmony, mutual benefits and prosperity in the region.

As the economic reasons for promoting the “Asia-Pacific Dream” and the connected FTAAP are obvious, the intention of this article is to find out which role the “Asia-Pacific Dream” plays in China’s soft power and ideological strategy. The focus here will be on China’s intentions for promoting this dream and its potential hidden agenda. This article argues that one potential reason for China’s free trade initiatives is to increase its soft power in the region and to undermine “universal values”. In other words, China may use the FTAAP and other economic integration initiatives as tools to fight an ideological battle with the U.S. By using the “Asia-Pacific Dream” as an example, this article is an approach to generate the link between economic integration, soft power and “universal values”. Hence, the aim of my research is to fill in the gap in the existing literature by generating this missing link. With this approach, I seek to find answers and explanations for the following research questions:

*RQ 1) Which role does the “Asia-Pacific Dream” play in consolidating China’s soft power in the East Asian and Southeast Asian region?*

*RQ 2) How and why may the promotion of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” reshape the discourse on “universal values”?*

This article is a summary of an extensive research project that I finished in 2016. Within my original research, I also closely examined the applicability of prevailing IR theories, such as realism, liberalism and constructivism, in order to understand China’s interest and behavior in the region. There are various opinions in academic circles on whether or not IR theories, which are mainly of Western origin, are relevant and applicable in explaining Asian international relations. Since they are often criticized of being too abstract and disconnected

from everyday reality in Asian affairs, Acharya (2014) suggests combining them with an empirical or policy-related analysis, such as analyzing speeches and writings of policy makers, because they reflect mental or social constructs that provide a better understanding of different paradigms than prevailing theories alone. The method that I have used within my research paper is a “disciplined-configurative” case study; I have used established theories and applied them to one specific case in order to generate new facts, concepts and hypotheses (George & Bennett, 2005: 75). The specific case used in this research is Xi Jinping’s promotion of the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, based on his speech at the opening ceremony at the 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing. The theoretical framework comprised both international relations and soft power theories that are used to strengthen my arguments in the analysis and act as an explanatory framework. This means that while my argumentation may partly be based on assumptions and hypotheses, the theories function as a theoretical tool to prove, justify and validate my hypotheses and arguments put forth in the analysis and discussion.

However, the part in which I used IR theories as a framework to explain how and why China is using the “Asia-Pacific Dream” to position itself in a certain way, will be omitted here due to the limited scope of this article. Instead, my focus here will be on the link between free trade agreements, soft power and “universal values”.

### **China’s Soft Power Strategy**

According to Li (2015: 30), China’s diplomatic strategy in the East Asian region has several objectives, i.e., to maintain stable and friendly relationships with its neighbors and build mutual trust, obtain stable supply of resources to maintain economic growth, obtain a strong position of political influence, prevent the formation of a strategic alliance that is directed against China, gain the region’s support in its international strategy, create a multipolarized world and expand its soft power. Regarding China’s soft power strategy, Young and Jong (2008: 460) have identified two main directions: one is directed at finding appropriate countermeasures to American soft power strategy, and the other direction is based on how foreign policy measures will path China’s way to becoming a global power.

In line with the first identified direction of China’s soft power, this article argues that various elements in China’s soft power strategy, including the “Beijing consensus”, the concept of a “harmonious world”, and the newly promoted “Asia-Pacific Dream” function as tools to

balance against American soft power. Furthermore, they may help to improve China's international image and support China's political legitimacy, while simultaneously undermining U.S. influence in the region. This direction is of strategic importance for China because U.S. soft power, including the promotion of "universal values", puts a major threat to China's political legitimacy and nourishes international wariness toward China's peaceful rise. At the same time, a successful "Asia-Pacific Dream" and FTAAP may strengthen China's position as a regional and global power player due to the entailed economic interdependencies.

### **The Role of the "Asia-Pacific Dream" in China's Soft Power Strategy**


Joseph Nye defined soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies" (Nye, 2004: X). With regard to the changing role of military power, technological developments and interdependencies among states, McCormick (2007: 11) argues that the most powerful state actors today are those who have attraction power and create opportunities instead of posing threats to other actors.

In order to explain how the "Asia-Pacific Dream" is closely linked to and incorporated in China's soft power strategy, I will use an extended soft power concept that is based on six soft power sources (i.e. culture, political values, foreign policies, economic development model, international image, and economic temptation) (Nye, 2004; Men, 2007; Li & Worn, 2010) and two soft power mechanisms (i.e. norm diffusion and discourse dominance) (Rothman, 2011).

In order to validate my argumentation put forth in this article, it is crucial to understand how these soft power sources, including foreign policies and economic development models, turn into soft power. The soft power mechanism *norm diffusion* plays a key role in this regard: it refers to a mechanism in which a country is attracted to another country's culture, policy practices or ideals if these are perceived to be successful, beneficial or ethically right (Rothman, 2011: 56-57). The success of the particular culture, policy or ideal thereby increases its attractiveness to another actor. Due to this dependency on success or failure, competitiveness is a main element of the mechanism of norm diffusion. Since norms do not follow rational calculation, actors influenced by norm diffusion behave according to what they perceive as being normal or right. Norms can be diffused through either teaching and learning or a successful demonstration of the norm in operation; a successful demonstration

will furthermore enhance the prestige, credibility and acceptance of the norm's implementer (Rothman, 2011: 58).

**Figure 1: Extended Chinese Soft Power Concept**



Source: Illustration compiled by author; based on Nye (2004), Men (2007), Li & Worm (2010), and Rothman (2011).

By linking the elements of this extended soft power concept to the three key elements in the “Asia-Pacific Dream” (i.e. development, economic connectivity, and Asian unity with an emphasis on harmony, mutual benefits and prosperity for the whole region), I will explain the role of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” in consolidating China’s soft power in the region:

#### *(1) Development*

A major part of Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing was devoted to highlighting China’s stability and remarkable achievements in economic growth, as well as its leading position and importance in the region. He invited all countries to “get on board the train of China’s development”, thus indirectly implying that they have to either accept China’s leading role and underlying conditions, or risk falling behind the development of other nations (Tiezzi, 2014). Due to China’s tremendous economic achievements since the opening up reform in 1979, along with the country’s huge and cheap labor force, the Chinese market has become very attractive for companies worldwide. This advantage gives China a high potential for enhancing its soft power in terms of *economic temptation*. As Xi (2014)

emphasized new paths and models for development, we can also draw a connection between the “Asia-Pacific Dream” and the soft power sources *economic development model* and to some degree *political values* due to the special characteristics of China’s development model, often referred to as the “Beijing consensus”. Furthermore, we can draw a connection to the soft power mechanism of *norm diffusion* as China’s neighbors may adopt attributes of the “China Model” if they perceive it as being beneficial for them.

The “China Model”, or “Beijing consensus”, was first coined by Joshua C. Ramo in 2004 as an alternative political and economic framework to the “Washington consensus”. He identified three main characteristics of the “China Model”: (1) focus on innovation and experimentation, (2) sustainable and equitable growth, and (3) adherence to national self-determination (in Liu, 2010). Many Western and Chinese scholars go far beyond this definition, and since the CCP is not using this term in its official rhetoric either, there seems to be no clear consensus on what the “China Model” actually is. However, the literature suggests some overlapping characteristics that are: a strong leading role of the political authoritarian party, market liberalization in the absence of political liberalization, gradual reform and innovation to achieve economic growth, self-determination and a non-interventionist approach (Kyriakides, 2010: 19-20; Liu, 2010; Smith, 2010: 30-31). According to Ramo (2004: 3), the “Beijing consensus” is not only a model for China, but it “has begun to remake the whole landscape of international development, economics, society and, by extension, politics”.

Despite its authoritarian nature, the success of China’s political economy and outstanding economic growth has made the “Beijing consensus” more attractive to developing countries - in Asia, Africa and Latin America - than the prevailing “Washington consensus”, and China is promoting this model - and thereby increasing its attraction to those regions - by economic aid and by allowing market access without any political strings attached (Wesley-Smith, 2007: 23; Li & Worm, 2010: 81). According to Li and Worm (Ibid.), the “Beijing consensus” is China’s most important soft power source, because it provides a stronger attraction power to many countries in the developing world than other aspects of China’s soft power, such as *culture*.

However, one has to be prudent when using this argument as China is not using the term “Beijing consensus” in its official rhetoric and the Chinese emphasize that they respect each country’s diversity and own development model (Cong, 2013). Because of this, it is difficult to argue that China is trying to export the “Beijing consensus” to its neighboring states;

however, as will be discussed below, Xi Jinping is pushing for new models of development and may at least attempt to gain some credibility and legitimacy for China's own path of development.

## *(2) Economic Connectivity*

Another important element that Xi Jinping emphasized in his speech is economic connectivity. Since the economic dimension constitutes the core of his dream, China's push for the FTAAP and its idea of a Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road are closely related to it or can be regarded as a part of this dream (Tiezzi, 2014). The "Asia-Pacific Dream" entails strong economic incentives for China's neighboring states, including an investment of \$40 billion in the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Fund that will foster the establishment of the Silk Road Economic Belt and Silk Road Maritime Belt. Furthermore, China plans to invest \$1.41 trillion until 2025 to support development projects in the region (Shambaugh, 2015a). From this it becomes obvious that China is providing strong incentives for its neighboring countries to tighten regional economic bonds. Although Xi (2014) said that the door should always be open to the entire world, the "Asia-Pacific Dream" implies the exclusion of non-Asian actors such as the United States since it promotes an "Asia for Asians" (Tiezzi, 2014). Similarly, Shambaugh (2014) regards the FTAAP as a countermeasure against the TPP and furthermore argues that Xi's ideas of a Silk Road Economic Belt and Silk Road Maritime Belt are directed against the U.S. pivot because of their emphasis on Asian connectivity and infrastructure connectivity from which the United States are naturally geographically excluded.

China-U.S. relations have been locked in a long-term competitive relationship, including economic, strategic, military, diplomatic, and cultural competition, as well as a competition for soft power (Ibid.). In order to become a comparable player to Western countries, not only in terms of hard power, including military and economic might, but also in terms of soft power, China will need to put more effort into promoting Chinese values and ideas that will contribute to becoming a future leader. These efforts also include China's strengthening of ASEAN diplomacy, establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), introduction of a new security concept and push for FTA through ASEAN (Young & Jong, 2008: 472).

Also, the internationalization of the Chinese Renminbi plays an important role here. Not only will it benefit China's image as a stable and global power player, but it will also

strengthen China's voice in international affairs. Du (2010) argues that the internationalization of the RMB will bring far more benefits and "soft gains" for China than costs; it will provide China with higher economic, political and diplomatic influencing power and, hence, be beneficial for the country's soft power. Also, it will help China counteract any negative effects of U.S. policies (Wang, 2016).

According to Razeen Sally (2013), who examined China's trade policies and preferential trade agreements, China's approach to trade agreements is rather light on trade; not even the trade agreement between China and ASEAN, that came into effect in January 2010 and covers 11 economies with a total population of 1.7 billion people, will likely lead to significantly more trade and investment. Regarding the driving force behind China's trade agreements, he explains that "foreign-policy 'soft power', i.e. diplomacy and relationship-building, is paramount" (Sally, 2013: 188), including motives such as securing influence and competing for leadership credentials in the East Asian region. This can be seen in the promotion of trade through institutions such as APEC, which will not only strengthen economic relationships but also serve as a foundation to improve the relationship on the political level. As this may lead to mutual trust and more political cooperation, it could also be beneficial for China's interests in the South China Sea. It can therefore be argued that the intentions behind the "Asia-Pacific Dream" go far beyond economic interests; through soft power, China intends to improve its political relationships with its neighbors by increasing economic cooperation and interdependence.

With regard to what has already been discussed above, Xi's grand gesture of economic aid may increase China's soft power and *international image* in a positive direction. Here, we can see a connection to the soft power concepts *economic temptation* and *foreign policies* that are perceived to be beneficial for China's neighboring countries.

### *(3) Asian Unity and The Emphasis on Harmony, Mutual Benefits and Prosperity for The Whole Region*

The "Asia-Pacific Dream" is intended to promote Asian unity with shared destinies, and centers around peace, development and mutual benefits (CCPIT, 2014). The emphasis on harmony is closely related to some of China's already existing soft power concepts, such as "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and "harmonious world". Hence, the notion of harmony appears to be a reoccurring concept in China's soft power strategy, and it is in China's strategic interest to further promote harmony because it may improve the country's



*international image* that has been overshadowed in the past due to Mao's rule, human rights violations, the "China threat theory", and incidents such as the Tiananmen Square massacre. The Chinese government has continually tried to improve its image and uses these concepts to convince its neighbors of China's peaceful rise and intentions. Xi Jinping's emphasis on Asian unity also entails the idea of shared *culture* and values, including the spread of Chinese *political values* and governing principles (Ni, 2014) that are, again, related to the "Beijing consensus". In terms of *culture*, the "Asia-Pacific Dream" is intended to increase communication and various forms of interaction between the countries that will facilitate the spread of Chinese culture, and therefore may also help to increase socialization and a shared Asian identity, as it is believed by constructivist scholars. Due to increased interaction and communication between the countries, *norm diffusion* as a soft power mechanism will eventually also become more effective, since norms and values can be diffused through teaching and learning, or a successful demonstration of the norm in operation (Rothman, 2011: 58). According to Xi's speech, China intends to create win-win situations that are mutually beneficial for all countries in the region and will create prosperity for the whole region. Again, this idea is connected to the soft power source *economic temptation*. This win-win approach is often emphasized by the Chinese, not only in international politics but also in business relations, but it is criticized as being a zero-sum game instead (Dujarric, 2011; Fang, 1998) and it seems like Chinese policymakers have an "I win, you lose" mentality.

The above analysis of the key elements of the "Asia-Pacific Dream's" provides us with the realization that the concept is deeply incorporated into and resembles China's prevailing soft power sources and mechanisms. This leads me to the supposition that the intentions behind the "Asia-Pacific Dream" exceed a push toward regional economic integration. Instead, the concept itself can be regarded as part of China's soft power and it affects various other dimensions of political, strategic and ideological importance. As Samm Sacks stated, the idea of the Chinese government is to use trade and investment to gain more political support from its neighbors and to foster a Chinese-led form of economic prosperity to enhance China's image as a great power (in Rosen, 2014). However, Shambaugh (2015a) criticizes China's latest soft power initiatives, including the "Asia-Pacific Dream" as being relatively fruitless. He pointed out that China is investing billions of dollars in a variety of public relations efforts in order to improve China's reputation and image. China has pledged to invest US\$1.41 trillion worldwide until 2025, which is unprecedented in human history. However, China's

investments seem to yield a low return due to the country's contradictory behavior. Hence, he argues that China is trying to buy influence in the region which does not seem to work:

The Chinese government approaches public diplomacy the same way it constructs high-speed rail or builds infrastructure — by investing money and expecting to see development (Ibid.).

He concludes that as long as China's political system keeps controlling its citizens, opinions abroad, and does not enable free human development and direct interaction between its citizens and the outside world, its propaganda efforts and investments in soft power will not pay off.

### **The Discourse on “Universal Values”**

While the discussion above has made clear that there is a link between China's economic integration and free trade initiatives and soft power, I want to take the discussion one step further and evaluate whether we can also draw a connection to the discourse on “universal values”. According to the United Nations (2003), “human rights and universal values are almost synonymous” and refer to values of peace, freedom, social progress, equal rights and human dignity. These values have been agreed upon by the United Nations and enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Proponents of such values define them as either being valued and held in common by all, or at least the majority of, human beings; or, as Sen (1999: 12) claims, that something is of “universal value” if people anywhere in the world have reason to consider it as being valuable. Although democracy is not being universally practiced yet, it has achieved the status of being generally right and is widely considered as being a “universal value” because a democratic system is based on certain values that ensure citizens' political freedom, civil rights, social and political participation and other rights that enhance the wellbeing of society and individuals (Sen, 1999: 5, 10).

Because of this, China is still being sharply criticized, especially by Western countries, for human rights violations, lack of democratic rights and the authoritarian nature of the regime, which systematically curbs fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, association and religion, if these practices are believed to potentially threaten the government (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). Also, the CCP's denial of genuine democracy in Hong Kong and the detention and later death of human rights activist Cao Shunli in 2014 clearly demonstrate the party's hostility toward “universal values” and human rights activists. Other issues that are of

great concern are the ethnic discrimination and religious and cultural suppression in Xinjiang and Tibet, violations of the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression, and discrimination against women, disabled people and homosexuals. Also, the detention and trial of the famous Chinese human rights blogger and lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, has gained international attention. Observers expect that he will have to face eight years in prison for publishing seven microblog posts on Weibo that, according to the indictment, “incited ethnic hatred”, “created disturbances” and led to “adverse social impact” (Human Rights Watch, 2015a; BBC, 2015). Due to this case, China is again sharply criticized for its lack of the “rule of law” and a new low point in the worsening climate of freedom of speech (BBC, 2015). Altogether, the Human Rights Watch (2015b) concluded that China has taken major steps backwards on human rights issues under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

In China, the term “universal values” (普世价值 *pushi jiazhi*) is relatively new in the political debate, though its associated concepts, such as freedom, human rights and democracy, have been discussed for many decades, especially after the massacre at Tiananmen Square in 1989. From a philosophical perspective, one can argue about the actual existence of “universal values” since values are subjective beliefs, morals or cultural norms that differ from person to person and culture to culture. Even the same kind of value may have a different meaning for each individual. However, in recent years, the discourse has changed from a philosophical question into a political and ideological battle. On the one hand, there are universalists who believe that “universal values” are commonly demanded by all humankind and that China should eventually converge on democratic norms. On the other hand, there are exceptionalists who believe that China is different from other countries and deny the existence of “universal values”, hence China should preserve its authoritarianism (The Economist, 2011). Many liberal scholars are worried about some of the views amongst the exceptionalist wing, such as the belief that the West is using the promotion of “universal values” to undermine China’s achievements and power. Wang (2013) claims that “universal values” have been used as a tool to ensure U.S. hegemony and that they have resulted in various forms of the “China threat theory”. Some also worry that this may have a negative influence on Chinese behavior, resulting in a confluence of nationalism and deep feelings of victimhood, along with an increasing military force (The Economist, 2011).

Zhou Xincheng (2009), professor at the School of Marxism at Renmin University of China, criticizes the promotion of “universal values” as they are not really universal, because each kind of value always reflects the system of values of just a fraction of people. He defines

values as being the meaning and function of an object or issue that is different for each person. Of course, he says that people in a society form a certain range of behavioral norms and standards, but due to each person's and culture's background, the meaning of these norms differs for each individual; therefore, he concludes that values can never be universal and are specific to each individual. Also, since the values and behavioral norms of a certain society change over time and are influenced by the underlying circumstances, such as social conditions and economy, the historical and cultural context of a society's values always need to be taken into consideration. His main criticism is that advocates of "universal values" simply extract a commonality or overlap of different systems' sets of values and declare it as being universal while neglecting the actual meaning and function that it has for each system and society (Ibid.). The Marxist scholar Li (2011) moreover criticizes "universal values" because even though it seems that the discussion of "universal values" is just a theoretical topic in the philosophy of values, it is in reality a concept that comes from Western countries which is used for political and ideological purposes. This view is also shared by Zhang (2013: 259) who believes that the West is promoting these values "behind a deceptive veil" to achieve their political and ideological objectives. Li (2011) alleges "universal values" to be a specific political proposition aimed at changing the development of China's political system and society. According to him, a society's core values should be based on cultural and historical inheritance rather than the exploiting class' core values (i.e. the Western capitalist countries, particularly the United States of America).

Another Marxist scholar, Hou Huiqin (2011), argues that the basic purpose of promoting "universal values" is to bring China's current reform politics onto the path of the capitalist world civilization and to intervene in China's democratic politics, as well as putting an end to the national power construct of CCP leadership. Therefore, he sees the promotion of "universal values" as an expression of the current Western discourse hegemony and mode of value infiltration. Furthermore, "universal values" deny the establishment of democratic politics of China's special socialism (中国特色社会主义 *zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi*); and adopting a Western democratic model, especially a U.S. democratic model, would totally change and interfere with the socialist direction of China's democratic politics, in which the paramount interests of the nation over the individual are being emphasized. However, he does not really criticize the essence of the values, rather how their promotion intervenes in China's special socialism and reform politics.

Based on evidence from public speeches and quotes, the attitudes of China's recent leaders toward "universal values" seem to be quite mixed, though the actual implementation of their proclamations always requires some critical examination. In April 2006, Hu Jintao made a speech at Yale University, saying that the Chinese government vigorously promotes economic and social development, ensuring that the citizens enjoy freedom, democracy and human rights, as well as social fairness and justice (in Wu, 2008). In an interview in September 2006 with five overseas news media, Wen Jiabao said that,

democracy is a system of values commonly pursued by the human race and commonly created achievement of civilization, but in different stages of history, in different countries, its forms and ways of realization have nothing in common with each other, there is no unified model (own direct translation, in Wu, 2008).

According to him, a socialist system and democracy do not deviate from one another, as he considers a high degree of democracy and a complete and faultless legal system as being the innate requirement of a socialist system (Wen, 2010).

Unlike Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping seems to reject Western beliefs and opposes "universal values", personal freedom and civil society that are espoused by the United States and other nations (Kemp, 2015). Recently, one of the CCP's state organs stated the importance of preventing party officials from becoming disoriented to Western ideals, and, furthermore, Xi Jinping shuns Western values in order to "avoid being lost in the clamor for Western democracy, 'universal values' and civil society" (in Sands, 2014).

### **The "Asia-Pacific Dream" - A Threat to "Universal Values"?**

Before beginning my argumentation on whether or not the "Asia-Pacific Dream" poses a threat to "universal values", I want to make clear that Xi Jinping in no words directly mentioned or attacked the concept of "universal values" in his speech at the 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing. Therefore, my argumentation will be based on the interpretation of his speech, China's foreign policy goals, and my own assumptions and hypotheses that I will back up with evidence found in other sources. The aim of this section is to bring new light into China's diplomatic strategy and its conceivable influence on the discourse on "universal values".

When closely examining Xi Jinping's speech at the opening ceremony of the 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing, it becomes conspicuous that his idea of an "Asia-Pacific Dream" resembles some principles of the "Beijing consensus" both in terms of the promotion of and focus on economic development and growth with the absence of political reforms and constraints.

In his speech, he said that, "we need to jointly build an open economy in the Asia Pacific. Openness brings progress, while closed-up policy leads to backwardness" and that "we need to [...] actively explore a new path and model that meets our own development needs and look for new growth points and impetus" (Xi, 2014). From this, we can see that Xi Jinping emphasizes the need for openness, innovation, reforms, and a new path and model for growth. He furthermore stresses new and open economic institutions and reforms without imposing other countries to adopt certain values, political systems or demand that they meet certain requirements. This proposed openness stands in stark contrast with the TPP that comes with tight political constraints from the U.S. and requirements to meet the "platinum standard" (Lim, Elms & Low, 2012: 203). The TPP's "platinum standard" addresses stronger protection of labor and intellectual property rights, investment, e-commerce, environment, as well as regulations of state-owned enterprises, regional integration and development, thus making it difficult for developing and transitional economies to join the agreement, most noticeably China (Armstrong, 2011; Bush, 2014: 7). Also, the high TPP standards would require China to substantially change some policies, such as altering the structure and operation of state-owned enterprises as well as information control and censorship policies (Yu, 2015).

China's push for new institutions and reforms becomes even more evident in Xi's speech, in which he utters quite clearly that he wants to break with the status quo and prevailing institutions and models. It is therefore very much conceivable that he intends to promote a Chinese-led model of development, such as the "China Model", and new ways for an open economic integration, as well as the establishment of new and open institutions. All of these stand in contrast to the U.S.-led development model, the "Washington consensus", that includes political reforms, the promotion of democratic systems, practices and values, and other political reforms, of which some are also included in the U.S.-led trade agreement. Due to their connection to "universal values" (especially democratic values and human rights), it is in China's strategic interest to promote certain new models and concepts, or at least gain legitimacy for them, that disregard such political reforms, constraints and "universal values".

Interesting to mention here is the fact that Liu (2010, 11) describes the “China Model” as a system that does not acknowledge the existence of “universal values”.

In Xi Jinping’s eyes, the “Asia-Pacific Dream” can be seen as an extension of the “Chinese Dream”; in order to become the Eastern dominant power and an important influencing and driving force of Asian-Pacific development, the “Chinese Dream”, “Asia-Pacific Dream” and even “World Dream” must be closely connected to each other (Ni, 2014). By doing this, the *governing principles* of the Chinese Communist Party and economic development will contribute to the Asia-Pacific region and each country in the world, and will furthermore give new impetus for global and Asian-Pacific development through mutual trust, cooperation and a win-win approach (Ibid.). Ni’s (2014) article was published on the CCP’s online news website and reflects the government’s intention of not only promoting economic cooperation through the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, but also of spreading the idea of a Chinese development model with Chinese political values and governing principles, including strong power of the ruling political party with an absence of political liberalization.

As the “China Model” has become more attractive in Southeast Asia, many countries, such as Thailand, have implemented strategies based on the Chinese development model over the past decade; examples of this include the recentralization of political decision-making, re-establishment of the one-party rule, taking back state control of certain industries, internet monitoring and other tools of control (Kurlantzick, 2013). Zhou and Peng (2009: 132) argue that due to China’s rise and the “China Model”, China’s socialist system is also having increasing influence worldwide, which the United States and other Western countries regard as a threat to their ideology and system of values. Similarly, Wang (2013) argues that Western countries feel threatened by the “China Model” because its incorporated Chinese values may eventually replace dominant Western values. One of these political values that could pose a threat to Western values may include political meritocracy as an alternative to direct election of politicians.

According to Ren (2015: 14), the United States have been using the “China threat theory” repeatedly as a political means and as an excuse to build and strengthen its allies and relationships with China’s neighboring countries, such as Japan, Vietnam and Myanmar. He furthermore points out that the struggle for and holding of a cultural and ideological position is among the core interests of countries in today’s world. In his eyes, the United States as a superpower is naturally attempting to firmly control ideological leadership authority (Ren, 2015: 15). He argues that the United States have always had self-confidence in their

development model, but that China's outstanding performance during the world financial and economic crisis in 2008 marked the success of the "China Model" and downfall of the American model which is one of the reasons why the United States feel threatened by China. The success of the "China Model" furthermore undermines the attractiveness and influencing power of the American model to developing countries, as well as the U.S. ability to control the world economy and international affairs. Because of this, Ren (2015: 15) concludes that the vilification of China's image by means of the "China threat theory" is an inevitable strategy of the United States to impair China's international influence.

With regard to the U.S. "pivot to Asia" and the relationship-building between the U.S. and China as global powers, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry declared in a speech delivered at the Tokyo Institute of Technology in April 2013 that, "Our [American] Pacific Dream is to translate our *strongest values* into an unprecedented security, economic, and social co-operation" (in Fu, 2013, emphasis added). Even though Kerry did not explicitly define what their strongest values are, it becomes evident that American values (that are likely related to "universal values") constitute an important function in the U.S. pivot and relationship-building in Asia. Kai (2015) furthermore states that,

the West and especially the United States tend to use these concepts [i.e. democracy and other "universal values" such as freedom, equality, and justice] as 'weapons' for intended regime or social changes in different regions.

The U.S. intentions also become clear when listening to Obama's speech at the 2014 APEC CEO Summit, where he said that,

we [the United States] look forward to China to become an innovative economy that values the protection of intellectual property rights (...), and yes, to stand up for human rights and freedom of the press.

In a later speech, Obama (2015) furthermore said that the TPP "reflects our values in ways that, frankly, some previous trade agreements did not".

From this, it becomes evident that "universal values" play a role in the promotion of the TPP and it is therefore very much conceivable that China's current diplomatic strategy, including the promotion of the "Asia-Pacific Dream", aims to undermine U.S. influence in the region and the spread of "universal values". The Human Rights Watch (2015b) revealed that the CCP has issued directives to correct ideology among party members, lecturers, researchers



and journalists, warning them “against the perils of ‘universal values’ and human rights, and assert the importance of a pro-government and pro-CCP stance”. Also, in recent years, the CCP has been emphasizing Confucian values in its political narratives; these values include e.g. social stability, hierarchy, respect for authority and harmony, as they are deeply rooted in the Chinese culture and can be used by the CCP to legitimize its authority and one-party rule (Dotson, 2011:5). Chinese scholars, such as Yan Xuetong and Zhao Tingyang, believe that a political system based on Confucian ideas may be a better philosophy and system for world governance than the prevailing Western systems (in Ford, 2015: 1044). Hence, Ford (2015: 1045) points out that international ambitiousness is an obvious element in some of the political Confucian ideas; therefore, he interprets pronouncements in the CCP’s political rhetoric talking about “breaking [the] hegemony of Western ‘universal values’” and “re-globalization” as a Chinese attempt to replace “global development based upon Western values with a ‘real globalization’ in which ‘Chinese dreams’ enrich the world” (Ibid.). Regarding the CCP regime’s official discourse, Ford (2015: 1047) concludes that,

the most interesting trend today may not be ‘de-ideologization’ but in fact the emergence and increasingly self-assertive promulgation of an ideological program of action self-consciously girding itself for battle against a Western democratic pluralism that it regards as its mortal enemy.

### **Scenario Thinking**

Although U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the TPP in 2017, two scenarios will be presented below, i.e. either the TPP or the FTAAP will become effective, although they are not mutually exclusive. The probability of these policy outcomes and also the possibility that none of these trade agreements become effective will not be discussed. These scenarios only serve as examples to compare different policy outcomes in order to strengthen my argumentation and to indicate how regional economic integration, in this case FTA, may influence soft power and “universal values”. The actual probability of these outcomes is therefore irrelevant for this section.

#### *Scenario 1: Success of the U.S. TPP and “Pivot to Asia”*

If the United States succeed with rebalancing to Asia and making the TPP become effective, they will also secure their position as a balancing power and will be able to exert more influence in the region - economically, politically and socially - compared to if the FTA

would not become effective. Since the TPP is supposed to bring economic benefits to the region and lift the member countries' standards to the so-called "platinum standard", a successful and efficient cooperation will naturally lead to a positive association with American standards and values. This may provide a solid basis for further promoting American political culture and (Western) "universal values".

In this scenario, China of course would not lose its entire influence in the region, but the U.S. promoted values will pose a challenge to the Chinese ideology, and China will have to continue justifying itself and being criticized for violating human rights and not allowing its citizens democracy-related political rights. Furthermore, an effective TPP may have a negative impact on the image of China's development model, because the explicit exclusion of China in the FTA is accounted for by China's inability to reach the "platinum standard". Thus, China's economic development model - the "Beijing consensus" - and its appertaining ideological values may seem to be less appealing to other actors or regarded as being backward.

#### *Scenario 2: Realization of the "Asia-Pacific Dream" and FTAAP*

It is quite obvious that there is little space for the United States in China's "Asia-Pacific Dream" due to the emphasis on Asian unity and connectivity. Although Xi Jinping, on the one hand, states that "the door of the Asia Pacific will always be open to the entire world" (Xi, 2014), this emphasis on Asian unity and connectivity, on the other hand, subtly excludes the United States from this dream. In his concept, Xi exactly addresses and promotes those issues that are necessary for consolidating China's influence in the region, i.e. strengthening economic bonds, mutual trust and prosperity that derives from China's economic development model (Xi invited the other Asian states to hop on China's road of success and, therefore, indirectly to reach prosperity in the region in the Chinese way). If China successfully manages to promote and implement this idea, other actors may feel less strategic necessity to have the United States present in the region due to increased mutual trust and prosperity. Furthermore, a regional cooperation that is based on friendship and unity that everyone benefits from, as Xi promoted it, may result in Asian countries being less willing to express their distrust in China due to closer interdependencies. Altogether, this will gradually decrease America's chance in terms of exerting influence in the region. Moreover, as China's image and cooperation with other actors in the region improves and its development model

becomes more appealing to other states, certain Chinese values that are related to the “Beijing consensus”, as mentioned above, and simultaneously disregard Western values (including democratic and other “universal values”) may be spread throughout the region. According to the constructivist theory, this may happen due to the process of socialization that shapes other actors’ perceptions and may result in different countries identifying with each other’s values. Since China itself disregards Western democratic and other “universal values”, an assertive spread of Chinese values will undermine the foundation of “universal values”. This is due to the assumption that the more people and cultures that follow other values than the “universal” ones, the more questionable it will become whether these “universal values” are actually universal or just Western values in disguise.


This scenario case envisions an Asian regional cooperation in which China plays a leading role and gives direction to regional development. It displays a future prospectus that would be ideal for China’s foreign strategy goals and it is conceivable that this is one of China’s intentions behind the “Asia-Pacific Dream”.

### **Main Findings and Theoretical Contributions**

We need to look at international relations, China’s rise and promoted foreign policy concepts, such as the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, from a multidimensional perspective. The above analysis and discussion provide evidence that Xi Jinping’s promoted “Asia-Pacific Dream” can be considered as being part of China’s soft power strategy. Based on the extended soft power model introduced in this article, the soft power sources *political values, foreign policies, economic development model, international image, culture* and *economic temptation*, as well as the soft power mechanism *norm diffusion* are reflected in the “Asia-Pacific Dream”. Also, the three key elements of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” (i.e. development, economic connectivity and Asian unity with an emphasis on harmony, mutual benefits and prosperity for the whole region) are closely related to and resemble prevailing concepts of China’s soft power, including the “Beijing consensus”, China’s peaceful rise, “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, and “harmonious world”. This research indicates that the aim of Xi Jinping’s promotion of this dream is not only to strengthen economic bonds with its neighbors through FTA and to pose counter trade policies against the U.S. “pivot to Asia” and its entailed FTA initiative, the TPP; moreover, the “Asia-Pacific Dream” may become a powerful tool in consolidating China’s soft power and leadership position in the region.

While the research clearly shows that the “Asia-Pacific Dream” is deeply incorporated into China’s soft power strategy, it is more complex to elaborate on the link between the “Asia-Pacific Dream” and “universal values”. Here, my argumentation is based on the concept’s connectedness to the “Beijing consensus” and the fact that it is directed against the U.S. “pivot to Asia”. A major objective of the TPP is to foster U.S. culture and values, including democracy, human rights and other values, rules and norms that the Americans perceive to be universal and progressive. Since the “Asia-Pacific Dream” is considered to be a counterpoint to the U.S. “pivot to Asia”, it is conceivable that one of the reasons for promoting this dream is not only to prevent the U.S. from exerting more influence in the region, but also to undermine “universal values”. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the 2014 APEC CEO Summit, Xi Jinping also stated quite clearly that he wants to break with the status quo, prevailing institutions and development models, while continuously emphasizing innovation, reforms and new paths and models of development. One reason why he is not content with the status quo is most likely because China still has to pit itself against “universal values” and is often criticized for violating human rights and democracy-related values, including freedom of political speech and freedom of press. Since these pose a threat to the CCP’s political legitimacy and international image, China therefore has a strong interest in undermining “universal values”. Because of this, it is very much conceivable that Xi intends to use the “Asia-Pacific Dream” to promote a Chinese-led model of development, i.e. the “Beijing consensus”, along with new ways for an open economic integration, as well as the establishment of new and open institutions. This would challenge the prevailing U.S.-led development model, the “Washington consensus”, and some scholars believe that China intends to break the hegemony of (Western) “universal values” and strives for a new form of globalization in which Chinese values and dreams enrich the world. Hence, this article argues that the intrinsic motives behind the free trade initiatives, that are entailed to the U.S. “pivot to Asia” and China’s “Asia-Pacific Dream”, are not only of economic nature, but represent a competition for soft power and influence in the region. Moreover, they may play a significant role in ideological battles and the discourse on “universal values” as figure 2 illustrates.

**Figure 2: The Link between Economic Integration, Soft Power and “Universal Values”**



Source: Illustration compiled by author.

If China’s regional development model proves to be fruitful, it may pose a major challenge to some Western ideas and values such as the “Washington consensus” and associated “universal values”. This is due to the assumption that a successful regional cooperation in line with the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, the Chinese-style development model and associated ideologies and values would demonstrate a path of development for a major part of the world’s population that dispenses with Western democracy-related development concepts and values altogether. This process is theoretically realistic due to the soft power mechanism of *norm diffusion*, in which values or an economic development model may more likely be adopted by other actors if they are perceived to be successful or beneficial for them. Here, economic integration and FTA may serve as a door opener or accelerator for this process due to increased interaction between the actors, which may facilitate the spread or infiltration of values. Hence, it is conceivable that some (Western) “universal values” may lose their universality, which would in turn result in the United States forfeiting legitimacy to a certain degree in other foreign policies and affairs as well.

While China’s rise and increasing efforts in consolidating its soft power in the region are posing major and diverse challenges to U.S. interests in the region, it remains uncertain how international relations and power constructs in the Asia-Pacific region will develop in the future. Currently, international relations in Asia are mainly based on economic ties and many countries are wary of China’s peacefulness due to several disputes, e.g. in the South China Sea and between Mainland China and Taiwan. It is therefore not surprising that other regional actors perceive the need of U.S. military presence in the region. If China manages to improve

its international image through the promotion of the discussed soft power concepts, international relations in the region may be strengthened in terms of mutual trust, cooperation, establishment of networks and regional integration. However, although China is putting tremendous efforts in international propaganda and investing huge amounts of money into economic development projects in the region, the major future challenge will be to gain some credibility in its peaceful rise and intentions behind the “Asia-Pacific Dream” because China is still facing sharp criticism due to its contradictive behavior in regional territorial disputes and lack of certain political and “universal values”. Another concern that remains unanswered is the likelihood that the trade policies will come into effect and an exact prediction of the future of Asian international relations remains elusive at this point in time.

By taking the example of the “Asia-Pacific Dream”, this article provides a new theoretical approach to elaborate the link between FTA (as a form of economic integration), soft power and “universal values”. It thus contributes to the theoretical discussion of China’s foreign policy strategy, its potential hidden intentions and the struggle for influence in Asia between China and the United States. My intention here is not to actually accuse Xi Jinping of using the “Asia-Pacific Dream” as a weapon to fight ideological battles. However, as the discussion above shows, there is at least reason enough to assume that shaping the discourse on “universal values” may be one of the intentions behind Xi Jinping’s “Asia-Pacific Dream”. Undoubtedly, further observation of China’s behavior and deeper academic discussion will be necessary to further prove my arguments.

For future research, the questions remain whether my theoretical supposition also proves to be valid in real life. For this, future empirical research will be necessary in order to find out if China’s free trade policies and investments actually lead to e.g. the diffusion of certain non-universal or Chinese values in the region, and how this may influence the discourse on “universal values”. Also, the research leaves us with the question of whether my theory can be generally applied to other forms of economic integration and FTA as well. As for now, this article brings new insights into the prevalent discussion and provides an impetus for further academic discussion on this subject matter.

## References

- Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan. 2007. "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7(3): 287-312, August 7. doi: 10.1093/irap/lcm012
- Acharya, Amitav. 2014. "Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR." March 13. In David Shambaugh, & Michael Yahuda, eds. *International Relations of Asia*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Allison Jr., Graham T. 2013. "Obama and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Classic Trap." *The New York Times*, June 6. Available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/obama-and-xi-must-think-broadly-to-avoid-a-classic-trap.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/obama-and-xi-must-think-broadly-to-avoid-a-classic-trap.html?_r=1). [Accessed on October 6, 2015]
- Armstrong, Shiro. 2011. "The TPP, APEC and East Asian trade strategies." *East Asia Forum*, November 14. Available at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/14/the-tpp-apec-and-east-asian-trade-strategies/>. [Accessed on October 14, 2015]
- Ban, Ki-moon. 2003. "UNIVERSAL VALUES - PEACE, FREEDOM, SOCIAL PROGRESS, EQUAL RIGHTS, HUMAN DIGNITY – ACUTELY NEEDED, SECRETARY-GENERAL SAYS AT TUBINGEN UNIVERSITY, GERMANY." *United Nations* [Press Release], December 12. Available at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sgsm9076.doc.htm>. [Accessed on November 25, 2015]
- BBC. 2015. *China rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang's trial ends amid scuffles*. December 14. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35089858>. [Accessed on December 16, 2015]
- Blanchard, Ben. 2015. "China communist party paper says country should join U.S.-led trade pact." *Reuters*, October 24. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-trade-tpp-idUSKCN0SJ01X20151025#gGbhkAt1jvPlyF5I.97>. [Accessed on December 7, 2015]
- Browne, Andrew. 2015. "Expect no Easing of 'Chinese Whirlwind'." *The Wall Street Journal*, January 6. Available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/expect-no-easing-of-chinese-whirlwind-1420531486>. [Accessed on October 5, 2015]
- Bush, Richard. 2014. "Taiwan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: The Political Dimension." *The Brookings Institution: Center for East Asia Policy Studies* [East Asia policy paper], January. Available at <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2013/10/03-taiwan-trans-pacific-partnership-bush/taiwan-tpp-bush-012014.pdf>. [Accessed on October 6, 2015]
- Campbell, Kurt and Brian Andrews. 2013. "Explaining the US 'Pivot' to Asia." *Americas*, 2013/01. London: Chatham House. Available at [www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp\\_pivottoasia.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf). [Accessed on November 20, 2015]
- Capannelli, Giovanni and Masahiro Kawai. 2014. "The Political Economy of Asian Regionalism: Issues and Challenges." In Giovanni Capannelli and Masahiro Kawai, eds. *The*

*Political Economy of Asian Regionalism*. Tokyo: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-4-431-54568-2\_1

CCPIT. 2014. "President Xi Jinping delivers keynote speech at opening ceremony of APEC CEO Summit." November 10. Available at [http://overseas.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel\\_1620/2014/1110/428024/content\\_428024.htm](http://overseas.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel_1620/2014/1110/428024/content_428024.htm). [Accessed on November 22, 2015]

Cong, Riyun [丛日云]. 2013. "Pushi jiazhi yu zhongguo daolu", (Universal values and China's path), [普世价值与中国道路]. *Aisixiang*, [爱思想], June 15. Available at <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/64827.html>. [Accessed on January 19, 2017]

Devadason, Evelyn. S. 2014. "The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): the Chinese perspective." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23(87): 462-479, January 17. doi: 10.1080/10670564.2013.843890

Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. 2014. "Beijing-Promoted FTAAP Will Delay TPP, Driving US Companies to ASEAN for FTA Benefits." *China Briefing*, November 10. Available at <http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2014/11/10/beijing-promoted-ftaap-will-delay-tpp-driving-us-companies-asean-fta-benefits.html>. [Accessed on September 1, 2015]

Dotson, John. 2011. "The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government." *USCC*: 1-22, July 20. Available at [http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Confucian\\_Revival\\_Paper.pdf](http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Confucian_Revival_Paper.pdf). [Accessed on December 6, 2015]

Drysdale, Peter. 2014. "The new nuance in Chinese diplomacy." *East Asia Forum*, November 24. Available at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/11/24/the-new-nuance-in-chinese-diplomacy/>. [Accessed on July 22, 2015]

Du, Xianggan [杜相乾]. 2010. "Jiyu ruanshili de renminbi guojihua jianjiu", (Research on the internationalization of the Renminbi based on soft power), [基于软实力的人民币国际化研究]. *Renminwang*, [人民网], July 6. Available at <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/166866/12089548.html>. [Accessed on January 5, 2017]

Dujarric, Robert. 2011. "China's Zero-Sum Game." *The Diplomat*, July 26. Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2011/07/chinas-zero-sum-game/>. [Accessed on December 14, 2015]

Eberhard, John W. 2011. "Socialized or Calculated Interests? Analyzing China's Regional Policy through Constructivist and Rationalist Perspectives." *Political Perspectives, Graduate Journal*, 5, January. Available at <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/vol-5-1-2011-Eberhard.pdf>. [Accessed on November 23, 2015]

Fang, Tony. 1998. *Chinese Business Negotiating Style*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Ford, Christopher A. 2015. "The Party and the Sage: Communist China's use of quasi-Confucian rationalizations for one-party dictatorship and imperial ambition." *Journal of Contemporary China*. 24(96): 1032-1047. doi: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1030954



Fu, Mengzi. 2013. "Pacific Dream, US' Ideal Diplomacy." *CHINA US Focus*, May 8. Available at <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/pacific-dream-us-ideal-diplomacy-in-asia-pacific/>. [Accessed on October 5, 2015]

Ge, Hongliang [葛红亮] and Hailong Ju [鞠海龙]. 2014. "'Zhongguo – dongmeng mingyun gongtongti' gouxiang xia nanhai wenti de qianjing zhanwang", (A Prospect Forecast of the South China Sea Issues under the Concept of China-ASEAN Community of Destiny), [中国—东盟命运共同体"构想下南海问题的前景展望]. *Dongbeiyi luntan*, (*Northeast Asia Forum*), [东北亚论坛], 4: 25-34, April 26. doi: 10.13654/j.cnki.naf.2014.04.003

George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press

Hou, Huiqin [侯惠勤]. 2011. "Guanyu dangqian 'pushi jiazhi guan' zheng lun de lilun bianjie", (On the theoretical boundaries of the current "universal values" debate), [关于当前“普世价值观”争论的理论边界]. *Makesi zhuyi yanjiu wang*, (*Academy of Marxism of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences*), [马克思主义研究网], December 7. Available at [www.myy.cass.cn/news/433941.htm](http://www.myy.cass.cn/news/433941.htm). [Accessed on September 3, 2015]

Huang, Yasheng. 2011. "Rethinking the Beijing Consensus." *Asia Policy*, 11, January. doi: 10.1353/asp.2011.0001

Hudda, Nabil. 2015. "Interpreting the Rise of China: Realists and Liberalist Perspectives." April 3. Available at <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-the-rise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/>. [Accessed on October 5, 2015]

Human Rights Watch. 2015a. "China: Free Prominent Lawyer Pu Zhiqiang." December 13. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/13/china-free-prominent-lawyer-pu-zhiqiang>. [Accessed on December 16, 2015]

Human Rights Watch. 2015b. "World Report 2015: China". Available at <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet>. [Accessed on November 25, 2015]

Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno. 2003. "International Relations Theory and the Search for Regional Stability." In G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds. *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jakobsen, Jo. 2013. "Neorealism in International Relations – Kenneth Waltz." *Popular Social Science*, November 6. Available at <http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2013/11/06/neorealism-in-international-relations-kenneth-waltz/>. [Accessed on October 6, 2015]

Jones, David Martin and Michael L. R. Smith. 2007. "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order." *International Security*, 32 (1): 148-84, Summer.

Jones-Rooy, Andrea. (n.d.). "Legitimacy and Credibility: The Media as a Political Tool in China and Other Autocracies." Available at <http://sitemaker.umich.edu/jonesrooy/files/ajr-chinamedia.pdf>. [Accessed on December 9, 2015]

Kai, Jin. 2014. "The Chinese Communist Party's Confucian Revival." *The Diplomat*, September 30. Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-chinese-communist-partys-confucian-revival/>. [Accessed on December 6, 2015]

Kai, Jin. 2015. "Why Should China Embrace 'Universal Values'? An argument for 'universal values' with Chinese characteristics." *The Diplomat*, June 16. Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/why-should-china-embrace-universal-values/>. [Accessed on November 25, 2015]

Kang, David. C. 2003. "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks." *International Security*, 27(4): 57-85, Spring. Available at <http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic787492.files/Kang%20Getting%20Asia%20Wrong.pdf>. [Accessed on October 11, 2015]

Kang, David. C. 2013. "Soft Power and Leadership in East Asia." *Asia Policy*, 15: 134-137, January. doi: 10.1353/asp.2013.0007

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathlyn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Keithley, Steven. 2014. "China's New Global Institutions: Beijing is seeking to shape international institutions to facilitate its emergence as a global power." *The Diplomat*, July 25. Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/chinas-new-global-institutions/>. [Accessed on November 4, 2015]

Kemp, Ted. 2015. "China leaders oppose 'universal values', but it may not matter." *CNBC*, July 6. Available at <http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/06/china-leaders-oppose-universal-values-but-it-may-not-matter.html>. [Accessed on November 25, 2015]

Ki, Shimko. 1992. "Realism, Neorealism and American Liberalism." *The Review of Politics*, 54(2): 281-301.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2013. "Why the 'China Model' Isn't Going Away." *The Atlantic*, March 21. Available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-the-china-model-isnt-going-away/274237/>. [Accessed on December 27, 2015]

Kyriakides, Jason. 2010. "Rule of Law and the China Model: Reform, the Law, and the Future." *China Elections and Governance Review*, 5: 15-28, April.

Lagerwey, John. 2015. "How Universal Are Human Values?" *TELOS*, 2015(171): 107-111. doi: 10.3817/0615171107

Lewis, Loida. N. 2012. "Loida Lewis on the Phillipines and the South China Sea." *China Focus*, September 13 [Video file]. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvvrJxRXW4M>. [Accessed on September 28, 2015]

Li, Chongfu. 2011. "Reflections on 'universal values'." *International Critical Thought*, 1(1): 57-62, March. doi: 10.1080/21598282.2011.566040

Li, Mingjiang [李明江]. 2015. "Yingshili, ruanshili, qiaoshili: toushi zhongguo – dongmeng guanxi", (Hard Power, Soft Power and Smart Power: A Perspective of China-ASEAN Relations), [硬实力、软实力、巧实力：透视中国—东盟关系]. *Yatai anquan yu haiyang yanjiu*, [亚太安全与海洋研究], 1: 28-38.

Li, Xin and Verner Worm. 2010. "Building China's Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise." *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 16: 69-89. doi: 10.1007/s11366-010-9130-2

Lim, Chin Leng, Deborah Kay Elms and Patrick Low. eds. 2012. *The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement*. Cambridge University Press.

Liu, Qianqian. 2010. "China's Rise and Regional Strategy: Power, Interdependence and Identity." *Journal of Cambridge Studies*, 5(4): 76-92. Available at <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.473.189&rep=rep1&type=pdf>. [Accessed on November 15, 2015]

Liu, Yawei. 2010. "How China's Quest for Political Reform Is Undercut by the China Model." *China Elections and Governance Review*, 5: 1-15, April.

Ma, Shikun. 2014. "Chinese are Wary of the 'China Threat Theory'." *CHINA US Focus*, May 13. Available at <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/chinese-are-wary-of-the-china-threat-theory/>. [Accessed on October 2, 2015]

McCormick, John. 2007. *The European Superpower*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Mearsheimer, John. 2006. "China's Unpeaceful Rise." *Current History*, 105(690): 160-162, April. Available at [http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b7/Attachments/22/Mearsheimer\\_China\\_UnpeacefulRise.pdf](http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b7/Attachments/22/Mearsheimer_China_UnpeacefulRise.pdf). [Accessed on October 8, 2015]

Mearsheimer, John. 2010. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia." *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3(4): 381-396. doi: 10.1093/cjip/poq016.

Mearsheimer, John. 2012. "Why China Cannot Rise Peacefully." *Speech at the Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa*, October 17 [Video file]. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXov7MkgPB4>. [Accessed on September 18, 2015]

Men, Honghua [门洪华]. 2007. "Zhongguo ruanshili pinggu baogao (shang)", (China's soft power assessment report (part one)), [中国软实力评估报告 (上)]. *Guoji guancha*, (*International Watch*), [国际观察], 2: 15-26. Available at [http://www.chinadmd.com/file/cprxroszc33s3opxcuapzorw\\_1.html](http://www.chinadmd.com/file/cprxroszc33s3opxcuapzorw_1.html). [Accessed on September 3, 2015]

Mitchell, Tom. 2015. "China lays out 'countermeasures' to offset exclusion from TPP." *The*

*Financial Times*, October 19. Available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8e81ab8c-763c-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.html#axzz3taPIAHUo>. [Accessed on December 7, 2015]

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4): 513-553. Available at <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf>. [Accessed on October 7, 2015]

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1993. *Politics Among Nations (brief edition)*, London: McGraw Hill.

Naughton, Barry et al. 2015. "What Will The TPP Mean for China?" *Foreign Policy*, October 7. Available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china-tpp-trans-pacific-partnership-obama-us-trade-xi/>. [Accessed on December 7, 2015]

Ni, Yangjun [倪洋军]. 2014. "Xi Jinping shouti "yatai mengxiang" tixian daguo zeren dandang", (Xi Jinping's first mentioning of the Asia-Pacific Dream reflects the responsibilities great powers hold), [习近平首提“亚太梦想”体现大国责任担当]. *Zhongguo gongchandang xinwen wang*, [中国共产党新闻网], November 13. Available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/pinglun/n/2014/1113/c241220-26017567.html>. [Accessed on November 24, 2015]

Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft power: the means to success in world politics* (1<sup>st</sup> edition). New York: Public Affairs.

Nye, Joseph S. 2005. "The Rise of China's Soft Power." *Wall Street Journal Asia*, December 29. Available at [http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/1499/rise\\_of\\_chinas\\_soft\\_power.html](http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/1499/rise_of_chinas_soft_power.html). [Accessed on August 23, 2015]

Nye, Joseph S. 2011. "The War on Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, April 12. Available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12/the\\_war\\_on\\_soft\\_power](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12/the_war_on_soft_power). [Accessed on September 1, 2015]

Nye, Joseph S. 2012. "China's Soft Power Deficit." *The Wall Street Journal*, May 8. Available at <http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842>. [Accessed on August 8, 2015]

Nye, Joseph S. [約瑟夫•奈]. 2015. "Tisheng guojia ruanshili shi zhongguo de mingzhi zhanlüe", (Enhancing national soft power is China's wise strategy), [提升國家軟實力是中國的明智戰略]. *Renminwang – Renmin ribao*, [人民網—人民日報]. February 16. Available at <http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2015/0216/c40531-26573926.html>. [Accessed on January 6, 2017]

Obama, Barack. 2014. "China; Remarks by Obama at APEC CEO Summit (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)" [Video file]. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ok9HEkILONI>. [Accessed on October 8, 2015]

Obama, Barack. 2015. "Remarks by the President on Trade." Public speech held on 8 May

2015 in Beaverton, Oregon. *The White House, Office of the Press Secretary*. Available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/08/remarks-president-trade>. [Accessed on October 11, 2015]

Radio Free Asia. 2015. “Zhongguo waijiao zai jilongpo zaoshou zhongguo dongmeng waizhang hui shang cheng zhongshi zhidi”, (Chinese diplomacy suffered great fall in Kuala Lumpur, target of public criticism on the ASEAN foreign ministry meeting), [中国外交在吉隆坡遭受重挫 东盟外长会上成众矢之的], August 8. Available at <http://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2015/08/08/4469765.html>. [Accessed on October 2, 2015]

Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2004. “The Beijing Consensus.” *The Foreign Policy Centre*, March. Available at <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>. [Accessed on November 2, 2015]

Ren, Jie [任洁]. 2015. “Zhongguo heping fazhan mianlin de zhudaoxing guoji yulun huanjing – cong “zhongguo weixielun” dao “zhongguo zerenlun””, (Dominant International Public Opinion Environment Faced by China’s Peaceful Development – From “China Threat Theory” to “China Responsibility Theory”), [中国和平发展面临的主导性国际舆论环境——从“中国威胁论”到“中国责任论”]. *Zhongguo kuangye daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)*, (*Journal of China University of Mining & Technology (Social Sciences)*), [中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版)]: 13-18. Available at [http://oversea.cnki.net/resources.asiaportal.info.proxy1-bib.sdu.dk:2048/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?QueryID=3&CurRec=1&DbCode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2015&filename=KDSK201501003&uid=WEEvREcwSIJHSlSdnQ1Y3R3MWZBcWpSNXVxWERqc2I1NGJITIBYREhYMUxsnJoMmV5WTRwc2xLd3MyT0FYVHJRP T0=\\$9A4hF\\_YAuvQ5obgVAqNKPCYcEjKensW4IQMowHtwkF4VYPoHbKxJw!!](http://oversea.cnki.net/resources.asiaportal.info.proxy1-bib.sdu.dk:2048/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?QueryID=3&CurRec=1&DbCode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2015&filename=KDSK201501003&uid=WEEvREcwSIJHSlSdnQ1Y3R3MWZBcWpSNXVxWERqc2I1NGJITIBYREhYMUxsnJoMmV5WTRwc2xLd3MyT0FYVHJRP T0=$9A4hF_YAuvQ5obgVAqNKPCYcEjKensW4IQMowHtwkF4VYPoHbKxJw!!). [Accessed on October 4, 2015]

Ren Xiaosi. 2014. *The Chinese Dream: What It Means for China and the Rest of the World* (revised edition). Beijing: New World Press.

Rosen, Armin. 2014. “China Is Finally Acting Like A Superpower – And Nobody Knows What’s Going To Happen Next.” *Business Insider UK*, November 12. Available at <http://uk.businessinsider.com/behind-chinas-asia-pacific-dream-2014-11?r=US&IR=T>. [Accessed on December 18, 2015]

Rothman, Steven B. 2011. “Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and mechanisms of soft power?” *Journal of Political Power*, 4(1): 49-64, April. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2158379X.2011.556346?journalCode=rpow21>. [Accessed on August 13, 2015]

Sally, Razeen. 2013. “Chinese trade policy after ten years in the World Trade Organization: A post-crisis stocktake.” In Yiping Huang and Miaojie Yu, eds. *China’s New Role in the World Economy*, Pacific Trade and Development Conference Series. London and New York: Routledge.

Sands, Gary. 2014. “Universal Values with Chinese Characteristics.” *Foreign Policy Association*, July 26. Available at <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/07/26/universal-values-with-chinese-characteristics/>. [Accessed on November 25, 2015]

Sen, Amartya. 1999. "Democracy as a Universal Value." *Journal of Democracy*, 10(3): 3-17. Available at [http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Democracy\\_as\\_a\\_Universal\\_Value.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Democracy_as_a_Universal_Value.pdf). [Accessed on November 25, 2015]

Shambaugh, David. ed. 2005. *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Shambaugh, David. 2014. "The Beijing APEC Summit in Review: David Shambaugh on China's ultimate goals in the region and how the APEC summit outlined this 'Asia-Pacific Dream.'" Interviewed by Shannon Tiezzi. *The Diplomat*, November 13. Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-beijing-apec-summit-in-review/>. [Accessed on August 2, 2015]

Shambaugh, David. 2015a. "China's Soft-Power Push." *Foreign Affairs*, June 16. Available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push>. [Accessed on September 2, 2015]

Shambaugh, David. 2015b. "The Coming Chinese Crackup." *The Wall Street Journal*. Available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198>. [Accessed on October 5, 2015]

Shirk, Susan L. 2008. *China: Fragile Superpower*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Jennifer Grace. 2010. "The 'Beijing Consensus': China's Next Major Export?" *China Elections and Governance Review*, 5: 29-42, April.  
Soft power (n.d.). *Oxford online dictionary*. Available at <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/soft-power>. [Accessed on August 12, 2015]

Solis, Mireya. 2014. "China flexes its muscles at APEC with the revival of FTAAP." *East Asia Forum*, November 23. Available at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/11/23/china-flexes-its-muscles-at-apec-with-the-revival-of-ftaap/>. [Accessed on July 21, 2015]

Song, Chaopeng. 2015. "A Chinese Entrepreneur's Rude Awakening at a German Manufacturing Fair." *The Epoch Times*, August 9. Available at <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1711073-a-chinese-entrepreneurs-rude-awakening-at-a-german-manufacturing-fair/>. [Accessed on September 9, 2015]

Stephens, Hugh. 2014. "TPP or FTAAP: What It Means for US and the Asia-Pacific Region." *China US Focus*, November 25. Available at <http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/tpp-or-ftaap-what-it-means-for-us-and-the-asia-pacific-region/>. [Accessed on July 21, 2015]

Su, Hao. 2008. "Harmonious World: The Conceived International Order in Framework of China's Foreign Affairs." Available at [http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint\\_research/series3/pdf/3-2.pdf](http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series3/pdf/3-2.pdf). [Accessed on September 27, 2015]

Sutter, Robert. 2014. "The United States in Asia." In David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, eds. *International Relations of Asia*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2000. "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited." *International Security*, 25(3): 128-161. Available at [http://www.rochelleterman.com/ir/sites/default/files/taliaferro%202001\\_0.pdf](http://www.rochelleterman.com/ir/sites/default/files/taliaferro%202001_0.pdf). [Accessed on October 15, 2015]

The Economist. 2010. "The debate over universal values: It is not quite true that China is rejecting Western values such as democracy. Rather, it is fighting over them." September 30. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/17150224>. [Accessed on November 14, 2015]

Thucydides. 431 BC. "History of the Peloponnesian War." Chapter XVII. Available at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm>. [Accessed on October 3, 2015]

Tiezzi, Shannon. 2014. "Is There Room for the US in China's 'Asia-Pacific Dream'?: China's 'Asia-Pacific Dream' involves a region led by Beijing, not Washington." *The Diplomat*, November 11. Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/is-there-room-for-the-us-in-chinas-asia-pacific-dream/>. [Accessed on November 11, 2015]

United Nations. 1948. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights." December 10. Available at <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>. [Accessed on November 25, 2015]

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.

Wang, Fang [王芳]. 2016. "Renminbi guojihua youzhuyi guoji huobi tixi gaige", (The internationalization of the Renminbi contributes to the reform of the international monetary system), [人民币国际化有助于国际货币体系改革]. *Guoji huobi wang (International Monetary Institute)*, [国际货币网], January 7. Available at <http://www.imi.org.cn/viewpoint/15938>. [Accessed on January 6, 2017]

Wang, Guoping [王国平]. 2010. "Lun jiaqiang zhongyue liang guo de huxin yu hezuo", (On strengthening mutual trust and cooperation between China and Vietnam), [论加强中越两国的互信与合作]. *Dongnanya yanjiu*, [东南亚研究], 4: 7-11. doi: 10.13848/j.cnki.dnyybjb.2010.04.002

Wang, Yiwei. 2013. "'China Model' breaking hegemony of Western universal values." *People's Daily Online*, January 16. Available at [http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-01/16/content\\_27693951.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-01/16/content_27693951.htm). [Accessed on December 4, 2015]

Wang, Zichang [王子昌]. 2003. "Jiegou meiguo huayu baquan – dui 'zhongguo weixielun' de huayu fenxi", (American Discourse Hegemony – A Discourse Analysis of "China Threat"), [解构美国话语霸权—对“中国威胁论”的话语分析]. *Dongnanya yanjiu*, (*Southeast Asian Studies*), [东南亚研究], 4: 46-50. 文章编号: 1009-105X(2015)01-00013-06

Wen, Jiabao [温家宝]. 2007. “Guanyu shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan de lishi renwu he wo guo duiwai zhengce de jige wenti”, (On the Historical Tasks of the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China’s Foreign Policy), [关于社会主义初级阶段的历史任务和我国对外政策的几个问题]. *Zhongguo zhengfu gongkai xinxi zhenghe fuwu pingtai*, [中国政府公开信息整合服务平台], April 10. Available at [www.govinfo.nlc.gov.cn/gtfz/zfgb/2007041010/201010/t20101011\\_449436.html](http://www.govinfo.nlc.gov.cn/gtfz/zfgb/2007041010/201010/t20101011_449436.html). [Accessed on October 12, 2015]

Wendt, Alexander. 1994. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” *American Political Science Review*, 88(2): 384-394.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics.” *International Organization*, 46(2): 391-425.

Wesley-Smith, Terence. 2007. *China in Oceania: New forces in Pacific politics*. Honolulu: East-West Center.

Wu, Min [吴敏]. 2008. “Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao kending “pushi jiazhi””, (Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao affirm “universal values”), [胡锦涛、温家宝肯定“普世价值”]. *Jin yang wang*, [金羊网], November 20. Available at [www.ycwb.com/sp/2008-11/20/content\\_2013882.htm](http://www.ycwb.com/sp/2008-11/20/content_2013882.htm). [Accessed on November 6, 2015]

Wu, Xinbo. 1998. “China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power.” In Muthiah Alagappa, ed. *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*. Stanford University Press.

Xi, Jinping. 2014. “Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing” November 9 [Video file]. Available at <http://english.cntv.cn/2014/11/09/VIDE1415500563485992.shtml>. [Accessed on July 21, 2015]

Xinhua. 2015. “Zhongguo ruhe kandai TPP you he yingxiang”, (How does China look at how the TPP is affecting it), [中国如何看待 TPP 有何影响], October 6. Available at <http://news.cntv.cn/2015/10/06/ARTI1444122647681226.shtml>. [Accessed on December 7, 2015]

Xiong, Guangkai [熊光楷]. 2010. “Tao guang yang hui” de zhongxi wudu, (Chinese and Western misreading of “keeping a low profile”), [“韬光养晦”的中西误读]. *FT zhongguo wang*, (*Financial Times China*), [FT 中国网], June 13. Available at <http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033110?full=y>. [Accessed on December 10, 2015]

Yan, Xuetong. 2013. “Yan Xuetong on Chinese Realism, the Tsinghua School of International Relations, and the Impossibility of Harmony.” December 24. Interviewed by P. Schouten, ed. ISN ETH Zurich. Available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=174842>. [Accessed on December 6, 2015]

Yang, Hengda. 2010. “Universal Values and Chinese Traditional Ethics.” *Journal of International Business Ethics*, 3(1): 81-90. Available at



[http://www.americanscholarspress.com/content/BusEth\\_Abstract/v3n110-art7.pdf](http://www.americanscholarspress.com/content/BusEth_Abstract/v3n110-art7.pdf). [Accessed on November 25, 2015]

Young, Nam Cho and Ho Jeong Jong. 2008. "China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects." *Asian Survey*, 48(3): 453-472. Available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2008.48.3.453>. [Accessed on August 15, 2015]

Yu, Peter K. 2015. "How China's exclusion from the TPP could hurt its economic growth." *Fortune*, October 19. Available at <http://fortune.com/2015/10/19/china-exclusion-tpp-economic-growth/>. [Accessed on December 7, 2015]

Yuzawa, Takeshi. 2006. "The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospects." *Asian Survey*, 46(5): 785-804.

Zhang, Yonghong. 2013. "Universal Values: Spread in China and the Essence." *American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 1(4): 258-262. doi: 10.11634/232907811301439

Zhang, Youwen [张幼文] and Renwei Huang [黄仁伟]. eds. 2005. "Zhongguo guoji diwei baogao", (China's international status report), [中国国际地位报告]. *Renmin chubanshe (People's Press)*, [人民出版社], 273-280.

Zhou, Qi [周琦] and Zhen Peng [彭震]. 2009. "'Zhongguo weixielun' chengyin tanxi", (On the Reasons of "China Threat Theory"), ["中国威胁论"成因探析]. *Xiangtan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexueyuan)*, (*Journal of Xiangtan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*), [湘潭大学学报 (哲学社会科学版)], 33(3): 130-134. 文章编号: 1001-5981(2009)03-130-05

Zhou, Xincheng [周新城]. 2009. "'Pushi jiazhi' wenti yanjiu ba ren tan (2)", (Eight people talking about the "universal value" research problem (2)), ["普世价值"问题研究八人谈 (2)]. *Zhongguo gongchandang xinwen wang*, (*Chinese Communist Party's news web*), [中国共产党新闻网], March 3. Available at <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/41038/8898841.html>. [Accessed on October 1, 2015]

Zhou, Xinyu [周鑫宇]. 2014. "'Yatai meng' xuyao zhongguo dandang", (*China needs to take on the "Asia-Pacific Dream"*), ["亚太梦"需要中国担当], November 17. Available at [http://house.ifeng.com/detail/2014\\_11\\_17/50120426\\_0.shtml](http://house.ifeng.com/detail/2014_11_17/50120426_0.shtml). [Accessed on November 7, 2015]

Zhou, Xianxin [周显信] and Yawei Kan [阚亚薇]. 2015. "Lun zhongguo meng, yatai meng yu shijie meng de luoji guanxi jiqi jiangou", (On the construction and logical relationship between the Chinese Dream, Asia-Pacific Dream and World Dream), [论中国梦、亚太梦与世界梦的逻辑关系及其建构]. *Nanjing xinxi gongcheng daxue, makesi zhuyi xueyuan*, [南京信息工程大学, 马克思主义学院], 1: 17-21. doi: 10.16501/j.cnki.50-1019/d.2015.01.003

Zhu, Nuo [朱诺]. 2015. "Nanhai wenti yingxiang zhongguo yu dongmeng de guanxi", (The South China Sea dispute influences Sino-ASEAN relations), [南海问题影响中国与东盟的关系]. *Meiguo zhi yin*, (*Voice of America*), [美国之音], September 21. Available at

<http://www.voachinese.com/content/south-china-seas-disputes-affect-china-asean-relations/2971959.html>. [Accessed on November 25, 2015]