Why fatalism is not a logico-semantic doctrine.

Abstract

Peter van Inwagen defines fatalism as a thesis about the logical or conceptual necessity of every action performed by any agent. In van Inwagen’s words: “Fatalism, as I shall use the term, is the thesis that it is a logical or conceptual truth that no one can act otherwise than he in fact does”. Richard Taylor defines fatalism as a thesis about the inevitability of all facts and events. Van Inwagen criticises Taylor’s definition as inadequate, especially concerning two possible senses of the word 'inevitable': a strong sense and a weak sense. In the strong sense, a fact is inevitable when it occurs regardless of one's actions. For instance, when a person's actions have no relevance or causal connection with what happens to them, every fact that becomes actual is totally independent of that person's actions. The weak sense of 'inevitable' is that if a fact is inevitable and one has tried to avoid its occurrence by taking preventive actions, then it is necessary that one should take the wrong actions. In that case, ignorance regarding how to proceed would be inherently inevitable. In this article, I defend Taylor’s definition of fatalism, address van Inwagen’s criticism and explain how the notion of 'inevitability' can be understood through Taylor's definition. In addition, I connect the discussion with some themes on modality and philosophy of religion, showing how ‘inevitability’ interacts with the existence or nonexistence of God, a point relevant for the correct understanding of 'inevitable' or 'inevitability'.