Logic and Philosophy of Time

Vol. 7 No. 1 (2026): Logic and Philosophy of Time
Articles

Temporal Propositiones and the Logic of Possibility in John Buridan

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MANUEL ALBERTO DAHLQUIST
UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DEL LITORAL
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v7i1.10568

Published 07-02-2026

Keywords

  • Time,
  • Buridan,
  • Propositio,
  • Possible,
  • Master argument,
  • Truth
    • ...More
    Less

How to Cite

DAHLQUIST, M. A. (2026). Temporal Propositiones and the Logic of Possibility in John Buridan. Logic and Philosophy of Time, 7(1), 110–140. https://doi.org/10.54337/lpt.v7i1.10568

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of temporal considerations in John Buridan’s logic by focusing on his conception of propositiones as the basic objects of logical theory. Unlike contemporary abstract propositions, Buridanian propositiones are concrete, spatio-temporal entities—mental, spoken, or written—which come into existence and cease to exist. This work argues that this ontological commitment has far-reaching semantic and metalogical consequences. First, it shows that if propositiones are temporal objects, truth must presuppose existence. Second, it argues that, under these constraints, validity can no longer be defined in terms of truth-preservation. Buridan is instead led to reconceive validity as the preservation of significatio. Finally, the paper demonstrates that these revisions compel a redefinition of possibility. The possibility of p cannot be identified "true in a state w” ya que la propuesta ontológica de Buridan  allows for the existence of possible propositiones that neither are nor will be true. Buridan therefore detaches possibility from truth and defines it in terms of satisfiable significate. This account rejects a temporal interpretation of modality and yields a systematic alternative to truth-based modal logic, illuminating Buridan’s position within both medieval and contemporary debates on modality.

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